Striving for the Impossible : The Hegelian background of Judith Butler by Roman-Lagerspetz, Sari
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Striving for the Impossible 
 
The Hegelian Background of Judith Butler 
 
 
 
Sari Roman-Lagerspetz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC DISSERTATION 
 
 
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the  
University of Helsinki, for public examination in the Small Hall,  
University Main Building, Fabianinkatu 33, on 28 March 2009, at 10 am. 
 
 
Acta Politica 36 
Department of Political Science 
University of Helsinki 2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-952-10-5319-1(paperback) 
ISSN 0515-3093 
ISBN 978-952-10-5387-0 (electronic version, http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/) 
 
Helsinki University Print 
Helsinki 2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vanhemmilleni Anjalle ja Maurille 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the Hegelian roots of the subject-theory and the political theory of Judith 
Butler. Butler can be seen as the author of the concept of gender performativity. Butler claims 
that identities are linquistic. Subject’s identities are “terms”. Linguistic identities are 
performative and normative: they produce, according to cultural rules, the identities which 
they just claim to describe. Butler’s theory of the performativity of identities is based on her 
theory of identities as ek-static constructions. This means that there is a relation between the 
self and the Other at the heart of identities. It is claimed in this study that Butler’s theory of 
the relation between the self and the Other, or, between the subject and the constitutive 
outside, is based on G.W.F.Hegel’s theory of the dialectics of recognition in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Especially the sections dealing with the relation between “Lord” 
and “Bondsman” set the theoretical base for Butler’s theory of the ek-statism of identities as 
well as for Butler’s political theory. Further, it is claimed that Hegel’s own solution for the 
enslaving and instrumentalizing relation between the self and the Other, reciprocal 
recognition, remains an important alternative to the postmodernist conception supported by 
political theorists like Butler.  
Chapter 2, on Hegel, goes through the dialectics of recognition between the self 
and the Other in The Phenomenology of Spirit up until the ideal of reciprocal recognition and 
absolute knowledge. Chapter 3 introduces two French interpretations of Hegel, by Alexandre 
Kojève and Louis Althusser. Both of these interpretations, especially the Kojèvian one, have 
deeply influenced the contemporary understanding of Hegel as well as the contemporary 
thought – presented e.g. in the postmodern political thought - on the relations between the self 
and the Other. The Kojèvian Marxist utopia with its notion of “the End of History” as well as 
the Althusserian theory of the interpellative formation of subjects have also influenced how 
Hegel’s theory of the self and the Other have travelled  into Butler’s  thought. In chapter 5 
these influences are analysed in detail. According to the analysis, Butler, like numerous other 
poststructuralist theorists, accepts Kojève’s interpretation as basically correct, but rejects his 
vision of “the End of History” as static and totalitarian. Kojève’s utopian philosophy of 
history is replaced by the paradoxical idea of an endless striving towards emancipation which, 
however, could not and should not be reached. 
In Chapter 6 Butler’s theory is linked to another postmodern political theory, 
that  of  Chantal  Mouffe.  It  is  argued  that  Mouffe’s  theory  is  based  on  a  similar  view of  the  
relation of the self and the Other as Butler’s theory. The former, however, deals explicitly 
with politics. Therefore, it makes the central paradox of striving for the impossible more 
visible; such a theory is unable to guide political action. Hegel actually anticipated this kind 
of theorizing in his critique of “Unhappy Consciousness” in The Phenomenology of Spirit.   
    
Keywords: Judith Butler, G.W.F.Hegel, Chantal Mouffe, Alexandre Kojève, Postmodernism, 
Politics, Identities,  Performativity,  Self-Consciousness, Other 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The subject of this study is Judith Butler, an influential American theorist of politics and of 
sexuality. In areas like women’s studies, queer-studies, sociology, cultural studies and 
political studies, Butler’s influence is visible and still growing. In this work, I shall 
concentrate on the most theoretical aspects of her work, ignoring most of those issues which 
have been discussed in the special disciplines. Apart from the more specific discussions on 
her views on sexuality and sexual identities, several general books on her views have been 
published.  Generally  these  works  are  meant  to  serve  as  introductions  to  Butler’s  thought.  
They neither criticize Butler’s ideas, nor try to put them into a wider context, except in a 
rather superficial way (on some works, see. ch. 5.1.1)  Besides these somewhat relatively 
uncritical expositions, there have been several relatively hostile critiques of Butler’s complex 
and controversial ideas. These critiques tend to be written in an impatient manner, without 
any deeper interest to Butler’s thinking (on the critiques, see ch. 4.2 ).  
 
The nature of this reception can partly be explained by Butler’s unusually difficult style and 
strange vocabulary. My starting hypothesis in this study was that these aspects of her work are 
at least partly motivated by her theoretical aims.  They are, more or less, dictated by the 
traditions in which she works and with which she – at least partly – identifies herself. The 
difficult nature of her work is not a purely stylistic choice: it reflects her continuing interest in 
the tradition of German Idealism – the tradition defined by Kant, Fichte, and especially by 
Hegel. This study is basically an attempt to relate Butler to the discussions that arise from this 
tradition. I think that Butler’s views deserve to be discussed in their proper context, and that 
such an inquiry may help us to assess them better, in a more informed way.   
 
In more specific contexts, when Butler’s ideas are “applied”, her connections to Hegel and to 
the Hegelian tradition are usually left unmentioned. Indeed, when I have mentioned my topic 
in  discussion,  the  first  reaction  of  those  who  know  something  about  Butler  has  often  been:  
“Butler and Hegel – what they have to do with each other?” Many of Butler’s expositors 
recognize the connection between her and Hegel, and even admit its importance, but are 
reluctant to go into the details. The reason behind these reactions is, probably, that most 
people who are interested in Butler’s work or see it as potentially relevant  (even when they 
criticize it) are not interested in Hegel at all. To take just one example, in a recent book on 
Butler’s political theory the authors tell us that,  
 
… while many post-foundational thinkers reject what they see as the theological 
closure in Hegel’s thought, Butler, working in a similar vein, remains a fierce 
defender of Hegel. (…) Butler remains a champion of Hegel and insists on the 
continued significance of Hegelian thought. (Chambers and Carver 2008b, 84.)  
 
However, after these lines, the authors have nothing more to say about the Butler-Hegel  -
connection; Hegel simply vanishes from the picture! Thus, I have not found the secondary 
literature on Butler very useful for my purposes. This explains why, in chapters 4 and 5  
which deal with Butler, I have mainly concentrated on Butler’s own texts.  
 
Together with French authors like Foucault and Derrida, Butler is often classified as a “post-
structuralist”, and generally seen as an anti-Hegelian. Here, it is argued that this particular 
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form of anti-Hegelianism is itself closely related to certain forms of Hegelianism. For 
example, Derrida has said about himself: 
 
We will never be finished with reading or rereading Hegel, and in a certain way, 
I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself on this point. 
(Derrida,’Positions’) 
 
However, I shall also argue that the relation between Butler and Hegel is much closer than the 
relation between Hegel and the French thinkers who are Butler’s main sources.  Butler herself 
has  emphasized  the  importance  of  Hegel  in  most  of  her  works.  Her  dissertation  -   her  first  
book-long study - Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in the Twentieth-Century France 
(hereafter: SD) was about Hegel. She has published several shorter pieces on Hegel and 
Hegelianism, and, for example in the discussion-book Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. 
(hereafter, CHU) written jointly with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek, she constantly refers 
to Hegel when criticizing the positions of her discussion partners.  Her relation to Hegel is  a 
complex one; she appeals to Hegel, discusses with him, defends him against others, and 
opposes him but always sees him as constantly relevant thinker, as a living thinker rather than 
as a curious monument in the museum of the history of philosophy.  
 
 In the new edition of SD, she comments her own work: 
 
In a sense, all of my work remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian 
questions: What is the relation between desire and recognition, and how is it that 
the constitution of the subject entails a radical and constitutive relation to 
alterity? (SD xiv) 
 
In this study, I accept this self-description of Butler as the correct one. Thus, instead of 
starting  with  Butler’s  own views,  I  begin  this  work  with  a  detailed  presentation  of  some of  
Hegel’s central ideas. The problem is, of course, that Hegel is a notoriously difficult thinker.  
In chapter 2 I go through those ideas of Hegel, which have been important for Butler and for 
her sources. They are mainly to be found in Hegel’s famous early work The Phenomenology 
of Spirit (hereafter PhS). This fact does not make things easier. Hegel’s Phenomenology is  a 
very  complex  work,  and  it  cannot  be  summarized  into  few  pages.  Interpretation  of  PhS  is  
even more contested than that of his other works (say, of The Philosophy of Right), and in the 
more popular expositions of Hegel’s ideas, PhS is often left aside. One cannot expect that the 
possible  readers  of  this  study  were  necessarily  acquainted  with  the  contents  of  PhS.  
Moreover, one single chapter of Hegel’s book, the famous part which describes the dialectics 
between  two  figures,  the  Lord  and  the  Bondsman,  has  begun  to  live  its  own  life  in  Hegel-
interpretations. I believe, however, that the meaning of that important chapter can be 
understood only in the wider context of Hegel’s theory.  For these reasons, I have seen 
necessary to begin this study on Butler with a long chapter on Hegel, succeeded by another 
chapter (ch. 3.) mainly on two influential interpretations of Hegel.    
 
In my own exposition of Hegel’s ideas I rely mainly on the interpretations provided by 
Charles Taylor and by my friend and colleague Heikki Ikäheimo. As I said, PhS has been read 
in numerous ways. In chapter 2 I shall read Hegel as a theorist  who has set the coordinates 
for the late 20th century  philosophical discussion on the nature of the human subject, of self-
consciousness, otherness, and identity. This is also the Hegel Butler is interested in, although I 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
read him in a very different way. One may claim that my attitude towards Hegel is too 
uncritical – that I take as self-evident that most of the things he discusses make sense. It 
should be noted that I am not trying to evaluate either his logical works or his theory of State, 
although both are partly relevant for my work (and I have used their insights when needed). I 
am, indeed, a Hegelian at least in a limited sense: I believe that many of his insights are 
continuously  relevant  and  worth  of  discussing,  also  for  a  political  theorist.  I  also  think  that  
even those who reject Hegel’s ideas and criticize him should at least be aware of what he was 
really saying. (There have been too many uniformed attempts to refute Hegel by simply 
declaring that what he says does not make sense at all!)  While I try to explicate the central 
aspects of the subject-theory of PhS, the last part of chapter 2 is largely critical. I discuss one 
of the more notorious aspects of Hegel’s work, his attitude towards women. I try to show that 
his position in this issue clearly violates the spirit of his own theory – thus showing that he 
was,  in  his  own  way,  constrained  by  the  same  limits  he  detects  in  the  theories  of  his  
philosophical predecessors.  
 
After introducing some of Hegel’s central concepts, I go through the descriptions of the 
different stages of consciousness presented in PhS.  The reason for presenting such a  detailed 
description of the various stages of consciousness, and how they are dialectically changed into 
ever larger  self-reflective constructions, is that I intend to show how Hegel constructs his 
ideas of  recognition, absolute knowing and rationality.  It is argued in this study that Butler’s 
subject-theory and political theory is a complex Hegelian-inflected construction.  Hegel’s 
theory of desire and recognition, as well as the dialectical aspect in PhS, sets the theoretical 
background for Butler’s subject-theory and political theory.  Butler appears to present, 
especially in her theory of performative politics, an alternative “recognitive” model, i.e. a 
theory of how to take the contradicting Other into account.  The basically Hegelian notions of 
desire and recognition are the central aspects of Butler’s performative politics, even when 
modified through thinkers like Kojève and Althusser.  She develops her political theory to a 
large extent by a critical reading of Hegel’s theory of the dialectics of desire and recognition 
in PhS.  It is, hence, necessary to show what kind of a construction Hegel’s theory of desire 
and recognition is, and how it is modified in Butler’s thinking through other thinkers,  in order 
to understand Butler’s politics.        
 
Like Butler, I see Hegel as a living discussion partner, and I try to show how his analyses of 
the different one-sided forms of consciousness in PhS still possess critical potential, and also 
have their political relevance. I try to show how Hegel uses these ideal-typical formulations 
when criticizing his contemporaries like Kant, but also how Hegel actually anticipated some 
later forms of thinking, including that represented by Butler. Finally I try to show how Hegel 
uses his crucial notion of recognition as a solution to both epistemological  and political 
problems. Recognition is, of course a central theme in modern philosophy and political theory 
(thematized by authors like Taylor, Williams, Honneth, and Ikäheimo). I try to show why 
recognition is absolutely central for Hegel: it simultaneously solves the epistemological 
problems which troubled Hegel’s predecessors like Kant, it forms a basis for ethical, personal 
and political relationships, and last but not least, it makes Hegel’s own project in PhS 
possible. In Chapter 3 I emphasize this self-referential character of Hegel’s theory, but also 
try to show that these aspects of recognition are interconnected. 
 
Butler, like her sources, rejects this aspect of Hegel’s thought. In chapter 3. I discuss two 
French thinkers who, in a different ways, are behind this rejection. Most historians of the 
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recent French thought (Descombes, Williams, Weir, as well as Butler herself in SD) are in 
agreement that the role of Alexandre Kojève’s provocative interpretation of Hegel: 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (hereafter IRH) has been crucial, and not only in France. 
Before Kojève, Hegel was generally read as a metaphysician, as a theorist of the State, and as 
a predecessor of Marx. Kojève read Hegel as a theorist of the subject and connected this 
aspect  with  Hegel’s  theory  of  history  and  theory  of  knowledge.  He  emphasized  the  role  of  
PhS, (downplaying Hegel’s later works). In spite of his influence, Kojève has largely 
remained in the background in the recent discussions on the theory of subject. In chapter 3.1. I 
present and criticize Kojève’s influential but idiosyncratic reading of Hegel.  There and in the 
next chapter I try to show that while Kojève took up one of Hegel’s most important and most 
neglected ideas, that of recognition, he misunderstood it in a fatal way. In Kojève’s 
interpretation, recognition started to mean an epistemological and political utopia, “the end of 
history”. The French thinkers, first Sartre and de Beauvoir, after them, many others, accepted 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel as correct. They accepted many of his ideas, but – quite 
understandably – rejected “the end of history” as utopian, closed and totalitarian. Kojèves’s 
“end of history” turned them against other aspects of Hegel’s theory, including his theory of 
recognition. Nevertheless, they accepted some crucial aspects of Kojève’s theory, especially 
his idea that subjects define themselves always in a conflictual relation with others. Before the 
(rejected) “end of history” the relation between self and the Other is basically a hostile one.  
These historical details have been noticed by others (including Weir, Williams and 
Descombes). In chapter 5. I try to argue that this is also true of Butler, although her attitude 
towards Hegel is more complex and nuanced.  
 
Before discussing  the Kojèvian aspects of Butler’s theory, I take up another French theorist 
whose role has been neglected in discussions on Butler: Louis Althusser was an anti-Hegelian 
Marxist who, nevertheless, was interested in similar themes as Kojève and those (like Sartre, 
de Beauvoir and Lacan) who derived their inspiration directly from Kojève. Thus Althusser 
tries to redefine the Hegelian idea that subject’s self-consciousness is created in a process of 
recognition in Marxian “scientific” terms. In Ch. 3.2. I try to show why such an attempt is 
problematic, and how Hegel himself anticipated this kind of move in his analysis of various 
one-sided forms of consciousness in PhS. From my point of view, Althusser is important, for 
he is one of most important sources of Butler. To put it simply, Butler tries to correct Hegel 
with Althusser and Althusser with Hegel. 
 
In Chapter 5  I  try to show why Butler’s attempt necessarily fails,  and why her theory falls  
into what Hegel called Unhappy Consciousness. Before that, however, I try to present the 
most important aspects of Butler’s theory. This task is undertaken in chapter 4. I discuss 
briefly  her  views  on  performativity   and  on  performative  politics,  on  the  crucial  role  of  
language and the violent birth of particular identities.  At the centre of this study, however, is 
her theory of the “ek-static self”. This is perhaps Butler’s most important and least understood 
concept. As a tentative starting point, I may quote Hazel Barnes’s explanation in her English 
translation of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (p. 549): 
 
Ekstasis. Used  in  the  original  Greek  sense  of  “standing  out  from”.  The  For-itself  is  
separated from its Self in three successive ekstases: 
(1) Temporality. The For-itself nihilates the In-itself (to which in one sense it still 
belongs) in the three dimensions of past, present and future (the three temporal 
ekstases). 
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(2) Reflection. The For-itself tries to adopt an external point on itself. 
(3) Being-for-others. The For-itself discovers that it has a Self for-the-other, a Self 
which it is without ever being able to know or get hold of it.  
 
Although meant to explicate Sartre’s use of the term, Barnes’s explication catches some 
essential aspects of Butler’s notion of ek-static self. Generally, “ek-static” refers to 
something which is essentially dependent on something outside itself. An ek-static thing 
would  not  be  what  it  is  without  its  relations  to  something  outside  it.   At  the  same  time,  
Barnes’s  explication  connects  the  notion  with  the  Hegelian  basic  concepts.  Both  Hegel  and  
Butler  (as  well  as  Sartre  who  relied  on  Kojève)  agree  that  the  self  is  in  a  fundamental  and  
complex way dependent on its outside. They also agree that the self cannot automatically see 
and understand this dependence. This is their common point of departure, after which Butler 
and Hegel take different routes, routes which occasionally cross.  
 
In  Chapter  4  I  also  briefly  discuss  some critics  of  Butler,  starting  with  Martha  Nussbaum’s  
provocative article. Although I agree with her critics on many points, I also think that they are 
far too impatient in their attempts to criticize Butler. They are not willing to examine the 
Hegelian roots of her ideas, and therefore tend to dismiss some of her ideas too quickly. The 
more specific discussions on, for example, Butler’s controversial theory of sexual differences 
are ignored in this study. I think that these ideas of Butler cannot be fully understood without 
taking into account her general philosophical framework. 
 
In chapter 5 I finally try to put things together and to show how Hegel, Kojève and Althusser 
are relevant if we try to understand Butler’s thought in its entire complexity. First I  - again 
briefly – review the works written on Butler. All the reviewed commentaries follow the same 
pattern. They acknowledge the importance of Hegel and his continuous influence on Butler’s 
thought,  but,  after  that  admission,  they  quickly  give  up  and  move  to  other  issues.  Thus,  the  
Butler-Hegel –relationship is largely left unanalysed, and her own views on Hegel are taken at 
their face value. The mediating role of Kojève is not recognized; instead, he is either ignored 
or used as an interpretive authority on Hegel.  
 
I  go  through  Butler’s  comments  and  criticisms  on  Hegel.  I  try  to  show  how  they  are  
influenced by a particular way to interpret Hegel’s key concepts, most notably, the concept of 
recognition. Although Butler does not - after SD and after some brief reviews published in the 
early 90’s – discuss Kojève, her way to read Hegel follows the pattern in which Hegel’s final 
synthesis is seen as totalitarian, while some other aspects of his subject-theory are preserved 
but interpreted in a more or less Kojèvian way. As I  said above, Butler attempts to criticize 
and correct Hegel by using Althusser’s theory. She does not, however, accept some crucial 
aspects  of  Althusser’s  view,  but  wants,  in  turn,  to  correct  them with  Hegel’s  notions.  Thus,  
chapter 5 reveals an interesting triangle. Althusser is hostile towards Hegel (and Kojève),  
while Butler partly accepts and partly rejects both, trying to play them against each other. My 
thesis in chapter 5 is that this interesting attempt for synthesis fails, for two reasons. First, 
Butler is unable to explain and justify her own position. She cannot really explain how her 
own view of the subject as necessarily limited and unable to see itself can be learned and 
communicated by someone who herself is a human subject among other subjects. As I explain 
in chapter 2, Hegel took great pains to show how his view was possible, and his notion of 
recognition provided a solution to the problem of epistemological asymmetries.  Althusser, 
following an orthodox Marxist pattern in this issue, draws the distinction between “science” 
and (subjective) “ideology”. In chapter 3 I try to show that this solution has problematic 
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political consequences, and, in Hegelian terms, leads to the acceptance of a Lord-Bondsman –
relationship. But Althusser at least  tries to provide some kind of solution to the problem of 
the epistemic status of his own theory. In contrast, Butler omits the issue; she cannot base her 
views on Althusser’s  subjectless Science, but she cannot accept Hegel’s solution either. For 
Hegel, this is just another form of Unhappy Consciousness.  
 
The second problem, taken up in ch. 5 is that this return to Unhappy Consciousness has its 
political consequences. Butler’s view is like the one-sided forms of consciousness described 
by Hegel in the sense that it cannot become shared by people in general. It is based on a tacit 
supposition of an epistemological asymmetry. The theorist, like Butler, sees that all identities 
necessarily fail, all attempts to strive for universal aims like justice are other-refuting and 
excluding, all political terms are, and should be permanently contested and questioned, all 
forms of recognition and solidarity leave some Others out. All this is a part of the heritage of 
Kojève. Because recognition in the Hegelian or in the utopian Kojèvian form is seen as 
impossible, all that remains is the continuous process of discussion, contestation, questioning 
and struggle. According to Butler and some theorists who think in the same way, this process 
is also  the (contentless) content of democracy. But if my argument is correct, this view 
cannot be shared by people in general. It cannot and should not become the basis of our 
general self-understanding. If it were generally accepted, it would destroy itself. As in 
Kojève’s  End  of  History,  all  the  movement  and  all  the  politics  would  cease.  Hence,  the  
consequence of Butler’s view is that people have to live in a “necessary error” which is 
recognized as an error only by the political theorist. People are doomed to strive for the 
impossible – an idea that already appears (in the context of the love relationship) in the first 
important study deriving from Kojève, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. I shall argue that in 
PhS, Hegel already discussed this kind of thinking, and understood its self-defeating nature.   
 
In chapter 5. Butler’s other important sources, e.g. Freud, Lacan and Foucault, are largely left 
out. This is certainly an omission. However, Butler’s ideas are so complex that taking all the 
aspects into account would require a much longer study; besides, these connections are 
already  examined  in  the  other  works  on  Butler.  My  aim  here  is  to  chart  some  less  known  
routes rather than to follow the well-trotted paths. (To take random example, a search in the 
database of the Helsinki University Library discloses ca. 150 books and monographs on 
Foucault, but only five on Kojève.) 
 
In the final chapter 6, I compare Butler’s views with those of Chantal Mouffe. Unlike Butler, 
Mouffe is exclusively a political theorist. With Ernesto Laclau, Mouffe has influenced 
Butler’s ideas, although Butler has also had an influence on Mouffe. Mouffe derives partly 
from the same sources as Butler, and draws similar conclusions. However, Mouffe’s theory of 
“agonistic” or “radical” democracy is explicitly a political theory.  Thus,  Butler’s  and  
Mouffe’s theories illuminate each other: Butler provides theoretical premises which are only 
mentioned in Mouffe’s works, Mouffe derives the conclusions which are more clearly 
articulated - and, as I try to show in chapter 6, paradoxical in exactly the same way as those of 
Butler’s theory.  In Chapter 6 I briefly discuss  Mouffe’s interpretation of the German theorist 
of the “political”, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt is still another important author whose influence on 
Continental political thinking has largely remained unacknowledged until the recent re-
appropriation of his ideas.  Unlike other theorists discussed here, Schmitt does neither belong 
to  the  Kojèvian  tradition  nor  reacts  to  it.  He  is  an  independent  thinker  whose  ideas  were  to  
some extent parallel to those of Kojève and his critics. Kojève’s unpublished work, Outline of 
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a Phenomenology of Right (written in 1943, but published only in 1981) reveals, however, 
that Kojève was influenced by Schmitt’s concept of the “political” Mouffe has, together with 
some other left-oriented postmodernists, tried to reinterpret Schmitt’s ideas in post-
structuralist  terms.   In  chapter  6,  I  criticize  this  attempt.  It  seems  to  me  that  while  Schmitt  
focused the relation between the self and the Other (in the form of “friend” and “foe” or “us” 
versus “they”) his view is actually quite unlike that accepted by Mouffe and Butler.  
 
Mouffe argues that modern theories of democracy are self-defeating. They presuppose a 
normative ideal (a sort of end of history) which, if realized, would, according to Mouffe, 
destroy democracy. However, I shall argue that Mouffe’s (and, arguably, Butler’s) own view 
of democracy is self-defeating in a rather similar way. It is “striving for the impossible”. Both 
Butler and Mouffe are quite willing to characterize their own works as “paradoxical” in some 
sense. I am quite ready to admit that our shared life has its paradoxical aspects – and Hegel 
was  deeply  aware  of  this  –  but  still  I  do  not  think  that  a  theorist  could  avoid  criticism  by  
simply affirming the paradoxical nature of her own theory. Hegel argued that while certain 
types of contradictions are unavoidable and important, others, however, make our views self-
defeating. Hegel’s fundamental insight was that the self-defeating forms of consciousness 
described in PhS were defective, not only because of their intellectual errors, but because they 
were  unable  to  work  as  the  basis  of  such  a  shared  self-understanding  on  which  lasting  
personal, ethical and political relationships could be built. This is ultimately also the problem 
with theorists like Butler and Mouffe. I believe that they contain important insights, and that 
they may well be able to illuminate important aspects of our shared existence. But when we 
are thinking our relations to the others, the final word should not be given to those who think 
that ethics, politics, or life, is striving for the impossible.  
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2. Hegel 
 
2.1. Introduction to Hegel 
 
2.1.1 Phenomenology of Spirit: a theory of the self-relation of thinking and knowing 
 
Philosophy has produced different theories of the “self”. For example, self as a non-material 
spirit; self as a series of impressions and thoughts; self as a material being; self as a contextual 
historical being etc. The Hegelian basic question is always: if the self is such-and such, is it 
able to see that it  is  such-and such? Is a particular theory of the self  able to explain its  own 
possibility?  In  other  words,  is  a  theory  of  the  self  able  to  explain  a  self  who  thinks  like  it  
(itself) thinks of the self? Is it possible for individual subjects to share the theory and take it as 
a basis for their self-understanding? According to Hegel, several subject-theories, for example 
the  Kantian  one,  end  up  in  what  we  could  call  the  “Ishmaelian”  paradox.   In  Herman  
Melville’s classical story of Moby Dick, the story-teller, Ishmael, alone survives the tragedy, 
which none of the other (subjects) survived. ”I only am escaped alone to tell thee.” Thus, the 
story-teller itself remains external to the story which tells what happened to all the others.  
Such subject-theories have to presuppose that there are epistemologically privileged 
viewpoints, but they (unlike Melville’s narrator) are unable to tell how such viewpoints are 
possible, and why cannot we all have an access to such a viewpoint.   
 
Hegel addresses some fundamental questions in PhS.  First, Hegel´s insight into human 
subjectivity is that human beings  are finite, particular beings, conditioned by their history, 
contexts etc. On the other hand, subjects are also seen as capable of freedom and rational 
thinking. For Hegel, a cultural context both constrains individual freedom, and, at the same 
time, makes it possible. Secondly, Modern (post-Cartesian) thought has put the thinking 
subject to the centre. It is the centre of its own universe. How can it relate itself to other 
beings who themselves are centres of their own universes? Thirdly, Hegel discusses how it is 
possible for a consciousness to take itself as an object of reflection? How can a human being 
understand itself – including the fact that it understands itself?  
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit,  in  which  Hegel  presents  his  theory  of  the  self,  is  one  of  the  
most difficult of philosophical classics. It is almost impossible to provide a short account of 
its contents, and it is no wonder that many interpreters tend to concentrate on some limited 
aspects or parts of it, leaving the rest of the work to the background. Three observations may 
be useful for the reader. First, according to Hegel, all objects (including the self) are always 
perceived, thought, and understood from some viewpoint. They are objects for someone. 
Nevertheless, Hegel believes that this does not lead to subjectivism or relativism. Second, the 
human self is self-determining. This means that it is not only free to act, but that it is also self-
interpreting (to use Charles Taylor’s expression).What it  is  depends partly on what it  thinks 
of itself. Hence, in the analysis of the self, the viewpoint of the self is always relevant.  Third, 
for Hegel, all the important philosophical problems (indeed, all important intellectual 
problems  of  the  humankind)  are  somehow  interconnected.  A  theory  of  the  self  has  to  deal  
with problems which are usually discussed in the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, 
history, psychology, or politics. These Hegelian basic principles are largely responsible for 
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the enormous complexity of his theory. 
 
Here, I try to present Hegel’s theory of the self in its entire complexity. The presentation 
follows the structure of PhS. Other works of Hegel are used only when they seem to be 
relevant; I do not discuss Hegel’s own intellectual development. The most important 
secondary sources in this chapter are the writings of Charles Taylor and of Heikki Ikäheimo. 
Many of the interpretative comments (and most examples) are my own, and may be 
controversial. Nevertheless, this is not meant to be a study on Hegel, but on the Hegelian 
themes in Judith Butler’s works. 
 
The reader may wonder whether such a long and detailed exposition of Hegel’s views is 
really necessary in a work which is supposed to be a study on Judith Butler. And it if really is 
necessary, why concentrate just on The Phenomenology of Spirit? Moreover, why use such a 
limited selection of secondary sources? After all, there are innumerable books written on 
Hegel,  and  many  of  them  are  more  recent  than  those  of  Taylor  (which  were  written  in  the  
70’s) or better known than those of Ikäheimo (who is a relatively young scholar).  
 
My  answer  is  the  following.  One  of  the  main  theses  of  this  study  is  that  Judith  Butler  is  a  
Hegelian and can be fully understood only as a Hegelian. In order to show how her ideas are 
related to those of Hegel, I have to explain what Hegel said and how he said what he said. It is 
argued here that Butler’s way to discuss things as “ek-static processes”  is based on Hegel’s 
way to discuss things as “dialectical processes”. Thus, a choice is made of showing how 
Hegel constructed, for example, the theory of free self-consciousness, reciprocal recognition 
and absolute knowing.   These Hegelian constructions and their processual nature are highly 
relevant for the understanding of the main focus of this work: Butler’s theory of terms as ek-
static processes and her model of radical politics.  
 
During the past two centuries, Hegel has been interpreted in many ways: as a metaphysical 
system-builder, as a theorist of the State, as a philosopher of history, as a theological thinker, 
and as a predecessor of Marx.  None of these interpretations are entirely misguided; they all 
emphasize different aspects of Hegel’s works. Judith Butler is interested mainly on Hegel’s 
views  on  “desire,  recognition  and  alterity”  (SD,  xiv).  Her  Hegelianism  is  related  to  the  
interpretive tradition which draws its inspiration mainly from The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
The issues mentioned by Butler do appear in Hegel’s other works, but only in PhS they are 
the  central  themes.  As  Robert  Williams  (1997,  3)  says,  these  themes  have  largely  been  
neglected in English-speaking literature on Hegel until the recent times. In the French 
tradition, heavily influenced by Alexandre Kojève, desire, recognition and alterity have been 
central. Because I am critical of the French tradition, I have relied on those (few) 
commentators who discuss the mentioned themes in detail, but who nevertheless disagree 
with Kojève and his followers. Among those, I have found Taylor, Ikäheimo plus some others 
(for example, Robert S. Williams, Kimberley Hutchings and Robert B. Pippin)  especially 
useful.  
  
Doubleness, or “thinking and knowing in parts”, connects closely to the Hegelian themes 
stated above. Doubleness introduces the relation which a subject has to itself. This relation 
takes place as reflective thinking.  As double, subject is able to take itself as its own object, 
i.e.  to have a relation to itself and to its own thinking. Importantly, this doubleness assumes 
many forms. Thinking is for Hegel always double. It always knows itself from a point of view 
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outside, yet at the same time inside, itself. Importantly, the notions of the self (being 
reflected) and the outside (from where the self is reflected) vary along the development of 
consciousness in PhS. We may take an example. Suppose that I think of myself as a woman. 
Both Kant and Hegel agree that, when formulating a conscious thought “I am a woman” I am 
also something else.  I must be a conscious being who can think of herself as something, and 
who can also reflect and criticize her own thoughts. In other words, I am also a free subject. 
But then, there are two apparently correct but radically different descriptions of me: I am an 
empirically observable, contingent being who thinks herself as a woman, and I am a free 
being.  In this sense, I am “double”. One fundamental Hegelian question concerns the 
moment of self-consciousness which reflects its doubleness (self as a “third”), a theme 
introduced in modern western philosophy especially by Kant. How these two parts or aspects 
or viewpoints (for Kant: “empirical” and “noumenal” selves) are to be connected? 
   
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains why “I “ can never know itself: 
 
The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is 
considered  to  be  an  intuition  of  the  subject  as  object;  and  the  category  of  
substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the 
unity of thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of 
substance – which always presupposes a given intuition – cannot be applied. 
Consequently,  the  subject  cannot  be  known.  The  subject  of  the  categories  
cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it thought these, frame any conception 
of itself as an object of the categories; for to think these, it must lay at the 
foundation of its own pure self-consciousness – the very thing that it wishes to 
explain and describe. (Kant 1993, B422) 
 
When Kant’s consciousness tries to take itself as an object of cognition, it is doomed to move 
in a circle (Kant 1993, 346/B404).  The only thing it can reach is the empirical self. But Kant 
never really explains how these two “things” are to be connected. 
 
In his so-called “Minor Logic” (the first part of his Encyclopaedia) Hegel gives an interesting 
linguistic analysis of one of the aspects of the doubleness of the self: 
 
Similarly when I say ‘I’, I mean my single self to the exclusion of all others; but 
what I say, viz. ‘I’, is just every ‘I’, which in like manner excludes all others 
from  itself.  In  an  awkward  expression  which  Kant  used,  he  said  that  I  
accompany all my conceptions – sensations, too, desires, actions, etc. ‘I’ is the 
essence and act the universal: and such partnership is a form, through an 
external form, of universality.  All  other men have it  in common with me to be 
‘I’; just as it is common to all my sensations and conceptions to be mine. But ‘I’, 
in the abstract, as such, is the mere act of self-concentration or self-relation, in 
which we make abstraction from all conception and feeling, from every state of 
mind and every peculiarity of nature, talent, and experience. To this extent, ‘I’ is 
the existence of a wholly abstract universality, a principle of  abstract freedom. 
(Enc.I § 20; emphasis in the original) 
 
Thus, when saying “I”, I try, according to Hegel, to refer to something singular and private, to 
myself as the locus of my own sensations, thoughts, and desires. But the expression “I” 
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actually refers to the universal “I” which is common for all thinking beings but which, as 
such, is void of any particular content. “I” seems either to refer to something which is purely 
private and inaccessible to others, or, then, to an empty abstraction. How are we actually able 
to communicate our thoughts and feelings? How are these two “I”:s to be connected? 
According  to  Hegel,  Kant  and  his  followers  could  never  solve  the  problem successfully.  (It  
should be added that I am not necessarily committed to all the claims Hegel makes about 
Kant, or about any other philosopher. Many of his interpretations are controversial, and may 
not do justice for the thinkers he interprets.  Nevertheless, by “Kant” I generally refer to 
“Kant, as read by Hegel”.) 
 
In order to compare Butler’s and Hegel’s theories on “doubleness” with each other, it is 
important to explicate carefully what Hegel thinks about doubleness. The duplication of the 
self introduced above is one aspect of it. Another aspect of doubleness in Hegel is the relation 
between subjective thinking and its constitutive outside, or still in other words, the relation 
between the Self and the Other, the relation between several “I”:s.  It is the basic theme of all 
PhS, as well as Hegel’s subject-theory in general. It is the theoretical base for many of his 
basic themes like dialectics, reciprocally recognitive relationships and Absolute knowing. 
Thus, there is a lot to be explained, if one wants to tell what Hegel thinks about “doubleness”. 
In this chapter I will first explain in somewhat general terms ( 2.1.1-2.1.7) what  Hegel thinks 
of relating in general, as doubleness is, basically, a relation for Hegel. For Hegel, relations in 
general take various forms because the way they are thought by a subjective thinker varies. 
Subject’s degree of self-consciousness, i.e. how subject reflects on its own thinking, affects 
how relations are thought. As a thinker becomes more self-conscious, the constitutive 
relations of its own thinking become more internal (conceptual, particularized, understood) 
instead of being external (abstract,  dualist).   Contradictions form  an  important  type  of  
relation, which introduces the idea of dialectics.  By  a  contradictory  relation,  self  is  usually  
taken into the “next”, or  actually “enlarged” level of self-reflection. Every new level of self-
reflection constitutes its own relational system, which is  more internally varied or rich than 
the earlier one.  Afterwards (chapters 2.2.1-2.2.11.) I will explicate how relating changes by 
the development of self-consciousness. In chapters 2.3.1-2.3.3 I explicate what takes place as 
Recognition and Absolute knowing. In chapters 2.3.4. and 2.3.5 I shall take up the 
problematic position of women in Hegel’s theory.  
 
In PhS Hegel appears to be focusing mainly on the problems which follow when thinking 
becomes conscious that it is limited by its own subjectivity. Hegel takes the  form of thought 
which he names as “Enlightenment thinking”, or Kantian thinking, as his main focus. 
According to Hegel, when thinking realizes its subjective nature and contextuality,  and 
further, when it realizes that it changes in time, thinking realizes something very important 
about itself, namely its active conceptuality. By its conceptual capacity, thinking is able to 
think that (its own) thinking takes place as a particular conceptual system (in a way, as a 
particular language). Thinking is also able to think that its own particular language is not 
stable, but that it changes in time because it is affected by powers coming outside of it. Hegel 
focuses in PhS on the problems which thinking confronts when it starts to think of itself as “a 
particular system, which is historical, subjective and on the move”.  
 
As is more thoroughly explained in chapter 4, also Butler theorizes  particular systems of 
thinking and knowing  which are on the move, and which are affected by their outsides. Yet, 
while  Butler´s  main  focus  is  on   particular  “sites  of  knowing”  (within  which  particular  
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subject-positions, and things/terms as particulars become determined),  constituted by their 
outsides, and constantly on the move, Hegel’s main focus is on this thinking which thinks that  
particular subjectivity is on the move and affected by its outside. Hegel concentrates on 
thinking which has internalized (that is, understood) the idea of subjectivity as contextual and 
historical.   
 
According  to  Hegel,  when  particular  subjects  are  thought to  be  affected  by  powers  coming  
from outside of them, and thought to be moved by these forces, the nature of the effects and 
the movement changes. These aspects become internal to thinking. The “outside” becomes 
internal – i.e. a thought outside - and as such, it becomes an object of thinking, in one way or 
the other. As in the several versions of the Enlightenment philosophy, and after Hegel, in 
Marx as well as in Freud, human beings become free partly by becoming conscious of the 
depth of and understanding how they are influenced by external powers.  Hegel focuses on 
what he calls “Kantian abstractivity” which followed from Kantian reflection of subjective 
thinking.  For Hegel, the Enlightenment, or Kantian “error” in its way to think about particular 
subjectivity (“thing for us” to use the Kantian vocabulary) and its relatedness to its 
constitutive “outside” (“thing in itself”) was to think this relation only as an abstraction. This 
relation became internalized (postulated as) an external relation in Kantian thinking. In other 
words, Kant placed, inside his own thinking this relation outside of his thinking. By this 
externalization, Kant turned this relation into an abstraction, a relation which is beyond the 
capacities of particular, historical subjects.  
 
Hegel takes the Kantian doubleness between “thing in itself” and “thing for us” as a structure 
on which he develops his own version of the doubleness, namely the one between “self” and 
“other”. Hegel intends to turn the Kantian external relation (abstract doubleness) into an 
internal relation (conceptual and particular doubleness).  Ultimately, for Hegel, the Kantian 
external relation is turned into an internal relation in reciprocally recognitive relations 
between free self-consciousnesses. This requires that the Kantian pure (abstract) self-
consciousness changes into an actual self-consciousness.  
 
PhS can be seen to present a theory of the self-relation of a thinking subject. Subject is 
primarily a thinking being for  Hegel.  Thus,  the  self-relation  is  the  self-relation  of  thinking.  
This relation is a reflective relation.  In self-reflection thinking is basically doubled into the 
reflecting thinking and the reflected thinking. For Hegel, in order for there to be any relation 
between anything, and hence also between thinking and itself, the relating parts must be 
somehow differentiated from each other. So, thinking must become divided into “two parts”, 
the part which reflects and the part which is reflected. Thinking must become its own object 
of reflection.  The scene of self-reflecting is however very multi-layered or “multi-circled” in 
Hegel as the self is not only seen as a reflecting being in PhS. Instead, the self is ultimately 
seen as a being who reflects itself and the world as a particular, differentiated  something (a 
particular  subject  and  a  particular  substance)  and   also  as  an  absolute,  universal  and  freely  
self-interpreting,  processual self.  (PhS §90-93, §113-121, §804) 
 
For Hegel, thinking must become a something for itself. Otherwise it cannot reflect itself. It is 
a fundamental Hegelian principle that every object of thought has to have definite properties 
which make it possible to distinguish it from other possible objects. This must also be true of 
thinking itself.  Ultimately, concept, or actually self as a concept, is this kind of “reflectable” 
something. Self-reflecting thinking can be an object for itself as a concept.  As a concept, the 
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self has related to itself internally, not externally. As a concept, it does not relate to itself as an 
internal externality, which is the case, according to Hegel, in Kantian thought. As a concept, 
the self relates to itself as an internally differentiated whole.  In PhS thinking is to gradually 
find itself as a concept.  This concept is to be realized as a synthesis, consisting of parts which 
are  differentiated and related with each other.  The parts are unified together, into a synthesis, 
by the self, which Hegel also calls as a “third”, and as a syllogistic middle term. However, for 
Hegel,  the  self  cannot  know  itself  as  an  actual, internally differentiated concept without 
differentiating itself from another self. In order to know itself fully the self must learn, first, 
how it is similar to the others, a member of a larger genus; and second, how it is unlike the 
others, an individual being with its own distinctive properties.  
 
For  Hegel  each  self  is  a  self-relational  whole  so  that  everything  it  thinks,  relates  to  it  (PhS 
§85-86). Thus, in order for a self to know itself as a something, it must particularize its own 
self-relational universe. If it can particularize itself as a self-relational whole, it can also 
particularize its internal structure, i.e. it can become an internally differentiated whole. 
According  to  Hegel,  this  can  happen  only  if  a  self  can  relate  to  another self-relational 
universe. Only another self-relational whole, another universe in its own right, can 
particularize a self-relational whole.  
 
In PhS, thinking is to find itself (to become self-conscious) by becoming related to another 
conceptual unity, the Other. Without acknowledging the Other as another, equal self as a 
concept, a self cannot become self-reflective in the way Hegel sees as necessary for a true, 
free self-consciousness. A self needs to find itself in another self fully, instead of projecting 
just some moments of itself into the other self, as is the case in the various cases of dualistic 
thinking, depicted in PhS, where the moment of “being dependent of one’s Other” is projected 
away from the self onto other selves, resulting into an “enslaving” (instrumentalizing, 
“silencing”) attitude towards other selves. (PhS §178-184). As explained in the chapter 2.3.2, 
a self can ideally differentiate itself from the other self, without instrumentalizing and 
“silencing” itself or the other self, through  a “shared knowing”.  
 
Actual, or true self-consciousness serves as the necessary base for, firstly, reciprocally 
recognitive relationships between the self and others, secondly, for reciprocally constructed 
objectivity and, thirdly, for Absolute knowing (explained later). (PhS §176-177,186-187,226-
227).  Reciprocal recognition is a theme which reappears in several works of Hegel (for 
example, Enc. III, §430-436; PR, § 57, 206, 330-338, 349) and, according to my 
interpretation, brings together his views on epistemology, ethics, personal relations, and 
politics. (On recognition, see Ikäheimo 2000; 2003 ; Williams 1992; 1997.) As Ikäheimo 
says: 
 
Recognition is not only a social philosophical concept, but has also an 
epistemological meaning. Yet, it would be inaccurate to say that this 
epistemological meaning of recognition is separate from the social  
philosophical one. (Ikäheimo 2000, 70) 
 
While the explicit role of recognition is less prominent in Hegel’s later works, I agree with 
Ikäheimo and Williams that it is the basis of his later philosophy of Spirit.  
 
Hegel  consciously  utilizes  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  “recognition”  (Anerkennung). The 
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expression – both in English and in German – has an epistemic meaning. We recognize 
objects by identifying them, for example when we recognize that a person sitting before us is 
our old classmate. But the expression also has an evaluative, active meaning: we may 
recognize someone as an equal. The latter meaning has often a constitutive aspect; for 
example, a state gains its independence through the recognition of the other states. According 
to International Law, it is an independent state if and only if it is recognized as one (Hegel 
discusses this example in PR, § 331; on the different meanings of recognition, see Ikäheimo 
2003, 125-137). 
   
Hegel’s theory of recognition can be seen as a plausible solution to several classical problems. 
First,  it  is  meant  to  solve  the  sceptical  problem of  “other  minds”  or  solipsism:  how can  we 
have knowledge about the minds of the others? (Sartre 2001, 212-220)  Second, it provides an 
answer to the traditional problem of morality: why should we take the others as morally 
relevant?  Third, it answers to the basic question of social ontology: how do those things 
which, in Hegel’s terminology, belong to the realm of objective spirit – laws, institutions, 
traditions etc. – exist?  Fourth, it answers to the fundamental epistemological question: how is 
valid knowledge possible?   
 
The constitution of the Self, as a concept (for itself) through being (self-consciously) limited 
and  particularized,  as  well  as  freed,  by  the  Other,  is  a  ground  theme  in  PhS.  The  relation  
between the Self and the Other is a necessarily complex one, for, according to Hegel, it must 
ultimately be a relation in which the parties are united and, nevertheless, both maintain their 
independence and freedom. This  means  that  they  cannot  be  known  to  each  other  in  an  
“ordinary” way of knowing, in which we identify particular objects and which Hegel calls 
consciousness as Understanding.  Ultimately the relation (in which both the particularity and 
the freedom of the Self and the Other are preserved) takes place in Hegel´s theory as 
reciprocally (mutually) recognitive relationship between self-consciousnesses (this is 
explained more thoroughly later). (see PhS §130-139, §174-179,§789-795;  Taylor 1975 130-
133,152-153,297-308; Inwood 1995,131-136)   
 
The problem, which thinking faces in PhS, as it tries to relate to its own thinking, is that it has 
a difficulty to relate to other thinking.  Nevertheless, thinking is to become conscious of other 
thinking as a particular other thinking, differentiated from its own thinking. Thinking needs 
to set a particular difference between its own thinking and other thinking in order to become 
conscious of itself as something particular. “Other thinking”, the “Other” and “otherness” in 
general denotes in PhS such an object of thinking which could be perhaps called “radically 
different”. It could be also called a “free” object.  The Other is “radically different” and “free” 
because it is so fundamentally similar to the thinking which takes it as its object.  In being 
similar to the self, the Other is depicted in PhS e.g. as an “internally negating power”, self-
determining, processual and free. As free, the Other is nevertheless also depicted as a being 
which is constituted by its own Other and as a being which can acknowledge its own Other in 
a recognitive (non-instrumentalizing, non-parochial) way. (see e.g. PhS §177-181)  
 
As depicted by Hegel in PhS, thinking has to face tremendous difficulties when trying to 
actually relate itself to others who are capable of their own thinking.  This is due to the fact 
that selves have a tendency to relate to themselves and to others by way of Desire.  Hegel’s 
notion of Desire shares a similarity with  Spinoza’s notion  of Desire. According to Spinoza, 
“desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular 
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activity by some given modification of itself” (Ethics III, 173). Desire is, for Hegel, the first, 
most primitive source of self-consciousness. 
 
According  to  my  interpretation,  Desire  cannot,  however,  be  seen  merely  as  a  primitive  
practical  attitude  (as  it  is,  for  example,  in  Hobbes).   It  should  be  noted  that,  in  Hegel,  
theoretical and practical ways of “grasping” objects are related. Hegel has an “appropriation” 
or “possession” model of understanding:  by understanding an object we make it “our own”. 
In PR, he writes: 
 
In thinking an object, I make it into thought and deprive it of its sensuous 
aspect; I make it into something which is directly and essentially mine. Since it 
is in thought that I am first by myself, I do not penetrate an object until I 
understand it; it then ceases to stand  over and against me and I have taken from 
it the character of its own which it had in opposition to me. (PR § 4, addition) 
 
In the same paragraph of PR, Hegel argues that the theoretical attitude (understanding an 
object) and the practical attitude (physically controlling and moulding – “labouring” - an 
object) are closely related: 
 
Thus these distinct attitudes cannot be divorced; they are one and the same; and 
in any activity, whether of thinking or willing, both moments are present. (idem) 
 
This partly explains why the self’s relationship with the Other is problematic: the Other also 
wants to make objects its own, theoretically and practically. The Other also wants to “labour 
objectivity”,  self-relationally, i.e. to make the world its “mirror”. Competing explanations of 
the world (ideologies, religions etc.) can be seen as expressions of this intellectualized form of 
Desire. This kind of “appropriation” model of understanding is shared by Butler as well as by 
many others. 
 
For Hegel, a self which is driven by an attitude of Desire “reads” the Others on the basis of its 
own view of the world, i.e. on the basis of its own particular thinking. According to this 
interpretation, Desire is not necessarily selfish, but it is always self-centred. It needs not just 
be a primitive appetite, but it always treats the external world, including the Others, as means 
to its own ends. However, the Others are similar beings, and thus they entertain the same 
desire.  Consequently,  as  concerns  the  mutual  relations  of  these  selves,  each  driven  by  a  
structurally similar desire, there is a conflict of interests as to whose way to read the world is 
the right one.  A question arises as to whose way to read the world is to be recognized as the 
truly universal and timeless one.  PhS appears to present various forms of Desire. Some are 
more intellectual and abstract than others. Some forms of Desire appear more “animal” (mere 
appetites) than others (PhS §175). The desire for recognition is a more complex form, 
possessed only by humans. In fact, the desire for recognition is depicted in PhS to belong only 
to  free  selves,  who  strive,  all  along  PhS,  to  become  free.  They  possess  the  conceptual  
capacities (for abstraction etc.) needed to become conscious of themselves and the world as 
internally contradicting, changeable, dialectical i.e. free. What these selves ultimately desire 
(i.e. what satisfies their desire) is, according to PhS,  to “go over” or to “turn” parochial, self-
centred ways of reading and “labouring” the world into socially shared (i.e. free) ones and to 
enter into mutually recognitive (equal) relationships with other free selves. (PhS §174-181; 
Pippin 1989, 143-148;  Hutchings 2003, 73-75)   
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Hegel’s basic scene of the struggle for recognition depicts a violent scene, which may lead 
even to death (PhS §186-188). However, some sort of struggle for recognition continues also 
at the highly intellectual levels of the Enlightenment reason. The type of self-centred self-
consciousnesses, denoted by Desire, entails a repressive superseding of the independent 
Other. Hegel writes of Desire: 
 
Self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that 
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is 
Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and 
thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty,  a  certainty  which  
has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner. (PhS 
§174) 
 
Desire  thus  denotes  a  self-consciousness  which  does  not  acknowledge  the  independence  of  
the Other. This way to read the Other continues also at the intellectual levels of the 
Enlightenment thought, where the Other is turned into a formalist abstraction and its own  
particular subjectivity is repressed. The Other is forced into a state of abstract freedom, and its 
own way to determine and particularize itself is considered not valid (PhS §570-578, §590-
593) 
 
According to this interpretation, Desire is not only related to a primitive appetite. Rather, it 
arises from the self´s will to make the external world its “own” intellectually as well as 
materially. Hegel argues that the self-consciousness takes place as Desire, whenever the Other 
is not conceived as another self-consciousness. Only when a self-consciousness acknowledges 
the Other as an internally negating being (i.e. a self-determining, free object, that is, ones 
equal as another self-consciousness) it is able to realize its own independence and the 
independence of the Other, and become free from the enslaving (un-free) relations of Desire.  
(PhS §174-177).   It appears that the scene of the struggle for recognition, depicted in PhS in 
the section B.IV.A. “Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and 
Bondage” displays a formal description, or a metaphor, of a relation dominated by an attitude 
of Desire. This scene appears not to be a separate moment or stage in a narrative. Instead, it 
appears to present a description of a relation which continues, in one way or the other, until 
there are proper reciprocally recognitive relationships between free selves. (see on this theme 
e.g. Pippin 1989, 143-154, 160, 169;  Hutchings 2003,  61-63, 75-76, 106)    
 
A struggle for recognition is a famous Hegelian theme. Basically, all selves are capable of 
universalization. Each one can basically universalize its own particular way to understand 
everything thinkable. Thinkers are similar in this important sense. Each constitutes a universe. 
Nevertheless, these universes are particulars, because there are more than one of them. When 
there is a struggle for recognition, based on similar Desire on all sides, each one claims to be 
the only truly universal “universalization”. Each one claims to know what the “real” is.  For a 
self, driven by an attitude of Desire, there is room for only one universalizing self who has the 
right to determine what the world is like.  Self, driven by Desire, demands the others to give 
up their own (wrong, non-real, misrecognitive) universalization in favour of the right one. 
Recognition should be directed towards just one universalization, i.e. towards one self. This 
one self should be recognized as the universal “knower” of the world.  Desire depicts hence a 
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scene of one-sided recognition (PhS §191). Yet, Hegel’s intention is to theorize the possibility 
of reciprocal recognition, the mutual acknowledgement between a self and an other 
self/selves as equals. Importantly, for Hegel, reciprocal recognition, which pertains also to the 
knowing of “things”, is a base for Absolute knowing.  When  a self acknowledges that others 
are equally valid contributors to how “things” are known, it can potentially endlessly enrich 
its knowing, and go over its (present) limits. (PhS §175-177, §670; Pippin 1989, 155-156, 
163-171; Hutchings 2003, 40-43, 106) 
 
2.1.2. Dialectics of freedom and the negation  
 
 
Hegel’s idea of freedom is ambiguous. On the one hand, he claims that thinking beings are 
always already free. As he says in his Introduction to the Philosophy of World History (p. 47), 
“just as gravity is the substance of matter, so also can it be said that freedom is the substance 
of spirit”. On the other hand, this freedom becomes actualized only when the subjects 
recognize their  own freedom. In one sense,  they are not free unless they know that they are 
free. In Hegel’s words 
 
Thus everything depends on the spirits self-awareness; if the spirit knows that it 
is free, then it is altogether different from what it would be without this 
knowledge. For if it does not know that it is free, it is in the position of a slave 
who is content with his slavery and does not know that his condition is an 
improper one. It  is  the sensation of freedom alone which makes the spirit  free,  
although it is in fact always free for and in itself. (Introduction, 48) 
 
The thinking subjects cannot recognize their own freedom if they do not share an adequate 
concept of freedom. If they share an adequate concept, they also understand that freedom is 
something which they all possess by virtue of being thinking subjects. Hence, freedom is 
necessarily the freedom of all. 
 
Hegel  wrote  his  PhS  at  a  time  when  the  Enlightenment  thinking  (Immanuel  Kant  etc.)  had  
questioned particular forms of subjective knowing. Hegel was concerned for the abstractivity 
and the denial of particularity which, he thought, ensued from the Enlightenment thought. 
Consequently, Hegel considered it important that the thought, which questions particular 
knowledge, be taken back into contact with its own particularity and historical subjectivity.  
Hegel argued that while being able to criticize other, earlier forms of thinking as historically 
limited and conditioned, the Enlightenment thinking is unable to see that it is itself similarly 
limited and conditioned. According to Hegel, a thinking which questions its own particular 
subjectivity, and any particular subjectivity, should become conscious of itself. Hegel agreed 
with the Enlightenment thought that no (one) particular form of knowledge can tell the 
unlimited, universal, timeless truth of things. Yet, Hegel saw that if this realization itself is not 
reflected self-consciously, an external (abstract) relation between a self-reflective thinking 
and its own particular subjectivity ensues. For Hegel, abstract, external relations between 
constitutive moments of thinking (like e.g. between particular subjectivity and self-reflective 
thinking) always imply some kind of dualist (enslaving, instrumentalizing) relations with 
others. (PhS §176-178, §206-208, §231-235, §538-548; Taylor 1975, 178-188)     
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For Hegel, thinking beings are in important ways always already free. What exactly this 
means is, literally, a complex question. In Hegel, one of the basic meanings of freedom is that 
a thinking self is a “complex object”, not reducible to or determined by any one, or just some 
of  its  internal  moments.  What  it  is  as  an  “object”,  or,  what  it  is  as  a  “subject”  is  not  
determined by a foreign “beyond” or an external “Lord”. As such, it is an autonomous object, 
a self-determining, self-grounding, self-changing subject. Nevertheless, in Hegel, freedom 
includes an aspect of dependency on one’s outside, the Other.  An important theme in PhS is 
how the idea of dependency is combined with the idea of the self as a self-determining, 
independent subject. Freedom as the unity of the moments of independence and dependence is 
constructed through the idea of reciprocal recognition between equal self-consciousnesses. In 
fact, a self cannot find itself as a free being except through other free beings. Actual freedom 
(in contrast to freedom as an empty abstraction) takes place in PhS only when it is shared by 
all. However, PhS shows that this is not always the case.  At times only some people (like e.g. 
members of higher classes, “Lords”, priests, or, at other times, philosophers practicing 
“transcendental philosophy”) are recognized to qualify as beings who are independent and 
free i.e. who can “minister” or “mediate” between the subject and its constitutive outside. 
This constitutes un-freedom (a system of “lordship and bondage”) in which some people are 
dependent on (and instrumentalized to) other people.  The “Lord”-people constitute a 
privileged “beyond”, a class, who knows more of  particular subjects – and of things in 
general – than others. In PhS, the theme of “lordship and bondage” (PhS, B.IV.) introduces 
the theme of independence and dependence as an aspect of freedom. 
 
In PhS, a self finds actual freedom by finding, little by little, itself and all other subjects as 
beings who are equally capable of  reciprocally recognitive relationships with others, i.e. 
equally capable for freedom and absolute knowledge.  Through recognizing another being 
who is capable of freedom, i.e. capable of recognizing its Other as its equal, a self becomes 
itself a being who is capable of recognizing its Other as its equal. This means that subjects in 
general are mutually recognized as complex objects, self-determining beings, who can 
mediate between mutually contradicting aspects (between “particular subjectivity” and its 
“othernesses” or “beyonds”). (PhS §177-184). It is important to emphasize that freedom is not 
only an ethical question for Hegel, instead, it is the ground principle of various aspects of life, 
in epistemology, social life, religion, art etc.  (see chapter 2.3).  
 
In PhS, freedom of the subject lies fundamentally in its internal complexity and 
contradictoriness, i.e. in its capacity to look at things from mutually contradicting aspects and 
in its capacity to change its world-view by mediating conceptually between contradicting 
aspects of the world. In Hegelian terms, freedom lies in the “spiritual-rational” capacities for 
conceptual, dialectical and “speculating” thinking. These faculties, enabling one for freedom, 
are needed in reciprocally recognitive relationships with other free selves.  It is important to 
emphasize that even that a self is in many ways depicted in PhS as always already free, its 
freedom can be actual only in reciprocally recognitive relationships. (PhS §670; see chapters 
2.2.9-2.2.11).  
 
 In PhS,  the same faculties which enable one for freedom (i.e. for reciprocal recognition) are 
the source of un-freedom (one-sided recognition; freedom understood only as an abstraction 
etc.). Only free beings possess the faculties for un-freedom; only they can be either the “slave-
masters” or the “enslaved”; only they are described as instrumentalized and silenced when not 
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acknowledged as free. This is shown importantly in the way Hegel speaks of women and the 
family (see chapter 2.4). Women are not described as “enslaved” when they are placed 
outside of the free community, into the realm of family.   
 
In Hegel, subjects are free insofar as they are recognized (mutually, by all) as beings whose 
constitutive aspects (i.e. constitutive “beyonds”) can be known to them, i.e. insofar as they are 
recognized as equally complex beings with the others.  (PhS §669-671, see chapter 2.3).  This 
means that a free subject is a one who is recognized as one, by itself and by others.  In order 
for  subjects  to  recognize  themselves  and  each  others  as  free,  they  must  share an adequate 
concept of a subject as free.  A free subject exists insofar as it is recognized as such by beings 
(including itself) for whom subjects in general are free.   In  Hegel’s  theory  of  freedom as  a  
self-reflective and self-conscious phenomenon, it is essential that the “object” and the 
“subject” of freedom are structurally similar, i.e. self-reflective complex objects, for whom 
there is no such “constitutive beyond” which the subject/object could not itself grasp by its 
faculties of mind.  In this sense, subjects can be free only for those for whom all subjects are 
free. In other words, subjects are free only for those for whom subjects, in general, are 
capable of treating (other) subjects as free beings.   In  PhS,  those  who  see  subjects  as  
incapable of treating other subjects as free beings, do not (themselves) recognize subjects as 
free beings. This results into interpreting (other) subjects through a dualist concept of a 
subject (i.e. a concept in which subjects are not seen as internally qualified for freedom), in 
other  words,  on  the  basis  of  some  version  of  an  attitude  of  Desire  (one-sided  recognition).  
(PhS §177-184, §670)  
 
PhS tells a developmental story of how a subject becomes free by developing an adequate 
concept of freedom and by starting to see itself and others – and the world – through this 
concept. Along PhS, subjects become for themselves and for each others beings,  who  are  
capable for freedom. They become for themselves and for each others beings who are capable 
of recognizing themselves and each others as free beings (PhS §177-178, §184, §670).  A  
shared concept of subjects as free beings is processually developed. Through this concept, a  
“genus” of free, independent self-consciousness, subjects are mutually recognized as beings 
who are capable for freedom.  In Hegel’s terms, a free subject must become explicit for itself 
“in its otherness”. A free subject must be “I” as well as an “object”, and further,  it must be 
“I” as well as it is “we”.  (PhS §176-177).  Importantly, as said before, actual freedom thus 
requires that subjects are mutually recognized as beings who are capable of recognizing their 
others as free beings.  All along PhS, placing people into “bondage” ( a state of un-freedom) 
takes place through not recognizing them as capable of freedom, in other words, seeing them 
as incapable of acknowledging their constitutive “otherness” in a free (non-instrumentalizing, 
“non-colonializing” way). (PhS §177-180; on Hegel’ own dilemma here, concerning women, 
chapter 2.4. This theme is central in the analysis of Butler’s subject-theory, see e.g. 5.3.1-
5.3.2).  
 
Hegel’s thought of freedom takes place, to a large extent, as a criticism towards 
Enlightenment (“Kantian”) thought, in which Hegel found an abstract, formalist notion of 
freedom.  For Hegel, the Kantian freedom included a refutation of particular, historical 
subjectivity, resulting from Kant’s abstract notion of constitutive “otherness” (i.e. from the 
idea that the “Thing in itself” is beyond the conceptual capacities of particular subjects ). For 
Hegel, Kant placed particular, historical subjects into a state of un-freedom (“bondage”) by 
the idea that the constitutive “otherness” (“Thing in itself”) is not known for particular 
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subjects. (see chapter 2.2.7-2.2.9). In order to solve the Enlightenment problem of abstract 
freedom, Hegel developed a concept of freedom in which the constitutive outside of the 
subject – the “other” or “otherness” - was not to be taken as an abstract, inaccessible 
“beyond”. Hegel argued that like any other object of thought, even an “abstract beyond” (e.g. 
the Kantian “Thing in itself”) exists for itself, i.e. for its thinker. It is not external but internal 
to subjective, historical thought, because insofar as it is thought of at all, it is not thought of 
by gods,  instead, it is thought of and spoken of by a human being who is always a particular 
subject. If it can be thought by somebody, it should not be treated as an (un-free, non-
contradictory) possession of a privileged party.  Instead, it should be seen as a “free object”, 
accessible for all subjects. For Hegel, in order to avoid the Kantian “abstract freedom” it is 
important to see  subjects in general as  “absolute beings”, for whom there are no inaccessible, 
constitutive beyonds. (see PhS §197-200, §670;  Hutchings 2003 41-43;  Pippin 1989, 143-
147)   
 
The coming together of the historical, finite subject with its own freedom and “infinitude” 
(absoluteness) - which is necessarily also the freedom and infinitude of others - is the basic 
theme of the book.  Particular “limited” subjectivity -  which is thought at most levels of PhS 
to denote the realm of context-dependency and thus non-freedom –  becomes gradually 
unified with the abstracting and otherness-recognitive (“unlimited”) consciousness. The 
narrative of how this “coming together” takes dialectically place, as the coming together of 
consciousness and self-consciousness  (or, as the coming together of dependency and 
independence) is explained later in sub-chapters (2.2.1-2.2.7). In the present sub-chapter I 
discuss the elements of freedom in general terms. The themes of “reciprocal recognition”, the 
“absolute” (e.g. as “absolute knowing” and “the subject as an absolute”) and “the subject as 
spiritual” are relevant here.   
 
In PhS, thinking  strives to know itself and to find its identity, which ultimately is freedom. In 
this,  Hegel  fully  agrees  with  Kant  and  the  other  thinkers  of  the  Enlightenment.  Hegel  also  
accepts Kant’s view that freedom is not arbitrariness. However, as was said above, Hegel 
argues that thinking must find freedom as a particular something, otherwise it cannot relate to 
it or identify with it.  Kant’s abstract moral law, which is binding for any rational being, is not 
sufficient. Human freedom cannot mean the total absence of all particular forms, limits and 
dependencies. Hegel calls such (impossible) freedom as “abstract” or “negative”. Abstract 
freedom does not actually exist at all.  (PhS §200-201; §584-595) (explained in chapter 
2.2.9.).  
 
The strive for freedom in PhS leads human thinking into seemingly opposite directions. On 
the one hand, it leads it to find its particular identity, and, on the other hand, it leads it to 
question all particular identities. Thinking seems to be fundamentally drawn towards two 
goals: towards limits and towards un-limitedness. The urge to find its particular identity 
means  that  it  needs  to  identify  its  particular  “position”  within  a  system larger  than  itself.  It  
needs to find its universal genus, and particularize itself as an instance of it, for example, in a 
nation, in a political or intellectual movement etc. Nevertheless, thinking also strives to make 
its  particular  identity  “its  own”.   It,  in  a  way,  strives  to  determine  the  universal  genus,  the  
particular instance of which it is. In other words, it strives to know not only itself as 
something particular, but also the larger whole, the context, where its self as something 
particular is situated.  It strives to know the constitutive “beyond-me”” as something 
particular.   (PhS §80-86,90-110, 231-239) 
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Along the course of its struggle to know itself, thinking is led to question identities which are 
given  to  it  by  some  foreign  “beyond  itself”.  Thinking  realizes  over  and  over  again  that  the  
foreign  identities,  given  to  it,  do  not  explain  what  and  who  it  is  in  a  satisfactory  way.   It  
questions the identities given to it by other people, by religion, traditions, science, philosophy 
etc. Along the way in PhS, thinking also comes to realize that one of its fundamental aspects 
is a capacity to abstract from any particular content or description, given of it, and that its own 
self is conceptually “movable”.  Thinking realizes that it is able to move “beyond itself” 
within itself. This movement is made possible by its basic faculties of reflection, abstraction 
and conceptuality. It may change its views of all things, including itself.  Gradually, in PhS, 
thinking realizes that its own conceptual and speculative capacities, e.g.  “moving beyond 
itself while remaining itself”, “becoming internally alien to itself” and “relating dialectically 
and rationally to its Other” cannot be fully described by any stable identity-description. Thus, 
its self-identity must ultimately be such in which “being limited (particularity)” is in unity 
with “being un-limited” and also with “being internally other, contradictory to oneself”.  (PhS 
§80, §184-187; §203-211, §790-794; Taylor 1975, 240-244, 340-342)  
 
Finally, freedom is found as a conceptual, dialectical unity between the self and the free other 
self . This triplicity (including also the moment of independent Being or “substance”) is a 
conceptual, dialectical and speculative unity and importantly, something particular. It is 
particular because particularity is one of its conceptual moments. Yet, particularity has 
become a part of a larger unity, in which there can be a movement beyond the limits of any 
particular case of particularity. (PhS §203-211; §669-671; §790-794).   
 
In PhS, Hegel describes the thinking self’s numerous unsuccessful attempts to come into 
terms with itself as a free being, i.e. to make its mutually contradicting aspects fit together. A 
satisfactory (a non-self-refuting) concept of freedom must mediate such seemingly 
incompatible aspects like “dependency”, “independence”, “particularity” and “universality” 
together.  Little by little the self  is  able to go forward, as it  is  able to gather more and more 
conceptually mediated information of itself, by the steps of successes and mistakes that it 
goes through. The basic theme of the book is to see how thinking gains better knowledge of 
itself, by gaining better knowledge of its contradicting, constitutive outside, the Other. What 
is  constitutive  of  the  self  yet  external  to  it  becomes  gradually  internal, in other words, 
conceptually mediated. External otherness becomes gradually internal, conceptually mediated.  
By this process the self becomes, gradually, a more complex object for itself. It becomes not 
only a conceptually mediated construction for itself, yet, it becomes also a dialectically 
changeable being for itself.  (PhS §178-186)    
  
Another self-consciousness conducts its own thinking by way of “negating its own self and 
the world within its own self”.  The other self-consciousness is another “complex object” i.e. 
a  free  subject.  In  order  for  these  selves  to  know  themselves  and  the  world  in  a  non-dualist  
(non-enslaving) way, they must find themselves in each others fully. If they find only some of 
their own aspects in the other self (e.g. the aspect of “dependency on one’s outside/beyond”, 
or, the aspect of “abstractivity”), but not all, they continue to see themselves, each others and 
the world in a dualist (enslaving) way. (PhS §670). To see another self as an “absolute” means 
ultimately (in equal, free relations) that no part or moment, seen as constitutive of the other 
self - or constitutive of the world in general - is placed beyond the other self, or beyond selves 
in general.   No aspect, constitutive of the world is regarded as inaccessible to the 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
epistemological or ethical (recognitive) capacities of selves in general.   When the other self is 
seen in this way, the other self is not enslaved (i.e. not kept in “bondage” or patronized. (PhS 
§176-178, §189-191, §670). This theme is important concerning the main theme of this study, 
i.e. Butler’s theory of the subject as an “ek-static” being. Put in brief here: for Butler, subjects 
are ek-static constructions which means that there is a “constitutive outside”, “other” to them.  
Subjects are, in this sense,  “complex objects” for Butler. For Butler, however, particular 
subjects themselves cannot know their constitutive outside, i.e. their constitutive “other”, at 
least fully. Particular subjects themselves cannot see the complexity or internal 
contradictoriness of themselves or other subjects without reducing these complex objects into 
non-complex objects.  The complex objects themselves have, hence, a limited (not “fully” 
complex, or, to use Butler’s terminology, not fully “ek-static”) capacity to recognize the 
complexity (or, the “ek-statism”) of objects.  Particular subjects, who are complex for Butler 
are not, hence, seen (by Butler) to be complex  for themselves or for each others, at least not 
fully. (discussed more e.g. in chapter 4.1.8 )  
 
Hegel’s famous dialectics of the Lord and the Bondsman (of which more in chapter 2.2.4.) is 
relevant to the theme of freedom.  As a universal “negating power”, as its own Lord, the self 
can resist other selves who try to rule it as its Lord.  PhS shows a developmental journey of 
how relations involving the figures of “Lord” (independence) and “Bondsman” (dependence) 
change into reciprocally recognitive relations between free selves.   In PhS, if there is no limit 
to a self, in the form of a recognized, equal other (through which the aspects of independence 
and dependence are mediated conceptually) a self exists as the only universal, a limitless 
centre of the world. It is necessary for a self to acknowledge another absolute - to particularize 
itself as an absolute through finding another equally absolute absolute (i.e. a being who has an 
equal, epistemological and ethical access to all possible constitutive “beyonds” of the world).  
Otherwise the knowledge of the world of the self is absolute, yet, in an abstract, empty  
manner, which makes this knowledge self-denying and unsatisfactory.   Hegel claims that the 
inherent structure of thinking is to universalize, and to “absolutize”, but also to particularize 
itself theoretically and practically.  The self needs to know everything in a free way, without 
dualist  epistemological  dependencies  on  external  “Lords”  beyond  itself.   However,  the  self  
also needs to render this free object a determinate, limited object. Otherwise it knows 
everything as an empty abstraction only. (PhS §791-794).  
 
In PhS, a satisfactory knowledge of the world and a satisfactory relation to the world has an 
ethical base.  Through acknowledging another universal being - another absolute besides itself 
- the self finds particularity and actuality within universality and the absolute.  Through 
sharing  the  world  epistemologically,  ethically  and  socially   with  the  other  self,  the  self  can  
(dialectically) go over its internal, constitutive  “unknown”.  In short, a self can find itself  - as 
a free being, which it ultimately is - processually in the other self, insofar as it recognizes the 
other as its equal.   Importantly, in this relation, they can be also differentiated from each 
other as particular subjects. This differentiation is, however, a dialectical process, due to their 
free relation. Even that the parties are particular subjects they are nevertheless also “complex 
objects” which cannot be rendered into non-complex, stable objects through some specific 
description of what kind of particular subjects they are and how they (timelessly, in all 
contexts) differ from each others. (PhS §582-593, §803-804)    
 
Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. 
(PhS §175) 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists 
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged. (PhS §178) 
 
 
Thinking finds the limits (particularity) of its freedom as a self-reflective, active thinker in 
another self-reflective, active thinker.  It discovers the particularity and positionality of its 
own free thinking in another free thinking (at least ideally, i.e. there is a rational possibility 
for such discovery). In PhS  Hegel often uses the Kantian-inflected  aspects of “(Thing) for 
us” and “(Thing) in itself” to refer, on the one hand, to particular, historical (“dependent”, 
subjective) knowledge of things and, on the other hand, to what things are in real, “in 
themselves”, free from the limits of subjective knowledge. According to Hegel in PhS, 
through reciprocal recognition with other selves, the abstract distinction between what the 
world is “for thinking selves” (i.e. “for itself” or “for us”)  and what the world is “in itself” 
can be processually, dialectically overcome (see e.g. Pippin 1989, 163-167). Hegel finds the 
Kantian distinction a dualist one and tries to overcome it dialectically by rendering it a 
conceptually mediated relation. ( discussed more in chapter 2.3):  
 
The “I” has neither to cling to itself in the form of self-consciousness as against 
the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if it were afraid of the 
externalization of itself: the power of Spirit lies rather in remaining the selfsame 
Spirit in its externalization and, as that which is both in itself and for itself , in 
making its being-for-self  no less merely a moment than its in-itself; nor is Spirit 
a tertium quid  that casts the differences back into the abyss of the Absolute and 
declares that therein they are all the same;  (PhS §804) 
 
In Hegel, freedom includes the moment of the “absolute”, limitlessness, that for which there 
is no beyond.  Hegel speaks of the Absolute as a “Subject” in which the aspects of the “self”, 
the “other”, “abstraction”, “Being” and external objectivity construct a whole which is actual 
and determinate, yet also “moving”. The Absolute is a determinate something (an object) for 
itself, yet, it also involves a movement, a “becoming other” (see e.g. PhS §19-20). Hegel 
describes it also as “a living spirit”: 
 
The spiritual alone is the actual; it is essence, or that which has being in itself; it 
is that which relates itself to itself and is determinate, it is other-being and 
being-for-self, and in this determinateness, or in its self-externality, abides 
within itself; in other words, it is in and for itself – it is spiritual Substance. It 
must also be this for itself (…) it must be an object to itself.. (PhS §25)  
 
Contradictions – or, movement involving contradictions and “otherness” -  do not hence 
disappear  when the  self  finds  itself  in  the  other  self  in  a  satisfactory  way or  when absolute  
knowing is reached.  Absolute knowledge is not practiced by a non-historical, abstract Spirit, 
a subject without limits, instead, it is practiced by historical subjects which are particular in 
many ways.  Absolute knowledge is thus always limited, historical knowledge which can 
become “other”. The reason why it is absolute, limitless, inheres in its capacity to go over its 
limits self-consciously, to reconcile contradictions, through the recognition of the “other” (see 
e.g. Hutchings 2003, 40-44).  
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The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds the 
pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure 
knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individuality – a 
reciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit. (PhS §670) 
 
Robert B. Pippin describes the Hegelian knowledge of objects as “spiritual” and as implying 
reciprocal recognition:  
 
Knowledge of objects is conditioned by forms of self-consciousness, and forms 
of such self-consciousness are to be understood as the product of opposed self-
consciousnesses attempting to resolve such opposition, ultimately in “thought”. 
“Recognition” is Hegel’s name for the achievement of such collective 
subjectivity. Assuming that individuals pursue their desires and are capable of 
understanding the threat to their desires posed by an other, we can reconstruct 
the development of a resolution of such conflict, of final satisfaction, in a form 
of self-understanding that Hegel calls “Spirit”. (Pippin 1989, 160) 
 
The end of the dualist bondage of the “other” does not mean that a final knowledge of things 
or a way to organize a society is reached (resembling a Kojevian “End of history” and the 
realm of the “wise men”). Any knowledge of things is particular knowledge as it exists for a 
historical thought, for  limited subjects. Thus it can become “other” through its “other” 
(explained further e.g. in 2.3.1-2.3.3). Hegel argues that thinking is able to potentially 
limitlessly enrich or deepen its knowledge of the world, internally, by connecting with 
particular “other”  knowledge.   The  result  of  the  “enrichment”,  i.e.  the  dialectical  
synthesizing, is always something particular, hence, it can be contradicted through its Other. 
(see e.g. Hutchings 2003, 41; Ikäheimo 2000, 85). For Hegel, this absolute enrichment is 
based  on  the  processual  solving  of  contradictions  (dialectics)  instead  of  getting  rid  of  them.   
The idea of non-self-refuting contradictions means, in short, that the “self” of knowledge does 
not get cancelled, refuted, when it is faced with new or “other” self of knowledge. This kind 
of “self-preserving” process requires that the old knowledge is not criticised through abstract, 
boundless knowledge (as is the case in the scepticism of “pure self-consciousness”, resulting 
into empty knowledge,  explained further).   The new or other knowledge builds rationally 
(dialectically, conceptually) upon the old, preserving it instead of cancelling it.  (see e.g. 
Taylor 1975, 132-138, 340-342).  
 
The process of acquiring new knowledge is called by Hegel as dialectics. Dialectics assumes 
the basic form of  “sublation” (in German as “Aufhebung”), which is perhaps the most famous 
of all Hegelian concepts.  Sublation means, in short, that when new knowledge of a “thing” is 
related to, old one is preserved at the same time. The new synthesis of a “thing” is built upon 
the old knowledge, so that the “old” knowledge or theory and the new theory can be seen to 
speak of the same thing. This can be explained also so that there is a sort of “reciprocal 
recognition” between one knowledge and another knowledge which results into a new form of 
knowledge. Despite the change, the old knowledge of a thing and the new knowledge are of a 
same thing.  The change takes place internally, in other words, the change is conceptual. The 
old thing and the new thing are, hence, not fragmented into two unrelated thoughts  – 
constructions  or  contexts  -  of  thinking  and  knowing.  In  the  case  of  two  externally  related  
contexts of knowledge, or, two externally related thoughts of a thing, each thought constitutes 
its own “thing”.  In sublation, however, the two thoughts become synthesized into a new, 
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enriched conceptual construction of the thing. (PhS §14-25)  A schematic account may be 
given. There are two thoughts; “The thing is F” and “The thing is G”. Both hypotheses have 
some rational support. However, they are mutually incompatible: if the thing is G, it cannot be 
F. Instead of rejecting one of the thoughts or both, we develop a new hypothesis: “The thing 
is H”. The new hypothesis does not just refute the old hypotheses; it must be such that does 
justice to both of them and helps us to understand why they both were rational, although 
incomplete. The new concept “H” is able to unify the observations, intuitions, or arguments 
which made the earlier hypotheses appealing.  Seen in this way, there is nothing odd or 
mystical in Hegel’s notion of dialectics; it is a rather plausible description of the development 
of human knowledge.  
 
What happens to the thing, the object of thought, in this dialectical process? In which sense 
are all these thoughts about the same thing, if different and mutually incompatible properties 
are  ascribed  to  it?  If,  for  example,  we  have  different  views  about  what  “politics”  is,  what  
makes them different views about the same thing?  For Hegel, only if the “thing” (which is to 
go through a sublation) is thought of as a concept, can it endure itself through the sublation 
for its thinker. In short, only a thinker who acknowledges things as “complex objects” 
(dialectical, conceptual and “free”) can identify the thing (going through a change through 
“otherness”) as a same thing.  Sublation takes place internally, inside a thing which is 
acknowledged for itself (i.e. for its thinker) as a conceptual construction, made of various 
aspects, parts and moments.  The result of sublation is the same thing as before, yet, this same 
thing exists now as an enlarged synthesis, a more complex concept. It has related to another 
knowledge of itself, in fact, it has made a conceptual synthesis with its otherness. It must be 
emphasized that, in Hegel, all this can happen only for a thinker who acknowledges itself as a 
“complex object” as a thinker, i.e. as a self capable of relating to otherness within its thought.   
Thus, a differentiation or a change by sublation is necessarily conceptual.  The identity of the 
“thing”, which the change is about, is preserved basically  by the conceptual capacities of the 
thinking self, in the thinking of whom the thing exists. Sublation does not happen externally 
“out there”, as a non-subjective natural fact, instead, it happens for a  self.  Thing  as  a  
sublating process relates to the sublating thinking of it.  For Hegel, there is no change or 
movement of things which would take place beyond the thinking of it.    
 
In fact, the thing is “carried over”  from its old conceptual construction into the new, more 
enriched conceptual construction within the same conceptually thinking self. The self who 
carries the thing from the way it was thought of and known before, into how it is thought of 
and known as “new” must be a one who is capable of doing this “carrying over”. For Hegel, a 
self who is self-consciously self-reflective and conceptual, and who acknowledges the value 
of the Other and its own capacity to recognize the Other is capable of this. (PhS §26-30, §86-
90; Taylor 1975 119,134,143-147, 340-342)   
 
Thus, in order for any thing to change, it must retain its identity with itself  for itself - i.e. for 
its thinker - during the change.  It must retain its self while “becoming other” (discussed later 
in  chapter  2.2.6).  Actual  change  requires  that  the  change  is  thought  of  by  somebody whom 
Immanuel  Kant  would  doubtless  call  a  transcendental self,  and  whom Hegel  calls  self  as  a  
concept, or a self who can move beyond its limits (i.e. become “other”) while still preserving 
itself conceptually.   Sublation is basically a dialectical change, a change within unity. As said 
before, this kind of change can be ultimately conducted in reciprocally recognitive relations 
with other selves. (PhS §670-671; Pippin 1989, 160) 
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In sublation the thing becomes “other”, however so, that its identity with what it was “before” 
is preserved.  This is what the Hegelian negation of negation is basically about. The first 
determination (first negation) of the thing actually denotes the thing as basically existent and 
something particular to its thinker. Without the first negation, the thinker could not think of 
the thing to start with.  The first negation does not, however, only see a thing to exist, instead, 
it also includes a theory of the thing. It looks at the thing from a point of view, rendering it a 
determinate something.  It includes it as a part of a “interpretative universe” in which such 
aspects as what is inside of the thing and outside of it become determined. Thus, Hegel’s 
“negation” has very little in common with the “negation” used either in traditional or in 
modern logic. First, like in traditional and unlike in modern logic, Hegel’s negation is 
attached to objects rather than to sentences or judgments. Second, for Hegel, negation is 
always connected to determination: if somebody is a woman, she is not a man. Third, in 
Hegel’s works, negation often denotes an act: “negation” means that an acting subject is 
“negating” something through its deeds or thoughts. The first determination must be 
preserved, because the very existence of the thing as something particular (for its thinker) 
depends on it. The first negation must be preserved, while any change (second negation) takes 
place, if the change is  to be of the same thing.   Thus, if we form a new view about what it is 
to  be  a  “woman”,  it  has  to  contain  parts  of  the  old  conception  of  “woman”  in  order  to  be,  
basically,   a  conception  of  “woman”  and  not  a  conception  of  something  else.  In  this  way  
Hegel´s notion of dialectical negation of negation shares fundamental similarity of how 
Aristotle conceived of change.   
 
The  interpretative universe as which the thing is conceptualized, has become larger and more 
internally varied in sublation, as something other has become a related (constitutive) part of it. 
The conceptual construction, concept, as which the thing exists (for its thinker) has become 
more complex, yet, its particularity as a unified whole has not vanished. The two thoughts of 
thing, from which it results as a third (after sublation) exist as a particular, determinate 
synthesis, so that neither one of the thoughts refutes the other. As such the result can be 
identified as a particular thing. (Taylor 1975, 146)  
 
However, for Hegel, dialectics, or sublation is not a method or  a  programme.   It  cannot  be  
said to be “conducted”, or done by anyone. One of the major reasons for this is that the very 
“thing” (or Being) which dialectical change is necessarily always of, has its own 
independence in relation to any thinker (self), who would  think of using dialectical 
movement as e.g. a political or a philosophical method. Charles Taylor says about Hegelian 
sublation: 
 
It is important to stress here that Hegel is not proposing the use of a dialectical 
“method” or “approach”. If we want to characterize his method we might just as 
well speak of it as “descriptive”, following Kenley Dove. For his aim is simply 
to follow the movement in his object of study. The task of the philosopher is “to 
submerge his freedom in (the content), and let it be moved by its own nature”. If 
the argument follows a dialectical movement, then this must be in the things 
themselves, not just in the way we reason about them. (Taylor 1975, 129) 
 
 
There has been a lot of discussion of what PhS is actually about: whether is tells a 
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developmental narrative of an individual self-reflection, or, whether it tells a developmental 
history of the self-reflection of something like the “world-Spirit”. Spirit denotes the level of 
collective thinking and knowing, which actualizes itself as cultures, religions and historical 
phases. There are elements in PhS of both of these aspects. With Hegel, the individual thinker 
gains ultimately knowledge of itself only by gaining knowledge of others. And, both the self 
and the others are situated in something called “world”. With Hegel, there are actually three 
aspects of thinking and none of them  is intended to cancel the others. There are no 
communities, nor the world-spirit without particular thinkers. Nor are there any particular 
thinkers without other thinkers and larger contexts of thinking: cultures and historical phases 
of thinking.  
 
Further, Hegel talks  about something called “matter”. Matter denotes the material 
“thingness” referred to in thinking. There is always a reference, or a pointing to something 
like objective reality in thinking. With Hegel, “Being” is ultimately conceptual. However, 
Hegel is not a subjective idealist: he does not think that objective reality is produced in our 
minds so that it would not have its own independence.  Being can be potentially known, 
because it is conceptual, yet, it also preserves its own independent freedom. Importantly, at 
the level of Absolute knowing, also Being becomes a part of the reciprocally recognitive 
relationship, which exists between self and  Other. As Being becomes a part of the recognitive 
triplicity of knowing, it is known in a way which can potentially limitlessly enrich itself. 
(§399-418, 789, 804-808)  (this is explained more thoroughly e.g. in chapters 2.3.1-2.3.3) 
 
Pertaining to the very thinking conducted in PhS itself, an interesting and important 
dialectical process takes place. When the final level of knowing, Absolute knowing, is 
reached, an important thing happens: the gap between what the book  (the storytelling “we” of 
PhS)  knows about “thinking”, and what the particular, subjective thinker (observed in the 
book)  knows about itself, vanishes. The subjective thinker has finally learned the elements of 
thinking described in the book. In the end, also the point of view of the theoretical and 
philosophical story-teller of PhS has become a part of the subjective conceptual unity. In the 
beginning of the story, only the book observes the relationship between “subjective thinking” 
and the “outside of subjective thinking”, yet, the thinking itself does not see what it is like.     
 
Along the narrative, new conceptual dimensions get added to subjective thinking, as thinking 
becomes aware of its own inherent structure. This means that these dimensions become 
particularized and conceptually mediated within subjective thinking. In the end of PhS, there 
remains nothing which is discussed as an externality of subjective thinking.  Everything  
discussed in the book becomes conceptually mediated within the thinking of a particular 
subject. (Hegel’s theory of the Family and women makes up a troubling exception here, see 
chapter 2.4)  
 
Basically, two levels of thinking are drawn closer and closer to each other along the dialectics 
of PhS. Subjective thinking becomes more and more self-reflective, and, abstracting, 
reflective thinking becomes more historical, more particularly subjective. In the end the 
philosopher meets its subject of inquiry, a particular subject, which is its own self.  Also, a 
particular subject meets the one who reflects it, the “beyonds” through which it “knows” 
itself, which is its own self. (PhS §84-86, 797-798) 
 
Besides being a theory of particular subjective thinking, PhS can be seen to present a theory 
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of something like collective self-reflection and the history of collective self-reflection, 
collective Spirit.  Collective self-reflection is initiated by, and it actualizes itself also as an 
inner conflict. Collectives are structured by internal parts which are dialectically driven into 
conflict  with  each  other.   The  internal  otherness  –  i.e.  other  thinking,  knowing  and  
constitution  of  the  objectivity  of  the  mutual  whole  -  is  the  origin  of  conflicts.   In  order  to  
make the parts fit together better, to make up a non-self-contradictory whole, their mutual 
relations must be mediated differently. And, in order for the mutual relations between the 
internal parts of a collective to change, the whole “particular universe”, namely the culture as 
a unity, must be changed.  What this actually means is that a collective must change the way it 
thinks about things.  For example, in order for a new mediation between groups to be possible 
in a situation of inner contradiction, a new collectively shared idea of things like “human”, or 
“citizen” appears necessary  (see Inwood 1983, 274-277). 
 
 
2.1.3 Self as a construction vs. self as a self-conscious concept  
 
 
PhS is not only about thinking, but also about knowing. Thinking and knowing are 
fundamentally inter-related because the things, which knowledge is of, are constructed in 
thinking into objects of knowledge. Basically, actual “things” exist in thinking as 
differentiated, as particulars. Actual things stand in contrast to non-actual, external, abstract 
things. Often Hegel refers to actual things (i.e. particulars) just by calling them different. As 
differentiated,  they  exist   as  posited, within a system of differentiations.  For Hegel, every 
particular is a universal, which means that the condition for the existence of a particular is a 
universe, a system larger than the one particular. Particulars never exist alone, externally, yet, 
they exist as particular instances of something which is universal, i.e. instances of their genus. 
This becomes clear in those parts of PhS where Hegel describes Sense-certainty. Hegel argues 
that we cannot identify particular objects by using a language which does not contain 
universal terms. (PhS §90-110)  In the overall universe, there exist various genera concerning 
the categorization and differentiation of plants, animals, humans etc. The overall system 
functions as a synthesis. The condition of a thought universe is a mediating thinker, a self. 
The self functions as a third, a syllogism, which relates and differentiates between all the 
parts, making up the whole.  (PhS§119-131; see also chapter 2.1.5.) 
 
Hegel writes in The Science of Logic:  
 
 …so something at the same time is through its limit. It is true that something, in 
limiting  the  other,  is  subjected  to  being  limited  itself;  but  at  the  same time its  
limits is, as the ceasing of the other in it, itself only the being of the something; 
through the limit something is what it is, and in the limit it has its quality. ..   
(SL, 126) 
 
…the limit which something has relatively to the other is also the limit of the 
other as a something, its limit whereby it keeps the first something as its other 
apart from it, or is a non-being of that something. (ibid.) 
 
Because thought things are limited, differentiated and related particulars, we always know the 
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things, that we think of, in one way or the other. Thinking about something means that we 
limit, determine the thing.  In this way it becomes a particular.  Particulars are constructed by 
their limits, and if any things are particulars for us, we know what is in their inside, and what 
is in their outside. If  we  can  say  what  a  thing  is,  we  can  also  say  what  it  is  not,  and  what  
distinguishes it from other things. We cannot think of any things, if these things have not been 
already constructed as  “things” in and as our thought. Thus, whenever we try to acquire 
knowledge of some thing, we already have knowledge of it, as we already think of  it.  An  
object of thinking is always a “determinate something”, in one way or the other, hence, there 
is always already some knowledge of it. If we, for example, set ourselves to acquire 
knowledge of “woman”, we must already know a great deal about the subject of study.  
Otherwise we would never come to the thought of attaining knowledge of it.  First of all, in 
order for us to start to gain knowledge of some thing, like woman, we must assert its basic 
existence. We must assume that  “woman” exists. “Woman” must exist (as a particular) for 
us, or for somebody,  in order for us to be able to gain any knowledge of it. If the object in 
question does not exist for us, it must exist at least for somebody (others), whose knowledge 
we can relate to, in order for us to be  able to think about it.  We must be able to somehow 
relate to it as a particular, even through other thinkers, otherwise we cannot think of it, to start 
with, as a potential object of knowledge.  
 
For Hegel, thinking is always of something. It always points at something, which it 
particularizes somehow, in order to be able to point at it. Things are always thought as 
particulars, in some way or the other, because any existent thing (existent as a thought thing, 
for a thinking self) is necessarily a particular. Even abstract entities, say, geometrical forms, 
are  always  grasped  in  terms  of  particular  circles  and  triangles.  Hence,  any  thinking  of  
something includes always a great deal of particular knowledge and information of the 
thought thing, in one way or the other.  For example, some structure of gender-differentiation, 
and an idea of “human” (in relation to which the gender-differentiation takes place) is 
included in any basic assumption that “woman” exists.  Further, one cannot think of 
particulars without thinking of universals, i.e. of genera.  And the other way round: one 
cannot think of universals without thinking particulars. This seems to exclude the most 
extreme versions of both nominalism and Platonism. According to those views either 
universals or particulars are somehow unreal.  
 
Yet, according to Hegel, “a thing” may be constructed as a one-sided, parochial unity. This 
means  that  the  way a  thinker  thinks  of  things,  or  sees  them,  does  not  correspond with  how 
things are actually constructed in its thinking, taken its constitutive (related, constructive) 
parts into consideration.  In these cases the thinker ends up in a self-contradictory strife with 
itself. Some of its thoughts refute others. Hegel presents the “split minds” of Lord and 
Bondsman, Stoicism, Scepticism, Unhappy Consciousness, Reason etc. as examples of ways 
to think which are in strife with their own selves. With Unhappy Consciousness, the thinking 
self denies its own possibility. This kind of thinking self has a notion or theory of subjectivity 
which becomes refuted through its own thinking. The Unhappy Consciousness thinks of 
subjects as un-capable of knowing their own subjectivity in full, i.e. unable to know their own 
formation. Yet, this very thought itself claims to know how all subjective knowledge is 
formed (as a knowledge which cannot know itself fully).  This very thought is presented as a 
universal truth about all subjects, including the subject who thinks in this way. It universalizes 
(fully) its notion of subjects as un-capable of knowing their own formations fully. Hence, its 
own  thought  constitutes  a  denial  of  its  own  theory.  In  reference  to  this  truth,  Unhappy  
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Consciousness can oppose any other attempt to know how subjects are formed. Its theory of 
subjectivity does not explain how its own subjectivity  is possible.   
 
In these cases thinking is made up of parts which do not speak of a same thing, i.e. parts 
which do not construct a conceptually mediated synthesis. Thinking is dualist: it is 
constructed of unrelated thoughts which constitute their own self-relational universes (e.g. the 
worlds of the “Lord” and the “Bondsman”) and thus do not constitute a common universe. 
(This is explained e.g. later in chapter 2.2.6). In PhS the dialectics goes basically so that 
subjective thinking proceeds to form such a theory, or, philosophy of itself, which explains its 
own possibility. This is reached by actual self-consciousness, reciprocal recognitive 
relationships between free self-consciousnesses.  
 
To avoid self-contradictory conflicts, thinking needs to become self-conscious. This means, 
for example, that thinking becomes conscious of how the  world  which  it  sees  relates  to  its  
own thinking of it.  For example, when “pure self-consciousness” (as e.g. Unhappy 
Consciousness) becomes self-conscious, it realizes that its own possibility depends on there 
being external “Bondsmen” (metaphorically) into whom it has projected its (own, internal) 
moment of  “dependency”. It realizes that its own thinking is split into two unrelated 
thoughts, each one refuting the other. On the other hand, there is the context-dependent 
thought of subjectivity (Bondsman as merely particular; as “immediate”), and on the other 
hand there is the universal truth of subjectivity (Lord, as merely universal, set dualistically 
“beyond” the Bondsman). (It should be noted here that I interpret Hegel’s section on Lord and 
Bondsman in the same way as e.g. Charles Taylor, who sees that this dualist doubleness may 
exist in one mind). (see PhS e.g. §178-218,231-239; Taylor 1975 152-161)  
 
In PhS, the strive for freedom means, among other things, that a thinker strives to become 
conscious of how the things, which it thinks and knows (including itself as an object) are 
formed for itself.  In  order  for  the  thinker  to  become  aware  of  the  system,  as which things 
exist for it, it must render this system known. In other words, it needs still a “larger” system 
of knowing, an internally interpreting system, to know its system of knowing. Within this 
larger whole, it knows itself as a part of it. Yet, in order for it to know itself as a part, it must 
also know the other parts of this system. If it does not differentiate its own system of knowing 
from the other systems of knowing, it cannot know the construction of its (own) thinking as 
differentiated.  Hence, it needs to know what its genus is, to be able to differentiate itself and 
particularize itself from other instances of the genus.  The genus, which it is to find in PhS, is 
a free self-consciousness. The thinking self cannot become conscious of its inside, its self, as 
a differentiated inside, without rendering it a particular inside.  Rendering its inside as 
something particular (limited) takes necessarily place by rendering its outside (other free self-
consciousnesses as other complex systems of thinking) as something particular.  Thus, to 
know itself, it must know its outside. Knowing the outside takes place, as all knowing does 
for Hegel, by relating.     
   
PhS is largely a theory of how this relating develops.  Basically, a thing comes into existence 
- in this theory of how things appear for a self-consciousness who is always a limited subject -  
by becoming a differentiated, limited, particular something. Things exist as differentiated 
particulars for a self. They exist in so far as they are limited, in short, they exist through their 
limits.  This takes place by a thing being related to other, different particulars internally, 
within a uniting whole. The whole, where things exist as particulars is an internally 
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differentiating, interpreting whole. Further, these constructions (internally differentiating 
wholes) come into existence as particulars by becoming related to other, different 
constructions. In order for the constructions to be “different”, i.e. differentiable from each 
other, they must be similar in the sense of being instances of the same genus.  In other words, 
internally differentiating wholes become existent through each others. In PhS, free thinking 
(i.e. self-conscious, dialectical, “speculating” thinking) is a construction which is to find itself 
as something existent through its finding other (different yet similar) constructions. A free self 
can appear to itself (i.e. become phenomenological) through a free other which it manages to 
see as different from itself.  If a free self can limit (particularize, differentiate) itself through a 
free other, it can appear to itself as something actual.  In other words, a free self finds itself in 
another free self;  a free self exists for a free self. (PhS §177-180) This specific type of 
existing as a “different” being -  i.e. being different  from internally differentiating “complex 
objects”, from other free self-consciousnesses - pertains to the themes of “self-conscious 
thirdness”, “Spirit”, “dialectics” and “speculation” which are discussed later.  
 
It  appears as crucially important for Hegel to theorize what kind of a “larger whole” makes 
free self-knowing possible. For Hegel, a self is a dynamic thinker, a thinker who can “move” 
dialectically and speculatively within its own thinking. In other words, self can go beyond, 
outside of itself (through relating with its contradicting other) internally.  A thinking self is 
free. As such, the self can go over its limits by itself, hence, it is an absolute and an un-limited 
being.  Self is not (internally) stable. Yet, how can this self know itself, as all thinking and 
knowing is of “somethings”, of limited objects. The “larger whole”, which renders self-
knowing ultimately possible, cannot be an ordinary, particular universe, by which the 
ordinary thinking (for Hegel, “Consciousness as Understanding” denotes the ordinary way of 
thinking) identifies stable (external, “non-complex”) particulars (see chapter 2.2.1.).  For the 
self is not just one particular element among the others, like a table or a plant. Self as a free 
concept which can mediate between contradictory and alien elements must be thought to exist 
within a whole, within which not only its particularity (internal limits) but also its freedom (its 
capability of “self-negation” and self-differentiation) becomes recognized. Self is able to go 
beyond the limits of a particular universe (context of knowing) by its own conceptual 
capacities. No particular universe can ultimately explain it, because it can move beyond its 
limits. What it is depends partly on how it describes itself. Thus, it cannot be described or 
pointed out like ordinary objects. (PhS §187,197)   
 
Self can see itself as a unified whole (as a whole with limits) only if it can see itself from 
another viewpoint. Metaphorically speaking, it needs a mirror in order to see itself. This can 
happen only if the view-point itself (namely, the Other) is formed alike the self.  Thus, if the 
basic identity of a self is freedom and internal conceptual speculation this “identity” becomes 
seen, as it is, when it is looked at from the view-point of a similar being. A free being is seen 
(for itself) as a free being when it looks at itself from the view-point of another, similar free 
being. In other words, a free being requires the structure of “reciprocal recognition” in order 
to be seen, as it is, by itself.   In the dialectical process described in PhS, the self realizes how 
it is formed when it acknowledges another free self-consciousness. Importantly, neither can 
the self or the Other be free if they are not identified as particular members of a larger whole 
(the theme of the “larger whole” is discussed also in 2.3.1-2.3.3).  The Other, as a view-point 
onto self, must be free, yet, conceptually identifiable as a particular something. It must be 
another particular instance of the same genus.  If it cannot be identifiable as similar yet also 
differentiated from the self, it constitutes an undifferentiated sameness with self, and cannot 
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function as such a point of view onto self, by which the self can see itself as free yet also as 
something particular.   If a self is to see itself, i.e. to identify itself as a particular something, it 
needs to determine its genus and differentiate itself from the Other in terms of this universal 
genus. There is no “God’s viewpoint” available, only a viewpoint of another, similar but 
distinct self. Ultimately, self as a self-conscious concept serves as such a genus, which allows 
for freedom as well as for identification and  particularization.  It constitutes an entity which 
is both a self-determining (free, independent) whole, yet, a particular, because there is more 
than one of its kind.   
 
If self is understood as a construction, including parts like “self as a context-dependent 
thinker”  and  “self  as  not  completely  limited  by  any  particular  context  ”  and   “self  as  a  
historical  construction”,  yet,  as  not  a  unity  of  these  moments,  its  moments  are  rendered  
externally related thoughts. If self is thought of as  “multiply constituted”, yet, if these 
multiple parts are not unified into a synthesis of self (i.e. self as a conceptual unity), this 
multiplicity becomes a fragmented set of thoughts external to each others. (see e.g. PhS §207-
208). The parts are not kept together as internal parts of a something. The parts are detached 
from each other, and consequently the self, which the parts were suppose to be of, becomes 
itself a void.  For Hegel, this is actually what takes place as pure self-consciousness, in 
Enlightenment, Kantian thinking, discussed further. The pure self-consciousness constitutes a 
“pure I”, or “pure, abstract genus”, which cannot relate its parts into itself.  
 
Along PhS, an important difference is made between mere constructions and constructions as 
unities (concepts). This difference shows itself as the difference between selves as conceptual, 
and, selves as self-conscious concepts. A non-self-conscious construction consists of 
externally related thoughts. This kind of construction is actually also a concept, but because it 
lacks self-consciousness of its aspects belonging to it as its “own” aspects,  it is not aware of 
this.  This  means  that  it  sees  all  or  some of  its  conceptual  parts  (i.e.  its  own thoughts  of  the  
world, itself, other selves etc.) as external, non-subjective reality.  For example, a thinking 
subject may see that there is some kind of unknown otherness (a God, super-natural forces 
etc.), and an intentionality which is other than its own and which affects it from outside of 
itself.  
 
The differentiation between, on the other hand, internally, self-consciously mediated things 
(thoughts) and, on the other hand, immediate things (thoughts) pertains to what was said 
above about mere constructions and concepts. When something is mediated as a part of a self 
as a concept, it is posited (limited, particularized) and thus rendered such a part, which gives 
room for other parts, or, thoughts of some “thing”, to exist.  If, on the other hand, something 
is thought, yet not mediated as a part of a larger conceptual whole, it is seen as immediate. 
Immediate things (thoughts) appear as non-conceptual, non-subjective objectivity for their 
thinker.      
 
It is important to note that for Hegel self is always a concept (unity).  This means, for 
example,  that it always includes a universal truth (a reflective self-knowledge) of itself and of 
things in general.  Its unity can take the form of a denial of the unity (as is more thoroughly 
discussed later, e.g. in chapter 2.2.7).  Nevertheless, self always unifies its parts into a unity 
and into a universal truth, whether it is itself conscious of how it conducts this, or not. 
(discussed more  in chapters dealing with questions of “otherness”, see e.g. 2.2.3)  
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In PhS, subjective thinking is depicted as an actively conceptualizing (synthesizing, unifying, 
mediating)  system,  which  relates  its  own  moments  together  in  its  thinking.   One  of  its  
conceptual moments is “a particular universe”, which Hegel also calls a consciousness as 
Understanding. Thus, self includes, as one of its conceptual moments, a systemic 
consciousness of particular things (including itself as an object for itself).  Yet, there is also 
other moments to self as a concept.  Self includes various types of mutually contradicting 
beyonds. The conceptual moments (like e.g. the moments of dependence and independence) 
may constitute external, non-mediated beyonds for each others (as is the case in one-sidedly 
recognitive thinking, see ch. 2.2.4).  In PhS, self always looks upon its own historical 
particularity, in one way or the other, from beyond it and situates it in a larger interpretative 
whole. This larger whole can be e.g. a religion.  In much of religious thought (at least as 
religious thought is depicted in PhS)  self tackles a unity between itself as a particular, 
temporal being and God as the constitutive beyond.  Self gives an explanation, i.e. a 
contextualization, to the particular reality which appears to it by looking at it from the point of 
view of a moment beyond it, i.e God.  Self also unites its own practical intentionality and the 
intentionality of the other (God) into a synthesis. If this self is not conscious that the “other 
intentionality” (of God) is an internal part of its own thinking, it may give the role of the 
uniting “third”, namely, the mediation (the ministering between its own conceptual parts) to 
an external “priest”. An external mediator is given the role of uniting the intentions of the 
constitutive beyond/Other (God) with the self’s  intentions as a human. (PhS §227-228) 
 
 
2.1.4. Conflicts inside unities  
 
 
What takes place dialectically in PhS is that thinkers keep constantly realizing that things are 
not what they seem to be. Thinkers realize over again that the way reality appears, or the way 
things are, is in contradiction with things “as a whole”, i.e. with how things are constructed, 
or constituted  as a relational unity, a concept.  Things proving not to be what they seem to be 
appears as the motivating force behind the dialectical movement in PhS.   
 
Contradictions are  an  essential  part  of  the  Hegelian  dialectics,  as  was  explained  in  the  
previous chapter. In fact there is no dialectics without contradictions. Ideally, Hegelian 
contradictions, and dialectics, are about movement in unity. Hegel does not in any way try to 
get rid of contradictions, nor does he think that it would be  possible. Contradictions take 
necessarily place because of the existence of  free other thinking, i.e. free otherness. The 
Other is always free to challenge the views of the thinking self.  
 
Most people tend to reject the idea that “the world itself” would contain contradictions. 
Descriptions of an object may be contradictory, not the object itself. However, it should be 
remembered that, for Hegel, the object is the  totality  or  synthesis  of  all  its  possible  
descriptions. We, particular and limited beings, are bound to produce mutually contradictory 
descriptions when trying to describe an object. If we argue that, from God’s point of view, the 
object would not appear as contradictory, Hegel’s reply is that we do not really understand 
how things would look from God’s viewpoint, and so the argument is unintelligible.    Any 
subjective thinking has to posit a particular, limited view on the thing, and hence, it is apt to 
be in contradiction with other ways of seeing the thing.  
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Also, the “matter itself ” constitutes its own independence in contrast to how matter, or 
nature, is constituted in any particular subjective thinking.  Matter, substance, is a kind of a 
free, self-resisting otherness, if only for the fact that it appears as impossible to give a 
satisfiable account of things like death  - a particular description which would satisfy us, 
permanently. Death (as well as e.g. fatal sicknesses, or, ecological catastrophes)  hold on to 
their own truths of us, and function as limits to us, not only as bodies but also as subjective 
thinkers. We encounter the fact that thinking is not free from its corporeality. Because of the 
un-deniability of  our fate as natural beings, there constantly remains a puzzling, free 
otherness of Being, which keeps over again contradicting with our (at some given time) 
particular knowledge of it.  (PhS e.g. §175-176,186-191)  
 
Charles Taylor explains the basic motivating power behind the dialectics in PhS in his book 
Hegel (1975). According to Taylor, the starting point in PhS is the knowing subject. Hegelian 
consciousness is bi-polar: it is consciousness of something. Thoughts are of something. The 
thoughts  of  a  thinking  subject  are  also,  in  one  way  or  the  other,  knowledge claims. A 
particular thinking subject claims that some particular “things” exist out there. It claims their 
existence by the sheer seeing of their existence. Yet, when compared with the ideal purpose 
that these particulars are supposed to meet, they appear as in-sufficient, self-contradictory. 
Their actual particular existence does not correspond with the standard, or purpose, “their 
universal ontological truth” which they are supposed to correspond with. The clash between 
their self-idea and their effective reality is the motor of the dialectic. (Taylor 1975, 128- 136) 
 
As Taylor notes, Hegelian ontological dialectics involves three terms. The “third term” is the  
system of internal differentiation and relation, as which we try to realize our conceptions of 
what things should be like. We try to construct a living reality according to our notions of 
what things should truly be like. We have, in our minds, also two other terms, firstly, 
“things”, and, secondly, the standard which things are suppose to correspond with, and which 
could  be  seen  as  our  theory  of  things.  Hence,  we  try  to  construct  an  actual  reality  (a  third  
term)  as  which  things  (first  term)  are  what  they  should  be  like  (second  term).  The  
contradiction actualizes itself at the level of the third term, or, as the third term itself. We see 
that  the  given  standard  is  not  met  (at  the  level  of  the  third  term)  in  our  present  attempt  to  
realize it   (ibid.) 
 
These three terms play active roles in Hegelian dialectics, both historical and ontological.  
The dialectics involves three terms: the present particular state of things, the ideal or standard 
against which the present state becomes measured, and, the larger, higher context, as which 
things correspond better  with what they ought to be. In dialectics, the present state of things 
becomes confronted with a “pressing argument” (i.e. such kind of otherness, which is 
acknowledged by us as a pressing argument as concerns how things ought to be) and 
synthesized (germ. “aufgehoben”, i.e. sublated) with it into a new third term.  The third term 
can then, dialectically, become again the first term, measured against some pressing argument  
(a standard, seen through otherness) and dialectics may proceed like this.        
 
Yet, how is this otherness actually experienced as such a pressing argument, which 
contradicts subjects “theory of the world”? Why is it not just read from the view-point of the 
subjects own theory of the world? Why is the thinker unsatisfied? Taylor argues that  the 
“argument”, which contradicts a knowledge-claim, inheres in the knowledge-claim itself, or, 
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actually in the concept, a part of which the knowledge-claim is.  The concept is the self, a 
thinker,  which  finds  a  satisfactory  “theory”  of  itself  only  when  it  is  able  to  relate,  as  a  
concept, to a free other.  
  
For Hegel, contradictions make the thinking self move, i.e. change and become different 
(other  through  sublation)  in  relation  to  what  it  was  before.    As  the  self  comes  across  of  a  
pressing argument, which comes from a contradicting other (i.e other which is Other) it 
moves, i.e. it changes (sublates, dialectically) its world-view, including its idea of itself. There 
has been a lot of discussion on how to think of the relation and the movement between self 
and Other especially in Hegel’s realm of free self-consciousness (which denotes the state of a 
conceptual unity between Self, Other, and Being). As is explained in the chapter 3, on Kojève,  
there are various influential interpretations of what the movement between the thinking self 
and its otherness is in Hegel’s realm of free self-consciousness and the actual State, which is 
its objectivization.  One influential line of interpretation is the one identified with Alexandre 
Kojève.  Kojève saw free self-consciousness as a realm of individuality, disappearance of 
differences and as an end of history. A few famous 20th century French thinkers (such as 
Sartre and Foucault) have been influenced by Kojève´s interpretation of Hegel, which has led 
them to reject Hegel, at least as concerns the state of self-conscious Spirit.  
 
Another  line  of  interpretation,  that  of  e.g.  Charles  Taylor  and  some  contemporary  theorists  
doing Hegel-linked research on the theme of social ontology and reciprocal recognition (e.g. 
Heikki Ikäheimo), emphasize that in Hegel’s realm of free self-consciousness (which is a 
realm of reciprocal recognition between self and Other) dialectics and critical mutual 
influencing (or history, for that matter) does not end. In contrast, movement between self and  
Other is enhanced, because the selves (through recognition) take each others view-points 
seriously and allow themselves to be influenced and changed by each others. This is the line 
of interpretation which is supported also in this study.  Nevertheless, by reciprocal 
recognition,  a  certain  type  of  movement  can  be  seen  to  end  as  it  turns  into  another  kind  of  
movement (in the narrative of PhS).  In the realm of free and actual self-consciousness, 
movement is different than in the phases preceding it, when the movement takes the form of a 
self-contradictory movement.  In the realm of self-conscious Spirit as reciprocal recognition, 
movement is not self-contradictory (i.e. simple negation), instead, it takes the form of 
dialectics (as Aufhebung, or in other words  “negation of negation”).  As has been explained 
in this and previous chapters (and also in 2.2.7; 2.3.1-2.3.2), movement as a self-contradictory 
movement is turned into a contradictory movement (dialectics as Aufhebung) gradually along 
the PhS. Self as its own internal mediator (as a third) acts as the agent, by which the self-
contradictory movement is turned into an internally mediated movement between the self and 
Other. Self as a third is discussed in the next chapter and also in  2.2.8. and 2.2.11   
 
 
 2.1.5. Self as a Third 
 
 
For Hegel, the third  (or middle term, or synthesis) is what “self” is actually about;  it denotes 
the thinking system as a contradictory process yet also as a conceptually mediating synthesis 
(see e.g. PhS §223-235, §789-794). Thinking includes contradicting elements (elements 
which are, in a way, “other” to each other) and as such it denotes the thinking self as 
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ultimately a speculative Spirit (see chapter 2.3). Hegelian “speculative” thinking denotes 
thinking as capable of mediating contradictory thoughts and things into syntheses with each 
other (as was explained in the previous chapter).    
 
Michael Inwood explains in Hegel Dictionary (1995) that “speculative” thinking unifies 
apparently opposed and distinct thoughts and things together by a Hegelian “sublative” 
dialectics. In Hegel’s subject-theory “speculation” and “dialectics” thus imply each other.  
Inwood writes about this: 
 
In a wide sense, Hegel´s dialectic involves three steps: 1) One or more concepts 
or  categories  are  taken  as  fixed,  sharply  defined  and  distinct  from  each  other.  
This  is  the  stage  of  UNDERSTANDING  .  2)  When  we  reflect  on  such  
categories, one or more contradictions emerge in them. This the stage of 
dialectic proper, or of dialectical or negative REASON. 3) The result of this 
dialectic is a new, higher category, which embraces the earlier categories and 
resolves the contradiction involved in them. This is the stage of  
SPECULATION or positive reason ( ).  Hegel suggests that this new category is 
a “unity of opposites”. (Inwood 1995, 82)   
 
 
Inwood writes further about Hegel’s idea of “speculation”:  
 
In contrast to the analytical UNDERSTANDING, it is akin to the poetic 
IMAGINATION and to mysticism, but it differs from them in that it is 
conceptual and presupposes the work of understanding. It is at odds with the 
Dogmatismus of pre-Kantian metaphysics, which insists on applying only one of 
a pair of contrasting predicates to objects, insisting, e.g., that the world is either 
FINITE or INFINITE,  and cannot be both. Speculative thought, by contrast, 
unifies the two concepts, and thus regards the world as both finite and infinite”;. 
…”Spekulation, Hegel insists, is not merely subjective: it SUBLATES the 
opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, along with other oppositions. 
(Inwood  1995, 272) 
 
 
Hegel calls Self a syllogism by which any two (or more) parts are “judged” to be related with 
each other. Why a “syllogism”? Hegel discusses at  length on syllogisms in SL as well  as in 
Enc I (Minor Logic). For him, a “syllogism” is not just a form of inference; rather syllogisms 
(of a certain form) reflect the basic structure of thinking and (therefore) of the world. Thus, he 
says in Enc I that every living being is a system of “syllogisms” (§217), and that the state is “a 
system of three syllogisms” (§ 198; this theme is developed further in PR). Without going to 
details, Hegel’s idea may, perhaps be illustrated by a classical form of syllogism:   
 
All Greeks are mortal. 
Socrates is a Greek. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
 
In this type of syllogism, a singular individual (“Socrates”) is related to a universal (“mortal”) 
through a particular middle term (“Greek”). What is common for all things called by Hegel as 
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“syllogisms” is that individuality and universality are united in them through particularity. In 
his lecture-notes for the introduction courses in philosophy (Philosophical Propedeutics) 
Hegel presents the bare bones of his doctrine of syllogisms:   
 
[48] In the Judgement two moments of the Concept are directly connected with 
each other; the Syllogism contains their mediation or ground. In  it  two  
determinations are linked together by a third which is their unity. 
 
[49] The two linked determinations are the Extremes (termini extremi), the 
determination linking them is their Middle Term (terminus medius). 
 
[50] The Middle Term subsumes under Individuality and is subsumed under 
Universality. 
 
[51] Since the Universal subsumes under it the Particular, but the Particular 
subsumes under it the Individual, so too  does the Universal subsume under it 
the Individual and the former is the Predicate of the latter. Or, conversely, since 
the Individual contains within itself the determination of the Particular but the 
Particular contains within itself the determination of the Universal, the 
individual thus also contains within itself the Universal. (Phil. Prop., 72; the 
first emphasis added) 
    
Arguably, this is also the role of the self. It is the “third” which links together the universal 
and individual aspects of thinking. 
 
 Hegel never forgets to emphasize in his texts that any thought thing - as a structure, made of 
parts, of which some are in contradiction with some others  - exists for self. Hegel calls the 
internal movement, by which the thinking self constructs thoughts into “things”, also as 
speculative Spirit. As a speculative and a dialectical Spirit, thinking constructs things out of 
contradictory  parts (thoughts) which are “other” or possibly “alien” to each other (as will be 
later explained when Hegel´s idea of “otherness” is discussed).     
 
Basically, for Hegel, any relational “dyads” (e.g. epistemological subject-object-relations) 
exist for a third, for a mediating self. This mediating self deals with contradicting thoughts, 
yet, it is always a historical, particular subject who constructs a historical, particular 
“thingness” (a “world”) in its thinking. The “subject” is thus somewhat the same as a 
“particular theory” or actually an on-going theorizing activity. It is an internally 
differentiating system of meaning-giving, or “an interpretative field” on the basis of which it 
“produces” a world for itself, self-relationally. (PhS §130-139; Inwood 1995,136-139) 
 
Hegel´s basic criticism against Kant pertains to the idea of “thirdness”. As was previously 
said, in Hegel the “third” denotes the level of thinking which Hegel calls as “Spirit”, capable 
of “speculative”  thinking in which thoughts which are “other” (and as such contradictory and 
possibly also alien to each other) can be conceptually mediated with each other.  According to 
Hegel, Kant had two thoughts of “a thing”, and because these two thoughts were “other” to 
each other, the Kantian thing turned into a self-contradiction and an impossibility.  The 
thought of  “thing for us” (“thing as known to particular subjects ”) and “thing in itself” (the 
independent aspect of a thing, or, the “beyond” of any particular description of a thing) both 
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pertain to a thing. This applies to the Kantian subject itself. It is divided into the “noumenal” 
or “transcendental” and the “empirical” self. According to Hegel, the ground mistake of Kant 
was not to realize that both of the thoughts were included into the conceptual construction of 
what a thing was for Kant (as a third). As Hegel explains in PhS (§85-86) the “thing in itself” 
exists also for a consciousness. By definition, Kant cannot observe the “thing itself”, but he 
can think of it and infer its existence. According to Hegel, Kant did not understand that he 
himself acted as a third, a uniting self, who made up an alien relation between the two parts 
by which he thought of “a thing”. For Hegel, an alien relation is a unity, a synthesis, even that 
it is a self-refuting unity. Also self-contradictory unities exist for selves, as thirds. According 
to Hegel,  Kant did not realize that his distinction between “thing for us” and “thing in itself” 
was a conceptually constructed alien relation, a duality, that existed for itself (i.e. for Kant). 
Hegel argued that the parts, through which Kant thought of  the thing, were related to each 
other in an alien way in Kant´s thinking, making up a Lord-Bondsman-relation (discussed 
further as the pure self-consciousness, see e.g. 2.2.6)  
 
One aspect of a Kantian “thing”  is that it is thought as independent from any particular 
subjective description given of it . As such, a thing is thought not only as “thing for us” yet, it 
is also thought as an independent “thing in itself”.  Both of these thoughts are of the (some 
specific) thing, which is thought of.  For Hegel, the Kantian thought of  the  thing  as  
independent refutes the other thought of the thing, namely the thought of the thing as 
dependent on its particular thinker  (“thing for us”). For Hegel, the result of this alien relation 
(by which a thingness in general, and consequently also any specific thing is thought) is that 
the Kantian thing turned into a self-refuting contradiction. It consisted of thoughts which 
refuted each other. Hegel´s view can, perhaps, be illustrated in the following way. In 
introductory texts, Kant´s distinction between “thing for us” and “thing in itself” is often 
presented with the help of a figure like this: 
 
transcendental self  ? empirical self   ? thing for us  ? thing in itself 
 
“The transcendental subject” is the active observer which synthesizes observations into 
knowledge,  “the  empirical  self”  is  the  medium  of  observation  (the  one  which  may,  for  
example, have a bad eyesight, or be deceived by an illusion), “the thing for us” is the object as 
perceived by the self while “the thing in itself” remains outside all observation but 
nevertheless produces the observable properties. Hegel´s critical point is this: we cannot grasp 
Kant´s distinctions without the thinking of this kind of figure which shows the thing itself 
lying behind the appearances. But the figure is drawn from a perspective which, according to 
Kant, is impossible (from the viewpoint of God, so to speak). The relationships depicted in 
the figure are, according to Kant, necessarily beyond our knowledge.   
 
According to Hegel, the Kantian thing became fragmented into externally related, atomistic 
thoughts. Consequently a thing, which would include both of these thoughts in it, turned into 
an  impossibility.  This  is  a  good  example  of  what  Hegel  calls  as  a  self-contradiction.  The  
Kantian self could not include both of the thoughts, through which it thought of itself, within 
itself, and thus, the result is two external  things, instead of a one thing which would mediate 
both of these thoughts as its “own” internal aspects. Importantly, each of the thoughts relates 
also, in a way, to separate selves. The Kantian (Enlightenment) mind is fragmented into two 
minds, which are alien to each other. These two minds are metaphorized, basically, by Hegel 
as the figures of Lord and Bondsman. Because this mind cannot relate its internal thoughts 
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with each other and make them acknowledge the existence of each other, the result is an 
external, dualist relation, an alien relation (discussed further in chapter 2.2.4) 
 
Ultimately, to be able to make the two thoughts of itself relate to one self,  instead of relating 
them to two separate atomistic selves, external to each other, self must unite together two 
descriptions of itself. These descriptions seem, at least initially, to describe somewhat very 
different selves. “Self as dependent” (i.e. self as a Bondsman - as having a particular identity, 
which is dependent on there existing a universal genus, “larger” than self itself ) and “self as 
independent” (self as independent from any specific particular generalizing description given 
of it) must be able to be united as descriptions of a same self. Ultimately, these descriptions 
are to be rendered as internal aspects of a same thing, as well. For Hegel, a thing, as a thought 
thing,  relates to its thinker.   
 
For Hegel, these two thoughts can be united into a self when self finds free self-consciousness 
as its universal genus.  In PhS self gradually finds out that any thinker is a free self-
consciousness.   Being a free self-consciousness is thus something universal. As a free self-
consciousness, it is not the only one of its kind, yet, a particular instance of its genus. The two 
thoughts of “independence” and “dependence” (metaphorized often as Lord and Bondsman) 
by Hegel,  are included into the thinking of each free self-consciousness. Ideally, the 
relationship between independence and dependence is not the one between Lord and 
Bondsman. The relationship between Lord and Bondsman is an external, not an internal 
relation. The level of actual self-consciousness (chapter 2.2.11) discusses how independence 
and dependence are mediated as parts of a self as a self-conscious concept.  
 
Each particular free self-consciousness includes these two thoughts of itself in itself, in one 
way or the other.  The way free self-consciousnesses relate to each others takes place, ideally, 
by way of considering each others as thinkers, who determine themselves within their own 
selves.  As such they recognize each others as internally negating (self-grounding) subjects, 
instead of considering them as ordinary objects. (PhS §175-177).  
 
External relation exists  between  thoughts  which  are  of  some  thing  (like  sexuality  etc.)  and  
which are thought by the same thinker, but which have not been identified by their thinker as 
its “own”. This is due to thinking´s being always conceptual and contradictory, whether the 
thinker itself is conscious of this or not. If the thinker does not identify its thoughts as its own 
thoughts,  and  mediate  them  as  particular  parts  of  its  own  particular  conceptual  system,  the  
thoughts may refute the existence of each other. This is what happened, according to Hegel, 
with the Kantian thoughts of “thing for us” and “thing in itself”.  
 
Internal relation, or a self-conscious relation exists between thoughts which have been 
mediated conceptually with each other. The thoughts are particularized by “returning them 
back”  to  their  particular  thinker.  They  are  identified  by  their  thinker  as  internal  to  its  own  
thinking.  As such they are conceptually related to each other and seen as particular thoughts 
of a particular thinker. The thoughts make up a particular, historical conceptual whole. 
Thoughts which would otherwise constitute, taken individually just by themselves, their own 
individual universes, can be particularized (and turned into a particular concept) by 
identifying them as the thoughts of a particular thinker.  
 
Externally related thoughts exist as fragmented and atomistic in the thinking of their thinker. 
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They exclude each others – and, in a way, deny the existence of each others -  because they 
constitute their own all-encompassing individual universes. Each one of them claims to 
“possess” the thing in question fully. They do not allow room for other thoughts of the same 
thing, i.e. they cannot allow the thing, or any aspect of the thing, be possessed by any other 
thought.  Nor can they share the possession of the thing with each others.  Their mutual 
relation could be described also so that there is an absolute difference between them. In 
contrast, internally mediated thoughts recognize the relevance of other thoughts, concerning 
the  thing  which  they  are  of.  There  exists  a  conceptual,  or  a  conceptually  mediated  relation  
between them, in the thinking system of their thinker. This recognition takes place so that the 
thoughts are limited, particularized, through each others, hence allowing for the existence of 
each others as relevant aspects of the thing in question.   Or actually, the conceptually 
thinking self, in the thinking of whom these thoughts exist, is conscious of the fact that it 
thinks of some thing on the basis of these various thoughts. It acknowledges that the thing in 
question is a conceptual construction, made of these different thoughts, or aspects.   
 
For example, a thinker may become conscious that it thinks of “sexuality” from other points 
of views, not only its “own” point of view. The other point of view may be ascribed to God, 
to some other authority like a teacher, or  to a friend etc.  A thinker may also become 
conscious that it is possible to think of sexuality as an abstract category, “independently” 
from any particular contents.  Also, a thinker may observe sexuality historically and see that it 
has had various particular contents, depending on the situation and time. A thinker may 
realize that its view on sexuality is related to all these viewpoints.  As it becomes conscious of 
its various thoughts of sexuality, it can become more conscious of how they affect each other 
and constitute each other. Further,  a thinker may realize that its own notion of sexuality is a 
construction, gathered together from these various aspects and thoughts. This notion may be 
dynamic and even troublesome, as it may include aspects which do not fit together easily. 
Nevertheless, this notion, even with its mutually contradicting aspects can be seen to be of a 
specific, particular  thing, sexuality, which can be differentiated (for its thinker) from other 
things, like e.g. from friendship, love,  or compassion.  It can be  seen  as a historical and a 
particular construction, as it is nevertheless thought by some particular self in some particular 
time and place.    
 
A thinker may comprehend that things (like sexuality) exist in the form of mutually “other” 
thoughts (in parts, or moments, of which some contradict others) not only for itself, but for 
other selves as well. Further, it may move towards reciprocally recognitive relationships by 
acknowledging the other selves as capable of acknowledging, that the mutually contradicting 
aspects (concerning a thing like sexuality) all provide valid knowledge of sexuality. As such, 
a thinker may be able to allow free other thinking concerning sexuality.  
 
The “thirdness”, or the nature of the thinker as a mediator between contradicting thoughts or 
moments  can either remain unknown  (external, abstract)  for the thinker itself (as is the case 
e.g. when thinking is dominated by “consciousness as Understanding”, as well as in the case 
of the abstract, “split minds”, such as Unhappy Consciousness ). Or, it can become known to 
the thinker itself, as is the case in actual self-consciousness (see e.g. chapter 2.2.11.) (PhS 
§799)  
 
Especially in the beginning of PhS the self-mediation assumes undeveloped forms. It takes the 
form of externally related thoughts. The early forms of mediation are seen as undeveloped 
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because the thinking subject lacks reflectivity and cannot see its thoughts as its own.  It is not 
aware of its conceptual capacities. Consequently, its conceptual parts may exist as an external 
reality to it. Further, the thinker may think that there is an “other knower” or an “other 
knowing”  beyond its own knowing (like e.g. a god, “fate”, “spirits of the dead” etc.). It may 
project some of its own thoughts (of the world, itself and other people) into this “beyond”. At 
the undeveloped stages the thinker does not find these “beyonds” and “other knowings” as its 
own conceptual moments, i.e. as its own capacity to contradict some thoughts through others 
or to move “beyond” some thoughts into the realm of other thoughts.  (see e.g. PhS §143-148, 
§204-205, §227-230) Further, a thinker may think that the other thinking exerts  power on it, 
i.e that  the other is  somehow related to it.  Yet,  it  does not identify the other thinking or the 
other intentionality as its own conceptual moment, a moment of itself.  
 
The early forms of self-mediation (between selves own thinking and the “beyond” or, other 
thinking) are undeveloped; hence, the beyond is an arbitrary power. A thinking subject  may 
believe  that  somewhere  “out  there”,  in  the  minds  of  “noble  classes”  or  “in  the  kingdom  of  
gods” etc. there is a creature/creatures who know more about things, or who know the 
universal truth about everything. Thinking posits the thought (“the universal truth”) internal to 
itself into this beyond.  The beyond is un-reachable because the thinker does not see it as its 
own  beyond,  i.e.  related  to  itself  as  a  self-relational  thinker.   The  universal  truth  about  the  
subject is seen to lie outside of the particular subjects own resources of thinking and knowing. 
The subject thinks that the beyond (which Hegel calls at times also by the somewhat Kantian 
term (thing) “in itself”, see e.g. PhS §544-545) contains timeless secrets of it, which the 
subject cannot grasp by its own limited thinking. Yet, the thought of the subjects incapability 
to reach the beyond, or, the “in itself” takes place as its own thought. (ibid.)  
 
 
2.1.6. Phenomenology.  Idealism.  Things presented in thought as constructions  
 
 
For Hegel concepts - and selves as concepts - are ideas and ideal. This means that the world, 
which appears “out there” is constituted conceptually for its thinker, or seer.  For Hegel, 
thinking is fundamentally  phenomenological.  The something, which thinking is of, appears 
to its thinker as objective reality. This world is differentiated internally (for its “looker”, who 
is always not only a looker but also a thinker) according to its thinkers system of thinking.  A 
thinking self thinks of particular things, and it sees “out there” the things it thinks. Because 
there exists particularities in thinking, a thinker can see particularities “out there”.    
 
The basic idea of idealism is that a thinking mind presents things to itself on the basis of 
itself, self-relationally.  It reads the reality on the basis of its own thinking system as an 
interpretative key.  “That thing out there” takes place as a construction in thinking. Things 
appear always  as  particulars  to  the  thinker.   The  way  things  appear  as  particular  objects  is  
however just one dimension of them as concepts. For Hegel, the way things appear is 
constituted by a “larger” conceptual whole, reaching outside of any specific temporal and 
contextual particular appearance. Any particular appearance of things is a moment of a larger 
conceptual whole, which is, importantly, contradictory.  In this sense, concepts are actualized, 
on the other hand, as a particular objectivity (i.e. as a particular, internally differentiated 
world “out there”) and, on the other hand, as a conceptually changeable objectivity.     
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In a way, the Hegelian self is a language, according to which, as always a particular language, 
it reads the world. The real, appearing world is always something particular, read on the basis 
of a particular interpretative scheme, “language”. Yet, the aspect of reading and seeing things 
“out there” on the basis of a particular language is just one moment of the thinking self as an 
internally contradictory concept.  It denotes the part of Consciousness as Understanding and 
the part of “labouring particular objects”.  However, it is important to emphasize that for 
Hegel Consciousness as Understanding does not disappear at any level of conceptual 
thinking. It becomes in a way “aufgehoben”, i.e. sublated, cancelled yet preserved at all levels 
of thinking, also at the stage of “absolute” knowing and the ideal state. (see e.g. Hutchings 
2003, 41; Ikäheimo 2000, 85) 
 
Importantly, according to Hegel, self needs to become conscious of itself as a concept, 
including also other parts than itself as a particular (not contradictory) language. Hegel saw 
that Kant and the Enlightenment thinking realized, quite rightly,  that the self is a particular 
language, and that there is something else about to the self and things than what a language 
can say, as any language is a particular language. However, Hegel saw that because 
Enlightenment thinking did not actually go further this thought, i.e. that there is something 
like “thing in itself” which no particular “thing for us” can describe or relate to in an ordinary 
way, this thinking ended into abstract formalism. If “thing in itself” is thought to be an 
epistemologically relevant part of things yet thought as “beyond” the knowledge of particular 
thinking subjects, this thinking turns things into empty abstractions. If something is thought as 
a constitutive part  of  things,  yet  seen  as  something  which  cannot  be  known  as  a  particular  
“something”,  the  thinking  which  thinks  like  this  ends  up  into  one  version  of  the  system  of  
Lordship and Bondage.  Things fail to appear as particulars to this thinker, except through an 
“enslaved” bondsman.  This thinker splits internally, dualistically, along the lines of Lordship 
and Bondage to be able to see particular reality, i.e. to “labour actual material particularity” 
for itself. The questions of the failing appearance of things (i.e. failing performativity, to use 
Butler´s terminology) are important questions as concerns this study. They are  discussed 
further in connection with Butler´s theory of performativity in chapters 4.1.6.- 4.1.8  
 
Hegel analyzes in PhS a type of thinking, in which e.g. thoughts like  “movement of things” 
and “otherness of things” are formulated.  For Hegel, if things are thought as “constituted by 
their beyonds” or as “changing in time” so that these thoughts are not thought self-
consciously (namely, as particular parts of a conceptual whole), thinking is self-contradictory.  
Hegel discusses this kind of thinking throughout PhS, for example in the Introduction. Hegel 
sees that for this kind of thinking the world as something real and particular, vanishes. 
Particular world vanishes (for this thinking) because particularity is seen as constituted by 
aspects which are not particular. Because the non-particular aspects of the world are not seen 
as internally, self-consciously  related  with the particular world, the non-particular aspects 
constitute an external, non-subjective “truth” of the world. According to Hegel, it is important 
that we relate all the aspects, namely all the thoughts, through which we think of the world, to 
our conceptual thinking of them. All aspects through which we think of the world and 
ourselves,   yet,  which  we do  not   particularize  and  relate  to  our  own thinking  of  them,  are  
seen as external reality by us. Non-particular thoughts of the world appear in various ways for 
their thinker, depending on the level of the development of self-consciousness. They may 
appear as “magical, super-natural, aspects of reality. Or, they may appear as the 
Enlightenment abstractivity, which sees things as instrumental (see chapter 2.2.7)  
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2.1.7. Subjective thinker and its philosophy  
 
 
Hegel  conducts,  along  PhS,  a  differentiation  as  to  what  the  thinking  self  knows about  itself  
and the world and what  “we” or “us” know about the thinking and about the world.   Hegel 
makes a differentiation between how the subject (observed in the book) thinks of things and 
how the world appears to it, and how the ones observing the subject (“we”) see things. For 
example, in §394 (at the developmental stage of the Enlightenment reason) Hegel points out 
that now the self-consciousness has itself realized that it is a self-consciousness, whereas 
before this state of things was known only by us. He writes:  
 
Self-consciousness has now grasped the Notion of itself which, to begin with, 
was only our Notion of it, viz. that in its certainty of itself it is all reality; (PhS 
§394)   
 
Comments like this, relating and comparing the thinking self (observed by the “we” of the 
text) and  the “we” take frequently place along PhS. Interestingly, the subject (observed by 
“us”) develops dialectically so that in the end the gap between the subject and “us” 
disappears. The subject knows as much about itself as the readers of PhS.  
 
In the beginning of PhS, only “we” (the philosophical text of PhS itself) see that all thinking 
relates to self, and that there is also an outside, otherness to all thinking.  Only “we” see, for 
most part of the text, that the “otherness” is internal to all selves. Yet, the subjective thinking 
itself, observed by “us”, is not aware of this.  First, the outside of subjective thinking exists 
only for “us”, not for the subjective thinking itself, observed by “us”. “We” see that the 
outside affects subjective thinking. The subjective thinking itself, especially at the levels of 
“Sense-certainty” and “Understanding” (explained more thoroughly later) does not see this. 
As such, the subject thinks of itself and the world in general very differently than “we”.  (PhS 
§794-798) 
 
When the subjective thinking itself (not only “we”) starts to become aware of its own 
(internal) outside, this outside turns from being outside of subjective thinking (and thus 
existing only in the thinking of “us”)  into being inside of subjective thinking. When things 
become subjective (thought by the subjective thinking, i.e. constructed as objects in subjective 
thinking) they become, interestingly,  known as conceptual “somethings” (limited objects) 
also for “us” (i.e.,  for  the  storytelling   “we”  of  PhS).  In other words, the internal abstract 
externality becomes self-consciously, conceptually internal, and as such, particularized, when 
it is turned from being known only by “us”, into being known also by the subjective thinker.   
It is very important to see how Hegel displays along PhS that the outside itself, or otherness 
itself cannot know itself (its own particularity) until its own Other, namely the particular 
subject (observed by “us” in PhS) has rendered it as a particular Other for itself.   
 
Particular subjective thinking denotes the object of reflection for “us” (the storytelling “we” 
of  PhS).  The  philosophical  “we”  constitutes  a  specific,  transcendental  moment  of   other 
thinking in the structure of PhS, which knows more of the subject than the subject itself, until 
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the end of PhS.  All along PhS the subject (observed by the “we”) is described in relation to 
its Other. The two sides (subjective, particular thinking and the Other thinking, outside of it) 
are constantly  interpreted and constituted from the point of view of each other. Otherness 
takes, dialectically, various forms in PhS. It changes as the subject becomes more and more 
aware of it as a  thinking and knowing, which has its own self, similar with the selves own 
self.   Ultimately,  they  are  to  acknowledge  each  others  as  similar,  complex  beings,  as  
independent and free self-consciousnesses. As such, they have found their universal genus (a 
free self-consciousness) and identified themselves as particular instances of this genus. When 
this happens, self-relational thinking has become particularized for itself, as it acknowledges 
the  other  self-relational  thinking  as  its  equal.  As  such,  the  two  fundamental  needs  of  a  
thinking self, namely,  to be free and to be a particular part of a larger whole, become 
satisfied.   (PhS §223-230) 
 
It appears that the ultimate, or the “last” otherness of PhS  takes place as the storytelling 
“we”. “We” denotes the ultimate “larger thinking”, in which both the subjective thinking and 
the various “other” thinkings and beyonds are thought along the text.  The “we” becomes 
united with itself (the contradictory self-consciousness) in the end of the book even that, in a 
way, it is present since the beginning. When this ultimate “sublation” takes place (in this 
specific historical text, i.e. in PhS) the dualist distinction between the “we” of the book and 
the “particular subject” disappears. As such, self-reflective thinking becomes an object for 
itself, because it does not place any epistemological part (in terms of an external “us”) beyond 
the thinking subjects any more.  
 
Very importantly, the philosophy of the free, self-conscious thinking (which, in a way, is the 
story  of  the  “we”  of  the  book)  which  is  all  along  telling  the  narrative  of  PhS,  cannot  know 
itself until the particular subject, which the “we” reflects from its place “beyond”, knows it in 
a conceptually mediated way.  The “sublation” between the “we” (the philosophy of  free self-
consciousness) and its “own” particular subjectivity takes place by the end of the book.   Until 
the end, the text is divided into a reflecting otherness (the “we”) and the reflected particular, 
historical subject. Philosophy reflects subjectivity from a view point, which is itself for most 
parts  of  the  book  somewhere  beyond  the  observed  subject.  This  is  the  case  e.g.  when  the  
otherness takes the form of “unknown natural forces” (at the level of Sense-certainty) or the 
form of stable, external knowledge (at the level of Consciousness as Understanding), or as 
abstract philosophy (the Kantian, or, Enlightenment thinking). At these levels the subjective 
thinking is lead by its beyond, which it considers an external fact.  Yet, the ultimate 
“otherness” in PhS, constantly present as the philosophy of PhS (the storytelling “we”) knows 
that these various versions of beyond are internal into the subjective thinking of them, even 
that the subjective thinking itself takes them as external facts or powers.   The philosophy of 
PhS (the “we”) sees that the various beyonds (which denote the enormous conceptual capacity 
of the thinking subject to move beyond itself inside itself) are all along the subjective thinking 
self’s own internal beyonds. In a way, PhS tells a story of how the philosophy of the subject 
renders everything it has  so far become conscious of (of the subject i.e. of itself) subjective 
and historical (for itself). In the end, the various philosophical beyonds become seen (by the 
philosophy itself, i.e. by the “us”) to be subjective and historical. (PhS§ 227-231, 794-798).  
 
The point when the “outside” (beyond) starts to transform from being somewhat completely 
outside of subjective thinking (and thus known only by the storytelling voice of PhS, “we”), 
into being recognized as constitutive (of itself) also by the subjective thinking itself marks the 
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stage when the major modern problems concerning self-reflection, namely abstraction, begin. 
Thinking goes through several stages where it always constitutes only an abstract, external 
knowledge of itself (i.e. knowledge which is beyond the capacity of the particular subjective 
thinker).  Thinking appears to reduce itself somewhat totally into the moment of the “abstract 
beyond”.  Because it thinks of otherness as an abstract other, and looks at itself from the 
view-point of this abstract other, it knows itself as an abstraction. As abstract, the otherness is 
indifferent. Importantly, when the otherness is recognized as constitutive of the particular 
subject for (by)  the particular subject itself, and thought as beyond the limited capacities of 
the particular subject for the particular subject itself  it becomes an “indifferentiating” and an 
“abstracting” power inside the subjective thinking.  Hegel’s solution to this is that he united 
the “internally differentiated” moment (“thing for us”), and the “indifferent” moment, the 
indifferent  otherness  (“thing  in  itself”)  into  a  self  as  a  concept.   For  Hegel,  the  moment  of  
“indifference”, namely the moment of abstraction, is historical, subjective, and particular. It is 
one of the moments of subjective thinking, to which there is other aspects too (like e.g. 
particular subjectivity).   In PhS, Hegel displays that at times, the conceptual moment of 
indifference assumes the form of unknown spirits of nature, or unknown gods, and, at more 
theoretical times, it assumes the form of e.g. the Kantian “thing in itself”.      
 
In a way, Hegel presents in  PhS a narrative theory of such a subjective, particular  thinking 
self who is able to think the way Hegel himself does, and write books like PhS.  Thus, Hegel 
solves the “Ishmaelian” problem by explaining his own possibility.  He explains where his 
own thinking has come from: how it  is  what  it  is.   For  example,  such  a  theory  of  a  subject  
which explains everything in terms of powers which are necessarily incomprehensible for the 
subject itself, cannot explain its own possibility.  It cannot explain what kind of a subject can 
form  such  a  theory  of  a  subject.  That  kind  of  thinking  is  a  typical  example  of  what  Hegel  
means by a thinking which is in contradiction with itself. Contemporary philosophers (for 
example, Habermas), use the term “performative contradiction”. A “performative 
contradiction” is a speech act whose content is incompatible with the fact that it is performed. 
Typical Hegelian self-contradictions are performative contradictions rather than just plain 
inconsistencies. (see on this theme e.g. Hutchings 2003, 40-43; Rosen 1974, 196). 
 
According to my interpretation, not only the concept of recognition or the famous section on 
the dialectics of Lord and Bondsman, but also the descriptions of various forms of one-sided 
consciousness found in PhS have a political relevance.  They  depict  different  forms  of  
scepticism, relativism, and dogmatism.  They can be connected with different cultural and 
political attitudes and with corresponding social forms. The internally contradictory nature of 
these one-sided forms of consciousness makes their corresponding social forms unstable (and, 
for Hegel “unreal”). Because of the internal contradictions, these forms of consciousness 
cannot be generally shared. They represent asymmetric, non-reciprocal, forms of recognition.  
Hegel argues that only the form of consciousness which is based on universal reciprocal 
recognition can be stable (i.e. non-self-denying) in this sense. 
 
PhS  tells  a  story  of  how  a  self  develops  to  relate  to  itself  and  to  another  self  in  a  more  
satisfying way i.e. in a more free, reciprocally recognitive, “sharing” way. The levels of the 
developing self-consciousness have their social base and correspond with how social 
institutions, laws etc. are constructed. (see Ikäheimo 2003, 69-73). Pippin writes of the 
Hegelian “institutions’ self-consciousness”: 
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His  idealist  argument  connects  the  very  possibility  of  any  number  of  basic  
institutions with their forms of self-understanding with, peculiar as it is to say, 
the institutions’ self-consciousness. And it is clear that he thinks that such a 
conditioning self-consciousness introduces a kind of dissatisfaction, or self-
negating impetus, into these institutions in ways that cannot be resolved until 
there is a full “scientific” account by thought of the basic categorical distinctions 
involved in such self-understanding and an account of the ground of such 
distinctions, their rationality, at least as defended in Hegel’s “self-moving” 
account.  (Pippin 1989, 169) 
 
 
 
2.2. The Stages of Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
2.2.1.  Understanding and Conceptual thinking  
 
 
This chapter  with its sub-chapters 2.2.1-2.2.7 discusses the development of thinking and 
knowing in PhS in detail. It discusses at length especially the way conceptual thinking and 
knowing can be constructed from externally related thoughts (pure self-consciousness) as well 
as from conceptually related thoughts (actual self-consciousness).  Hegel theorizes how the 
parts of the basic doubleness  are thought in relation to each other at different levels of 
thinking and knowing. Sometimes the sides are thought as external thoughts, which refute the 
existence of each other.  Yet, as the thinking self becomes gradually more aware of itself as 
the synthesizer of its internal thoughts, the thoughts become more conceptually and self-
consciously mediated with each other. This chapter explicates how the thinking proceeds in 
becoming conscious of its internal thoughts, and in relating them with each other.  
 
As considers thinking, Hegel speaks of different levels, or forms of thinking, for example of 
Sense-certainty,  Understanding and Conceptual thinking.   The most important differences 
between  “thinkings”  are   between  a   sensuous  level  of  thinking  called  Sense-Certainty,  the  
“ordinary”, stable thinking called Understanding, and the internally mediated, dynamic 
thinking called conceptual thinking. The difference between Understanding and conceptual 
thinking could be maybe exemplified as the difference between a particular language, and, a 
construction where a particular language is one moment, together with other moments like 
abstracting from the particular language, and moving beyond the particular language into 
otherness, a larger context where the particular language is situated and explained.   
 
Ultimately, in PhS, all these levels of thinking are to be included into self-conscious 
conceptual thinking. Self-conscious conceptual thinking consists of internally mediated, 
differentiated and particularized moments. The internal moments, or thoughts, are 
particularized by being identified as the thoughts of a particular thinker. As parts of a self-
conscious concept, they appear as fundamentally different than when they dominate thinking 
by themselves, alone.  PhS depicts a developmental narrative in which different forms of 
thinking first dominate thinking alone, and then become included in a “larger” thinking.    
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In the beginning of PhS, Hegel  describes a form of thinking which in a way lacks particular 
subjectivity. It is conducted on the basis of what Hegel describes as pure “I”.  It  cannot  
comprehend particularity, because it does not see itself as a particular. Because its self is (for 
it) non-particular, the world appears for it as non-particular. The point of view, from which it 
sees the world, relates to the world it sees, hence, because it does not at this moment see the 
world from a particular, limited point of view (i.e. from a subject-position), it sees the world 
as not limited, not differentiated into particular entities.   It is an undifferentiating thinking, 
and cannot grasp things as particulars.  As such, thinking is described as sensuous. Thinking 
is not about particular things, as it cannot understand things as determinate somethings, 
posited into their places within any kind of an internally differentiating and relating  systemic 
whole. Instead, it is about sensuous immediacy.  Nevertheless, the thinker sees, hears and 
feels.  Hegel talks here about thinking and knowing as Sense-certainty. The “thing”, that this 
seeing and hearing is of, is not figured as a particular “something” for this thinking. Even that 
it points at “this” and  another  “this”, it cannot differentiate between “this” and “that”, so that 
they would be  particulars for this thinking. As such, sensuous thinking is somewhat abstract. 
Hegel calls the “something”, that this thinking is of, as pure Being, or, Being in general.  The 
locus of thinking and seeing (pure I) corresponds with what is seen (pure Being). “Pure 
Being” is not actually any “something” because it is not a an internally differentiated whole. 
(§90-92; §97-99, SL 82-83) 
 
According to M.J.Inwood,  sense-certainty in PhS is about immediate awareness of items in 
our  sensory  field.   Mind  picks  out  particular  items  in  its  experience.  It  picks  out   “that”  or  
“this”, and it is aware of something like “now”, denoting experience of temporality.   What is 
seen by the mind does  not, however, have determinacy in such a way that the particular 
items, picked out by the mind, would make up an internally differentiated, circumscribed 
system of “determinate being”. As such, there is no  circumscribed “subject”, nor no 
circumscribed “object”. At this stage, thoughts do not take place as a whole, or as a system. 
Thoughts are intimately connected to sensory experiences, even that “token-reflexive” words 
(or indexicals) like “this” and “that” are used. (Inwood 1983 l, 14, 73,123) Hegel seems to 
present a linguistic argument: we cannot refer to definite particular things if our language 
does not contain expressions for universals. 
 
M.J. Inwood writes about the Hegelian stage of sense-certainty: 
 
If  I  am  sense-certain,  I  survey  the  sensible  world  in  all  its  concrete  richness  
without classifying, conceptualizing or selecting, and I attempt to express what I 
am conscious of by the use of such words as “this”, “here”, and “now”(ibid.73) 
 
Hegel’s sense-certainty may either be conceived as a description of a primitive stage of 
human thinking, or, then, just as a thought-experiment intended to demonstrate the necessity 
of universal concepts. 
 
Thinking becomes a thinking of something at  the  level  of  Understanding. This is called by 
Hegel the “ordinary”, or  every-day-life-way of thinking.  As said earlier, this thinking can be 
seen as a particular language. It reads the world on the basis of its internally differentiated and 
particularized system which resembles the structure of some particular language.  It thinks 
about particular things. It looks at the world as an internally differentiated whole. Yet,  it does 
not relate the particulars which it  sees to its  own thinking of them.  As such, thinking has a 
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subject, yet, it lacks a subject who is aware of its subjectivity as being related to its own self-
relational particular language. Things are particular, but their particularity is not seen by this 
thinker  itself  to  be  related  to  particular universality. Particulars are posited through a 
reference to universality, yet, the universality is understood as the only universality there is.  
Consequently, this thinker sees its own “language” as the external reality. As such the a priori 
given universal is understood as timeless, unchangeable, non-subjective. (PhS §120-131)  
 
Understanding “reads” the world on the basis of a stable construction.  Every “thing” is its 
own position amongst a closed system of positions. Things become basically identifiable by 
being differentiated from each other by their relational positions within the system. Also the 
thinkers own self is a stable position, with its stable identity. The system of Understanding is 
its own universe, a meaningful unity. It is a particular universe, yet, Understanding itself does 
not see its own particularity.  (PhS §133) 
 
For Understanding things are always, timelessly and universally as they (now) appear to it. 
Understanding sees a stable, universal world, and anything which contradicts with its picture 
of  the  world  is  considered  as  a  perversion  from  the  right,  natural  way,  or  maybe  a  sin.   If  
somebody  sees  the  world  differently,  it  is  not  “different”  but  “false”,  or  “sinful”.   
Understanding lacks a reflective attitude towards itself, namely, self-consciousness, which 
means that it does not see that its own way of thinking is a particular, self-relational way of 
thinking.  
 
For Hegel, conceptual thinking is a higher or more encompassing level of thinking than 
Sense-certainty and Understanding, because it includes both of them into itself and thus goes 
beyond them. It reaches beyond the “particular language” of Understanding, as one of its 
internal thoughts is   abstraction from particularities. It includes a moment of abstraction 
within itself. It also includes some idea of “other thinking” in itself.   
 
Abstraction from particular contents is necessary in order for any conceptual thought or self-
reflective thought to take place. However, for Hegel in PhS, abstraction is also a key to 
various self-contradictions which can be made whenever reflective thinking takes place. 
These “errors”, inhering in many ways in the very faculty of abstraction, can take place at 
various levels of the dialectics in PhS. Every step “forward” in dialectics is conducted by 
abstracting  from  the  old  one,  the  old  or  actually  present  level  of  thinking.   Every  step  is  a  
possibility towards a larger context of thinking and knowing. By coming into contact with 
“something new”, the old context can be enlarged. In order to reach this larger context, an act 
of stepping aside from the totality of the old one must take place. However, at the moment of 
abstraction, there is a possibility to stop there, at the level of abstraction. Thinking can stop at 
the level of “pure self-reflection”, namely external self-reflection, called by Hegel as pure 
self-consciousness. When this kind of stopping takes place, the earlier level of thinking and 
knowing becomes contextualized in an abstract context.  The earlier form of thinking is 
looked at, reflected upon, from an abstract (indifferent, non-particular, external) point of 
view, instead of being reflected from a particular, different other point of view. As such, an 
external, abstract beyond becomes a locus (or a genus) for self-reflection.    
 
As concerns Consciousness as Understanding, it may end up being contextualized in an 
abstract context, by pure self-consciousness. It can become a “Bondsman”, a “labourer” for 
pure self-consciousness, because it can “produce” the particularities which the pure self-
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consciousness is unable to produce itself.  The only way for the pure self-consciousness to be 
in contact with particularity is through an external other thinking (an external Bondsman, who 
labours for it), depicted by Hegel in PhS as the dialectics between Lord and Bondsman, the 
thinking of Unhappy Consciousness and Reason etc.   
 
In the above cases (Unhappy Consciousness etc.), according to Hegel, a leap into the early 
forms of thinking takes place, denoted by “Sense-certainty”, originating in pure “I”. Or, 
actually, the thinking splits into two parts, the other one resembling Sense-certainty, and the 
other one resembling the particular thinking, denoted by Consciousness as Understanding. 
When a thinker thinks of things  by  these  two  externally  related  parts,  it  splits  into  two  
thoughts, between which an absolute dialectical unrest occurs. This dialectics is a kind of 
movement, yet, nothing actually moves along this movement. (PhS §203-208) (this is 
explained further in chapter 2.2.6). A seemingly “higher” level of thinking, one with a long 
history of development behind it, does not surprisingly automatically protect the thinker from 
the possibility of regressing into self-contradictory ways of thinking, at least for some time. 
Hence, the succession of various forms of self-consciousness presented in PhS cannot be 
interpreted as a linear historical development. Our contemporaries can be “stoics”, “sceptics” 
and so on.   
 
In order to avoid the moment of abstractivity from becoming a limitless, total context of 
thinking, abstractivity should be particularized. It should be identified as a particular moment 
of abstraction, related to the particularity from which it is abstracted. For Hegel, any 
abstraction relates to its particular thinker and to the other conceptual parts of its thinker. In 
this sense, any moment of abstraction relates to the particular thing, from which it is 
abstracted, as well as to the history and “otherness” of this particular thing.  (PhS §79-80) 
 
Abstraction is one important moment in the Hegelian idea of self-reflection, inherent in 
conceptual thinking. However, ideally, it becomes a self-consciously mediated moment within 
self. As particularized, and thus limited, it becomes a limited abstraction, instead of being un-
limited and borderless. As such, it does not render the other thoughts of self similar with it.  It 
keeps  within  its  limits.  It  denotes,  in  a  way,  the  first  step  in  the  act  of  self-reflection,  the  
initiative stepping outside of the self`s particular (present, or old) view-point. It denotes the 
moment when we realize that “things could be maybe thought differently”. Yet, when things 
are actually thought differently, the other point of view cannot be an external abstraction. 
External abstractions cannot be actual other points of views. For Hegel, an actual other point 
of view is found in another self-consciousness. (ibid., §190) 
 
For Hegel, if self or things are looked at from an indifferent “other point of view”, things and 
self become indifferent. The look of an indifferent other is indifferentiating.  It indifferentiates 
its object. It turns its object into a non-particular object, i.e. an abstraction. Actual other view-
point to things (i.e. a viewpoint which is more than a mere abstraction) is taken by a particular 
Other.  Abstraction remains an important moment, yet, in self-conscious conceptual thinking 
it becomes a mediated, particularized moment in thinking. Here, a difference between 
conceptual thinking and self-conscious conceptual thinking is a crucial one. Thinking is 
always conceptual, yet, only self-conscious thinking identifies its conceptual parts as 
belonging to its own thinking of them. Self-conscious thinking can return its conceptual parts 
(thoughts) to itself and thus recognize them as subjective, instead of seeing them as non-
subjective external reality.   
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In Hegel’s view, things are never necessarily or “naturally” beyond our cognitive powers. 
Hegel actually criticises Kant and Enlightenment thinking for thinking in this way about 
things. For them, certain things (Kant’s “thing in itself”) are hidden from the consciousness. 
They must, then, be determined by unknown powers, resembling the unknown natural forces 
which govern the primitive and un-conceptualized world of “Sense-certainty”. The thinker, 
who thinks this contingent movement, does not itself bring  the  two  sides  of  itself  together,  
namely the sides of “particular thinking” and “Sense-certainty” (pure “I”), yet, moves 
continuously between these two poles.  
 
A self-conscious conceptual thinker is able to realize that the “beyond”, which affects the 
stable world, seen by Consciousness as Understanding, is another moment within its own 
(conceptual) thinking.  In self-conscious conceptual thinking the role of the self as an active 
mediator (a third, a minister) between its internal thoughts is fundamental. Self practices 
internally mediated thinking within itself, as a unity, concept.  Here, “Concept” is in a way a 
synonym to “self”, “third” and “mediator”. The important idea is that the self can recognize 
its role as a mediator.   
 
 
2.2.2. The singularity, doubleness and triplicity of knowing.  
 
 
In the last chapter the faculty of thinking was explicated. To repeat the basic idea, thinking 
cannot be separated from knowing. Nevertheless, in this sub-chapter knowing is given a 
special focus.  Hegel speaks of Consciousness,  Self-consciousness, Reason, Spirit and 
absolute knowing.  In PhS thinking and knowing always entail each other.  M.J. Inwood 
writes: 
 
It is true that on Hegel´s account conceptual and, more generally, cognitive 
systems are, at least to a high degree, self-developing and self-determining. The 
determinate nature of those systems which are known to us or of their parts is 
guaranteed by their internal relationships or by the relationships of the parts to 
each other. The concept of causality, for example, is what it is in virtue of its 
position in a system of concepts, its logical relationship to other concepts. 
Again, perception in the Phenomenology – the view of the world as consisting 
of things with properties –owes its determinate character, in part at least, to its 
historical and/or rational relationships to other forms of consciousness.(Inwood 
1983, 123-124) 
 
In PhS, as considers not only thinking but also knowing, Hegel addresses first the stage of 
Sense-certainty.  Sense-certainty denotes faculties like “seeing” and “hearing”, as was already 
explicated before when thinking was discussed. Sense-certainty sees that something exists, 
yet, it is frustrated by its own incapacity of actually explicating what exists. Sense-certainty 
denotes a singular, abstract knowing.  
 
The phase of sense-certainty gives way to Consciousness, which is in a more adequate way a 
consciousness of something determinate.  Consciousness,  as  a  type  of  knowing,  relates  to  
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Understanding, as a type of thinking. Further, by the emergence of self-consciousness, a self-
reflective turn is made.  Self-consciousness is always a consciousness of other consciousness, 
or other knowing, besides being a consciousness of the selves own consciousness. When a 
consciousness takes itself (its own consciousness) as its object, it must relate it, objectify it in 
relation to something similar with it. Consciousness of other knowing (i.e. another 
consciousness, outside of consciousnesses own consciousness, yet similar with it) is thus a 
necessary part of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a consciousness of things as 
double. It includes a thought of its own knowing of things and a thought of other knowing of 
things.  (PhS §147-150)   
 
Hegel’s view may be explicated in terms of the traditional trilemma of justified knowledge. 
First, consciousness takes itself as an object. Thus, it is doubled: there is the object of 
knowledge, the self, and the knowing subject, the self-consciousness. However, the self-
consciousness can itself become a further object of knowledge (as it is, for example, in 
Hegel’s philosophy); then, a higher form of self-consciousness has to be postulated. Because 
consciousness is free, it can also take this higher form of self-consciousness as its object, and 
so on. There is an infinite regress, in Hegel’s terms, a “bad infinite”. Logically, there are only 
three possibilities. The regress may go on infinitely, it may be halted in a dogmatic and 
arbitrary way (for example, when a religious or scientific authority just pronounces “the 
ultimate truth”), or it may form some kind of circle. Hegel chooses the last possibility. There 
is no endless regress but a mutual, symmetrical relationship between two consciousnesses 
which can reflect each other.  
 
By  the  notion  of   the play of Forces  Hegel explains why  and  how  Consciousness  as  
Understanding is pushed to (conceptually) step beyond its stable world. (§135-139)  There 
emerges something which contradicts the stable reality seen by Consciousness as 
Understanding.  There emerges an inner pull beyond the closed language on the basis of 
which Consciousness reads the world. This “something else” cannot be explained from the 
point of view, or contained by the system of differentiations, of the stable Consciousness as 
Understanding. Consciousness realizes that things do not universally and timelessly 
correspond with its categorizations. Consciousness e.g. sees that things can be “wrong”, that 
they can be “out” of their natural categories.  For example, the sexuality of some people may 
be “wrong”.  Consciousness sees that things do not always correspond with what it thought to 
be their universal nature. For example, people act against their stable, universal, God-ordained 
nature. They worship false gods.  Consciousness may refute the otherness as wrong or sinful, 
however, it is nevertheless troubled by the thought that maybe the otherness may include 
valid knowledge of the world. It is also troubled by the thought that there is an Other who is 
in contradiction to it, an Other, who does not recognize the universal validity of its own 
(correct, rational) idea of the world. The freedom of the Other troubles the consciousness 
(however, what in fact troubles this consciousness is its own freedom in the Other). What is 
needed now is a way to relate with the “something else”, with the “beyond” of the universal, 
stable system of Consciousness as Understanding.   
 
Thinking needs an explanation of the beyond, namely, the world or people which are beyond 
its own stable world.  Yet, importantly, it also strives to maintain itself, i.e. its stability and 
unity. Because “things” are basically identified (as particulars) on the basis of Consciousness 
as Understanding,  the stable, unified consciousness must be somehow preserved.  If things 
are not thought as determined particulars, they cannot be thought at all, because thinking is 
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always of some thing. Consciousness has to use some system of categorization or “conceptual 
scheme”, however imperfect or unsatisfactory it might be. However, there nevertheless is this 
beyond, which the thinking is enthralled with and which threatens its stability. It needs to 
explain the beyond while at the same time maintaining its capacity to identify stable objects.  
If the thinking does not explain the beyond conceptually (internally), thinking remains 
externally/dualistically split between these two levels or forms: itself and its beyond/Other.  It 
remains split between consciousness of particularity (Consciousness as Understanding) and 
the consciousness of the consciousness of particularity (Self-consciousness). Only in Absolute 
knowing these two levels finally meet. (explained further in chapter 2.2.11) (PhS §135-
150,161-165; Taylor 1975, 128-135)  
 
By starting to acknowledge the Other as some sort of an “inner pull”, or, as a “pressing 
argument” (i.e. by starting to acknowledge the Other as a valid Other)  consciousness starts to 
be for itself what it is in itself, namely, a self-relational system of thinking. Further, self starts 
to become aware of its own free self-relationality by becoming conscious of free, other self-
relationality.  It starts to see self-relationality also outside of itself. Self-relationality as such 
(as a genus) begins to be objectified when thinking reflects one self-relationality from the 
view-point of something similar with it.  A reflective turn towards self-relationality takes 
place. Before this self-reflective turn, the self’s own self-relational world appeared as external 
reality for consciousness. Now, the external world starts to be seen as internal to the 
consciousness of it. Consequently, there is a drastic change in what appears as external for 
consciousness.  “The world of another thinker”, namely, a world which exists for other self-
relational thinking, takes over the place of what appears as external, or, what is thought as 
outside of self.  Importantly, externality, or outside of self, starts to reflect the consciousness 
back to itself. Another self-relational world reflects another self-relational world.  (PhS §175-
177)  
 
Thirdly, a thinking self starts to develop an idea of what is later to be known as “shared 
knowing”, “Being for Self and for Other”, or “reciprocally constituted objectivity”. Self 
realizes that there is “other worlds”, which, importantly, not just exist there, completely 
outside of its own world, but which affect its own self-relational world.  A thinking self starts 
to  see  that  its  own  consciousness  and  the  other,  contradicting  consciousness  are  of  a  same 
thing. By thinking that these worlds are basically thoughts of a same thing, the thinking self  
sets  a conceptually constitutive relation between them. If they were not of a same thing, they 
could not affect each other, but instead, they would exist as atomistic contexts of thinking and 
knowing. If these two (or more) pieces of knowledge were not of a same thing, there could be 
no idea of the internal doubleness of “thing”, or internal doubleness of a subjective thinking. 
Internal doubleness of  things and subjects is constituted as the relation between selves own 
consciousness of a thing and the other/s consciousness of a thing.  
 
External  doubleness  takes  place  between  two  atomistic  thoughts.  In  contrast  to  external  
doubleness, an idea of internal doubleness starts to develop (at least in Hegel’s narrative in 
PhS) when thinking becomes frustrated by the self-contradiction of external doubleness.  By 
starting to become aware of the internal doubleness a self-consciousness starts to think of 
things in parts. The particularity and actuality of “thing” is preserved, even if the knowing of 
a thing is constituted as a shared knowledge between the self and the Other. The other part of 
the doubleness of shared knowing is the thinking self’s own consciousness of things and the 
other  part  is  the  other  consciousness  of  things.  The  third,  necessary  part  in  this  relation  of  
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“partly knowing” is the thing itself, which unites the knowledge of the self and the Other. The 
thing must have its own independence, otherwise it can not serve as the point where the two 
viewpoints meet . If it were completely “produced” by an individual consciousness of it, the 
self and the Other would constitute atomistic consciousnesses, each producing its own 
“thing”, not related to each other.  (PhS §163-165)  
 
The independence of things is constituted along the way when self-consciousness develops 
into actual self-consciousness and finds itself in the other free self-consciousness. When self 
finds its own independent thirdness, and the equal thirdness of the other, the  “thing” as its 
own third is constituted at the same time.   
  
In this chapter I have explicated the basic idea of the Hegelian triplicity of knowing. This idea 
is more throughly discussed in the following sub-chapters (in this chapter on Hegel)  which 
discuss the development towards self-conscious self-relationality, namely, towards the 
triplicity of knowing.  It is important to note that for Hegel thinking is always fully self-
relational, yet, when thinking is self-consciously self-relational, it can go over the limits of its 
own self-relationality. Self-conscious self-relationality is reached when a self recognizes 
another thinking as its equal.  By recognizing others as its equals, self can become free from 
the limits of its knowledge.  
 
Basically, self-relationality of knowing means that consciousness of things is always self-
relational and thus singular: it is its own universe. When we understand that more than one  
thinker practices self-relational knowing, self-relationality becomes thought as plural. It takes 
place  within  the  thinking  of  more  than  one  self.  This  marks  the  entrance  into  self-
consciousness, and into the  doubleness of knowing. Doubleness, namely, self-consciousness 
of knowing may first assume the form of pure self-consciousness. Yet, pure self-
consciousness is made unhappy by its own internal self-contradictoriness, and hence pushed 
to develop into actual self-consciousness. When thinking reaches actual self-consciousness, 
and the level of shared knowing (in reciprocally recognitive  relationhips) thinking becomes 
for itself what  it  is  in itself.  Hegel uses here, basically, the Kantian terminology and 
distinction between  “thing for us” and “thing in itself”. Hegel´s intention was to theorize a 
form  of  knowing  which  would  unite  the  two  aspects  separated  by  Kant  (which Hegel 
discusses as pure self-consciousness). The two forms knowledge separated by Kant  are called 
by Hegel as Consciousness as Understanding (which sees things as particulars) and Self-
Consciousness.  In order to unite or mediate the two parts, Hegel developed an idea of self as 
a concept.  (Kant, in his Prolegomena (§46) says explicitly that “I” or “self” is not a concept, 
but only a name for the unknown object of the internal sense.)  
 
For Hegel, the uniting of the two ways to know a “thing” takes place within conceptual 
thought,  a  self  as  a  concept.  In  order  to  do  this,  each  self  had  to  be  developed  into  its  own 
“thirdness”, into a thinker who “ministers” between the internal moments of its conceptual 
whole. Self as a conceptually, self-consciously  self-relational whole is its own universe, as all 
thinking is. Yet, it can move beyond its particular limits (beyond its moment of “thing for 
us”), as well as beyond its abstract limits within itself.  
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3. Other thinking and knowing   
 
 
Otherness, i.e. other thinking, other knowing, other practical intentionality and other 
constitution of objective reality constitutes the “other side” of the famous Hegelian 
doubleness. PhS depicts a narrative of how this other realm, (which is called by a somewhat 
general name as otherness or Other in this study), relates to, and is constitutive of subjective 
thinking.  
 
For  Hegel,  thinking  and  knowing of  the  world,  as  well  as  the  constitution  of  objectivity,  is  
always  self-relational.  Yet,  the  self,  to  whom  it  relates  to,  is  a  particular  self.  Universal  
thinking, knowing and constitution of objectivity relates not only to one self but also to other 
selves. Self-relational universality is an internal part of the thinking of everybody who 
practices double thinking, i.e. thinking which constitutes particularity in reference to 
universality. The double-thinking selves must -  in order to know the world not only as related 
to themselves but also related to other double-thinking selves - know their own universal 
thinking as particular universal thinking. Each self practices universal thinking and knowing, 
i.e. internally double knowing. Thus, the effort to particularize universality is the effort to 
particularize the internal doubleness. The effort to know the other as a particular self-
relational universe is, for Hegel, the effort to know ones self as a particular self-relational 
universe.  
 
The Hegelian effort -  to particularize universal self-relationality and to go over ones own 
self-relationality  –  corresponds  closely  to  Judith  Butler’s  effort  to  become  conscious  of  the  
self-relationality of thinking and to go over it. As is explained in the chapter on Butler, she 
bases her theory on a basically similar doubleness, internal to subjective thinking and 
knowing as Hegel does, i.e. the internal, constitutive relation between a subject-position and 
its constitutive outside. Butler introduces the politics of “going beyond ones self” (the “ek-
static” politics) as a way of going beyond the limits of ones own self-relational universe and 
reaching for the “un-limitedness of thinking and knowing”.  The Hegelian solution to the 
same problem is reciprocal recognition between free self-consciousnesses.  
 
With Hegel, a subject can go over the limits of its own self-relational knowing, when it 
acknowledges the existence of other self-relational universes and starts to communicate with 
them on a reciprocal basis.  Yet, before this can happen, the subject must explore the depths 
of its own universe, and become frustrated by the extent of its own self-relationality.  Subject 
goes as far as to claim all knowing of the world as suspect, because it feels, unhappily,  that 
there is no way for it to go beyond knowledge, which would not always turn out to be its own, 
parochial  knowledge,  or  the  parochial  knowledge  of  somebody  else.   Thus,  it  explores  the  
whole universe, only to find itself - or other parochial subjects – in every place it goes. It does 
not find any independent object anywhere, only subjectively conceived objects. Every object 
it finds, relates to itself or to other selves. (PhS §173-175) 
 
Thinking finds itself, finally, also in and as an  unknown  universe  -  as  an  unknown  object.   
Even if it tries to free the object from parochial subjectivity, by claiming it to remain 
subjectively unknown, it finds even this thought as a self-relational thought. Subject realizes 
that if it claims the universe as an unknown universe, even this un-knowability relates to its 
own thinking of it. Thus, first, subject finds that all particular knowledge of the world is self-
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relational, and then secondly, it finds that also all its doubts and critical views about particular 
forms knowledge are self-relational. The subject recognizes that even the all-encompassing 
forms of scepticism or relativism are just particular, historically conditioned viewpoints.  
Thus, all knowledge concerning both of the sides of its internal doubleness (particularity and 
universality) turn out to be completely and fully self-relational.  
 
Everything which is thought or perceived by the self seems to be dependent on, not 
independent of the self (including its own self as an object for itself).  This frustrates the self, 
because it feels that if it cannot look at itself as a part of a larger universe, free from parochial 
self-relationality, it cannot know who  it  is.  Knowledge  which  refers  back  to  itself  does  not  
satisfy it. It desires independent knowledge of itself and the world. Self needs to differentiate 
between its particular inside, its content and its outside. Yet, in order for it to have any inside, 
it must have an outside. In fact, there has to be a particular outside in order for there to be a 
particular inside.  An abstract, limitless outside renders its inside similar, abstract and 
limitless. Only a determinate particular outside renders its own self a particular something.   
 
If everything is internal to self, everything is external to self. Here Hegel´s elaboration on 
Being and non-Being may be useful. If everything there is depends on its being thought by 
me, or perceived by me, felt by me, experienced by me, I may feel that I am the most 
powerful creature in the world  -  I  am actually a God, an ultimate performative power who 
has created the world.  Yet, according to Hegel, if everything is dependent on the self, the self 
remains equally dependent. (PhS §191-192)  Self needs to meet something which exists 
independently, outside of its own will and its own self-relational thoughts, in order to 
understand its own thoughts.   Thus, in order for a self to be independent it needs to meet an 
independent object.  For Hegel, another self-consciousness is this kind of an independent 
object.  Objects which are not their own double-thinking universes cannot be such 
independent objects which would constitute the independence of self. The object must be able 
to  resist  the  self,   to  be  able  to  constitute  its  own independence,  to  be  an  object  which  is  a  
subject.  A self can determine – and simultaneously negate – all self-less objects. A self can 
turn them into mere objects for itself.  Self can find its limits only when it confronts a self-
determining object.  Only by mirroring itself in this kind of object, the self can see itself as an 
independent subject.  Thus, self finds its limit in another universally negating power.  Objects 
which exist for Other - which exist as thought, seen, experienced and determined by Other – 
constitute a realm which exists independently of the self.  (PhS §169-172) To use a historical 
analogy, in Descartes´ philosophy only the existence of a benevolent God guarantees that the 
self’s beliefs about the external world are not based on an illusion and imagination. God saves 
the knowing subject from the universal scepticism. In Hegel, the presence of other selves 
performs, in a sense, the same task.  An essentially similar view was, before Hegel, presented 
by J.G. Fichte in his Grundlage der Naturrechts (Foundations of Natural Right, 1796-1797). 
In the first chapter of his work,  Fichte argues that a rational being cannot be self-conscious 
without positing an independent world, inhabited by other rational beings who limit its 
activity (on Fichte and his influence on Hegel, see Williams 1992).  
 
For Hegel, an independent, internally differentiated universe, which exists for the Other, can 
resist the universalizing power of the self. Because the Other is a similar universalizing, 
performative power, it constitutes also a means for the particularization and objectivication of 
itself. By this kind of similar Other, self can find its genus as an independent, free self-
consciousness  and  become  conscious  of  itself  as  a  particular  instance  of  this  genus.  As  
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universalizing performative powers, i.e. as thinkers which negate a Being within themselves, 
they  are  similar  yet  also  differentiable  from each  other.   In  the  Phenomenology –section  of  
Encyclopaedia, Hegel gives a vivid description of the confrontation between the self and the 
Other: 
 
In this determination lies the tremendous contradiction that, on the one hand, the 
‘I’ is wholly universal, absolutely pervasive, and interrupted by no limit, is the 
universal essence common to all men, the two mutually related selves therefore 
constituting one identity, constituting, so to speak, one light; and yet, on the 
other hand, they are also two selves rigidly and unyieldingly confronting each 
other, existing as a reflection-into-self, as absolutely distinct from and 
impenetrable by the other. (Enc III, §430, Zusatz) 
 
Hegel  points  out  the  fundamental  source  of  the  contradiction:  the  Other  appears  as  another,  
different and “impenetrable” for the very reason that it is, unlike all the other, “ordinary” 
objects, similar to  the  self.   It  is  similar,  because  it  also  sees  itself  as  the  centre  of  its  own 
universe, its “owner”, because it also is a self-determining being with its own viewpoint. 
 
Importantly, when selves, reciprocally, find their limits in each others’ freedom and 
independence, the third element, the substance or nature, is able to gain its own independence 
too. In the Hegelian triplicity of knowing, i.e. Being for Self and for Other,  nature or 
substance is not dependent on one thinker for its existence. It is not an object, dependent on a 
(one) subject. It is not determined and known by one self. Instead, it is thought to exist for self 
and for another self. An independence of Being becomes conceptually constituted, because 
the two selves are independent from each other, yet so that their knowledge is of the same 
Being.  The independence  of any part of the triplicity becomes conceptually constituted in the 
same fashion.  In order for the self, other self and Being not to be fragmented into externally 
related  thoughts,  each  part  of  the  triplicity  must  be  independent.   None  of  the  parts  is  
determined only as a relation between two, but instead as a relation between three.  A relation 
between two, i.e. the basic subject-object-relation is typical for Consciousness as 
Understanding. As such, the other side (subject) sees the other side (object) as the stable 
external reality. A doubleness, which is not self-consciously thought to be mediated by a third 
constitutes the stagnated structure of Consciousness as Understanding. 
 
Hegel thinks that only if we think that Being can be potentially known as an internally 
differentiated whole -  i.e. that there can be a subjective, particular  knowledge of it -  can the 
systems of thinking of self and Other be related to each other. Self and Other can be thought 
to affect each other, or to use power on each other, only if they are thought as conceptually 
related to each other.  They can be thought to agree, to disagree, be opposed, or criticise each 
other on something, if there is the ground assumption that the unifying substance exists. In 
short, they must be thought to be made of same substance. Thus, an independent substance 
(nature, materiality) must be assumed, otherwise the self-relational universes cannot be 
thought to relate to each other in any way. (see PhS §15-23)     
 
In the dialectics of PhS, after the subject has found itself as absolutely any object it thinks  - 
including the non-Being and nothingness it thinks,  literally, as absolute thinking and 
knowing, it can finally allow for the existence of an independent, free Other. It sees that it 
cannot find its own self, independently, within its own universalizing thoughts. It realizes that 
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it  can find an actual outside to its  own self-relational world only in what an Other thinks of 
the world.  An independent constitution of objectivity exists (independent from the objectivity 
of self) for another self-consciousness. A self can particularize and limit its own absolute only 
by another absolute, by the acknowledgement of another free self-consciousness.  By relating 
reciprocally with the thinking and knowledge of Others, as Other absolutes, its own thinking 
can reach beyond its own absolute depths.  Something like a shared absolute (absolute 
knowing which takes place through reciprocal recognition) can be reached. The shared 
absolute can potentially endlessly enrich itself, as there are always other particular absolute 
thinkers who can enrich it (see chapter 2.3)     
 
The Hegelian narrative in PhS is largely inspired by the Enlightenment thinking and the 
Kantian subject-theory. The division between “thing for us” and “thing in itself” is developed 
famously in the thought of Kant. For Kant, thing for us  denotes a “thingness” (a world) as a 
particular thingness, known to subjects. Thing for us is  a  world,  a  Being  in  general,  as  it  is  
known to us as an identifiable object to our particular subjective knowledge. Thing for us thus 
corresponds with what Hegel calls as Consciousness as Understanding. Thing in itself  
denotes a thingness as not known to us. Thing in itself cannot be an identifiable, particular  
object for particular subjects. Thus, the way to cope with thing in itself is that it must just be 
thought to exist, even that it cannot be known to exist as a particular object of  knowledge.   
However, Kant’s basic distinction generates several problems.  According to it a knowing 
subject is always confronted by phenomena. The “thing in itself” remains unknown, but it is 
nevertheless the cause and origin of the observed phenomena. Suppose that two knowing 
subjects  disagree  about  the  properties  of  a  thing  (for  example,  one  sees  it  as  green  and  the  
other sees it as red). Thus, there are two different “things for them” (a green one and a red 
one). What guarantees that behind the appearances there exists one thing on which they 
disagree? Hegel’s view can, among other things, be seen as an attempt to solve this problem. 
 
According to Kant, it is important that we think that there is such aspect of thingness as the 
thing in itself. In order for us not to be limited by parochial, limited subjective descriptions, 
we should keep in mind that we can never know everything about the things we perceive. 
Further, Kant’s idea of universal reason is based on an idea of “bracketing off” the realm of 
phenomena  or  of  things  for  us.  Subjective,  particular  reasoning  about  what  is  good  for  
humans, and what the laws should be, should be bracketed. In order for us to take everybody 
into account - when we make laws for everybody, not only for us – we should bracket all the 
contingent aspects of the world. This bracketing is conducted, basically, by the same faculty 
of thinking, transcendental faculty, by which we are able to keep in mind the realm of thing in 
itself.  Universal reason is supposed not to be limited by parochial subjective understanding. 
By transcendentality Kant refers to the inherent capacity of thinking to take a distance to 
itself. Thinking can take a reflective distance towards its own and other parochial subjectivity, 
to rise above it. Transcendental capacity is thus the prerequisite for the Kantian universal law. 
Universal law is a law which is constituted for all and which binds all. Universal law binds all 
by virtue of their rationality only. If there are other rational beings besides humans, they are 
also bound by the universal law.  
 
Several basic “moments” of subjective thinking, found in Hegel’s subject-theory, are based on 
the Kantian categories or moments. Also, the Kantian transcendental rising above particular 
subjectivity is found in Hegel’s subject-theory, as the moment of abstraction.   
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2.2.4.   Other thinking from the point of view of Desire: Unspeakable humanity 
 
 
Hegel discusses at length in PhS the question of unspeakable humanity and the unspeakable 
outside of rational subjectivity. For Hegel, other thinking, knowing and ideality of the world 
can be rendered unspeakable, and it very often is.  In PhS Hegel sees various ways in which 
this does happen. Actually, some sort of an unspeakable humanity (or abstract, external  
humanity) is always a part of thinking until the thinking is able to acknowledge free and 
independent thinking (free self-consciousness) as the identity or the nature of its own thinking 
and as the identity of the thinking of others.  As said before, for Hegel, other thinking always 
mirrors the self of thinking: the way other thinking is thought of  corresponds with how the 
thinking itself is structured. Thinking always sees itself in and as the other thinking, even if 
the thinking itself is not always aware of this. For Hegel, every thought thing corresponds 
with  the  structure  of  thinking  of  the  one  who thinks  it.  The  thought object and the thinking 
subject are thus, in this way, identical. Also, when we think of other thinking, we think it on 
the basis of how our own thinking is constructed. Other thinking does not only exist “out 
there”, it exists for us.   
 
“Other thinking” is a grand theme for Hegel. With Hegel, other thinking can be internally 
related to because it is fundamentally similar with the selves own thinking. In fact, any 
thinking is other thinking as every thinking constitutes the other, or the outside,  for its other. 
Every self is an Other, as not only is one’s Other contradictory for oneself but also oneself is 
contradictory for one’s Other. In PhS, the dialectics concerning otherness starts well before 
other thinking is thought of either in the Kantian way (the Enlightenment thought) or as the 
Hegelian ideal of  free, yet rationally known Other. In the beginning of PhS, the subject sees 
other thinking as an external “other world”, as the realm of gods and supernatural powers.  In 
the beginning of PhS the Other denotes a somewhat blurred realm of arbitrary powers (for the 
consciousness, as e.g. “sense-certainty”)  which the subject thinks of as supernatural forces, 
affecting it from “beyond” it. It relates to other thinking so that it thinks that   the “ways of 
god”, or  “the unknown activities of  metaphysical forces” affect itself, other subjects and the 
whole world externally.  (PhS §138-144).    
 
Importantly, the subject thinks that in the realm of other thinking, there are various other 
thinking beings, not only one.  There exist not only right and good “other thinking” but also 
malign and evil forms of other thinking. There are good and evil gods, spirits and other 
powers.  People and their thoughts are seen to be driven by good or evil powers, and to 
contradictory directions, often at the same time.  Gods, or other powers are seen as intentional 
actors who often work through individuals. Individuals can become even totally possessed or 
led,  by other thinking; even inviduals themselves may see their thoughts and actions not as 
their own.  Thus, the powers, gods etc. are thought of as related parts of the same world as the 
ordinary,  conscious  thinking,  and  also  as  part  of  the  whole  objective  world.  The  thinking  
subject itself is unable see that other thinking is constructed in its own thinking.  It cannot see 
that its own thinking is a self-related whole, which includes, as one of its parts, the other 
thinking.  
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As  soon  as  the  thinking  starts  to  figure  itself  as  a self-related whole - as a thinking which   
includes its own (idea of) other thinking –  the  way  it  consciously  relates  between  its  own  
thinking and other thinking becomes changed.  Now this beyond is seen to exist internally, in 
subjective thinking itself. Other thinking is not seen as an external (magical etc.) non-
subjective reality any more.  Thinking starts to also realize that all thinking, including its own,  
includes its own specific (idea of) other thinking.  Even that the subjects may agree that e.g. 
the will of God should be taken into consideration, they may disagree as regards the specific 
substance of the will of God.   
 
A more contemporary example of how other thinking is thought of, would no doubt be the 
psychoanalytical idea of the unconscious. As Judith Butler convincingly shows, there are 
many ways in which the unconscious becomes conceptualized in psychoanalytical theories. 
Butler’s analysis shows that a difference could be drawn between the more Kantian and the 
more Hegelian versions. Butler gives examples of at least two kinds of psychoanalytical 
notions  of  unconscious,  the  Freudian  one  (whom  she  apparently  sees  as  a  somewhat  
“Hegelian unconscious”, for the fact that it can potentially become known for the self itself) 
and the Lacanian one, within which there is an aspect called  “Real”. “Real” is  thought of as a 
constitutive part of the structure of the psyche, which however remains necessarily unknown 
for  the  self  itself.  The  Freudian  unconscious  constitutes  a  form  of  other  thinking  (psyches  
internal other intentionality) which can potentially become both conceptualized and  “worked 
on” by the person itself (at least through therapeutic analysis).  For Lacan, there is a necessary 
failure (a lack) in the self-understanding of the self.  (Butler: BM  187-222; SD 126-127, 193-
199; PLP 57-62,86-87) 
 
For Hegel, a phase when the self sees the other thinking as internal to its own thinking,  and 
especially  when the self sees other thinkers as having their own internal “other thoughts”, 
marks  an important step for the subject towards becoming conscious of itself and others as  
conceptual subjects.   Here  the  subject  starts  to  see  that  everything  not  only  relates  to  other  
thinking but that there are is different ways to think of this relation.  Each thinking self relates 
to other thinking internally.  This marks a crucial and also a painful change in the way a 
thinker thinks and relates to itself and to otherness.(PhS §165)   
 
At this point the thinking self is not necessarily immediately capable of - at least according to 
Hegel´s narrative in PhS  -  starting to think  that the way it itself thinks of otherness is 
particular, or context-dependent, and that there are other ways to relate to otherness, deserving 
of equal acknowledgement.  Yet, what it becomes conscious of (formulated here in a highly  
theoretical way) is that others think of something like “the universal meaning of particular 
human life”, or “the universal significance of particular things” in not a different way, but in 
an  irrational way. The thinking self cannot admit that the other may be equally rational in its 
own terms, and that the world, posited by other thinking, may be a rational world. Instead, 
interpreted on the basis of the selves own rationality, the other appears as irrational. (PhS 
§173-174)  
 
If thinking cannot constitute, “appropriate” or “produce” a particular world according to its 
own universal truth, it finds it very difficult to relate to a world at all. A thinker does not 
know how to speak about or understand other thinking, or the particular world, seen by other 
thinking.   Because the others are self-sufficient, self-relational wholes, they seem utterly 
irrational from the point of view of a thinker who is used to read things on the basis of its own 
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self-relationally rational system of thinking (on the basis of Consciousness as Understanding). 
In order not to lose itself and the world as something objective, thinking must denounce the 
other thinking as a nothingness.(ibid.). Hegel writes:  
 
…self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that 
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is 
Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and 
thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which 
has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner.  (PhS § 
174) 
 
Historically, the way to relate to other self-relational wholes have typically taken the form of   
thinking of them as “worshippers of false gods”,“insane” etc.  Self-relational thinkers and 
groups of thinkers often try to force the others to become worshippers of the true gods or to 
accept the truly rational explanation of the universe. What Hegel calls as the struggle for 
recognition is relevant here. Often the contact with otherness has also ended up in physically 
killing the others. This killing has been conducted in the name of the one true universal and 
the  true  certainty  of  what   the  world  is  like.   The  killing  of  others  is  easily  seen  also  as  a  
righteous act, the very thing to do, because after all, others are not only wrong, they are also 
evil. The false universal should be eliminated, in order for it not to contaminate our right 
world, or seduce us.   Because the others have a “satanic”, or “perverted” idea of what is 
universal, they must be disposed of. According to Hegel, the denouncing of other thinking, or 
preventing its seductive powers, is however a continuous process, until there is a proper 
recognition of the Other. The Other cannot be disposed of, as “otherness” constitutes 
ultimately the truth of the self itself. As said before, every thinking constitutes an other 
thinking (from the point of view of its Other), and,  every self is an Other. (PhS §187-188) 
 
The eliminating of a wrong universal  can also take the form of “death in life”. The (other) 
independence of thinking is thought of as non-existent. Self-consciousness - which is 
ultimately always the  consciousness of itself and the  other thinking as similar with each 
other – assumes an abstract point of view. Yet, by this announcement, this thinking renders 
also  its  own  independent  self-relational  thinking  as  an  abstract  void  .  By  rendering  what  is  
external  to  it,  namely  its  outside  (the  other)  an  abstraction,  there  is  no  actual  border  to  
separate it from such abstract other. It itself becomes also an abstraction. Abstractions do not 
have borders, only particulars do. As such, it becomes as abstract as its other. Hegel sees that, 
historically, the way for example ancient Greece thought of “barbarians” displays this kind of 
attitude towards otherness. Barbarians saw objective, actual world, according to their own 
ideas  of  what  is  universal.   For  the  Greek,  the  barbarians  were  irrational  beings,  whose  
constitution of objectivity did not correspond with the true objectivity of things. (PhS §187)  
 
“A death in life” can also take the form of slavery. This denotes a mode of relating to other 
self-relational thinking and knowing, where particular objectivity is seen as necessary for the 
basic maintenance of life, yet, where reciprocal recognition is still lacking.  This thinking 
recognizes only one universal (its own) as the true reference-point, according to which  
particular objectivity should be “produced”.  The other self-relational thinking is enslaved. 
The internally mediated unity of particularity and universality (of the other) is broken up, and 
the particularity (the labour-force, the particularizing force) of the other is forced to work for 
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another universal, a truth which is not its own.  The other is forced to recognize the other, yet, 
there is no reciprocal recognition.  The other is instrumentalized: it is turned into something 
useful for  another  universal  truth.  It  is  deprived  of  the  right  to  actualize,  i.e.  constitute  
objectivity, in reference to its own universal truth, but instead it must work to actualize the 
universal truth of another.  The most cultivated and intellectual form of this takes place, for 
Hegel,  as the Enlightenment thinking and the thought of Utility. The less intellectually 
cultivated  forms of this take place, for Hegel, as any forced labour and slavery of e.g. the 
ancient world.  
 
Because slaves cannot particularize, i.e. actualize, their own universal truth – because they 
must labour for an external, not internally mediated Lord – their own universal truth is non-
particular,  non-existent,  not  actual.  Slaves  are  not  allowed to  be  their  own masters,  as  their  
own internal doubleness is not recognized as a valid one. Their identity as their own self-
relational  wholes  is  denied.  They  are  not  considered  as  valid  knowers  of  themselves  or  the  
world. (PhS §189-190) 
 
Because slaves cannot identify the particular world on their own, they constitute a death in 
life.   In  Hegel’s  words,  they cannot find themselves in the world because that what exists 
mirrors the universality of the other, the masters’ universe. Yet, slavery does not only affect 
the slaves; it affects also the masters. Even that the masters, Lords, gain recognition to their 
own doubleness – in the form of their own self-relational system of thinking, knowing and 
constituting the objectivity being considered as the only universal truth – a moment of 
“slavery” or “death in life” becomes a part of their thinking also.  
 
In fact, slavery becomes an internally threatening part of the thinking of the masters. Slaves 
are indifferent for Lords, yet, they exist. Slaves constitute an existing, irrational humanity. 
Their humanity cannot however be completely denied, because they apparently are not 
animals either. They constitute a troubling ambivalence within humanity and subjectivity. 
They become an existing and living indifference, which is something threatening because it is 
something unknown, limitless, uncontrollable and thus potentially dangerous. The other 
thinking of slaves is unpredictable, and as such, a threat. The intentions of the slaves cannot 
be known because slaves are, literally, not allowed to have any rational self-knowledge, nor 
consequently rational  intentions, either.  In fact, slaves are deprived of the right to have such 
own selves which could be rationally described by the masters, or known even by the slaves 
themselves. If the slaves were treated as responsible for their deeds, their humanity would 
thereby be admitted. If the masters at least sometimes have to treat the slaves as responsible 
beings, their attitude towards them becomes self-contradictory: the slaves are treated as 
rational beings, while their capacity to rational thinking is denied. Slavery as a social relation 
presupposes a form of thinking (“ideology” in modern terms) which is internally inconsistent, 
and, for Hegel, “unreal”. Slaves,  which  are  supposed  to  be  dependent  on  their  masters,  for  
their  very  lives,  turn  into  a  threat  to  the  rational  lives  of  the  masters.  Lords  which  are  
supposed to be independent, not dependent beings, are rendered threatened, and thus 
dependent, on the arbitrary intentions of the slaves. When other thinking is enslaved, rendered 
irrational, anything can be expected of it. (PhS §192-193)      
 
Importantly, in a system of lordship and slavery, particular individual slaves are not given 
particular human identity to, on the basis of universal – and thus also valuable -  humanity.  
They exist as fragmentary particulars, as their particularity is not conceptually related to 
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universality. As such, they are actually not particular humans, yet abstract, arbitrary humans, 
of  which  a  rational  description  cannot  be  given.  For  Hegel,  actual  particulars  are  always  
instances of something which is thought as universal. Actual particulars have a universal 
genus. As not particulars, slaves lack also subjective identities.    Slaves exist as vehicles for 
others, as instruments. They produce particularity for others.   They are not parts of the 
universal humanity of the Lords, nor are they part of any system of universal humanity (in the 
system of lordship and slavery).   Laws, principles,  ethical standards etc. which apply for  
particular humans, do not apply for slaves, because slaves constitute a non-particularizable 
human mass.   
 
Other thinking, which is rendered an abstraction, is rendered unspeakable. It cannot be 
listened to, because it is not allowed to say anything particular. It cannot be allowed to say 
anything particular which would be its own, because it is not allowed to refer to its own 
universal truth. As such, its own internal rationality  (its internal doubleness, namely  the 
relation between particularity and universality) is not considered as valid. For Hegel, a 
moment of abstraction is an important part of conceptual thinking. Yet, the moment of 
abstraction may exist as a non-mediated part of thinking. It may exist as unknown gods, or 
unknown natural spirits. Also, it may exist as indifferent, abstract humanity, slavery, which, 
typically, may have very concrete consequences to various groups of people.  Hegels theory 
implies that whenever others (i.e. other self-relational wholes, i.e. other internal doublenesses) 
exist as not equals for thinking, a sort of internal indifference is constituted.  
 
Moment of abstraction is an inherent part in all thinking because all thinking is conceptual 
whether or not it is self-consciously conceptual.  Thus, abstraction plays always some part in 
thinking. It can however also become abstract otherness,  or   internal slavery of thinking. 
Hegel explains that before otherness becomes a self-consciously mediated part of thinking, it 
exists   as  some  sort  of  “unknown  god”  and/or  internal  slavery.  As  such,  it  functions  as  a  
moment of indifference, irrationality, chaos, unspeakability within thinking.  
 
An unmediated abstractivity threatens anything which is not abstract for thinking.  As a 
constitutive (a thought) part, yet as a non-particular (abstract) part, it is limitless. There is no 
knowing where it starts and where it ends. As such, it does not stay outside the borders of the 
particular , determinate things, which are thought by this thinking. 
 
Thinking can solve the relating to self-relational, independent thinking (namely, its own 
thinking and “other thinking”)  in a way of Lordship and slavery, explained above. Yet, this 
solution does not satisfy it. Thinking is burdened by its internal slavery, the presence of 
unspeakable humanity, the troubling idea that there may be some actual truth (actual 
differentiations  of  particulars)   affecting  its  own  humanity,  in  the  realm  of  the  forced 
indifference. The motif, behind its drive to seek the possibility of relating conceptually, not 
only indifferently (as abstract otherness, or, slavery) to other thinking is that it cannot relate to 
itself in a satisfactory way, until it can take itself and other thinking as objects of particular, 
subjective knowing.   When indifferent, irrational  humanity is a part of its thinking, its own 
thinking is not known to it as a rational whole. The indifferent humanity, i.e abstract or 
enslaved other thinking,  renders its whole system of thinking as indifferent. Because there 
exists humanity which is not related as a rational part of its thinking as a whole, all the rest of 
the parts of its system are threatened by this one “irrational” part. As an irrational, non-
particular part of its thinking, it is limitless. It has no identity, nor no borders to it. Randomly, 
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any part of humanity can seem irrational because all the parts are constituted by the irrational 
part. Irrationality is, potentially, found anywhere. Thus, thinking strives to relate this 
externally related (abstract, indifferent) part into a conceptual unity with other parts.   
 
 
2.2.5.  Acknowledging  the Other as something valid and constitutive    
 
 
When thinking, or consciousness, starts to think that valid other thanking may be possible, it 
strives to relate to and know this “beyond”.  Hegel sees thinking/consciousness as a faculty, 
which needs to find out who and what it is. It wants not to be determined by something which 
it does not know. It wants to know the ultimate context, where it is situated, and which gives a 
universally valid meaning to it.  As such, it strives after generalizations, of universal 
knowledge: knowledge which does not leave anything “beyond it” but explains it all. It does 
not want to be limited by anything which it itself does not know. Thinking/consciousness 
wants  to  know  itself  (differentiate,  posit,  situate  itself)  within  a  universal  context,  which  is  
truly universal, not parochial. Thus, whenever a thinker realizes that its (present) 
universalization (meaning-giving context)  about itself may actually be not universal at all,  it 
strives to relate to that part of its ultimate  context (the context within which it knows itself) 
which is beyond its  present (incomplete) context. Thus emerges the Hegelian self-
consciousness. (PhS §174-177; Taylor  1975, 150-155) 
 
Hegelian self-consciousness must not be mistaken for what for Hegel is “free and actual self-
consciousness”, which is connected with the theme of “reciprocal recognition”.  Not until 
self-consciousness can mediate “speculatively” with the consciousness of particularity 
(Consciousness as Understanding) – as well as with its abstracting and self-alienating 
capacities - is it able to go over its internal dualisms and relations of “Lordship and Bondage”. 
However, for Hegel, self-consciousness includes always some idea of speculative thinking i.e. 
thinking which is capable of mediating contradictory thoughts with each other. Hegel sees 
that self-consciousness always has some idea of a realm where relations of Lordship and 
Bondage are overcome. Yet often the capacity of “speculation” is seen by Hegel to be 
projected into a realm beyond humans (i.e. into a realm of God)  who is alone thought to be 
able to mediate between such dualisms like “limited  subjectivity” (finity) and “unlimited, 
absolute (God-like) subjectivity” (infinity)”. If the capacity of “speculation” is seen as not 
belonging to  humans yet only to some mystical realm beyond humans, relations which Hegel 
call “reciprocally recognitive” are impossible. In relations of reciprocal recognition, a 
thinking self regards itself and other selves as beings capable of “speculation” (ibid.)     
 
At the early developmental level  the two basic parts of the internal doubleness of thinking 
(Consciousness as Understanding and self-consciousness) assume various ways in which they 
exist as parts of the same thinking, yet, not being conceptually  and speculatively mediated 
with each other.  They are externally mediated, because they exist within the same thinking.  
A relationship of mutual indifference, metaphorically presented as the relationship between  
Lord and Bondsman can be detected as the basic structure.  The figures of Lord and 
Bondsman  function  as  the  basic  metaphors  of  the   split  thinking  at  its  early  levels  of  self-
consciousness. Both figures, the Lord and the Bondsman denote a self-relational thinking, yet, 
their relationship is not conceptually mediated before the stage of actual self-consciousness 
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and reciprocal recognition is reached.   Thinking is internally doubled, yet, so that the sides 
exist as externally related fragments.  Self-consciousness assumes the form of pure self-
consciousness. Hegel relates  pure self-consciousness e.g. with the Enlightenment (Kantian) 
thought.  Pure self-consciousness adopts a universally abstract attitude towards all self-
relational thinking, by placing all self-relational thinking into a larger, abstract context. 
Consequently, because it, nevertheless, needs self-relational thinking in order to produce 
particularity for it, it splits internally, into the figures of Lord and Bondsman.   
 
This fragmentation actualizes itself both in relations between people, as slavery, class-systems 
etc.  and, necessarily, also inside the thinking of particular thinkers.  By it Hegel shows that in 
order for the actual, real-life recognitive relationships to be possible (between people who 
acknowledge each other as equals), recognition must exist as a conceptual system of thinking 
of each one of the individual thinkers, which take part in recognitive relationships. For Hegel, 
recognition exists in thinking when a thinker has included “an independent, equal other” as a 
part of its thinking. Only when recognition exists in thinking, can it exist in “reality”, between 
people.  
 
As was said before, this interpretation of PhS is based on the view, shared by Charles Taylor, 
that the famous chapter on Lordship and Bondage (PhS § 178-196) describes one stage in the 
development of self-consciousness. Thus, “Lord” and “Bondsman” (Hegel’s “Knecht” has 
also been translated as “slave” or “servant”) do not only denote social classes or positions, as 
in some interpretations written under the influence of Marx. According to the interpretation 
adopted here, the stage of the drama is not (only) the society, but the thinking subject. 
Moreover, the figures of the Lord and the Bondsman do reappear after the Lordship and 
Bondage -section in PhS (e. g.  § 198, 202, 233), and provide a key for the interpretation of 
the later parts of Hegel’s text.  The Taylorian interpretation is, of course, a controversial one. 
However, it can supported by a simple textual argument. The chapter which precedes the 
section on Lord and Bondsman speaks about the development of consciousness. So does the 
chapter which succeeds it (“Stoicism, Scepticism and Unhappy Consciousness”). If the 
chapter on Lordship and Bondage were mainly about something else (for example, about the 
class struggle), it would completely disrupt the narrative in PhS. Hence, all attempts to “use” 
Hegel’s dialectics of Lordship and Bondage while ignoring the later parts of the story are one-
sided (although they may, of course, be interesting in their own right).  
 
In the thinking of pure self-consciousness, the split (explained above) becomes the point of 
view from which it sees others, its own self, and everything that is thought, said and known 
about the world.  This means that it interprets everything what the others say, and what it says 
itself  on  the  basis  of  this  split.   Thinking  enters  into  the  internalized split of Lord and 
Bondsman at the brink of realizing that its own thinking constitutes a free, self-relational 
whole. It mistakes abstraction for freedom. Pure self-consciousness feels empowered by its 
capacity of abstraction. It reckons that actually abstraction, freedom from all particularity,  is 
the universal truth of itself.  Thinking, overwhelmed, yet also empowered by its (conceptual) 
capacity  to  abstract  from -  or,  rise  above  -  all  particular  view-points  onto  the  world,  thinks  
that  there is no limits to it. It can for example produce any kind of world it wants. It feels that 
it has somewhat completely “come out of its (particular) self”, as no particular explanation of 
who it is, seems to hold universally and timelessly. Nevertheless, this new “non-particular” 
non-position is not without its fearful sides. Placed and contextualized in its new non-
position, it fears that as a particular subject, it is non-existent.  None of the particular 
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explanations of who it is, is a universal or timeless explanation. The thinking self, as well as 
all others,  as particulars,  are vanishing creatures.      
 
Reflecting itself from this “point of view”, of which no universally valid  particular 
description can be given, the thinking self takes pure “I”  as its universal genus. This genus 
functions in the thinking of pure self-consciousness in a similar way as it functioned for the 
non-particular thinking of Sense-certainty. Pure self-consciousness cannot differentiate 
between particulars from the point of view of  pure I.  It  has understood what self-relational 
thinking is universally like, yet, it has understood it only as an abstraction. It needs to be able 
to differentiate between particular self-relational systems of thinking, yet, it cannot do this on 
the basis of “pure I”. When a thinker reflects itself from an “un-speakable” (pure, abstract) 
point  of  view,  it  situates  itself  into  an  abstract  context,  into   a  non-particular  universe,  and  
sees itself as non-situated, non-limited, non-historical. It has posited itself into a similar 
abstract universe where slaves were posited in the system of lordship and slavery. (PhS §179-
182,186-197; Taylor 1975, 153-158)    
 
Yet, according to Hegel, what has actually happened in the mind of a thinker who thinks like 
this, is that it has come to the brink of realizing that it is a conceptual thinker. By conceptual 
thought, it can abstract from all particular contents. It can step beyond itself while still being 
inside its own thinking. The place beyond, where it steps into,  is not, however, external but 
internal to it. In fact, the place beyond is a thought which can be identified as its own thought. 
It has not finally found a “God’s point of view” or “Archimedean point” outside all history 
and subjectivity.  This thought, or place beyond,  can be returned to its conceptual thinker, 
because it exists in its own thinking. Yet, before it can relate this newly found capacity to 
“rise above all particularity” back to its own particular, historical subjectivity, its 
conceptuality remains an  abstraction. In short, the moments of its conceptual thinking  take 
place as unrelated thoughts. (PhS §184-186; Taylor 1975, 157-159)  
 
The primary stage of a mind, who has (conceptually) come out of itself, is that it splits 
internally, into a totally independent mind, free from all particularity and into a totally 
dependent mind. Actually, these two sides exist as abstractions of self-relational thinking, 
because they are not mediated with other parts of thinking and as parts of a particular whole.   
 (PhS 178-196; Taylor 1975, 153-158)   
 
In the thinking of pure self-consciousness, an abstract Lord serves as the Lord for whom all 
particularity is laboured , i.e related to. The pure Lord constitutes thus the universal truth of 
particularity. All particularity is handed over to the abstract Lord, who stamps it with his own, 
non-particular name. Thus, all particulars are turned into non-particulars when they are 
handed over (mediated ) to the abstract Lord inside the thinking of pure self-consciousness. 
Everything which is known as a particular becomes stamped as unknown. Pure I ( as a 
universal genus of all self-relational thinking)   functions as the middle term between this 
doubleness.  The syllogist result of this mediation is an abstract self-relational thinking, as 
well as abstract thingness.  The result of this mediation takes the form of  indifferentiation.  
Things, which are differentiated and particularized by the Bondsman, become indifferentiated, 
while passed on to the Lord.   
 
Here, the Lord is a mind, independent from any particular content which “thingness” (Being, 
or Life) may have. The Lord can discard any particular particularity, as he himself does not 
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identify with any specific case of particularity. Yet, he appreciates particularity in general.  
This means that no particular “slave” is important to him, yet, he needs slaves in general to 
take care of his material needs, the basic needs of Life. (PhS § 186-187).  
 
The Lord and the Bondsman constitute, each one separately, somewhat independent, self-
sufficient viewpoints or ways to relate to things.  Thus, if e.g. “democracy” would be the 
object of thought, the Lord thinks in his way about it, and the Bondsman thinks in his way 
about it. The Lord may. e.g. think that any way to institutionalize democracy is incomplete 
and unsatisfactory, because it cannot be fully accepted and endorsed by all.  A Bondsman 
may consider it best to stick to the democracy at hand, because, after all,  it is based on the 
ideas of the superior minds (compared to the mind of his own) of academic philosophers, 
experts on democracy and politicians.    (PhS §184-186) These two independent view-points  
exist inside one mind, the mind of abstract (pure) self-consciousness. They are independent at 
least in the sense that they resist each other. The Lord claims not to be a Bondsman – as it 
strives to be free from the enslavement of parochial subjectivity,  and the Bondsman claims 
not to be a Lord.  
 
The existence of these two independent thoughts in one mind introduces a primary scene of 
the existence of an independent other inside thinking. The pure self-consciousness thinks of 
things from two (contradicting) points of views and, thus, shows a primary (however, 
abstract) level of the consideration of independent other thinking.  The two points of view are 
nevertheless external to each other, as well as alien to each other. What things are for the 
other thought become cancelled in what things are for the other (contradicting) thought.  
Inside the mind of pure self-consciousness there exists, in a sense, two individuals who do not 
actually acknowledge each other.  In contrast to pure self-consciousness, actual self-
consciousness (explained later) includes an equal, independent other in its thinking. The free 
other constitutes its own locus of thinking. Free other is recognized, by actual self-
consciousness, as a similar locus of thinking than the actual self-consciousness itself.  Free 
other is a locus of thinking which is acknowledged to include its own self-determining 
doubleness, instead of functioning as the other side of the thinking´s  own doubleness. As 
such, a free other is acknowledged as another “third”. (PhS §190-194)   
 
The dilemma of pure self-consciousness is that it has a view of freedom and independence 
with which it is not capable of identifying with. It cannot identify itself either with the Lord or 
with Bondsman.  It is itself a thinking which includes a doubleness: it constitutes a locus of 
two  thoughts.  Yet,  neither  the  Lord,  nor  the  Bondsman  are  thought,  by the pure self-
consciousness, to be structured as an internal doubleness. Neither the structure of the Lord nor 
the structure of the Bondsman correspond with its own, internally double structure. For Hegel, 
only when a self acknowledges other thinking  as another, internally double thinking, can it 
reach actual self-consciousness, i.e. to become conscious of how its own thinking is 
structured. It must make an internally double thinking into a universal genus, and see its own 
thinking as a particular instance of it. 
 
Unhappy Consciousness is a consciousness of the internal doubleness, yet, it has not 
particularized the internal doubleness, which it is aware of. Consequently, it looks at the 
internal doubleness as some kind of an external fact (of things) and not as subjective and as 
related to the thinking of it.   In other words, it sees other thinking – as well as its own 
thinking – as structured by internal doubleness, yet, because this internal doubleness is not 
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particularized, it takes the form of fragmentary thoughts and  as fragmentary external reality.     
 
Within the thinking of pure self-consciousness,  the Lord is independent (or,  this is  what the 
Lord thinks) from the Bondsman. And, the Bondsman is dependent on something (the Lord) 
which it cannot relate to, because the Lord cannot “speak its name”.  The Lord cannot 
describe himself, or give information of himself, because any piece of information would be  
particular information. Because the Lord is above particularity, he can say of himself only 
something like “I am who I am”. This relation shows itself  both at the level of real-life 
attitudes towards other people, and towards what they say about the world.  The relation 
displays itself also inside individual thinking.  Here it is easy to see that this relation may 
assume somewhat different structures within different individual minds. Either “Lordship” or 
“Bondage” can be imagined to dominate an individual mind, even if both must be present: 
when there exists the other, there must exist the other one, too. There are no Lords without 
Bondsmen, nor Bondsmen without Lords. “Lords” could be seen for example as intellectuals, 
who look at particularity in general, or context-dependent thinking, from “above”, not 
identifying with it, yet, needing it in order to go on with their intellectual enterprise as cultural 
critics. “Bondsmen” can be seen as people who e.g. think that “I do not know what sense 
there is to the world, but maybe God knows, or my superiors know, or the intellectuals know. 
I had better just to do my part, to do as the others do, and not strive after universal wisdom 
because that is anyways beyond my limited capacity”.    
 
As pertains to the concrete relationships between people, Hegel’s theory implies that both the 
Lord-minded people and the Bondsman-minded people are incapable of treating each others 
as equals.  Thus, they both are, to each other, creatures which do not “speak their name”, 
because both of them read the other one only on the basis of their own limited system of 
thinking. They actually do not communicate with each other when they meet, yet, keep 
contained within the limits of each ones own self-relational context. As they do not relate 
conceptually with each other, they are external others in relation to each other, or, external 
contexts to each other. Their relationship concerns just the basic necessities of life-
maintenance. The particularity, which the Bondsman  produces for the Lord, is a necessity as 
such for the Lord.  Yet, because the Lord does not self-consciously  comprehend his 
dependency on any specific product of the Bondsman, nor of any specific Bondsman, Hegel 
notes that the Lord enjoys the products of the Bondsman. Enjoyment denotes a somewhat 
sensuous relation to something, which was earlier described to take place at the level of 
Sense-certainty. At the level of Sense-certainty, thinking does not identify particulars, yet, its 
way of being conscious of something takes the immanent and abstract way of sensuousness. 
Also, Hegel writes that the Lord thinks on the basis of “pure I”, which is the basis for thinking 
of Sense-certainty. (PhS §189)  
 
The Lord is able to “enjoy” the ready-made thing without itself going through the trouble of 
forming it according to any idea of particular “shape”, i.e. identity. There is the Bondsman 
who works on the thing and gives a particular shape to it. The Bondsman identifies with the 
reality, in short, negates it through work.  Displayed at the level of thinking, he does the work 
which Consciousness as Understanding does. He negates the immanent, abstract 
indeterminacy of Being and forms, produces, particular things.  He produces particulars on 
the basis of his context-dependent universe. Thus, he makes the thing his “own”. Yet, even 
that the particular thing (or, the first negation of Being) is the Bondsman’s own, he is aware 
that there exists another, second negation, a larger context where the thing which he has 
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negated, receives its ultimate description.  He knows that the larger, second  context of thing 
where his  limited, first context of thing is situated, is beyond his capacity of understanding. 
That very Being, or substance, which he negates, lies in hands, which he cannot understand. 
He thinks that even that he makes the basic negation (produces particular things), the ultimate 
description, i.e. a second negation which negates his first negation, is out of his reach to 
understand. Thus, inside the Bondsman-minded  thinking, his own product, in fact, his 
identity, becomes refuted because it is  related  to something (Lord) which he cannot 
conceptually relate to.  (PhS §190).  
 
Within the system of Lordship and Bondage, the two ways of thinking refute each other.  
Bondsman (particularity) turns into an abstraction, as his particular identity is emptied of 
meaning when contextualized by, and passed onto, the Lord.  And, the Lord is an abstraction 
as he cannot identify with particularity and describe who he is. (PhS §188)    
 
Hegel intended to theorize a construction, where the double negation, negation of the 
negation, would not be self-cancelling. Hegel’s idea was that within self as a concept, 
particularity   (Consciousness as Understanding) and self-consciousness (the reflection of an 
independent self, from the view point of an independent other thinking) would be united.     
 
The Lord is unaware of how his independence  is actually dependent on the Bondsman and 
the particular “thing” which the Bondsman produces for him. He is unaware that bondage 
(Bondsman)  is a constitutive part of his independence, Lordship.   Yet, as the Lord does not 
acknowledge this, he does not relate to bondage internally (or he does but in dualist, 
“internally external” manner). He does not see that independence (limitlessness) is dependent 
on bondage (particularity, limitedness).  The Lord is in contact with the particular world 
through the Bondsman, i.e. through other self-relational thinking, yet, this connection as 
something constitutive has not yet occurred to the Lord himself. What the Lord does not also 
see is that he is not only dependent on Bondsmen in general, but, instead,  he is dependant on 
a particular Bondsman. As the actual particular products which the Bondsman produces for 
the Lord are not particular in general, but particular in particular, the Lord is still to face the 
fact that what he is actually dependent on is an actual world, with real differences, not only 
indifferent differences.   
 
In fact, the Lord would have nothing to think of, to start with, without the “limited” 
particularities, produced by the Bondsman. In fact, the Lord would have nothing (no limits) to 
be independent of and free from, without the bondage of the Bondsman.  Independence 
(freedom) and dependence (particularity, being limited and dependent on others) are split into 
two unrelated parts. Yet, they exist as necessary moments within this split mind of pure self-
consciousness.   In order for a Lord to be able to be a Lord over something, there must be this 
realm of limited, particular things and the labouring of them.  There must be a particular, 
limited reality  which he can reflect from a place “beyond” and thus realize his independence 
as actual independence.  As such, the Lord and the Bondsman are connected through the 
limited, particular thing, which is passed between them. Yet, this connection does not exist as 
a self-conscious concept  at this dialectical stage. (PhS §178-196)  
 
Further,  by  actual  self-consciousness,  these  two sides,  the  Lord  and  the  Bondsman,  become  
internalized as necessary parts of one mind. By mediating lordship and bondage with each 
other, a self-conscious thinker mediates Consciousness as Understanding and Self-
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consciousness into a unified concept.  It sees itself not only as internally double, yet, also as a 
self-reflective thinking which can reflect its internal doubleness. However, in order for it to 
see itself in this way, it must see also other thinking in this way.   
 
In this chapter the structure of pure self-consciousness, as a structure between two individual 
thoughts, has been explained. In the next chapter the thinking of pure self-consciousness, as a 
continuous  activity is explained.   
 
 
2.2.6. Stoicism, Scepticism, Absolute dialectical unrest 
 
 
Thinking is self-relational.  It posits its own particular world in reference to its own universe. 
Thinkers are, for Hegel, primarily thinking, self-relational beings. Yet, for Hegel, the thinking 
which itself arrives on this insight  does  not  yet  need  to  be  aware  of  “self-relationality”  as  
anything  else  than  an  abstraction.  In  PhS  “Stoicism”  and  “scepticism”  denote  modes  of  
thinking in which a thinker has itself realized that its thinking is universal and self-relational. 
These modes of thinking are versions of pure self-consciousness (together with the system of 
Lordship and Bondage, Unhappy Consciousness and Reason, explained later). Pure self-
consciousness takes self as an abstraction (content-less, pure I) as the main point of view from 
which it looks at itself, other subjects, and the whole world.   
 
For Hegel, a Stoic is focused on  its own single, pure universe. A Stoic has realized that it is a 
universal thinking being. For a Stoic, everything that exists, exists in thought. Hegel writes 
about stoic thinking: 
 
Its principle is that consciousness is a being that thinks, and that consciousness 
holds something to be essentially important, or true and good only in so far as it 
thinks it to be such. (PhS §198) 
 
A Stoic is quite completely estranged from the particular, internally differentiated sphere of 
life, namely, from the concrete and seemingly stable sphere of everyday life which appears 
for Consciousness as Understanding. According to Hegel,  Stoic thinking has a negative 
attitude towards the Lord and Bondsman-relationship (explained in ch. 2.2.5.). It thinks that it 
does not need the particular world; hence it does not need Bondsmen to produce particularity 
for it.  It has withdrawn from the realm of Desire. Hegel writes: 
 
…its aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless indifference which 
steadfastly withdraws from bustle of existence, alike from being active as 
passive, into the simple essentiality of thought. (PhS §199)   
 
For  Hegel,  Stoic  freedom  denotes  freedom  in  thought.  Yet,  this  thought  is  only  an  abstract  
thought,  a truth lacking the fullness of life. It is a notion of freedom, not the living reality of 
freedom itself. It cannot give any content or any particular actualization to its freedom. Nor 
can it give any content to what is good or bad etc. It clings to the freedom of a  contentless 
thought. (PhS §201) 
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Hegelian idea of scepticism is that it is the realization of that of which Stoicism was only the 
thought. It is the actual experience of what the freedom of thought is. Hegel writes: 
 
In scepticism, now, the wholly unessential and non-independent character of this 
“other” becomes explicit for consciousness; the (abstract) thought becomes the 
concrete thinking which annihilates the being of the world in all its manifold 
determinateness (…) it is clear that just as Stoicism corresponds to the Notion of 
the independent consciousness which appeared as the lord and bondsman 
relationship, so Scepticism corresponds to its realization as the negative attitude 
towards otherness, to desire and work.  (PhS §202) 
     
An  internal  doubleness  returns  with  scepticism,  as  scepticism  turns  its  (Stoic)  notion  of  
freedom against the sphere of particular life. With scepticism, a negative dialectical 
movement, between the two poles of thought (metaphorized as Lord and Bondsman, i.,e. 
independence and dependence) takes continuously place. This  movement is called by Hegel 
as absolute dialectical unrest.  
 
The sceptical self-consciousness thus experiences in the flux of all that would 
stand secure before it its own freedom as given and preserved by itself. It is 
aware of this stoical indifference of a thinking which thinks itself, the 
unchanging and genuine certainty of itself. This self-certainty does not issue 
from something alien, whose complex development was deposited within it, a 
result  which  would  leave  behind  it  the  process  of  its  coming  to  be.  On  the  
contrary, consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley of 
sensuous and intellectual representations whose differences coincide, and whose 
identity is equally again dissolved, for it is itself determinateness as contrasted 
with the non-identical. (PhS §205) 
 
Hegel sees that in order for a thinking to be able to relate to itself as a particular (instead of 
abstract) system of self-relational thinking, and to others, similar with it, it must be able to 
bring, to use Hegel’s choice of words, the two thoughts of itself  together.  These two thoughts 
imply independence and dependence.  
 
Sceptical thought can see what belongs to self from the view-point of some  context of self.  It 
can identify itself as a particular something from the point of view of some particular self-
relational system. In other words, it can identify itself through the thought of some specific 
“Bondsman”. Similarly, it can identify others on the basis of some particular self-relational 
context, a Bondsman. Further, it can differentiate between itself and others on the basis of the 
thought  of  some  Bondsman.  Yet,  a  sceptical  thinker  can  neither  identify  itself or  others  as  
particulars, nor draw any differentiations anywhere. It refutes, in reference to its “pure I”- 
thought, any particular identity which it thinks (momentarily) of identifying with.       
 
Particular identities, produced (namely, thought into existence)  by  a  Bondsman  are  
unsatisfactory for a sceptic, because they are not its “own”.  A particular self-identity is 
thought in bondage. It is thought by a self who is in bondage.  It is produced according to the 
orders of an alien Lord. This Lord does not let the Bondsman be freely what it is.  A particular 
self-identity is not thought freely, independently, unlimitedly.  Consequently, it cannot be 
seen to relate to a free self, who determines by itself, as its own master, who and what it is.  
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Consequently, a sceptic cannot recognize any particular identity as its “own”. It cannot find 
itself fully in it, as its freedom and independence (its other thought, the pure I) is not an 
internal part of any particular identity.  (PhS §394-398)  
 
According to Hegel, a sceptical, changeable consciousness cannot bring the two thoughts of 
itself together. Basically, these two alien thoughts refer to what have been exemplified before 
as the Lord and the Bondsman. This mind is sceptical of the things it sees and thinks. Yet, it is 
structured so that it is dependent on the things, the existence of which it is sceptical of.  In 
order to be sceptical of things,  it needs Bondsmen (namely, other thinking) to produce things 
for  it.  It  does  not  posit  things  self-consciously,  by  itself,  yet  instead  it  takes  a  step  into  an  
external place beyond (into the abstract thought) when particular things are thought into 
existence (by Bondsmen, particular thinking) as this mind itself  cannot be sure whether 
things exist or not.   
 
To think of these two thoughts as two minds, or selves, gazing at each other, whenever this 
mind thinks of things, emphazises the idea of their alienation as two externally related sites of 
thinking and knowing. Even as they exist within one mind, as two thoughts within one 
thinking, they do not return (relate) to the same (particular) self, nor do they speak of a same 
thing. Hegel describes the movement within this self-contradictory consciousness 
 
Its deeds and its words always belie one another and equally it has itself the 
doubly contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and sameness, and of 
utter contingency and non-identity with itself. But it keeps the poles of this its 
self-contradiction apart, and adopts the same attitude to it as it does in its purely 
negative activity in general. Point out likeness or identity to it, and it will point 
out unlikeness or non-identity; and when it is now confronted with what it has 
just asserted, it turns round and points out likeness or identity. Its talk is in fact 
like the squabbling of self-willed children, one of whom says A if the other says 
B, and in turn says B if the other says A, and who by contradicting themselves 
buy for themselves the pleasure of continually contradicting one another.  (PhS 
§205)  
 
This dual thinking is without any such own self, which could be particularized and 
differentiated from  another self.  In sceptical thinking, there is no self which would identify 
with both of the thoughts which it has of itself, so that neither thought would need to be 
cancelled, externalized, be alienated, when an identification with the other takes place.  Both 
the thinker and the “thing” being thought are collections of mutually alien thoughts. The 
thing, thought by way of dialectical unrest, corresponds with the structure of the thinking 
which thinks it. Neither the system of thinking or the thing (thought in this system) can be 
seen as particulars. They cannot be differentiated from anything outside of them. Structured 
as the absolute dialectical unrest, both of them are unlimited abstractions. Absolute dialectical 
unrest describes the general logic of how pure self-consciousness thinks of things. It appears 
as the inner logic of a thinking which is structured as the alien relation between the Lord and 
the Bondsman.  
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2.2.7. From sceptical thought towards Unhappy Consciousness 
 
 
For Hegel, Unhappy Consciousness denotes another version of pure self-consciousness 
(together with e.g. Stoicism and Scepticism, explained above). Unhappy Consciousness is 
somewhat different from the sceptical consciousness. It is  more conscious of its internal 
doubleness. Thus, it is a more mature, self-conscious version of pure self-consciousness. 
When a sceptic just rambled between its two thoughts,  and felt quite free from the world of 
desire and bondage, an Unhappy Consciousness is aware that it is double, and that both of its 
thoughts  are  necessary  for  it.  However,  it  does  not  bring  its  two  thoughts  into  a  particular  
unity. Instead, they remain as an abstract unity. Consequently,  the thinking of Unhappy 
Consciousness lacks its own particular (actual) self-consciousness, and hence it is divided into 
two consciousnesses  externally  related  to  each  other.   Unhappy Consciousness  makes  these  
thoughts reciprocally deny the existence of each other.  
 
In Unhappy Consciousness, there are Bondsmen-thoughts, on the basis of which it may think 
of itself having a particular identity. And, then there is the pure thought of itself, by which 
this thinking frees, or “purifies” itself from the bondage of the Bondsman-thoughts. The 
phases of “being in bondage” and “getting free from bondage” follow each other. When this 
thinking sees itself “in bondage”, it is not satisfied, because being in bondage does not 
correspond, at least fully, with what it thinks of itself. And, when it sees itself “free from 
bondage”, it is also not quite satisfied. Then it actually sees itself as absolutely free from any 
particularity, and hence as a non-being.   
 
When an Unhappy Consciousness thinks of itself as having a particular identity, it must 
externalize its capacity to abstract from, and see beyond the limits of this particular identity. 
Thus, when it thinks of itself as having a particular identity it must reduce itself to bondage, 
into the limited consciousness of Bondsman. And, on the other hand, if it thinks of itself as 
un-limited by any particular identity, it must externalize its particularity.  Consequently, its 
thinking of itself, and of the whole world, moves between the extremes of these two thoughts.  
(ibid.)  
 
An Unhappy Consciousness may, for example, think of  sexuality by moving between the 
moment of “bondage” (as one of its  thoughts) and the moment of “freedom from bondage” 
(the other one of the thoughts). A thinker may, first, identify with some specific sexual 
identity. Then, another thought arrives, and the thinker thinks that  its  sexual  identity  is  
actually limited; it is sexuality in bondage, not its own freely chosen identity. Thus, the 
thinker moves off from its previous sexual identity to another identity, which also is to be 
found as alien. Whatever the sexuality is like, it is seen to be in bondage, if it is a particular 
identity.  A thinking self will always find any sexual identity as “in bondage” because it 
cannot relate the thought of “free from bondage” to any one of the particular sexual identities. 
Thus, the thinking self will think that any specific sexual identity reduces sexuality “to 
bondage”.  No  particular  sexual  identity  is  its  own,  because  the  self  receives  it  from  an  
arbitrary “Lord”. Hegel writes about the dual nature of the Unhappy Consciousness:   
 
This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially 
contradictory nature is for it a single consciousness, must for ever have present 
in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn 
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in the very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful 
unity with the other. Its true return to itself, or its reconciliation with itself, will, 
however,  display  the  Notion  of  Spirit  that  has  become  a  living  spirit,  and  has  
achieved an actual existence, because it already possesses as a single undivided 
consciousness a dual nature.  The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the gazing of 
one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is 
also its essential nature. But it is not as yet explicitly aware that this is its 
essential nature, or that it is the unity of both. (PhS 207)) 
 
If the two thoughts of sexuality (or of any “something”) are not mediated by a particular 
middle term, the two thoughts do not construct an actual (identifiable, particular) form of 
sexuality. Sexuality remains as fragmented into sexuality “in bondage” and sexuality “as 
freedom from all (particular) forms of sexuality”.  Thus, for this kind of thinking there cannot 
exist any sexuality.  Any recognition of actual (particular) existence of sexuality is soon 
thought to have its  origin in the thoughts of a Bondsman.  Yet, in order for a Unhappy 
Consciousness to think of sexuality at all, it must anyhow have it produced by  Bondsmen. 
Without sexuality “in bondage” it cannot think of sexuality at all, because only particular 
sexuality (i.e. Bondsman-sexuality) can be identified as existent. Abstract sexuality cannot be 
identified as an existent sexuality, it is everywhere and nowhere.  Actually, this kind of a 
thinker moves between the two extremes of “sexuality in bondage”  and  “no sexuality at all”. 
(PhS §238)    
 
A pure self-consciousness (e.g. Unhappy Consciousness) does not have an own notion of 
sexuality, freedom, democracy, subjectivity, or of anything else.  Objects of thought, which 
could be identified as “sexuality” or “democracy”, do not exist for it at all for it cannot accept 
any particular description of them. It is aware that these “things” exist for Bondsmen (i.e. for 
context-dependent thinking), yet, because it does not find itself in bondage, like Bondsmen, 
they do not exist for it. Its own thought of things do not appear for it as existent, 
phenomenological, because, the thoughts which produce actual “things” (Bondsman-thinking) 
and  its other thoughts concerning things (Lord-thinking) make up reciprocally denied 
fragments in its thinking.  (PhS §205-208)  
 
Importantly, the two externally related thoughts of this thinking do not construct a (particular)  
thing, nor do they relate to any (particular) self.  In pure self-consciousness, the “things” 
which are thought of, and the “self”, doing the thinking,  actually do relate to each other, as 
the things and the self show the same structure of “absolute dialectical unrest”.  The basic 
fragmentary nature of thinking (i.e. the lack of identifiable self, to which the thoughts could 
be  seen  to  relate  to)  shows  hence  itself  as  the  fragmentary  nature  of  its  objects  of  thought 
Thus, in this sense, pure self-consciousness is non-existent for itself. (PhS §590)    
 
Unhappy Consciousness feels that something important is denied, left out, whenever  it thinks 
of itself from the view-point of either one of its selves.  Neither one of the thoughts satisfies 
it, because the other thought becomes cancelled, violated by the other thought. These thoughts 
are their own universes, allowing for no “other” existence. Both of them constitute, thus, the 
non-being of the other. Because this thinking itself is the thinking (and consciousness) of both 
of these thoughts, it is the consciousness of contradiction. Because it cannot identify actually 
with neither one of its internal self-consciousnesses, it identifies itself, according to Hegel, 
with a changeable consciousness, and takes itself to be an unessential Being. (PhS §208)  
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Since it is, to begin with, only the immediate unity of the two and so takes them 
to be, not the same, but opposites, one of them, viz. the simple Unchangeable, it 
takes ot be the essential Being; but the other, the protean Changeable, it takes to 
be  the  unessential.  The  two  are,  for  the  Unhappy  Consciousness,  alien  to  one  
another; and because it is itself the consciousness of this contradiction, it 
identifies itself with the changeable consciosuness, and takes itself to be the 
unessential Being. But as consciousness of unchangeableness, or of simple 
essential  Being,  it  must  at  the  same  time  set  about  freeing  itself  from  the  
unessential,i.e. from itself. For though it indeed takes itself to be merely the 
Changeable, and the Unchangeable is, for it, an alien Being, yet it is itself   a  
simple, hence unchangeable, consciousness, and hence aware that this 
consciousness is its own essence, although in such a way that again it does not 
itself take the essence to be its own. The attitude it assigns to both cannot 
therefore be one of mutual indifference, i.e. it cannot itself be indifferent 
towards the Unchangeable; rather, it is itself directly both of them, and the 
relation of the two is for it a relation of essential being to the unessential, so that 
this  latter  has  to  be  set  aside;  but  since  for  it  both  are  equally  essential  and  
contradictory, it is merely the contradictory movement in which one opposite 
does not come to rest in its opposite, but in it only produces itself afresh as an 
opposite.  (PhS 208)  
 
Unhappy Consciousness, as a changeable consciousness, actually identifies with a 
Bondsman´s self-consciousness.  The Bondsman is a consciousness which, for it is in 
bondage, is vulnerable to arbitrary changes. It is, by Hegel, also described as a changeable 
consciousness. What it knows and what it thinks is vulnerable to changes, uncontrolled by 
itself.   It  changes at  the will  of its  master,  the Lord. The master’s will  is  not known for the 
Bondsman, instead it comes from an unknown “beyond”. Consequently, the changeable 
consciousness changes (for itself) somewhat contingently, arbitrarily, as the master, effecting 
its  changes,   is  external  for  it.   The  Lord,  in  contrast,   is  an  unchangeable consciousness,  
universally and timelessly same. It is unchangeable by anything which it does not, itself, 
master.  As such, it is autonomous.  However, as the Lord’s “pure” knowledge and will is not 
known to the Lord itself, nor is it known to the Bondsman, the unity of these two figures (i.e 
the changeable consciousness, which includes these two thoughts) is at the mercy of 
somewhat contingent changes. (PhS §207-209) The internal movement of pure self-
consciousness contrasts with how actual self-consciousness moves as it thinks. By actual self-
consciousness, the dialectical unrest of pure self-consciousness is replaced by the dialectics, 
Aufhebung (negation of negation).   
 
Changeable consciousness cannot unite together the two thoughts which it has of itself, 
namely, itself as a particular something (as limited) and also as a non-limited thinker. Or, 
actually, it does think of itself as both, yet only so that these two thoughts constitute a 
reciprocal denial of each other Hence, pure self-consciousness is externally beyond itself 
inside itself.  With Hegel, there is an important difference between being “externally beyond 
itself inside itself”, and being “internally beyond  itself inside itself”. Pure self-consciousness 
has not internally, conceptually, mediated the two thoughts of itself together; hence it is 
externally  beyond itself inside itself. A pure self-consciousness constitutes an active self-
denial, which it thinks of as “freedom”.  (PhS §205, §208, §216, §227, §231-237) 
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This means that whenever it thinks of itself as having e.g. a particular sexual identity, it also 
has the urge to “free” itself from the bondage of this “limited” identity. And reciprocally, the 
freedom, into which it frees itself, does not satisfy it either. When it clings to the “identity” of 
a master, it feels that it is a master over a nothingness, because the object, which it masters, 
has no independence outside of its own thoughts. It is a master over a particularity 
(Bondsman, and the objects, laboured by it) which is actually a nothingness. The satisfaction 
of being a master is a vanishing thought, because the particular world, which it masters, is 
non-existent.  In the name of freedom, Unhappy Consciousness rejects all particular forms. It 
cannot actually accept anything particular, because any choice it makes necessarily restricts 
its freedom. Paradoxically, its uncompromising view of freedom makes it less free. (Consider 
a person who does not want to have any permanent sexual relationship because it would 
“limit her freedom”. She is less free than most of us in the sense that she is not free to live in a 
permanent relationship.)   Hence, Unhappy Consciousness needs to go on, towards new 
particular identities, in search for a satisfaction in an independent object, which would not be 
“moved”,  or  “changed”  at  its  own  will.  It  needs  to  find  an  object,  with  a  will  of  its  own,  
capable of resisting it. It desires to relate to an object, which is a subject, namely, a being with 
its own self.  In this kind of object, it can find its own self. 
 
Pure self-consciousness thinks of things on the basis of immediate duality, which denotes an 
important contrast to a mediated conceptual construction (explained in chapter 2.1.3).   The 
parties of a  duality cannot be, together, parts of a same particular whole. The dual sides do 
not “speak” of a same particular thing, because they are not related to each other conceptually, 
by a mediating “third”.  These kinds of dualist parts constitute what Hegel calls as the 
“absolute dialectical unrest”.  In the absolute dialectical unrest  a “particularizing”  thought of 
a thing (i.e. a Bondsman -thought) is opposed by, or criticised by,  an abstract thought (a pure, 
empty, sceptical thought).  The result of this confrontation is “purifying”. The thing is 
purified of its particular contents. Nothing actually changes in dialectical unrest, instead, the 
thing in question becomes over again rendered into an abstraction.  In dialectical unrest, the 
other thought of a thing denies the existence of the other thought,  instead of “criticising” it, 
adding some new information to it, or making it change into something new. Absolute 
dialectical unrest changes things into  abstractions, into voids: not  into something (particular) 
“new”. Hegel implies that this kind of “unrest” is an on-going process in the mind of pure 
self-consciousness.  This “unrest” constitutes the fundamental way in which this self thinks of 
things. Whenever it is presented with a particular description of some thing, it purifies the 
thing by this  “pure criticism”.    
 
For Hegel, ideally free selves see themselves both as universals and particulars. They take 
free self-consciousness as their universal genus, and see themselves as particular instances of 
this genus.  Between free selves there can be communication, e.g. disagreements and 
conflicts. Disagreements become possible only when thinkers think that they speak of same 
particular things.  There can be no disagreements over abstractions. Abstractions are void of 
such features which could be the object of a disagreement.  Because free self-consciousnesses 
themselves think that they speak of same things, and consider each others as valid knowers, or 
theorists of  things, they can e.g. enter into a dispute over the thing. This kind of disputes 
denote the kind of dialectical movement (in contrast to absolute dialectical unrest) by which 
thinkers can potentially limitlessly enrich their knowledge of thingness.  (PhS §208)   
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2.2.8. Between universal and particular 
 
 
A conceptual thinker may move  externally between the various thoughts by which it thinks 
of  some  specific  thing,  e.g.  of  sexuality.   It  does  not  identify  its  thoughts  (of  sexuality)  as  
internal to  itself  as  a  particular  thinker.  Nor  does  it  realize  that  its  way to  think  of  things  –  
even as a collection of mutually contradicting aspects – constitutes a self-relational, historical, 
particular construction of some thing, e.g. sexuality.   In order for it to identify its  thoughts 
concerning the thing in question, as its own thoughts, it should acknowledge itself as the one 
who gathers together these various aspects and makes a particular construction (a concept) out 
of these aspects.   It should see itself as the one who builds up, or produces  a specific thing 
(like sexuality) out of various thoughts. It is the one who relates various thoughts as aspects of 
some thing. Only if it sees itself as the one who makes some thing,  like sexuality, or its own 
self (as a subject for itself),  into a unified concept,  it is able to differentiate its own thinking 
from other thinking.  The idea of conceptual unities refers  especially to the self who makes 
unities (identifiable things, objects) out from components (thoughts). This self, who actually 
always is a concept (i.e. a system-building connector of its thoughts, so that it makes its 
thoughts into “somethings”, e.g. concepts of sexuality)  should see itself as a concept and thus 
become a self-conscious concept (a  reflective  concept).   As  a  self-conscious  concept,  it  can  
differentiate itself from another (as another concept).  Because particularity (the aspect of the 
Bondsman) is a feature of all selves, the self is able to differentiate itself from the other. If the 
self does not identify itself as a particular concept, it cannot differentiate itself from the other.   
 
A third, or, a middle term (the self as a mediator of its own thoughts) is identifiable as a 
particular middle term. Thoughts relate not only to a self, but to a particular self. According 
to Hegel, a thinker can acknowledge itself as a particular middle term, by acknowledging the 
existence of other middle terms.  A third, a mediator, exists for a mediator, i.e. for a thinker 
who acknowledges itself (and others) as mediators. A self-conscious mediator looks at itself 
and others from the point of view of a mediator. In order for it to look at itself from the point 
of view of a mediator, it must have formed a genus out of the mediating property.   
 
In order to find itself as its own middle term (i.e. the mediator of its own thoughts) pure self-
consciousness should become aware that there are other thinkers besides itself, who think of 
themselves and the world, on the basis of two thoughts. Actually, all thinking ministers 
between its own two thoughts, its doubleness.  All thinking ministers between its particularity 
and the ultimate context of its particularity. The middle term (minister) unifies its various 
thoughts.  Even if thinking seems to have given up its faculty of ministering, and handed it 
over to another minister, e.g. to an external priest (as, for Hegel,  is the case in much of 
religious thought) it anyhow ultimately does the ministering by itself. The very act of handing 
over its own middle term (and, as such the unity of itself) to another is anyhow something 
thought by the thinking self itself. (PhS §227-230) 
 
It could be mentioned here that as considers the contrast between external priesthood and 
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internal priesthood, Hegel appears as somewhat a true Protestant.  For Hegel, in the spirit of 
Protestant “universal priesthood” , the minister between what is an unlimited (God) and what 
is limited (a particular human subject) lies ultimately in each thinking self.  Nevertheless (as 
concerns Hegel´s own religiousness) he places the rational state above religion in matters 
affecting e.g. ethical principles, rightness, laws and institutions. As Taylor says, for Hegel the 
convictions of the church are too undetermined, and too subjective in their application, 
without there being a  concrete expression of ethical life in the rational state. (PhS §227-230; 
Taylor 1975,  485)  
 
In order for a pure self-consciousness to be able to become conscious of itself as the minister 
of  its own affairs, it should see that any thinking is ultimately in bondage (limited) for itself. 
Thus, any Bondsman-thought relates to a potentially free self. In short, anybody who takes 
itself as its own object of thought is an internally doubled thinker (i.e. a self-consciousness) 
and thus capable for free self-consciousness and  freedom. Every internally doubled self  
carries in it the basic elements (the two thoughts) enabling it to freedom.  Only free selves can 
allow others to contribute to their thinking and knowing of the world.  Bondsman-thought (or, 
Bondsman-minded thinker),  who is not ministered to its own Lord-thought,  cannot go 
beyond its limits, because it does not recognize its Lord (the one who determines its limits) as 
its own self. And, reciprocally, a Lord-thought cannot go beyond its limits, because it does 
not recognize any limits to itself.        
 
By seeing that there is also other “ministers” who can reflect on particular subjectivity from 
the universal view-point , pure self-consciousness becomes conscious that it is not the only, 
universal reflecting consciousness, or the Lord, over all Bondsmen any more. It is a particular 
Lord over a particular Bondsman, i.e. it is its own Lord over its own Bondsman. When 
Bondsmen become acknowledged as actually containing their own Lords, they can become 
acknowledged as the “knowers” of their own limits. They are acknowledged as valid 
“knowers” of the world, as there is no higher knowing of them “beyond” themselves.  There 
is no point of view (above them), by which their own point of view onto themselves would be 
seen  to  be  limited,  without  their  own  knowing  of  this  ultimate  point  of  view.    Pure  self-
consciousness realizes that it does not look at Bondsmen from beyond or above Bondsmen 
themselves, yet, Bondsmen are at the same level of “looking at everything there is” than itself.  
By this dialectical step forward, along the ladder of self-knowledge, pure self-consciousness 
realizes that as a system of thinking, containing such conceptual moments as bondage (which 
refers, basically, to Consciousness as Understanding) and lordship (referring to self-
consciousness) it is similar with Others.   
 
Basically, for Hegel, by the act of acknowledging the existence of “other ministers”, besides 
itself, pure self-consciousness turns into actual self-consciousness. The crucial point is that 
both of its two thoughts gain particularity through the particularization of their minister, their 
mediating third.  As a minister acknowledges its similarity with other ministers, it is able to 
see itself as also different from others. It does not constitute the abstract beyond (the pure I) of 
particular differentiation any more. Instead, it can be differentiated from others (ministers, 
thirds) because others are basically similar to it. It is not  an undifferentiated (pure) reflecting 
consciousness  of  all  others  any  more.  Yet,   as  a  reflecting  consciousness,   it  can  be  both  
differentiated and particularized by Other reflecting consciousnesses. It can see itself as a self-
consciousness,  because it sees other self-consciousnesses.  Because there exists other 
structurally similar systems of doubly thinking  besides its own, its existence can be 
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particularized. 
 
However,  before it particularizes itself through others, its system of thinking exists for it as 
immediate externality.  Its internal system of thinking exists as objective reality, as the world 
“out there”.  Pure self-consciousness reads the world as immediate absolute dialectical unrest 
(discussed earlier in 2.2.2).   If a particular doubleness is not particularized (i.e. related back, 
or returned back to its thinking self) it is read as a non-subjective fact. This means that a self 
reads the whole world on the basis of its own doubleness only. (PhS § 547-548, 574-577 
 
When the Other is acknowledged, its own ministership (its own self-contextualization) is 
considered to be basically as valid as mine, or any others.  Hegel does not imply that this 
means that we would have to consider the other to be automatically (universally) right, in 
what it thinks, yet, that we take its views seriously, as basically equal to our own, or anybody 
elses views. This means that I do not contextualize the Other from beyond Others own 
contextualization of itself. I do not situate Others contextualization of itself as situated still in 
a larger universe of knowledge, unknown to the other itself.  The Other is not, by me,  seen to 
be contextualized in relation to something which it necessarily cannot  itself know. An 
example of recognizing the Other as a valid contributor, as concerns the general “knowing” of 
things, is that when the Other presents its ideas about things, I do not, in my mind, see these 
ideas as symptoms of e.g. the difficult childhood of the Other, or caused by some other 
context, unknown to the Other itself. Thus, even if I  may see the ideas presented by the Other 
as mistaken, I can still consider them  as serious contributions, not as symptoms or effects of 
some “higher” or more remote cause which affects the Other but which is beyond Other’s 
own capacity of understanding.  
 
The next sub-chapter continues with the theme of pure self-consciousness as Unhappy 
Consciousness. The various aspects of Unhappy Consciousness are important to take up as the 
theme of “two thoughts” or “internal doubleness” is the basic theme of this work. With 
Unhappy Consciousness the doubleness takes a form which is only externally ministered. 
This means that the minister has not become conscious of his own ministering,  nor  has  he  
henceforth been able to become conscious of the existence of other ministers. The contrast 
between external (immediate) ministering and internal (self-consciously mediated) 
ministering is crucially important with Hegel. The Hegelian relation between free self-
consciousnesses (between free self and free other) is ultimately the relation between 
ministers, made possible by the particularization of ministering. Further, recognitive 
relationships and absolute knowing are based on the particularization of ministering, i.e. 
mediated internal doubleness. Unhappy consciousness presents for Hegel, besides Reason, 
one of the most developed forms of external, immediate doubleness. It is interesting that even 
that it includes most of the same components than the internally mediated doubleness, it is in 
a sharp contrast with it.  
 
  
2.2.9.  Bad infinite. Absolute freedom.   
 
In this chapter I explicate Unhappy Consciousness as an internally “worn out” stage of 
abstract (pure) self-consciousness. It is to become gradually so unhappy and frustrated with 
itself, as to finally allow for the existence of other knowledge of the world, besides its own.  
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This is the stage where the object is known to be unknown for any particular subject.  In this 
chapter I refer to Charles Taylor’s account of two important aspects of Unhappy 
Consciousness, bad infinite and absolute freedom.   
 
For Hegel, the “Enlightenment thinker” thinks that all thinking (including its own, to the 
extent that its thinking has any particular content to it) is unknown to, or beyond itself. Thus, 
it has become a conscious of the internal doubleness of thinking, described above. It not only 
is internally double, it also is aware that its own thinking as well as the thinking of Other, is 
internally double An internal doubleness assumes a specific form for a thinker who is itself 
conscious of it. Because it knows that it is an internal doubleness, it clings to the idea that it 
thinks, whatever it thinks, on the basis of two thoughts, (discussed already in the previous 
chapter). 
 
Unhappy Consciousness thinks of any thing on the basis of two thoughts, or two moments, 
inherent in conceptual thinking.  The two thoughts are, as explained already earlier, the 
moment of particularity, i.e. the moment of stable subject-object-relation, which displays  
Consciousness as Understanding. The other thought denotes the moment of abstracting from 
particularity. The moment of abstraction”, namely, the moment of absolute singularity or 
individuality, displays also a  genus or origin, which is “pure I”.   Pure  I  is  an  inherent  
moment of conceptual thinking, by which it conducts abstracting from particularities. 
Unhappy Consciousness thinks of any thing on the basis of  two “selves”, namely the 
Consciousness as Understanding, and the pure I.  
 
As Taylor suggests, Unhappy Consciousness is a stage of a highly internalized form of a 
system of lordship and bondage. Unhappy Consciousness realizes that there is no way of 
getting rid of particular subjectivity. It sees that it cannot rise anywhere above particular 
subjectivity by the power of its thought, yet stays limited by it even if it tries to rise above it. 
However, it cannot see any particular identity as its own, because it sees that all of them are 
thought while in bondage. Thus, unhappy consciousness has become disappointed in its 
ability to actually rise above “slavery”.  It is globally cynical towards all efforts to reach the 
“immutable”, i.e. that which is universally and timelessly identical with itself.  (Taylor 
1975,159) 
 
Taylor writes about the Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness: 
 
In PhG Hegel presents the unhappy consciousness as one who is deeply divided 
because it is both the immutable self-identical subject of thought and the 
individual who is subject to the changeable world. But this situation as it is lived 
by the subject is one in which he identifies himself as particular with the 
inessential and the mutable. The immutable is projected into a beyond. His unity 
with it is felt only in the sense of loss, the sense that he must somehow go 
beyond his present estate and achieve oneness with this immutable.But since at 
the present stage, particular and immutable are so defined as to be incompatible, 
this attempt is perpetually doomed to failure. Since I cannot stop being a 
particular  individual,  I  can  never  attain  to  unity  with  the  unchanging.  (Taylor  
1975, 160)   
 
According to Hegelian analysis, this somewhat resigned, self-enslaved  mode of thought 
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practices nevertheless “immutable” knowing, even that it itself thinks that it has given up 
hope of ever reaching the “immutable”. As its self-consciousness is still underdeveloped and 
not particularized through acknowledging actual Others,  it is unaware of how it still 
universalizes  its  own  sceptical  doubts.  It  does  not  relate   its  way  to  suspect  universally all 
attempts to reach the immutable into its own thinking of it.  Thus, it practices its own 
immutability in the form of cynicism towards all attempts to reach immutability.   
 
Paradoxically, this special mode of self-reflection thinks that it treats itself and others equally, 
as it claims to be as unreachable (as considers its own immutable nature) to itself as the others 
are to their selves.   It claims that all are universally and equally incapable of finding the 
immutable truth. Yet, it does not recognize that it commits to a performative contradiction by 
making this claim.  
 
Unhappy Consciousness has realized that all thinking is self-relational thinking, and thus 
particular.   What Hegel means by self-relational thinking is what we would nowadays call 
not only as self-relational thinking but also as contextual, situational and historicist thinking 
context-dependent, situation-dependent,  historically time-dependent  thinking. Context-
dependent thinking sees the world on the basis of its context. Its own context denotes the 
universe, according to which it sees particulars. Unhappy consciousness is itself a 
consciousness of this. It has realized that  selves are actually normative “contexts of thinking” 
and that these contexts are numerous.  
 
According to Hegel, Unhappy consciousness sees thinking in general, however, as only 
context-dependent.  It sees also its own thinking as only context-dependent. The reason for 
this is that Unhappy Consciousness continues to pass, mediate, all particularity to the hands of 
an abstract Lord, within its own thinking. It places all thinking into brackets, considers it as 
suspect, because all of it relates to parochial subjectivity. It sees that all self-relational, 
particular things (also abstractions, as they are self-relational abstractions) belong to the realm 
of unessential things.  As it cannot mediate any further than just the immediate mediation 
between the two (i.e. the absolute dialectical unrest between particularity and universality) it 
cannot hold on to any particularity.    
 
Unhappy Consciousness does not see the context-dependent  thinking as including its own 
self-reflective faculty. It does not acknowledge the context-dependent thinking as constituting 
its own mediated doubleness. In other words, it does not see the context-dependent thinking 
as a thinking which is capable of reflecting its context-dependency. It sees all forms thinking 
as imprisoned into their particular traditions, ideologies or social conditions. As such, 
unhappy consciousness does not see the context-dependent thinking as similar with its own 
thinking. Unhappy consciousness thinks of context-dependent (self-relational) thinking as  
externally double, not as internally double. As such, consciousness of doubleness is not 
particularized for Unhappy Consciousness, as it later will be for actual self-consciousness. 
Unhappy Consciousness just is a consciousness of doubleness, yet, it does not yet think that it 
is a consciousness of doubleness, and that there are others, too. It thinks of things on the basis 
of two thoughts, yet, it does not think that it itself is the mediator, the ministering activity, of 
these two thoughts. It does not recognize that its own way to think is a living proof that 
human thought can arise above particular contexts: what is possible for it must be possible for 
others, too.  
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For Hegel, the stage of abstract self-consciousness denotes the stage of abstracting from other 
thinking, and as such it is a necessary stage. Yet, if thinking does not go any further than this, 
it realizes the nature of its own thinking and other thinking only as abstractions. Pure self-
consciousness cannot actually see anything particular, when it looks at particularity, because 
it cannot particularize the position from which it itself looks at particularity.    
 
In consequence abstract self-consciousness appears as patronizing. It contextualizes context-
dependent thinking from beyond the contexts themselves. Its own self and others are abstract 
(unknown)  contexts  of  thinking  for  it,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  others  themselves  may 
not be abstract contexts of thinking to themselves, as not all thinkers think in the same way as 
pure self-consciousness. Yet, pure self-consciousness does not acknowledge the other thinkers 
as  equal  knowers  of  themselves,  and  equal  knowers  of  the  world,  and  thus  it  considers  the  
particular self-knowledge, practiced by others, as not equal with its own abstract knowledge.  
 
In a way, Hegel´s Unhappy consciousness appears like a peculiar kind of a psycho-therapist 
who thinks that the patients will never find out  what causes them to think, or feel,  the way 
they  do.   Whatever  context  the  patients  reconstruct,  to  give  an  explanation  as  to  why  they  
think the way they do, feel the way they do, or why they think of other people, or the world, 
the way they do, the therapist knows always more, as s/he knows that the patients will never 
find out, in full, the ultimate context of  their thoughts and feelings. The therapist knows (and 
applies this knowing to all of her/his patients, as well as to her/himself, to the extent that s/he 
her/himself has ideas of why s/he her/himself thinks the way s/he does) that the ultimate 
meaning-giving context is lost. The therapist knows that her/his own universal context is lost, 
and so is the universal context of all others. Yet, the very fact that the therapist is able to see 
all this, shows that people are not doomed to live in ignorance.   
 
By becoming conscious of itself, Unhappy consciousness  may realize that it (itself) sees 
others as unknown to themselves. The unknowingness of others is something thought by it. 
As it may relate  its own thoughts of others to itself, it may be able to acknowledge that others 
practice their own thinking also, outside of what it thinks of others. Consequently, by 
becoming  conscious  of  how  it  thinks  of  others,  it  may  differentiate  between  its  thoughts  of  
others and actual others themselves. However, it  sees the Others as necessarily imprisoned 
inside their particular contexts.  
 
Unhappy consciousness does not identify with context-dependent (other) thinking. It  observes 
the   realm  of  otherness  from  a  position  beyond  it,  itself  abstracted  pure  from  all  particular  
otherness  of  its  own.   It  sees  its  own particular  subjectivity  also  as  situated  in  this  external  
realm. For Hegel, the “point of view” (otherness) from which a self reflects itself, is always 
similar with the self. Thus, if self does not particularize the abstract point of view, from which 
it looks at itself, it sees itself as an abstraction. For Hegel, a moment of abstraction (a moment 
of “pure I”) is an inherent moment of all conceptual thinking. However, if it is taken as a non-
particular, limitless point of view , from which self is looked at,  the self, who looks at itself 
like this, is seen as an abstraction to itself.  
 
For Hegel, self is in fact meant to (by becoming self-conscious) to find itself as beyond itself, 
external to itself, and other to itself. Yet, unhappy consciousness has understood the meaning 
of “being beyond itself” so that it looks at itself from a non-particularized moment of “pure 
I”. It does not identify the moment of pure I as its own moment of abstraction, as belonging to 
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the system of a particular conceptual thinker. As such it cannot recognize actual “externality” 
nor “beyond” itself at all, as the beyond is an indifferent abstraction for it.  (PhS §192-193, 
199-200) 
 
According to Hegel, the realm of self-relational thinking is externalized by the unhappy 
consciousness. As external, self-relational thinking is seen to exist, yet, it is an indifferent 
abstraction for unhappy consciousness.  As such, all self-relational thinking is (for it) external 
other thinking, not actually its own. Because other thinking is universally and timelessly  
questionable, it would be a mistake to identify with any particular case of it. The stage of   
unhappy consciousness denotes, for Hegel,  the “Kantian” dilemma, in which thinking can see 
other  thinking  (i.e  particular  subjective  ideas  about  “thing”)  only  as  abstractions,  not  as  its  
“own”. It observes that things are thought differently (in the realm of otherness, external to it) 
between one (questionable) thinking, and other (questionable) thinking. Unhappy 
Consciousness has no way of  determining which one of the “other thinkers” are right about 
things and which are wrong. It cannot make any own judgements concerning things because it 
is fundamentally sceptical towards all particular determinations of things.  Thus, it observes 
that things exist indefinitely for other. In contrast to a thinking in which things exist endlessly 
for other, Hegel intended to theorize how things could exist both for self and for other. (ibid.)   
 
According to Hegel, the ability to “go over” the limits of context-dependent particular 
subjectivity (the level of Consciousness or Understanding”)  is connected to subject´s 
conceptual capacities to reflect itself and to be self-conscious. Subject is able to be conscious 
of its own consciousness. Subject can become conscious that its own thinking is particular, 
historical and limited. Subject is able to think that the world it sees, and the things included in 
this word,  is a world which it sees,  it  is  a  world  “for  it”,  and  that  the  world  “for  it”  is  
probably not what the true world is “in itself”.  
 
Yet, for Hegel, the above realization alone does not constitute actual self-consciousness which  
can take place only when the existence of equal other self-consciousness is acknowledged. 
Subjectivity, which considers the outside of its own particular subjectivity as something valid 
cannot be built just on the realization that “particular subjectivity is limited”. The Hegelian 
difference between pure self-consciousness and actual, free self-consciousness becomes 
discussed here. Pure self-consciousness realizes that particular subjective thinking is limited. 
Yet, particular subjective thinking is not limited (particular) for pure self-consciousness itself 
because it does not have such a particular self, from which it could see limits. For pure self-
consciousness, particulars as particulars exist for context-dependent thinking 
(metaphorically, for Bondsman).   
 
 
For Hegel, a consciousness of one´s own limits is the base for actual freedom. This means that 
a self should not be only conscious of the limited nature and and  particularity of others (i.e. 
the  limits  of  Bondsmen).  Actual  freedom  contrasts  with  the  abstract  freedom  (which  is  the  
freedom for pure self-consciousness, called by Hegel also as Absolute freedom). Actual 
freedom means that thinking is limited (particular) for itself. Acknowledging ones own limits 
(i.e. ones own particularity) thus goes hand in hand with actual freedom.  Importantly, for 
Hegel, one becomes free (i.e. thinking becomes free) by acknowledging its own particularity. 
This however includes also the important idea of going beyond one’s own limits. In abstract 
freedom one observes the limits of others (bondsmen) without being able to acknowledge 
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one’s own limits. Not being able to see one’s own limits  is due to the structure of lordship 
and bondage, inherent in pure self-consciousness.  A thinking which does not acknowledge its 
own limits, cannot go beyond it own limits, either. Limits must become internal and one’s 
own  (particular) in order for a one to be able to go beyond them.   This can take place only if 
the existence of other, equal self-consciousnesses is acknowledged. Equality or similarity is a 
crucial point here, as it means for Hegel that other (as another thinking and knowing  of the 
world) does not automatically cancel or question the truth of its other. There is reciprocal 
resistance as to which truth is right. As is explained more thoroughly later, when the basic 
rationality of the other is acknowledged, thinking can go beyond its limits because, in short, it 
can learn from the other. Thinking can learn from the other  if it recognizes the basic 
rationality of the other.  This means, among other things, that one must give up the 
patronizing attitude, characteristic for all sceptical thinking and all thinking based on pure 
self-consciousness (including unhappy consciousness). Importantly, for Hegel, one becomes 
free from its own limits (its limited knowing of the world) when it acknowledges the basically 
equal rationality of the others. The going beyond/over one’s own limits takes place as relating 
to the rationality of the others. The actual, objective freedom inherent in this takes ultimately 
place as the constitution of objectivity which is laboured for “us”.   
 
In order to become limited for itself, subject must know its limits as particulars and as 
included in its own conceptual thinking.  This is possible only if it knows what is outside of 
its  own  limits.  According  to  Hegel,  the  outside  of  one´s  own  limits  is  another  (basically  
similar  with  one´s  own)  conceptual  system,  which  posits  its  own particular  limits.   Another  
name for a conceptual system is a self or a self-consciousness. Each self  is (or, constitutes) 
the outside of another self. The outside (other self)  must become recognized as something 
conceptual and rational for one,  if  one  wishes  to  become  limited  for  oneself.  It  must  be  
emphasized  that  becoming  limited  (particular)  for  one´s  self  means  for  Hegel  that  one  
becomes also conceptual and rational for one´s self. This is not possible if one does not 
acknowledge the existence of other beings as rational and conceptual.  
 
One must find its own limits (its particularity, conceptuality and rationality) in another self, 
basically similar and equal with itself. Only another self-consciousness can provide rational, 
particular limit for oneself.  For Hegel, just the realization that a subject is limited by its 
historical position is not enough, if the goal is to actually take the outside, or the beyond of 
oneself into account. To be able to actually see “something” outside the limits of one´s own 
subjective world-view, the subject must become not only particular for itself, but instead a 
particular third for itself. This is possible only if it can relate to another self-consciousness, 
which it sees not only as a particular subject, but instead as another internally mediating 
thinker, capable of reflecting its own limits, contextuality and historicity.         
 
Unhappy Consciousness can be also seen as an ideology – as an insight towards objective 
reality as institutions, social structures and traditions. And it can be seen as an insight towards 
material substance, or, what Hegel calls as Being. For Unhappy consciousness, the material, 
objective world is something alien as its actual truth is somewhere beyond itself.  Unhappy 
Consciousness thinks that the substance of particular lives is beyond them.  Taylor writes:  
 
It  has the sense of a reconciliation which is felt  as absent,  in another world or 
long ago and far away, a reconciliation achieved elsewhere on which we 
essentially depend This is part of the consciousness of alienation (…) The basic 
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attitude of alienation is one in which men feel that their substance lies in 
something outside them, and hence that they can only realize themselves by 
overcoming their particularity and conforming to this reality. (Taylor 1975, 179)  
 
Hegel relates the Enlightenment thinking and Kantian thought with Unhappy Consciousness. 
According to Taylor, especially two aspects of the Enlightenment ideology are important for 
Hegel.   First,  there  is  the  idea  that  the  absolute  or  God is  reduced  to  the  empty  notion  of  a  
supreme being to which no further description can be applied.  Taylor writes: 
 
Of course, many Aufklärer did not believe in God at all, but for Hegel not much 
separated these materialists from those who believed in a super-sensuble reality. 
For they thought of some abstraction like Nature or Matter as underlying the 
changing reality of the sensible world. But an abstraction like Matter, which 
bears none of the particular descriptions of things in the world, is 
indistinguishable from spiritual substrate; and a spiritual substrate without 
particular description is indistinguishable from pure Being. We have here an 
echo of Hegel´s famous opening dialectic of the Logic, that of Being and 
Nothing; and the message is the same: in the end all abstractions are alike 
(Taylor 1975, 180-181) 
  
The second aspect of the Enlightenment ideology which Taylor sees as especially important 
for Hegel, is the idea of the usefulness, or utility,  which denotes the concept underlying the 
Enlightenment. Taylor writes about this: 
 
To think of something as useful is to think of it as without intrinsic significance, 
rather its significance is to serve the ends of something else. This notion of the 
useful flows naturally out of the Enlightenment outlook; for this sees the world 
as made up of material things without any further significance. This neutral 
world has no meaning for man, either as expressive of something higher, or as 
embodying a form with which he must conform in order to realize himself. (…) 
Utilitarianism is therefore the ethic of the Enlightenment. Utilitarianism is an 
ethic in which acts are judged according to their consequences, that is, their 
relevance to some extraneous end, hence their usefulness. This is opposed to an 
ethic which judges an act by some intrinsic quality, such as embodying a given 
virtue, or conforming to some moral law. Such intrinsic properties are swept 
aside by the Enlightenment as nonsense..  (Taylor 1975, 181) 
     
Important Hegelian notion of bad infinite is linked with the Enlightenment thought and 
Unhappy Consciousness.  Actually, in bad infinite the two aspects described above, 
characteristic of the Enlightenment thought, meet. Things are useful, not because of 
themselves but because of something else. Yet, because this “something else” which would 
have intrinsic value, is something that cannot be described, the category of the useful has no 
stopping point for it. Taylor explains this: 
 
But the hidden contradiction in this for Hegel is that the category of the useful 
has no stopping point, it is universal in application. Some things may be judged 
useful for my purposes; but I too am a particular reality in the world, there is no 
reason why my purposes should be considered final ends. I and my purposes in 
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turn can be seen as serving or disserving the ends of others, perhaps that of 
society in general; and these others, or society in general can be seen as serving 
or not the purposes of  others,  say the members of this society,  and so on. We 
have a bad infinite. Hegel expresses this by saying that each thing can be seen as 
in itself, but also as for an other, that is, as having just instrumental significance. 
There  is  no  structure  of  significant  reality  which  forces  us  to  stop  somewhere,  
which expresses the final purpose; or as Hegel puts it this chain of extrinsic 
justifications does not return to a self, that is to a subjectivity which would 
encompass the whole development. (Taylor 1975, 181) 
 
Hegel sees that the Enlightenment thinking is trapped in a peculiar kind of universal: 
universal as infinite movement. This movement is motivated by a recurring dissatisfaction. 
This thinking cannot be satisfied with any actual solutions (e.g. as actual state institutions) 
because any solution is necessarily a particular solution.  Unhappy Consciousness resembles 
the dialectical unrest, explained earlier. Bad infinite and dialectical unrest are both based on a 
lack of a particular “middle term”. This means that the mind of  the self, who moves from one 
moment of bad infinite, or dialectical unrest, to another, is not conscious of this movement as 
a particular process, taking place in a particular mind.  As the self is not conscious of itself as 
a particular conceptual thinker, it does not relate its conceptual moments (the moment of 
affirming  particular  reality,  and  the  moment  of  abstracting  from it)    to  its  own thinking  of  
them. If it identifies with (or, “posits”) the other thought, it must refute the other thought. 
When it identifies with the other moment (the moment of affirming particular reality), it 
cannot identify with the other one (the moment of moving beyond, or, abstracting from 
particularity).  
 
Another concept which Hegel relates to Enlightenment thought and Unhappy Consciousness, 
that of Absolute freedom is important.  It resembles bad infinite: the consciousness strives for 
a goal,  which is forever doomed to fail, as the goal is known to be forever somewhere 
beyond. Taylor explains Hegel´s notion of Absolute freedom: 
 
this consciousness sees the world as neutral, as capable of being formed to fit 
human purposes. There is nothing in it which has intrinsic significance, which 
demands to be treated with respect and preserved; all can be altered and 
reformed according to man´s needs and goals. Moreover this consciousness is 
not that of particular individuals, it is a universal rational consciousness which 
has won through to this insight; therefore its purpose in reforming the world will 
be a single, rational and a universal one. (…) The universal knowing subject 
who sees the world spread out as neutral objects whose workings it thoroughly 
understands,  cannot  but  be  seized  by  the  ambition  to  transform  this  world  
according to universal reason. This is the idea of absolute freedom, freedom 
untrammelled  by  any  obstacle,  not  even  that  of  other  wills,  for  the  will  in  
question is a universal will, hence that of all men in so far as they are free. The 
world is (for this consciousness) simply its will, and this will is universal 
(Taylor 1975, 184-185) 
 
Hegel explains the consciousness of absolute freedom as incapable of accepting any 
differentiation (into identities, estates etc.) because all such differentiations are an assault 
against its freedom.   As a non-particular, non-differentiated will, it does not accept the limits 
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of particular differentiations. Thus, in action,  it  does  not  take  some  particular  thing,  or  
structure, as its goal. Instead, as its intentionality is based on itself, on its non-differentiated, 
non-positional, non-particular self, it takes the destruction of particularities and 
differentiations as its goal. It wants to universalize itself. When it assumes an intentional, 
practical attitude, based on itself, it becomes a destruction of all differentiation. Hegel sees 
Terror, of e.g. the French Revolution as exemplifying this consciousness. Terror can be seen 
as the ultimate form of alienation. As in the Terror, absolute freedom ultimately leads to 
absolute un-freedom.  (PhS §582-594; Taylor 1975, 184-187) 
    
 
2.2.10. Consciousness as the Enlightenment Reason  
 
 
Knowing as Reason takes place after the earlier phases of self-consciousness as pure self-
consciousness have been passed. (PhS §231).  At the earlier levels of self-consciousness (as 
pure self-consciousness) the world as something particular and stable -  as it once was known 
by Consciousness as Understanding -  became a restless abstraction.  Whereas Consciousness 
as Understanding saw a particular world, this “stable world” became fragmented into 
fragmented thoughts by the emergence of self-consciousness, first as  pure self-consciousness. 
When the level of Reason is reached, the world as something real returns. Yet, Reason still 
denotes a consciousness which continues to be based on pure self-consciousness. 
 
Here the idea of idealism emerges. Basically it means that, for Reason, rationality, or rational 
thought determines the course of things. Reason thinks that Being is structured rationally, and 
it develops according to its inherent rational laws. Thus, what appears as a world, is ideal, it 
corresponds with reason.  Reason knows the things  it sees in terms of  idealism. At this phase 
the thinker makes an effort to bring together the two levels of consciousness. It tries to bring 
together the identifying of particulars (Consciousness as Understanding) and self-
consciousness so that the empirical world would be  preserved. It does not want to be lost into 
the  ambivalence  of  pure  self-consciousness.   Here,  the  thinker  knows that  the  world  it  sees  
relates to its own  -  rational - knowing and thinking of it. Thus, the world and the thinking of 
the world are thought to have a shared fundament, rationality.   
 
Nevertheless, still at the level of Reason, the thinker itself remains in distance from its rational 
world. The thinker as subjective, historical and particular is not brought into a conceptual 
unity with its own rationality.  As such, reason appears as timeless, context-less and universal, 
without a consciousness of its situation, history and particular subjectivity. Reason has, in a 
way, found a real world, yet keeps itself, as a subject, distanced from it. It feels that if it 
connects reason with particular subjectivity, reason as universal vanishes. As such, Reason 
cannot  yet  bring  together  (within  its  own  thinking)  consciousness  of  particulars  with   self-
consciousness. The result is that a particular world exists for others (metaphorically, for 
Bondsmen), namely, for particular contexts, but not for the rational thinker itself. (PhS §232-
233; Taylor 1975, 161)  
 
The thinker, as ultimately a conceptual thinker, must still leave some important parts of itself 
out if it understands itself only as rational, as is the case at the level of reason. Reason is the 
phase of scientific thought, especially of empirical science. As such, , it is very important for 
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Hegel. Hegel is not arguing that scientific thought should be replaced by something else, for 
example, by Hegelian philosophical speculation. Yet, it scientific thought cannot grasp such 
aspects like actual, particular otherness, spirit and history. According to Taylor, reason (as 
observing  reason)  cannot  cope  with  the  meshing  of  the  given  and  the  self-made  in  man.  It  
cannot understand man as an agent. As concerns the idea of finding a satisfactory explanation 
of who he is, rational thinker of Reason thinks that it will find himself in the reality which 
surrounds him. Taylor writes about how the rational thinker thinks about self-fulfilment: 
 
Man and the world are designed for happiness, man has only to reach out, as it 
were, and pluck the fruit of happiness. Instead of consuming external reality as 
in the earlier dialectic of desire, the subject, certain of his unity an sich with it, 
just removes from it “the form of other-being”;  “The Enlightenment doctrine of 
man as naturally good and hence as finding the criterion of right in his own 
natural desires (whose fulfilment is pleasure) builds on the view of nature as 
rational harmonious whole which underlay the scientific enterprise (observing 
reason).  (Taylor 1975,163)  
 
 
However,  thinking  still  remains  unsatisfied  at  the  level  of  the  Enlightenment  Reason.  It  
anyhow seeks to find itself as an individual, not as a creature which displays externally the 
laws of universal rationality so as to constitute, in itself,  an ordinary object of empirical 
science.   
 
By Reason, “thing” as empirical is brought back, yet it still remains something alien.  Thing 
as a particular must be still received externally - from the metaphorical Bondsman who 
labours on particularity.   This means that thing is still an external abstraction to its thinker, 
because here the thinker identifies especially with rationality. However, as particulars are still 
needed to be thought by someone,  it remains thought, and turned into existence,  by 
Bondsmen.  Reason thus still needs Bondsmen, through whom it deals with its dependency on 
specific particularity, as particularity cannot be thought in reference to rational categories. 
World, and the rational thinker itself, as particulars, remain externalized. They continue to be 
indifferent abstractions, not particulars, to this thinker itself.  Reason observes how a 
particular thing is posited by the context-dependent others, yet it itself cannot posit a 
particular thing.   At the level of Reason, thinking makes the mistake that it adheres only to 
pure reason and pure idealism, which remains still based on pure self-consciousness.  
According to Hegel, Reason lacks self-reflection. It reflects only on others, not on itself. (PhS 
§234) 
 
Nevertheless, it is important that idealism is introduced at the stage of Reason. This means 
that Reason relates the world it sees to the thinking and knowing selves. Reason knows that 
different thinkers may posit different worlds in their thinking, yet, these different worlds are 
united by a common rationality. Because Being (thingness in general) is rational, views of it 
can be potentially measured against this rationality. As rational, selves can find themselves in 
each other, i.e. they can communicate and relate to each others’ ideas. Various ways to know 
the world  are not atomistically separated from each other.  
 
Reason knows  that the world is nowhere beyond the thinking selves. World is not external to 
thinking.  Reason knows that thinkers cannot escape from their dependency on nature and 
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others  into any “ freedom from particularity”.  It sees that the idea of absolute or abstract 
freedom was an error. However, Reason comprehends these very thoughts themselves still as 
abstractions. Reason has gathered together several  moments of its conceptual thinking, but it 
still has not united them into a particular concept. The conceptual parts of thinking are known 
to exist, yet, they are still external thoughts in their relation to each other.  The reason for this 
is that this thinking has not yet acknowledged an actual Other. As it is, it understands itself 
very profoundly already, yet, all that it understands remains abstractive, because there is not 
yet a recognitive relationship with another free self-consciousness.  
 
The problem with Reason, as with all thinking based on pure self-consciousness, is that it has 
not found the “middle term” which binds together the moments of its thinking. As such, it 
remains dualistic, that is, parochial and one-sidedly recognitive. It is divided between 
observing thinking (self-consciousness, “Lord”) and observed thinking (Consciousness as 
understanding, “Bondsman”), yet it cannot bind these two sides of itself together in any 
satisfactory way. It is a conceptual thinker, who moves between conceptual moments as it 
thinks, yet, it cannot construct a unified unity of its thoughts, a concept, before it finds the 
unifying element, the middle term. For Hegel, the middle term, or itself as a mediator, a third,  
can be found only when reflected back by the Other as another middle term.   (PhS §241-242, 
§802-805)    
 
As not conscious of itself as a mediator - and as a particular mediator - the relations 
(differences, similarities etc.) this thinking makes, continue to have their origin in pure 
(abstract) I. (PhS §233-239). It cannot bring the various thoughts of itself actually together, 
because it cannot make them to refer to a shared origin, a genus, which would also appear as a 
particular instance of its genus.  As Reason does not yet posit itself as a particular origin of its 
thoughts,  and  as  a  particular,  differentiable  origin  in  relation  to  Other,   it  cannot  posit  
particular differences in “things” or “world” either. Because it does not differentiate itself, no 
differences exist for it. It remains an abstract context, or origin, of its thoughts.  Thus, it 
depends on Others (Bondsmen) who do not think of things the same way it does.  It depends 
on those who actually think that they have particular identities and who think that also others, 
and the whole world,  have particular identities. Reason is dependent on Bondsmen-minded 
thinkers, because it cannot affirm particularities on the basis of its own fragmented thoughts.  
In its own self, it moves between its conceptual poles, and annuls any particularity, which 
enters its thinking..  Thus, to actually see “things”, it needs to see through others. For Reason 
itself, things can be only “contextually” (i.e. for others) different.  This kind of thinking and 
knowing is called by Hegel also as empty idealism. For Reason itself “thing” is indifferent.      
 
 
2.2.11. From pure self-consciousness into actual self-consciousness 
 
Hegel´s idea of dialectical unrest (explained earlier) describes a mediator, who mediates 
without knowing it itself.  An abstract mediator (a middle term who is not known to itself) is 
not conscious of itself as the one who keeps the construction together - on the basis of which 
it thinks, knows and looks at things. (PhS §184)   
 
Pure self-consciousness is particularized when it realizes that the “thing”, which it sees and 
knows in (conceptual) parts, relates to its own partial thinking of it. It realizes that the thing is 
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not made of parts externally, yet instead, its own thinking of the thing consists of parts, i.e. of 
different thoughts. It also realizes that it is not the only conceptual thinker of the world, yet, 
one  among  many.   It  realizes  that  each  thinker  is  its  own  conceptual  system.  Each  thinker  
constitutes a self as a concept. It sees that because the point of view, from which a self looks 
at a thing, is a conceptual point of view (made of conceptual parts), selves see things in parts. 
Further,  it  realizes that the movement which it   (as pure self-consciousness) observed as the 
external movement of  “thing” (namely, as the external, dialectical unrest of a thing) is seen 
now, by itself,  to correspond with the movement of its own thinking. .   
 
In  conceptual  thought   the  object  of  thinking  is  constantly  thought  of  in  terms  of   parts,  or  
moments. As the self thinks of a thing, it constructs it out of various thoughts. The 
conceptually thought thing is actually a result of the various thoughts, by which it is thought.   
However, if the parts are not “returned” back to, and identified as belonging to their particular  
thinker,   the parts are seen as external (non-subjective, non-particular) reality of the thing, or 
as external otherness of thing.  External otherness is  “other  knowing” (of some specific 
thing), which is not identified as a viewpoint of some  particular thinker. Consequently, this 
conceptual part constitutes  self-less, non-particular  otherness. This is the case for example 
with “unknown gods or powers” (as thought unknown gods) or the Kantian noumenal self.   
 
Pure self-consciousness does not see other thinking as having an own self-consciously 
conceptual  self. It does not see a conceptual self-consciousness as a universal genus. Nor 
does it see itself and other thinking as particular instances of a conceptual self-consciousness. 
Other thinking mirrors always, for Hegel, the selves’ own thinking. Hence, if the other is seen 
as lacking a conceptual, self-conscious self, the self, who thinks like this, is non-conceptual 
for itself, as well.   
 
The mistake of pure self-consciousness is not to allow the other thinking, or its own thinking, 
to have its own particular conceptual self. Pure self-consciousness wants to free all thinking 
from particularity, because it believes that particularity is actually limitedness, bondage, 
slavery.  It does not consider particularity a necessary part of things as conceptual. As such, 
pure self-consciousness may e.g. want to free everybody’s thinking of sexuality from 
“limited” particularities. It believes that any  thought of sexuality as something particular is a 
thought in bondage, i.e it is an enslaved  thought. Pure self-consciousness may, for example, 
think that all particular sexual identities are enslaved identities. All particular ideas about 
sexual identities are produced by powers which remain unknown for the subjects themselves.   
 
The dilemma of pure self-consciousness is that it  thinks of sexuality through the ideas of 
“known sexuality” and “unknown sexuality”. It moves between these two viewpoints.  
Whatever the other thought knows of the thing is rendered unknown by what the other 
thought knows of the same thing. Pure self-consciousness is itself aware of this. These two 
viewpoints exclude each other, but pure self-consciousness contains both of them.  According 
to Hegel, a Kantian dilemma is constituted in the thinking of pure self-consciousness.  It 
looks, reciprocally, at each of its internal thoughts from the viewpoint of the other one, and 
observes that these forms of thinking  do not know each other. Because these forms of 
thinking do not know each others, they cannot know themselves either, because (as the pure 
self-consciousness observes) they nevertheless are constituted through each other. Because 
they are constituted through each others, their self-knowledge would necessary mean that they 
would have to know each others, i.e. be mediated with each other. Pure self-consciousness 
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sees that “thing” cannot be thought so as to leave any one of the constitutive thoughts outside 
of it. Yet, because the viewpoints which constitute the thing do not know themselves, nor 
each other (i.e. they cannot be mediated into an internally related concept),  the thing remains 
a self-contadictory assembly of thoughts which reciprocally deny each others 
 
This thinking constitutes a sort of abstract reciprocal recognition,  by which (in contrast to 
the ideal, self-consciously mediated  reciprocal recognition) the both thoughts of the thing are 
nullified. Whereas in the system of external slavery (not the internalized form of the Unhappy 
Consciousness) where all parties are forced to recognize the universal validity of one truth 
and  one  Lord,  in  pure  self-consciousness  all  truths  and  all  Lords  are  being  equally  un-
recognized. The result of this  is that when any “thing” is thought, it is known by way of 
mutually un-recognitive,  reciprocally nullifying thoughts.  This self-contradiction constitutes 
for Hegel, nevertheless, a universal knowing of a thing, as infinite dialectical unrest, or, as bad 
infinite.  
 
When pure self-consciousness turns to reflect its own thinking (i.e. when it itself becomes 
aware of what was said above, namely, that its own thinking denotes a universal bad infinite, 
and that it holds two reciprocally un-recognitive thoughts within itself) it develops into a 
consciousness of itself as a third, namely, a mediator between its two thoughts.  By this turn, 
it develops into an actual self-consciousness. It takes its own “doubleness” as an object of 
reflection. It finds itself as a third  - the “minister”, a mediator between its own doubleness, 
the  synthesizer  of  its  own  thoughts.  In  short,  it  becomes  aware  of  itself  as  a  self-
consciousness. It becomes a self-consciousness and a third for itself.  Before it just was a self-
consciousness,  yet,  without  a  knowledge  of  it.  Earlier,  it  just  saw  things  as  “  double”  (i.e.  
made of parts) without the awareness of its own, internally ministered, particular way of 
seeing things as double.  When it starts to see itself as a particular thinker, who sees things as 
double (i.e as a particular self-consciousness) it finds self-consciousness as a universal genus. 
This cannot happen if it does not, at the same time, acknowledge the existence of other similar 
beings, i.e. other thirds.   (PhS §208 ,227) 
 
According to Hegel’s dialectics in PhS, Unhappy Consciousness is to become conscious that 
thinking not just is self-relational, but that thinking also thinks that it is self-relational. Thus, 
the seemingly all-pervading self-relationality is its own object of reflection.  At the level of 
Unhappy Consciousness thinking has found the fundamental depths of its own self-
relationality and realized that everything it thinks of relates to itself. Also the self-relationality 
of all thinking is a self-relational thought in its thinking. This is an important step on the road 
for acknowledging actual otherness.  Only when thinking returns to itself from all conceptual 
parts of its thinking system, and sees that anything it thinks is thought by it and relates to 
itself, can it become so frustrated of trying to find a non-self-relational “truth” of itself  from 
inside its own universe, as to actually allow for actual otherness to exist.   Unhappy 
Consciousness, on its road to acknowledge the existence of free others, realizes that even the  
“un-reachability of the Other” is a thought in its own thinking. It realizes that its thought of 
the un-knowability of otherness is its own self-relational thought, and tells nothing much 
about the actual other.  
 
According to Hegel, when thinking has become totally frustrated with itself, it may find the 
existence of its own thirdness. Through realizing that it is itself the mediator of its own self-
relational system, there emerges the possibility of particularizing itself through its “identity” 
101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as a mediator. Self can particularize its system of thinking, by realizing that it is different than 
the other “third”, who keeps its own system of thinking a self-relational whole.  Because all 
the  relations  within  a  system  of  thinking  are  mediated  by  a  third  (a  self)  ,  a  third  can  
differentiate itself from other thirds.  Self can find itself as an active  thinker and knower, who 
constantly conducts its “reading of the world” (relating, differentiating, and making a 
synthesis  in  and  as  its  thinking).  It  can   differentiate  itself  from  another  mediator.  As  
mediators, they can find particularity and difference of themselves in each other.  As systems 
of internal mediation, it is not possible that they would be entirely same. Even if two people 
come from the same family, they have not constructed the “Being” (what world is for them) 
from same bits and pieces.  At least to some extent they have gathered their own conceptual 
parts from different sources: different teachers or other authorities, experinces  friends, books, 
films, lovers etc.      (PhS §394-396) 
  
According to Hegel, through finding its own thirdness (itself as a mediator) a thinker can 
realize that it  not only is a self-relational whole, so that everything it thinks, knows, and sees, 
relates to itself. Instead, it is a self-relational whole for itself. Through being particularized by 
another self-relational whole, it can become  identified as “me”, my self-relational whole. It 
identifies its seeing of things as double as its own (a particular) seeing of things as double. 
The way it sees things as double relates to its own particular self-consciousness, so that this 
relation does not just take place in itself, externally, but it is able to reflect this relation self-
consciously.   
 
For Hegel, it is utterly important that these self-relational viewpoints are not thought as 
external  abstractions  in  their  relation  to  each  others.  Thus,  it  is  important  not  to  stop  at  the  
notion of Self and Other as self-relational wholes. In order for them  to actually be different 
from each other, limited and particularized by each other, they must be thought as parts of a 
larger,  shared  whole.  Self  and  other  must  be  thought  as  parts  of  a  larger  whole  which  
necessarily,  itself,  cannot  be  an  abstraction.  Within  Hegel’s  triplicity  of  knowing  Being for 
Self and for Other each moment is a  particular one, or, none is a particular one. Very 
importantly, Self and Other can, each one,  potentially go beyond their own limits, as 
considers  how  they  know  the  Being.  Because  they  can  relate  to  how  Being  is  thought  and  
known by the other one, they can learn from each other and enrich their mutual knowledge of 
the Being.   
 
As a limited self-relational whole, thinking is a self-identical whole. It can find its particular 
identity in the other one, similar yet different from it.  To know the other, must hear from the 
other self what it is like. Each self-identical whole needs to communicate with the other self-
relational whole, to be able to know how the other is what it is, and how the other knows what 
it  knows.   It  is  important to hear,  from the Other itself,   how something is  (conceptualized 
from parts) for it. How something appears as valuable, or as not valuable for the other.  How 
the other knows that something is  pleasurable or not pleasurable, or worthy or unworthy, can 
become known only if the Other itself, for whom the something as e.g. valuable exists to, is 
listened to. Because the Other knows itself, the Other can be known by other selves.  Through 
hearing how the other “ministers” between its own internal moments, the other can be known. 
Even if the other knows itself as “unknowable”, this unknowability can be known as 
particular,  conceptual  unknowability.   It  is  the  unknown self  of  some particular  thinker.   If  
self  as  unknowable  is  thought  by  somebody,    it  is  necessarily  related  to  some  sort  of  
subjective particularity. At least some internal Bondsmen can be always found, by which any 
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abstract self can be linked to a particular subjectivity.  However,  only by communicating 
with the other, we can come to know the various relations, by which the other exists for itself. 
We can e.g. understand why something is valuable to another person, by “mirroring” it in 
relation to what, why and how something is important to ourselves. We can try to understand 
the meaning and construction of “other values” by realizing how our own values are 
constructed. Because other thinking and other values always relates to some self, it is 
reachable. There are no freely floating thoughts -  particulars or abstractions - existing outside 
of being thought by some self. 
 
Without seeing the other as another particular third, a thinker cannot see itself as a particular 
third.  In  other  words,  without  seeing  the  other  as  a  particular universal, the self cannot see 
itself as a particular universal. If a thinker does not see itself as a particular third, it remains an 
abstract third,  namely a pure self-consciousness. When a thinker becomes a particular third – 
a particular universal - for itself,  it has become an actual self-consciousness. Thus, thirdness 
denotes  a universal genus, the other description  of which is an actual self-consciousness.  
The Other is similar with Self, because they are both thirds. However, the other is not similar 
only in a general, abstract sense. The other is similar also by being another internally 
particularizing – internally subjecting – being. The other labours particularity within itself. A 
third can relate to other knowing and another labouring of particularity through 
acknowledging  the  one,  to  whom  the  other  knowing  relates  to,  as  similar  with  itself.  They  
both know “universally” as well as “particularly” inside their own self-relational wholes. 
Because they acknowledge this, i.e. themselves and each others as particularity-producing 
universals, universality can become particularized for them. Universal thinking and knowing 
can be seen as practiced by many thinkers. Through the other self-relational whole, the self 
can find itself as not only an abstraction (as a self-relational whole) but as having an identity ( 
as a particular self-relational, universal whole).   
 
For Hegel, thinking cannot find actual other knowing from within its own self-relational 
system,  but  from  inside  the  other  self.  Thinking  can  find  only  an  abstraction  of  other,  
independent  knowing (an abstract other) from inside its own self, because it can gather 
together the formal parts of which the other independent thinking consists of.  Consequently, 
other thinking can be known as an abstraction, while still staying within the selves own 
thinking system. When the self makes an abstraction of its own self-relational thinking, it can 
reach the other as a formality. However, it does not need to be in contact with actual others at 
all while doing this.   Instead, in order for a thinking to find a particular, internally active 
other  thinking  –  and  allow  it  to  have  its  own  self  -   it  must  acknowledge  an  other  self-
consciousness as its equal.  If it does not consider the other as its equal, it does not allow for 
free other knowing. If the other is not taken as its own equal universe, the self universalizes 
its own self over the other. As such, self subsumes the other under its own system of knowing 
and practices an attitude towards otherness called, by Hegel,  as Desire.  Consequently, 
thinking  needs  to  ask,  who the  other  is  to  its  (own,  other)  self,  and  take  seriously  what  the  
other says about itself.  What Being (“thing”) potentially is beyond my self-relational system 
of knowing, can be  found in another self-relational system of knowing. (PhS §181-182, 400, 
802-803) 
 
According to Hegel, the thirds, i.e. particular universals, must become united still at a larger 
level, at a level of higher thirdness, which sublates their own particular thirdness, in order to 
be conceptually mediated with each others.  If the particular universals do not become 
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mediated at still a higher level, they still remain external contexts of knowing for each others. 
Their equality, independence and freedom exist only as formal abstractions for themselves 
and each others. The higher level of knowing actually denotes what reciprocally recognitive 
knowing, or shared knowing, is in particular actuality about. This level is called Absolute 
Knowing, and discussed further in the next chapters (2.3.1-2.3.3).  Absolute Knowing means 
that the other particular universal does exist somewhere “beyond”, out of reach for another 
particular universal.   Absolute knowing denotes a realm where the particular universals 
speak of a same particular thing. They labour particular objectivity for themselves as 
reciprocally recognitive selves. As such, the particular universals (selves as internally 
mediating thirds)  are not external thoughts of “thing” in relation to each others, as in pure 
self-consciousness.   
2.3. Recognition  
 
2.3.1. Actual self-consciousness of Spirit.   
 
A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-
consciousness: for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness 
become  explicit  for  it.  The  “I”  which  is  the  object  of  its  Notion  is  in  fact  not  
“object”; the object of Desire, however, is only independent, for it is the 
universal indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical essence. A self-
consciosuness, in being an object, is just as much “I” as “object”. With this, we 
already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for 
consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this absolute substance which 
is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: “I” that is “we” and “we” 
that is “I”. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit,  that consciousness 
first finds its turning point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the 
sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and 
steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.  (PhS §177) 
 
 
For Hegel, subjective thinkers are always  conceptual thinkers. This means that thinking – 
which is subjective and limited – is also contradictory. Contradictoriness means in Hegel that 
a thinker thinks of subjects and things by thoughts which are “beyond” each others. Thoughts 
which are beyond each others are also behind the possible “dualisms” of thinking, which take 
place as relations of Lordship and Bondage.  These “beyonds” can, however, become 
conceptually mediated in free relations, in other words, objects can be known in a non-dualist, 
“non-enslaving” way. Contradictory thoughts are such  which do not share a common 
“differentiating” measure, i.e. they cannot be differentiated from each other in the ordinary 
way, in which we relate, differentiate and “positionalize” thoughts and things in general.  As 
said above, being an internally contradictory thinker means in Hegel the same as a conceptual 
thinker  and the same as an inherently free thinker (see chapter 2.1.2)  This means that a 
thinker is a unifying “third” of contradictory thoughts, thoughts which are beyond each 
others. The unification of contradictory elements (the activity of “thirdness”, i.e. speculation) 
takes place when thinker thinks of subjects and things through contradictory elements. The 
contradictory thoughts become unified as the “subjects” and “things”,  which are thought by 
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these thoughts.   
 
Hegel makes an important distinction between thinking as contradictory and thinking as 
contradictory for itself.  This implies another distinction, between beings who are free and 
beings which are free for themselves.  It makes sense to say that thinkers are, in Hegel´s 
subject-theory, always seen as free: conceptual, dialectical, rational and speculative beings, 
i.e.  beings who unify, as thirds, contradictory thoughts together so that identifiable, particular 
and rational “things” and “subjects” result from these thoughts.  However, Hegel argues 
throughout  PhS that thinkers end up in “enslaving” themselves and each others (in relations 
of Lordship and Bondage) if they do not become conceptual, speculative beings for 
themselves.  Becoming a contradictory being for oneself – in a way which does not include 
some form of Lordship and Bondage, i.e. a “desiring attitude”  - appears to be possible in 
Hegel only in relations of reciprocal recognition.   
 
For Hegel, particular subjects are capable of relations of reciprocal recognition and capable of 
an actual self-consciousness of Spirit. As actual, self-consciousness of Spirit is seen to  take 
place in  particular subjective minds, “on earth”,  instead of being projected into a realm 
beyond the world of humans. Spirit as such denotes in Hegel the mediation between 
contradictions.  Conceptuality, dialectics and speculation (i.e. “thirdness”) denote in Hegel 
capacities of Spirit as in them contradictory thoughts are mediated. Hegel shows in PhS that 
often the  capacity of Spirit is projected into the realm of mystical powers, creating dualities 
which can be somehow mediated  only by “priests”, trafficking between the dual realms of 
“infinity” (God) and “finity” (humans).  
 
Actual, self-conscious Spirit denotes in Hegel the level where thinking is not only 
contradictory, or “internally beyond itself” (which it always is). Nor is thinking just an 
abstract consciousness of its contradictory nature, its being beyond itself (as is the case  in 
Unhappy Consciousness).  Instead, actual self-consciousness of Spirit is the level of thinking 
where  it is contradictory for itself,  beyond itself for itself and a mediating third for itself.  In 
short, this is the level where thinking is “other for itself”. Thinking does not only include 
“otherness” (contradictory elements, elements beyond each others) which it always includes. 
Instead, it is a  consciousness  of itself as a particular (subjective, historical) being, who is 
internally beyond itself.  A consciousness of one´s self as a particular thinker who is internally 
contradictory is possible in Hegel only in relations of reciprocal recognition. Hegel argues 
(through the whole processual subject-theory of PhS) that without reciprocally recognitive 
relations, contradictory thinking (also a consciousness of the contradictoriness of thinking) 
ends up assuming some “dualist” form, i.e. a some system of “Lordship and Bondage”. One 
version of Lordship and Bondage is  Unhappy Consciousness, which is a consciousness of the 
contradictoriness of thinking  yet without a reciprocally recognitive attitude toward itself and 
other selves.  
 
Unhappy Consciousness constitutes a consciousness of contradiction i.e. it  is aware of itself 
as a being which is “beyond” itself. It is aware that all subjective thinking is beyond itself. 
Because of this awareness, it is sceptical towards all particular thoughts and ideas. Unhappy 
Consciousness constitutes thus a high awareness of there being a “beyond”, a  “contradictory 
outside” (outside which does not share a common measure with the differential system from 
which it is excluded)  to all possible “differentiating” descriptions or theories of subjects and 
things. Importantly, for Hegel, Unhappy Consciousness constitutes one version of a “Lordship 
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and Bondage”, by its way of  placing “subjective, limited thinking” in bondage, (as was 
explained in the  earlier sub-chapters). For Hegel Unhappy Consciousness (or the 
Enlightenment “Kantian” thinking) enslaves and refutes subjective thinking (in general) as it 
considers only such thought  from which subjectivity is “bracketed out” (i.e. formal reason) 
universally valid.  
 
For Hegel, an actual self-consciousness, which is a prerequisite for reciprocally recognitive 
relationships, takes place as “we”, which is “I” (PhS§ 177) According to my interpretation, 
“we”, in this context,  is not an abstract “we” - i.e. a community of non-particular “Wise 
Men”, as in the Kojèvian interpretation – but  instead, a particular we (see a more thorough 
discussion of the Kojèvian reading of Hegel, in chapter 3.1.).  The self-conscious subjects, 
making up the “we”, are particular self-consciousnesses. However, each one of them “enjoy 
perfect freedom and independence”. Each one is for itself and for each others “an 
indestructible universal substance”.  They are acknowledged, mutually, as their own masters, 
and, because each one is acknowledged in this way by others, to be its own master, there is no 
master “above” these masters. Nobody is to be considered as the possessor of knowing 
“above”, “beyond”  the knowing of others. These selves are unlimited by no-one external 
(beyond, abstract) to them.  This means that each one is not limited by anything, which is not 
knowable (at least potentially) as something particular for itself.  As such, these free selves 
are limited (i.e. known as particulars) for themselves.  This  means  that  each  self  is  known,  
subjected, in such a manner which can become criticised and  contradicted by itself, if the self 
sees it necessary.  Contradicting oneself (moving beyond oneself and changing oneself) is 
considered an internal capacity, i.e. a “speculative capacity”,  shared equally by all. In Hegel’s 
vision – unlike in that of Kojève – individuality is sublated (that, is, preserved as a part of a 
wider synthesis) rather than destroyed.  
 
Hegelian freedom as well as the possibility of “absolute, unlimited knowing”,  is 
interpersonally constituted in reciprocally recognitive relationships.  As it assumes objectivity 
in and as the state it constitutes actual freedom (in contrast to the abstract freedom of the 
dialectical unrest of the pure self-consciousness).  An important idea here is that it (i.e. actual 
self-consciousness ) can  go over its own limits internally by “speculation”- potentially 
endlessly.   The  way  the  actual  self-consciousness  can  go  over  its  own  limits  is  by  way  of  
contradicting itself (dialectically, speculatively) if it sees it necessary. This means that the 
particular, limited  knowledge of “thing” , shared by free selves, can endlessly (at least 
potentially) correct, change and enrich itself. As new selves and thinkers enter the 
community, there emerges potentially endlessly new viewpoints, from where knowledge of 
things may be enriched. The movement, taking place as the changing knowledge of “thing” 
and “subject”, takes also place as the internal changing of the state. The state can potentially 
endlessly move internally, by way of becoming contradicted. As the state – as always a 
particular (limited)  state-  is constituted  in relationships of reciprocal recognition, it can 
change the way it is limited.   
 
Absolute knowing is “absolute” in the sense of not being limited by or dependent on anything 
outside the conscious process of knowing. Actually, Hegel’s “absolute knowledge” is just 
what philosophers traditionally mean by “knowledge”. If knowledge is defined as a true 
belief,  warranted  by  the  best  and  most  comprehensive  evidence,  there  seems  to  be  two  
alternatives. Either the best evidence is reached through some revelation, intuition or special 
method  available  only  for  few  or,  then  it  is  reached  by  taking  all  partial  and  potentially  
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distorted views into account and letting them to correct each other. Hegel chooses the latter 
alternative. Absolute knowledge is essentially a process which may be compared to Jürgen 
Habermas’s and Seyla Benhabib’s “open dialogical process” – although this does not, of 
course, mean that Hegel would, for example, accept Habermas’s (Kantian) “communicative 
ethics”.    
 
Among the reciprocally recognitive “knowers”, nobody (or, actually, nobody´s own singular 
“doubleness”)  has the status of describing the ultimate whole or the largest context,  which 
would determine the places and positions of the particular self-consciousnesses of this 
community. Thus, the selves are not parochially particularized, subjected and positioned. 
How the concrete community  (e.g. the particular positions and hierarchical structures) are 
determined between subjects, who have this kind of attitudes towards each other,  takes place 
as “reciprocally recognitive relationships”, ultimately as the state, the community of free 
persons.  The concrete reality of freedom takes place as laws and ethical institutions, which 
are constituted for reciprocally recognitive selves. This means that the communication 
between the mutually recognitive self-consciousnesses takes place as rational 
communication. Each self is taken as a free and rational self-consciousness which means that 
the way each self mediates, internally,  between universality and particularity is given equal 
acknowledgement with the others. As such, each one is taken as an object who negates 
(determines, subjects) itself within itself.    
 
Yet, what is this rationality? For Hegel, rationality stems, basically, from the internal 
structure of thinking itself. Thus, it is inherent in each thinker.  A structure of thinking needs 
to make all its parts relate to each other. It needs to differentiate and particularize in relation 
to something which is claimed, by itself,  as universal. This doubleness (of universality, 
ministered into particularity) is, for Hegel, what thinking is about. Its basic manner of 
relating, mediating and becoming synthesized into a particular whole, is in itself rational.  It 
also  needs  to  look  at  itself   as  a  rational  object  in  the  world.  When  a  system  of  internally  
mediating  thinking considers another system as its equal, it acknowledges and recognizes the 
others rationality. In other words, one mediator considers another mediator as its equal. It 
considers the other as a valid mediator between what is particular of things and what is 
universal of things.  Together  –   equipped with the attitude of regarding each other as  
sources of valid knowledge of things -   they can enrich each others knowledge.  For Hegel,  
this kind of recognition is fundamental if selves are to create together a shared rationality, i.e. 
Absolute knowing. Shared mediation between universal and particular takes place as a 
community between equals (“I” which is “we”), secondly, as a shared constitution of 
objectivity and, thirdly, as Absolute knowing (philosophy).  Hegelian state denotes a shared 
objectivity (i.e. ministered, internally,  into particular institutions etc.).   (PhS §178-185) 
 
Mutual rationality, between free, actual self-conscious subjects, seems to take place, for 
Hegel, so that each one reflects its own rationality and relates to the rationality of others.  This 
relating means  that each one allows itself to be known by the others. Each can enrich its  self-
knowledge by allowing to be “mirrored, translated” by the rationality of the other.  
 
For Hegel, self and other can in fact both be known, to themselves and to each other, because 
they always exist as  rational systems (conceptual unities)  to themselves.   This includes the 
fundamentally important aspect in Hegelian reciprocal recognition i.e. that selves consider 
themselves and each others equally capable of “speculation”. In reciprocally recognitive 
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relations contradictory thoughts of subjects and things (mutually alien, dualist, mutually 
cancelling) are seen as internally mediated within each one of the selves. Each self appears as 
a rational whole as it is recognized as capable of mediating between contradictory thoughts 
concerning itself and things in general. As such, the self and the other are seen as beings who 
are not internally alien. Internally alien beings are beings who are seen as incapable of 
mediating (internally) contradictory thoughts of themselves and things.  In reciprocal 
recognition the other self is seen as  conceptually understandable to itself. In short, the other is 
seen as a “concept” (similar to one´s own self).  As a “concept”, the other is understandable 
for other selves too. The other is seen as a being who is not beyond, external, or other to itself 
in a way which cannot be “speculated” by itself. Seeing the other in this way – as a being who 
is beyond itself in a way which is conceptual  for itself – is a necessary feature in Hegelian 
reciprocal recognition. This feature differentiates reciprocally recognitive relations in Hegel  
from Master-Slave-relations. In Master-Slave-relations  the other is seen as a being who is 
“beyond itself” in a way which it cannot itself conceptualize. The other is seen as “beyond 
itself”, “other to itself”, instead of  “other to itself” for itself.  Unhappy Consciousness was a 
consciousness of the otherness in thinking, yet, it did not  consider others capable of internal 
speculation of their otherness.  In Master-Slave-relations (e.g. in Unhappy Consciousness) the 
“bondage” or the “slavery” of the other is constituted by placing some constitutive part of the 
other “beyond” the conceptual capacities of the other itself. The other is slaved (silenced) 
when its knowledge of itself (and of things) is seen as constituted by something which it itself 
cannot reach.  As such, the other is seen as a being whose knowledge of itself and things fails 
to be complete.  Kantian distinction into “thing for us”/thing in itself” or “empirical” 
/”transcendental self” constituted for Hegel one version of a Master-Slave-relation. In 
relations of reciprocal recognition each self is seen as basically free, complete and absolute 
i.e. the self is recognized as constituted by nothing which is “beyond” its own “speculative” 
capacity.  
 
Basically “speculation” is (in Hegel) what renders selves free, actual self-consciousnesses.  
Finding oneself in another  free self-consciousness means that we consider ourselves and 
others beings who are capable of speculation, i.e. relating conceptually to that which is 
beyond us. When we see other as a being in which contradictions are internally speculated 
(unified into conceptual thoughts of things) the other itself does not need to remain  “beyond” 
us, “unspeakable” to us.  If we consider the other only as contradictory (as Unhappy 
Consciousness does), yet not contradictory for itself (i.e. a being capable of speculation) the 
other constitutes a silenced, refuted other in our thinking.  
 
When both the self and the other consider themselves and each others beings equally capable 
of relating conceptually to that which is beyond oneself,  the relation is reciprocally 
recognitive. As such, freedom is constituted in this relation. In speculation, basically,  dualist 
Master-Slave-relations - i.e. relations of self-alienation - are dialectically “sublated” into a  
rational  unity.  In  reciprocal  recognition  selves  see  themselves  and  each  others  as  internally  
dialectical (sublating, synthesizing) i.e. speculative unities.  Selves see themselves and each 
others as beings who can overcome “desiring attitudes” toward others and things in general 
(i.e. relations of Lordship and Bondage) internally. Consequently, the other self does not need 
to be alien or a threat to one´s self, nor does one´s self need to constitute a threat  to the other 
self. They can consider each others capable of mediating and overcoming   “being a threat to 
otherness” internally.   In short, reciprocally recognitive selves consider each others as beings 
capable of synthesizing (“sublating”) dialectics, i.e. speculation. The other is not alien to us, 
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nor are we alien to the other as we both can render our internal contradictions into “I”:s  as  
rational wholes, understandable for ourselves and for others.   
 
As explained earlier, speculation is for Hegel a dialectical, synthesizing capacity – or a 
“poetic” capacity - to unite contradictory thoughts of things together. In Hegel this poetic 
capacity results into conceptual and rational wholes. In reciprocally recognitive relations, 
selves see themselves, each others and  things in general as structured by contradictory 
elements (resembling perhaps elements united in “modern” poetry), initially regarded as 
mutually exclusive. Dual pairs like “finity” / “infinity”, or, “context-dependent” / “universally 
valid”, or,  the Kantian duality of “thing for us”/ “thing in itself” constitute such 
contradictions. In reciprocally recognitive relations the selves see themselves and each others 
as capable of internal speculation of contradictions.    
 
For Hegel, a capacity to speculate contradictions into unities is a capacity which a self can 
find. However, as said already above, it is a capacity which selves always have already.   
Hegel sees that a thinking self always has some idea of a thinking which has a capacity of 
speculation. However this capacity is often thought to belong to Gods or  priests (chosen by 
gods through some mystic procedure) hence situated in a realm beyond general subjective 
reason.   Or, as Hegel sees to be the case in Kant, this capacity is seen as a transcendental 
capacity, reached only if one´s particular subjectivity is “bracketed out” by abstraction. When 
the capacity of speculation is projected into a realm beyond particular subjects, relations of 
reciprocal recognition are impossible. In reciprocal recognition the recognizing parties 
consider themselves and others as equally capable of speculation.  
 
For Hegel, we can find a sense to how we and others think of things, because “things”, to start 
with, are internal instead of external to particular subjective thinking. For Hegel, there can be 
no parts (thoughts, aspects, concepts) of things which would not exist inside some particular 
system of thinking. If something  is thought at all, it must be hence conceptual to somebody. If 
some thing would be non-particular and non-conceptual  for everybody, this thing would not 
exist at all. Hence we  could not speculate its non-particularity or non-conceptuality.   Thus, 
the precondition for there to be a “thing” for a thinker is that it exists as a particular thing for 
this thinker (even that there can be also other thoughts of this thing, for its thinker, besides its 
particular somethingness).  The identifiable (particular) form of a thing must become 
“laboured” within some particular system of knowing, which does not only affirm the form of 
the thing, but also the particular  content of it.   
 
The rationality of a thing is in many ways attached to its history, which is an invaluable 
source of self-knowledge for Hegel. Mutual rationality can be communicated on, because 
each one carries rationality as its own conceptual system of thinking. Because we are rational, 
(and, for Hegel every one is, if we take a self-conscious look at ourselves) we can make 
ourselves known to our selves and to each others. Because any case of “other knowing” 
(everyone´s knowing is other knowing from the other´s point of view) is “speculatively” 
rational  to  itself   it  can  be  made  known  as  rational  to  others.   As  rational  thinkers,  we  are  
similar, and can thus relate to each other´s systems of knowing. Even if rationality is denied 
by some thinker, this argumentation itself, of why and how there is no rationality, takes place 
as rational and speculative thinking. Even a thinking which claims that thinking as such is 
non-rational  conducts speculation between contradictory thoughts (i.e. between thoughts of 
”rationality”  and “non-rationality”). By relating internally to rationality – which can be 
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always found to be some specific rationality, i.e. a specific view of the world - it can be made 
rational to itself and others. As such it can become also differentiated, as a system of its own 
rationality, from other rational systems of thinking.       
 
 
2.3.2.  Shared knowing.  
 
The knowing that takes place within the Hegelian self, as it finds itself in the other self-
consciousness, is a special kind of knowing. It knows the Other, through how the Other 
knows itself,  and  considers  the  Other  as  basically  a  valid  knower  of  itself  and  of the whole 
world.  In the other it also finds its own “identity” as its own self-knower. In the Other the self 
finds itself as a speculative being, a being “beyond itself internally”. In other words, it finds 
itself as a free being and a universal, absolute being. Hegelian recognition denotes an attitude 
towards a free object, an object which is not primarily “different”, instead Other, in the sense 
that it is its own, internally differentiating power. Thus, recognition is not about the 
identification of the Other, at least not primarily.  The other is seen as “a complex object”, a 
free subject, whose objectivity is in the hands of its own “lordship”. The other labours, 
metaphorically said, for itself.  It is its own  performative power, to use a somewhat Butlerian 
notion. (PhS  §175-177). 
 
 The Other as an object and a free subject is considered as a valid authority of how, and on 
which basis, its own “objectivity”, or particular identity is determined. To use Charles 
Taylor’s expression, the Other is self-defining.  Yet, the Other can anyhow be an object, 
because the one who looks at the Other, recognizes in the Other a similar being than it is 
itself. By this act, the one who looks at the Other, can recognize itself, in fact, by this act, the 
self can know what its own self is like. The similarity, however, does not end here, because 
the one who looks should also acknowledge that it is “looked back” by the Other.  It is itself 
the Others object, hoping that the Other sees itself, as it sees the Other, i.e. as an object which 
is its own “speculative” subject. Basically, this potential reciprocality, between thinkers and 
knowers, is the base for the Hegelian “shared knowing”. Knowledge can be shared, and so 
can be the socially constructed reality, in so far as the selves recognize themselves and each 
others  as  beings  who  can  relate  to  their  Others  as  their  equals.  The  selves  need  to  
acknowledge limited subjects in general as beings who can “sublate” their limits through the 
recognition of their Others in order for them to share knowledge with them.  In other words, 
one must recognize its Others as beings who are capable of free (i.e. reciprocally recognitive) 
attitudes towards their others and towards objects in general (see chapter 2.1.2.). Shared 
knowing, conducted in reciprocally recognitive relationships is unlimited knowing, i.e. 
Absolute knowing (PhS §670; see also Hutchings 2003, 41-43, 106; Pippin 1989, 170).  There 
is, again, an infinite regress or a reflexive circle – the subjects reflect each others endlessly – 
but, for Hegel, this is not a bad infinity or a vicious circle.  Rather, it solves the fundamental 
problem of self-consciousness. There is no need to postulate an endless series of “meta-
levels” or viewpoints.   
 
Shared knowing, unlimited knowing, or knowing which goes over its own limits could not be 
possible if Self and Other did not acknowledge that they speak of a same particular thing. 
Because their knowing can become united, synthesized as a “better” theory of a same 
particular  thing,  they  can,  each  one,  go  over  their  own  limits.  If  the  others  knowledge  (of  
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some thing) were not considered conceptually relatable to my knowledge (of the same 
specific thing) my knowledge could not become influenced or differentiated from what is was 
before. My notion of e.g. “subjectivity” can be changed through the Other, if I  relate the 
others particular thoughts of subjectivity to my own particular notion of “subjectivity”. I must 
create a new theory of subjectivity  by connecting my particular knowledge and the particular 
knowledge of the other into a new particular theory of a subject. Only if the new theory is a 
particular theory for us (of the specific thing in question), not an abstract theory of an abstract 
thing, it can be said that I and the other spoke of a same thing.   For Hegel, any change 
(concerning the way we know and think of things) takes always place as a particular result 
(i.e. a new particular theory of the particular thing).  Any actual change takes place as  a 
differentiation concerning our way to see  things as particular things. For Hegel,   only 
particulars can be changed, as only they can be thought differently of. Only particulars can be 
thought from other points of views, and thus only they (i.e. some particular notion of them) 
can be criticised. 
 
What was said above repeats the idea of dialectical contradictions, change and sublation 
(Aufhebung).  If  there  is  no  particularization  of  dialectical  change,  there  can  be  no  such  
change which could be identified to have happened. Hence, we must think that some 
particular thing changes, as only particulars can be seen to  become different.   According  to  
Hegel, this means also that selves and others should relate to themselves and to each others as 
particulars (speculative, particular and rational thirds) if they want to actually speak of things 
at all with each others, or produce better theories of things together.  Because Self and Other 
can indeed, according to Hegel, conceptually  relate to each others particular knowledge of 
particular things,  reciprocal knowing of things and also reciprocal dialectical change 
(sublation) is possible. However, as said above, this requires that selves recognize each others 
as beings who can “speculate”. In reciprocally recognitive relations, the conceptual relating to 
each others particular knowledge of things takes place through acknowledging the other as 
another free, complete (internally speculative) self-consciousness.  Basically, this takes place 
as recognizing the other as a being who is not determined (subjected) by anything, which is 
beyond the other itself.  For Hegel, we can relate to each others contradictory yet also 
particular knowledge conceptually, if we do not take each others as Bondsmen, i.e. if we do 
not enslave each others epistemologically.  
 
For Hegel any actual change of things is dialectical, in the “speculative” way , i.e. it takes 
place as a conceptual differentiation of a conceptual thing, within the thinking of a conceptual 
self.  When some thing is seen as internally related to otherness – which is Hegel´s idea of 
things as conceptual (corresponding  to Butler´s idea of things as ek-static, as is explained in 
the chapter 3) - the thing can maintain itself, while changing. The conceptual relating to 
others knowledge (inside some specific thing) takes place by acknowledging the existence of 
the particular thing, within which the self and the other relate to each other.   The self and the 
other can relate to each others thinking and knowledge if they acknowledge the particular 
identity of the subject, or thing, that they are talking and thinking of.  If, in contrast, they 
consider each others as unrelated thinkers of things, they do not actually relate to each other 
internally at all, within some particular thing. As such, they cannot become influenced or 
differentiated through each other, except externally, by a Lord-Bondsman-based thinking. 
However, according to Hegel, we can speak of particular things with others, and see each 
others as particulars also in reciprocally recognitive relations. We can see each others both as 
particulars and as free. Basically, the Other, as a being who has some actual power (and not 
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only an abstract, formal power) to influence us, make us actually different, exists for our 
selves. This means that we should acknowledge the other as a valid knower of the same 
particular things, of which our own knowledge is of.  The other becomes a valid knower of 
things for us, when we relate to its knowledge conceptually, i.e. when we do not enslave the 
other epistemologically. 
 
Importantly, shared knowing also pertains to “shared objectivity”, which could be also 
described as shared or reciprocal “performativity” (to use a somewhat Butlerian, or Austinian 
choice of words).  Basically,  according to Hegel,  world appears to us always on the basis of 
how we think of it. Also, the way we “labour” on the world, i.e.  form it into something 
particular  corresponds  to  how  we  think  of  the  world.   Our  power  of  negation  -   taking   an  
objective form -  relates to our  thinking and knowing of the world.   When we do what 
“Bondsmen” do and create the world as an internally differentiated, internally particularized 
whole, we do it on the basis of whatever idea of “Lordship” we have in mind (however, at the 
level of recognition or shared knowing, there does not exist any system of serfdom or slavery 
any more).   (see e.g. PhS §772-787) 
 
The “performative power”, through which the world as a particular, identifiable world is 
produced  can be also thought on the basis of reciprocal recognition.  The productive power 
can be seen as a shared power. It can be made to relate to, ultimately, a community of free 
self-consciousnesses. If we think and know the world in a shared way, world appears to us in 
a shared way. What does this mean? This means that the way we think of particular identities, 
social hierarchies, law, institutions etc. may be based on reciprocally recognitive  thinking and 
knowing. According to Hegel, the way we think and know, determine and construct anything 
which has interpersonal relevance, or affects others, can be based on recognitive relations. 
Actually, any other way to “produce objectivity” is unfree, based on some form of parochial 
subjectivity. Objectivity can be e.g. produced on the basis of some particular case of 
Consciousness as Understanding. Then some particular world-view alone is taken as universal 
and stable, and e.g. social classification and institutions, law etc. is conducted on the basis of 
it.  This  kind  of  objectivity  is  apt  to  go  under,  because  it  cannot  cope  with  its  internal  
otherness, as was explained earlier. Or, objectivity can be produced e.g. on the basis of the 
Enlightenment thought. According to Hegel, in this case,  the particular cultural or state 
institutions  are produced on the basis of the thought of Utility of Enlightenment. In utility, 
Enlightenment thought of Unhappy consciousness finds its objectivity. Also this objectivity is 
apt to go under, e.g. because it alienates itself from all that is particular. This was discussed 
already earlier. (see e.g. Enlightenment culture from §538 -596). 
 
As Heikki Ikäheimo argues in his article “Rehabilitating Hegel´s Spirit -Recognitive Attitude 
as a Social-ontological Concept”, reciprocal or shared objectivity could be described as an 
objectivity which is constituted for by mutually recognizing subjects. Then objectivity is 
interpersonally constituted. As such, objectivity has interpersonal ontology. (Ikäheimo 2003, 
6)  
 
This ontology is self-relational,  yet,  it  relates to selves who think and know themselves and 
the world on the basis of acknowledging each others as valid sources of knowledge. Probably 
something like this has been already intended, since Hegel´s times, in democratic thinking.  In 
Hegel´s  times  there  were  no  democracies  as  we  know  them  now.  Reciprocal  objectivity  
should be, however, based on reciprocal recognition, which, itself, is based on actual self-
112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consciousness and the idea of “middle term”.   The idea of actual self-consciousness, and 
internally ministered doubleness (self as a concept)  are highly important here. The contrast 
between actual self-consciousness and pure self-consciousness is a very important element in 
realizing what “free otherness” actually means. A pure self-consciousnes, for whom an Other 
is an unrelated thought, cannot recognize the other in a way, necessary for interpersonal 
ontology, or reciprocally constituted objectivity. PhS implies that the history of actual self-
consciousness, i.e. the phases of Lord and Bondsman and pure self-consciousness are 
invaluable to keep in mind in order for us to actually realize what actual self-consciousness is. 
The “free other” may well be thought of only as an “unrelated thought”  (as in the 
Enlightenment thought, based on pure self-consciousness).  
 
Interpersonally constituted objectivity may exist  as an abstraction only,  as is  the case of the 
empty idealism of Reason, still exemplifying the pure consciousness of Enlightenment 
thought.  Shared objectivity, or, plural objectivity, or, ideality of the many, must be based on 
acknowledging the other, particular self-consciousnesses as  valid sources of particular 
knowledge. Shared knowing should provide the particular content to the objectivity, not only 
its general principle. If it denotes only its general principle, the shared knowing may well take 
the form of “two (or more) unrelated thoughts”, explained earlier. Kimberley Hutchings’s 
interpretation of the Hegelian “absolute” knowledge as “shared” knowledge is relevant here:  
 
…three factors emerge as relevant to the evaluation of knowledge claims. First, 
the  partiality  of  all  claims  to  knowledge  is  inherent  in  Hegel’s  account  of  the  
partial identification of particular knowing subjects with spirit. For Hegel 
“absolute” knowledge rests on the explicit articulation of this partiality so that, 
paradoxically, truth is linked to partiality’s acknowledgement. This implies that 
claims which disguise their partiality are immediately open to criticism. Second, 
Hegel  emphasizes  the  significance  of  the  articulation  of  the  partial  grounds  of  
any judgement to the possibility of recognition of the validity of this claim by 
others. This recognition is best understood as “sharing” which rests on the 
degree to which the audience of any claim can identify with its grounding. This 
therefore  implies  that  for  Hegel  knowledge  claims  can  be  evaluated  by  the  
extent to which they are recognized to be shareable – something which cannot 
be judged a priori, and is not in any sense in the gift of the subject making this 
claim. (Hutchings 2003, 106)   
 
As said earlier, Hegel does not accept subjective idealism, even if this idealism is shared 
between many subjects. “Subjective idealism of the many” would constitute the empty 
idealism of unrelated, un-shareable thoughts,  because then the independence of the particular 
thinkers, making up the “many”, as well as the independence of the “substance” would be 
refuted.  
  
 
2.3.3. Absolute knowing  
 
 
What the freedom or independence of otherness means has been explained earlier, yet, the 
independence of the “substance” needs to  be still taken up. For Hegel, being, nature, or 
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substance, retains its own independence even that it is conceptually related to us. Thought 
both as something independent as well as something conceptual it is its own internally 
negating power, too.  It constitutes an externality to us, which in some ways appears as an 
absolute externality - in terms of death. Death cannot be conceptually differentiated for us, 
and in this sense it is an immediate, absolute abstraction for us.  However, for Hegel, it is very 
important to think that nature – the particular substance of things - is a conceptually mediated 
part of our systems of thinking. In other words, it is important to think that we can know 
something about the nature. In fact, for Hegel, a core “error” with pure self-consciousness is 
that it treats nature as some sort of a “lost referent”. In other words, nature is a non-conceptual 
“thing in itself” for pure self-consciousness.  For Hegel, if the nature is something thought,  
yet thought by the distinction of “thing for us” and “thing in itself”, an internalized form of 
the Master-Slave-distinction (i.e. a pure self-consciousness) ensues.  
 
As is explained also in the chapter on the Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel (chapter 3.1), the 
idea that “substance” is something conceptual is very important for Hegel. One of the most 
important  differences between the pure self-consciousness and the free self-consciousness is 
the way “nature” is thought at these stages of consciousness. For the pure self-consciousness 
“material nature” is something which it cannot identify with. In contrast, the free self-
consciousness has conceptually mediated the nature as a part of it. If nature is seen to denote 
an absolute difference to us, it becomes a “lost referent”, a Kantian “thing in itself”, which 
renders our thinking “pure”, as in pure self-consciousness.  
 
According to Hegel, we cannot “labour” any kind of objectivity we want, because the 
substance, or nature, which the objectivity relates to, has its own independence. If we could 
labour any kind of objectivity we want, the objectivity would denote a realm of Subjective 
Idealism.   It  would  be  fragmented  into  atomistic  contexts,  not  related  to  each  other.  There  
would be “my world” and “your world” with no conceptual connection between these worlds. 
We  could  not  speak  of  the  same  world,  or  same  things  at  all.  Nor  could  we  differentiate  
between “I” and other “I”:s, as there would be no shared standards, no shared rationality, we 
could refer to.  
 
However,  even  when  the  knowing  subjects  share  a  common  rationality  –  and,  hence,  a  
common world – they preserve their particularity. In Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation 
(influenced by Marx’s vision of communism) the ultimate negation of the atomistic 
community is the “universal homogenous State”. There, all important differences between the 
knowing subjects would disappear. The “Wise Men”, the inhabitants of Kojève’s ideal state 
would all necessarily share a common viewpoint on everything.  There would be just the 
Kojevian type of “Wise Men”, not They would not be differentiated from each other or from 
the rest of the universe. Rationality, as conceived by Hegel, would be equally impossible in 
this  homogenous world. Rationality presupposes particularity as well as communality.  
 
For Hegel, a thinking which does not identify with the particular substance of things is 
necessarily divided into the Lord-Bondsman-distinction. Even the “pure I” must think of 
something. Hence it needs Bondsmen to provide those somethings for it, because it refuses to 
labour particularity for itself.  Lord removes its own  dependency on otherness, and its own 
dependency on particular substance, onto Bondsmen. As such, it feels that it is free from any 
dependencies.   However, in the Hegelian triplicity of knowing (the parts of which are Being, 
Self and Other) each one of the parts are independent powers of negation, even that they are 
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related to each other. Their unity is conceptual, and potentially un-limitlessly enriching its 
internal differentiation. Yet, the necessary precondition for the actuality and particularity of 
this triplicity is that all its three parts retain their independence. The particular Being, or 
“thing with a particular substance”, which any knowing is always of, must be also thought as 
an independent thing, otherwise its knowing becomes split into unrelated thoughts. The 
Kojèvian “dualist ontology” (ch. 3.1.2.) is an example of this kind of splitting into unrelated 
thoughts.  The nature becomes split into externally related thoughts for the one who does not 
think of nature  as an independent thing, 
 
As independent, the “thing” constitutes its own doubleness. It is rational in somewhat the 
same way as the self and the other.  What it is, and how it appears as a particular, corresponds 
with its own internally differentiated rationality.  Only when we think that it is structured in 
this  way,  we  can  present  theoretical  argumentation  of  it.  We  can  e.g.  argue  that  we  know  
more of it now, or we know it better than before. To start with, only if we suppose that there 
is some it, which can be potentially known in terms of “more”, “less”,  “right”, 
“insufficiently”,  or “wrong”,  we can present arguments  of  it.   The claim that it  cannot be 
known is based on a universal claim which can (presumably) be known. Thus, universal 
unknowingness is its universal truth, in reference to which we can argue against any particular 
description of it. This kind of thinking actually constitutes pure self-consciousness, which 
does not get involved in disagreements of how it is differentiated in particular, as it refutes 
altogether the idea of knowing its particular substance of it. Nevertheless, pure self-
consciousness has a universal knowledge of the thing, even that this knowledge has universal 
emptiness as its content.      
 
According to Hegel, we actually think of the “thing” always as double, e.g. so that we relate 
its particularity to its universality. Thus, the ultimate question, for Hegel, is not whether we 
universalize about Being, or not, but instead how we universalize about it. For Hegel, 
becoming self-conscious as to how we universalize the Being, is thus necessary. According to 
Hegel,  all  the parts of the triplicity of knowing are free and independent,  even that they are 
conceptually related to each other. Thus, even that the Being is related to the self and the 
Other,   and  known  as  a  particular  by  them,  it  is  anyhow  independent  and  unlimited.   It  is  
fundamentally important, concerning  the freedom of Being, that it is related to both the self 
and the Other. For Hegel, the substance is dialectically known by the self and the Other. 
When the self and the Other negotiate and argue of how the Being is known, the knowledge 
of the being can potentially limitlessly enrich itself.  The shared, reciprocal knowing of Being 
is the necessary prerequisite of Absolute Knowing.   
 
If Being is thought to be known either by self alone, or, by the Other alone, or by unrelated 
atomistic thoughts, its own independence is refuted.. The idea that self and other acknowledge 
each other as valid contributors of how the Being is known enables for the independence of 
the Being. The full knowledge of thing is not claimed alone, by any thinker. Neither is the full 
un-knowledge of thing claimed by any thinker alone. By reciprocal recognition, it is 
understood that to claim that thing is un-known is one version of claiming full knowledge of 
it, and thus assuming the place of a Lord, a superior knowledge over other knowledge. Yet, by 
acknowledging others as valid contributors of how the thing is known, a thinker may think 
that it does not know the thing fully, or that no singular description describes the thing fully, 
but that they can learn from each others and enrich their knowledge of thing.   
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For Hegel, things are concepts, made of parts. Hegel argues that only if we assume that there 
is a concept which can be potentially known fully (as a particular whole)  can we say that it is 
known  “partly”.  If  parts  are  actual  parts,  they  relate  to  a  something,  which  can  be  (at  least  
potentially)  seen  as  a  whole,  unity,  built  of  parts.    Only  particular  objects  are  made  up  of  
mutually related parts. According to Hegel, it is self-contradictory to say that one part of 
something, or some parts of something, can be known, while other parts of it are bound to 
remain hidden forever.  This was his argument against the Kantian “thing for us/thing in 
itself”-distinction. By Kant, thing was split into parts, of which some were known and some 
were necessarily beyond our knowledge. According to Hegel, if something is a particular 
object, it is at least possible to know all parts and aspects of it. If it cannot be known, even in 
principle, it is turned into an abstraction. If we take something to be a potential object of 
knowledge, we are committed to the claim that it can be known fully. For Hegel, “the thing 
itself” is a totality or synthesis of all possible descriptions of the thing, observed and thought 
from different particular viewpoints. This means that although the thing has, at any given 
moment, aspects which are not thought or observed by anyone, it has no permanently un-
knowable or un-observable aspects. It also entails that knowing inevitably takes place in a 
community of particular subjects who, due to their different interests, life-histories and 
background, look the object of knowledge from different viewpoints. This does not show that 
our knowledge is “imperfect”; our knowledge simply is like that. We cannot conceive any 
other way to know things. According to theological speculations, omniscient God can know 
and see  all  aspects  of  the  world  simultaneously  and  atemporally.   For  Hegel,  this  is  not  the  
ideal or most perfect form of knowledge, for our notion of “knowledge” is the knowledge of 
particular beings.  
 
Hegel criticises a form of thinking which he calls as “intellectualism” and which he identifies 
with the Enlightenment version of pure self-consciousness. In this “empty” intellectualism, 
the intellectual thinking itself has not united with its own subjective content, and thus the 
actual content of its intellectual enterprise is, metaphorically, laboured by external Bondsmen. 
For Hegel, the coming together of the realm of particularity and universality, i.e. that what 
exists for Consciousness as Understanding and that what exists for self-consciousness, 
denotes also the coming together of content and form. By actual self-consciousness the form 
becomes united with its own content. This unification is about becoming conscious of the 
unity of form and content which actually always exists for a thinker whenever thinking is 
conducted.  
 
For Hegel, the larger whole, where a self satisfactorily finds its identity, is a community of 
equals, a community of us.   As a community of equals, it is a “we”, which is at the same time 
“I”. The equality between various “I´s” becomes actual, or shows itself in several ways.  One 
level is the reciprocal relationships between the individual selves; they consider each other as 
deserving equal value and rights. They also consider each others as equal sources of 
knowledge.   Because they relate conceptually and rationally to each others viewpoints, their 
different pieces of knowledge make up a unified, rational whole.  In reciprocal relationships 
the selves consider each others as absolutes, in other words, free from external subjection and 
free from interpretations that would be forced upon them by someone.  They do not subject 
(negate, determine, limit) each others except in a reciprocal way.  They consider each others 
their own Lords. The members of the community share the view that they are free subjects 
constituted in reciprocal recognition – they are, so speak, finally learned Hegel’s basic ideas.  
This “theory” or philosophy of the subject is seen, by Hegel, to have an endless potential to 
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enrich (change internally, by sublation) itself.  For Hegel, this is not just an abstract ideal we 
might accept or reject at will. The basic argument in PhS is that we are ultimately bound to 
accept this view because all other views – basically, different versions of scepticism, 
relativism, subjectivism, or dogmatism – lead to epistemological asymmetries and self-
contradictions. Therefore, they are unsatisfactory, and the social and political forms based on 
them are “unreal”. They cannot work as a basis for general, shared self-understanding.  
 
Reciprocally recognitive knowing is called by Hegel as free and also as absolute knowing. 
Hegelian absolute knowing appears indeed as a process, not as a final epistemological stage, 
“final knowledge” implying something like a Kojevian “end of history” (see chapter 3.1)  at 
which all possible knowledge is reached and there is nothing more to know. PhS suggests that 
absolute knowledge is practiced by particular, limited subjects and it is of particular objects. 
However, these subjects are capable of free knowledge of objects. Free knowing includes a 
moment of un-limitedness, the absolute, through reciprocal recognition. Free and absolute 
knowledge is a process in which limited knowers go over their limits through each others  It is 
important to emphasize that “limited knowledge” is a necessary moment in free and absolute 
knowing. Only limited knowledge can go, processually, over its limits. (PhS §670, §794-795; 
Hutchings 2003, 41-44, 106-107; Ikäheimo 2003, 72-72; Ikäheimo 2000, 85; Taylor 1975, 
127-134;).  
 
 
2.3.4. A note on Hegel and Kant 
 
 
Hegel’s criticisms of Kant, as explicated in the previous chapters, are mainly directed at 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Hegel was also critical of Kant’s practical philosophy. In his 
criticism, Hegel focuses into Kant’s famous Universal Law: “Act only on the maxim thorough 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1986, 84). 
According to Hegel, this law and the “generalization argument” (“We cannot all act in that 
way without subverting the purpose of our actions”) are purely formal and devoid of any 
content. In his works, Hegel argues in several places that Kant’s Universal Law is unable to 
distinguish between ethically acceptable and unacceptable maxims (grounds of action), and 
presents several examples in order to show its emptiness. 
 
According to many commentators, Hegel’s arguments are not fully convincing because they 
do not really do justice to the complexity of Kant’s ideas (Wood 1990, ch. 9.; Knowles 2002, 
198-210). At the same time, these commentators tend to agree with Hegel in that Kant is not 
able to derive substantive moral principles from his rather thin theory of a free and rational 
subject (Wood 1990, 165-7). Moreover, Kant is wrong when trying to apply these principles 
directly to politics – as he clearly does in his political essays (for example, Kant 1983).  Hegel 
emphasized that human subjects are always and unavoidably particular beings living in 
particular contexts. While any particular form of this particularity is contingent, the very fact 
of particularity is a necessary aspect of their rationality and cannot be abstracted away. A 
political or ethical theory has to take this into account.  
 
Interestingly, neither Hegel, nor his commentators, discuss Kant’s second formulation of the 
Universal  Law:  “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
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person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end” (Kant 1986, 91). According to the interpretation of Hegel defended in this study, this 
version of the Universal Law would be more acceptable from a Hegelian point of view. 
Kant’s argument for this version is the following. A subject is an acting being. It necessarily 
has ends which it sees valuable and worth of pursuing. They are, however, valuable only 
conditionally, only because the subject accepts them as valuable. Hence, the subject itself is 
the necessary source and precondition of values. A rational subject has to acknowledge this; 
therefore,  it  has  to  see  itself  as  valuable.  Unlike  its  contingent  aims  and  projects,  it  is  
unconditionally (Hegel would say: “absolutely”) valuable. But it also has to acknowledge that 
all other subjects are similar in this respect. Therefore, it has to treat them as intrinsically 
valuable, not only because they may be contingently useful for it, but because they are also 
unconditional sources of values. Therefore, it can not treat the others merely as means for its 
own ends. When we do so, we contradict our own rational nature. (Kant 1986, 90-1)  
 
Unlike the better-known version of the Universal Law, the second version makes an explicit 
reference to the others. It forbids using them merely as means. Slavery or bondage, Hegel’s 
basic metaphor for an asymmetrical relationship, is a prime example of using others merely as 
means. Hegel, like Kant, thinks that such an attitude is self-contradictory. Kant might add that 
this shows that the first version of the Universal Law is not powerless, for we cannot all treat 
each others only as means. But for Hegel, the contradiction involved in Lord-Bondsman 
(Master-Slave) relationships is not only an intellectual error. Because the attitude cannot be 
generally shared, it cannot be a basis for lasting social arrangements and for politics. 
Moreover, it is also unsatisfactory from an individual (including the Lord’s) point of view. It 
leads  to  a  sort  of  schizophrenic  attitude  towards  the  others:  in  some contexts  they  are  to  be  
treated merely as slaves, but in other contexts they should be treated as morally responsible 
(rational, free) beings. There is, then, a sort of “generalization argument” in the heart of 
Hegel’s philosophy. It may be argued that, in spite of the differences, Hegel’s ideas of 
recognition and of Absolute knowing are rather close to certain aspects of Kant’s practical 
philosophy.   
 
 
2.4.     The limits of Hegel’s theory 
 
2.4.1. Family and the “womankind”.  The realm of  immediate self-consciousness.  
 
 
 
Hegel’s views on women are an important topic of its own. But they are also relevant for his 
theory  of  the  subject.  Ironically,  they  show  that  Hegel  himself  was  not  free  from  the  
limitations he analysed in PhS. On this, all contemporary commentators seem to be in 
agreement. 
 
Hegel´s views on women and the Family has been widely criticised by feminist thinkers, for 
example, by Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray and Carole Pateman. It is indeed easy to join 
in with these criticisms.  Judith Butler has also criticised Hegel. Calling Butler a feminist 
critic of Hegel would, however, be misleading. Even that Butler criticises Hegel also for his 
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views of women, her main target is Hegel´s theory of “self-conscious Spirit”. Butler criticises 
Hegel´s “self-conscious Spirit” because it, according to Butler, refutes violently its “Other”. 
However,  unlike most of the feminist critics of Hegel, Butler  does not identify this “refuted 
other” necessarily as “woman”, at least in any simple way.  For her, any “radical otherness” 
becomes refuted in Hegelian “self-conscious Spirit”.  Instead of taking “women”  as the point 
of reference in her critique of Hegel (or, for that matter, of any thinker) Butler takes the 
general theory formulated in some sections of PhS (i.e. the thought of the “ek-static process”) 
itself as the basis in her criticism. (This will be further explained in the ch. 4 on Butler) 
 
Nevertheless it appears that in Hegel´s subject-theory (especially as concerns PhS, which is, 
of Hegel´s texts, the focus in this study) it is especially the women and the realm of Family 
which constitutes the “other in bondage”.  Butler´s way to criticise not only Hegel but also 
other thinkers for refuting “radical otherness as such” connects with the ground theme in this 
study.  It is important to go through what Hegel says about women and family – i.e. to take up 
the “dualism” in Hegel´s own thinking -  in order to discuss Butler´s problems in taking 
“radical otherness as such” as the reference point not only in her criticism of Hegel (and 
others) but also in her subject-theory and political theory in general.  This discussion is 
carried  further especially in  ch. 5). 
 
Everything what has been so far said in this chapter on “thinking”, “knowing”, 
“consciousness” and “self-consciousness” – as well as of “Desire”, “Lordship and Bondage”, 
reciprocal recognition,  rationality and self-conscious Spirit - concerns men.    All what has 
been said here is  said of  conceptual thinkers.  For Hegel, only men are conceptual thinkers.  
It is not clear whether Hegel regards all males, totally regardless of race etc., as conceptual 
thinkers   -   at  least  in  PhS there  are  no  signs  that  he  would  not.    Nevertheless,  it  becomes  
clear in PhS that he does not consider any women as conceptual thinkers. However, even that 
women  are  closed  out  from  those  realms  of  society  which  are  based  on  the  capacity  for  
conceptual thinking (e.g. the realms of civil society and state)  women do, however, constitute 
a part of “Spirit” . The Spirit includes everything in it, not only the internally conceptual 
beings (i.e. the subjects, human males). Human males  constitute that “subjective” part of the 
Spirit through which it raises to a consciousness of itself. However, there are also other parts 
to  the  Spirit.  Importantly,  community  as  a  whole  (corresponding  to  the  whole  of  Spirit)  
includes not only its subjective parts, but also its non-subjective part. The non-subjective part 
of Spirit takes place as femininity and at communal level it has its existence in the Family.  
Hegel speaks of the family as the realm of “Divine Law”: 
 
Confronting this clearly manifest ethical power there is, however, another 
power, the Divine Law. For the ethical power of the state, being the movement 
of self-conscious action, finds its antithesis in the simple and immediate essence 
of  the  ethical  sphere;”...”  This  moment  which  expresses  the  ethical  sphere   in  
this element of immediacy or (simple) being, or which is an immediate 
consciousness of itself, both as essence and as this particular self, in an “other”, 
i.e. as a natural ethical community – this is the Family. (PhS §449-450) 
 
In Family the separate individuals are immediately, naturally, connected with each others. 
(PhS §451). This contrasts with the conceptually mediated manner in which male subjects in 
the other spheres of society relate to each others. As such, the family relations – family as a 
whole – are  not dialectical: the family does not change. Whereas the subjective realms of the 
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community can develop, change (for themselves) the family stays always the same. Because 
Hegel was certainly aware that the legal forms of family relations have changed, he obviously 
conceived these changes as inessential. This stability of family relations is due to the feminine 
immediacy.  Women are, for Hegel and for the philosophical “we” (denoting the “storytellers” 
in PhS) not capable of conceptuality, for rationality or speculation. In short, the difference 
between  men  and  women  in  PhS  is  that  whereas  men  are  seen  as  internally mediating 
(conceptual, active) beings, women are seen as immediate beings (passive, always the same). 
Whereas men constitute the self-conscious, active part of Spirit, women constitute its 
unconscious, passive part. This constitutes the special “difference”, or actually the lack of 
difference  between men and women in Hegel,  criticised by feminist thinkers like e.g. 
Irigaray.   For  Irigaray,  women  do  not  exist  in  philosophies  like  the  Hegel´s,  as  there  is  no  
such  “differentiated” entity like “femininity”. As such, there is no gender-difference. For 
Irigaray,  as well as for thinkers like Lacan, there is just one sex (the male) in Hegelian 
thinking. Hegelian thought - in its way to think of men and women – constitutes the paradigm 
of traditional western philosophy, going back to Aristotle and Plato (see Butler on this theme; 
BM 27-55). In Aristotle the society as a whole was divided into the parts of non-freedom and 
dependence (the “household”, the “oikos”) and freedom and independence (the “public” 
spheres). The households were inhabited by people seen as internally not capable for freedom, 
independence and equality.  These people were women, slaves, children and servants.  Each 
household was somewhat sovereignly mastered by a person internally capable for 
independence, freedom and equality.  The masters of the households were “white” males (i.e. 
Greek, “non-barbarian”). The public spheres were inhabited by basically equal males, i.e. by 
the citizens of the state. The development at the level of the State was essential for Hegel, for 
this development was, ultimately, development towards greater freedom and independence – 
the very essence of the Spirit.   
 
For feminist thinkers like Irigaray, Hegel, alike traditional western philosophy in general,  
retains the ancient division between the feminine private sphere and the male public sphere. 
For Irigaray this includes the idea that women do not exist in western philosophical thought.  
As something non-differentiated and hence non-existent, femininity is not “objective”.   It is 
actually not a “something” at all.  Irigaray,  alike Lacan, speaks of feminity as “non-
linguistic” as all identification of objects takes place in language, whether in thinking or in 
speech.  Femininity is without an objective reality of its own hence both in language and “out 
there”.  Femininity is something “imaginary”. It constitutes the “formless”, “silenced”  base 
of male reality, objectivity and rational language (Irigaray 1985).   For  Hegelian-inflected  
thinkers like Lacan, women, or actually the gender-difference constitutes a “lost object”.    
 
In PhS women are not seen as “subjects”, and, correspondingly, femininity is not something 
“subjective”.  “Subject” for Hegel is basically a self-reflective, internally mediative 
(conceptual) entity. It is a “subject – as an object, constituted through otherness - for itself”.  
In Hegel, there is no subject as a non-self-reflective category,  in other words, there is no 
subject in itself without  its  at  the  same  time  being  a  subject  for itself.    The  realm  of  
subjectivity  denotes  hence  for  Hegel  the  self-reflective  (self-conscious)  part  of  Spirit.    For  
Hegel, Spirit, taken simply, is however divided into a self-conscious, internally speculative 
Spirit  (called  by  Hegel  as  “self-conscious  Spirit”  or  “Spirit   for  itself”)  and   Spirit  as  
immediate, intuitive   self-consciousness  (or,  what  Hegel  called  “unconscious  Spirit”).   The  
former constitutes the male part of Spirit, having its ultimate existence in the rational state and 
in all that is rational, actual and real. The male part of Spirit constitutes also the properly 
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human for Hegel.  The latter constitutes the female part of Spirit, having its existence in the 
Family. Femininity constitutes that part of Spirit which has not risen into a consciousness (of 
itself).. Hegel speaks of Family as the realm of  the feminine, unconscious part of Spirit: 
 
...the law of the Family is an implicit, inner essence which is not exposed to the 
daylight of consciousness, but remains an inner feeling and the divine element 
that is exempt from an existence in the real world. The woman is associated with 
these household gods (Penates) and beholds in them both her universal 
substance and her particular individuality, yet in such a way that this relation of 
her individuality to them is at the same time not the natural one of desire. (PhS  
§ 457) 
 
Hegel  writes  of  the  two  sides  of  Spirit,  the  side  which  is  for itself and the side which is 
implicit,  not for itself.  
 
It is Spirit which is for itself in that it preserves itself in its reflection in 
individuals; and it is implicitly Spirit, or substance, in that it preserves them 
within itself. As actual substance, it is a nation, as actual consciouness, it is the 
citizens of that nation. This consciousness has its essence in simple Spirit, and 
the certainty of itself in the actuality of this Spirit, in the nation as a whole; it 
has  its  truth,  therefore,  not  in  something  that  is  not  actual,  but  in  a  Spirit  that  
exists and prevails. This Spirit can be called the human law, because it is 
essentially in the form of a reality that is conscious of itself.  (PhS §447-448) 
 
Hegel speaks of the female part of Spirit as the “Nether World” (“underworld”). This is the 
world of weakness and darkness, the realm of “sacred claims” and “pathos”. This contrasts 
with the human, rational  world (“upper world”) of men. ( PhS §474-§475).  
 
For Hegel, women are the beholders of the “Penates” - “particular gods” who, in the ancient 
Roman mythology, were thought to watch over a particular household  or community. 
Women are the guardians of Divine Law, self-contained, singular rule, which does not reach 
an actual self-consciousness.    This means, for example, that whereas women can have 
intuitive awareness of what is ethical, men can form rationally state-institutions and laws 
which are free, i.e. which are constituted  for reciprocally recognitive selves (PhS §457-463).  
 
For Hegel, and for the speculating “we” in PhS, only men are proper subjects, capable of 
rationality and conceptuality. This means that men´s limits exist for men themselves as they 
are subjective (particular, conceptual) limits. Women´s limits are immediate and thus they do 
not exist as particular limits. Men can hence go over their limits (as their limits exist for 
them),  dialectically by “sublation”, internally, socially and epistemologically. Men are 
capable of relating to free otherness in reciprocally recognitive relations.  As such, men are fit 
for the public, political realms of community life – in other words, they can enter those realms 
of society where objectivity is (ideally) supposed to be constituted for reciprocally recognitive 
selves.  Men inhabit the realms of proper subjects – the civil society, the state, the academinc 
life (including philosophy) and so forth. Men are, firstly, conceptual, internally double, self-
reflective  self-consciousnesses (i.e. subjects).   Secondly, men are capable of relating equally 
to other selves and thus capable to forming free communities. Thirdly, men are capable of 
absolute knowing as  they  can  enrich  their  limited   knowledge  –  and  reach  absolute  and  
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universal knowledge -  by relating rationally to the knowledge of others. Because men´s 
knowledge is limited for themselves (i.e. subjective, particular) they can go over their limits in 
knowing things. Men are hence internally, socially and epistemologically capable of actual, 
rational universality.   
 
Whereas men’s knowledge of themselves, other selves and things is universal in a subjective 
(rational and actual) way, women´s universality is not rational and real, instead, it is unreal.  
Because women are non-subjective beings, women´s knowledge of things is not subjective in 
Hegel’s sense of the term. Women for Hegel are not capable of relating conceptually 
(speculatively, dialectically and rationally) to contradictory otherness. This means that for 
Hegel  women  are  not  capable  of  taking  part  in  free communities,  as  freedom  for  Hegel  is  
primarily connected to rationality and conceptuality. Also, women´s immediate way to relate 
to things (in contrast to internally double, conceptual relation to things) means that women´s 
“knowledge” of things is not universal,  actual,  real. Women cannot understand the real 
substance of things  which is conceptually constituted. Whereas the (male) actual, free self-
consciousnesses find their limits (internally, as well as socially and epistemologically) in 
reciprocally recognitive relationships with other males, women lack the basic internal 
structure (i.e. conceptuality), which enables one for this kind of relationships. Consequently,  
they cannot go over their limits either as concerns their self-knowledge, their social relations 
with others or their knowledge of things.   
 
In PhS women are closed out  from relations of “desire”, “Lordship and Bondage” and 
“reciprocal recognition” – both internally, socially and epistemologically - as all these 
relations exist in thinking, and between such thinkers, who have the inherent capacity for 
conceptual, speculative and rational thinking. Women cannot be treated unequally (i.e. placed 
in bondage, silenced) as they cannot be treated or heard equally. They are incapable of taking 
part in equal relationships, to start with. They also cannot be “Lords” over others, as they do 
not have the basic capacity to treat, or even to learn to treat others as their equals.  
 
Hence in Hegel, like in Aristotle, only those who are internally capable for freedom, 
independence and equality can be “masters” (Lords) over others. However, whereas Aristotle 
considered  slaves and servants (both males and females) internally not capable for freedom,  
Hegel apparently intends to free the male slaves and  servants from relations of “Lordship and 
bondage” into the public realms of independence, freedom and equality (explicated in the 
previous sub-chapters of this chapter). Hegel´s theory of Lordship and Bondage is a theory of 
a non-justified bondage.  For Hegel, it is not justified to place males into a state of bondage, 
as males are not internally in bondage.  As for women,  Hegel clearly retains the traditional 
Aristotelian philosophy. Because women are internally un-free (internally in bondage), it is 
only justified that they remain in  the realm of un-freedom, i.e. in the realm of the household. 
They cannot be let to the public, free spheres of society. Keeping women in the realm of un-
freedom does not mean (for Hegel) that women are treated in an unjust way, alike as it did not 
mean for Aristotle that either male or female “barbarians” (non-Greeks) were treated unjustly 
when excluded from the public spheres of society.  Only those who Hegel (in PhS) already 
recognizes as (internally, potentially) free subjects,  i.e. deserving to be treated as free beings, 
are seen by Hegel to be treated unjustly when treated as unfree (placed in bondage).  Women 
are not “in bondage” (for Hegel) when they are “mastered externally” by their husbands, in 
the manner how Hegel explains the state of “bondage” in his theory of Lordship and bondage.  
As women lack the internal capacity of being their own masters – i.e. they lack the internal 
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capacity to “subject themselves as their own objects” and “labour” for themselves – women 
are treated justly while externally mastered. As immediate beings (in contrast to internally 
mediating males, who can limit themselves)  women are in need of external “Lordship” 
(“mastering”). Women are not internally negating (internally “subjecting”) independent, “free 
objects” – i.e. subjects.  As was explicated in the previous chapters, only internally negating, 
independent subjects are “ free self-consciousnesses” and hence capable to take part in 
reciprocally recognitive relationships with other selves.  As women’s state of un-equality in 
Family corresponds with what women are,  women are treated in a right way when confined 
into family.  
 
Carole Pateman criticises in her book The Sexual Contract (1988) especially the way women 
are excluded from the public spheres of the community and confined into the private sphere in 
Hegel´s Philosophy of Right.   Hegel  sees in his Philosophy of Right that both women and 
men enter the marriage by a marriage contract.   Pateman pays attention to the unequal 
standing of the two parties entering marriage.  She argues that the marriage contract in Hegel 
alike in the traditional Western political philosophy in general takes place in a society which 
is founded on the subordination of  women.  Pateman calls the “original contract” which 
founds  the  subordination  of   women  a  “sexual  contract”.  Marriage  contracts  are  made  in  a  
society which is already based on “sexual contract”. The “sexual contract” is made by men, to 
the exclusion of women from the political  spheres of the community.   Women are excluded 
from those realms where various relations and conditions are constituted  politically (between 
citizens of the state) into the realm of “natural subordination”. Pateman argues that states of 
un-freedom and inequality cannot in general be seen to be  entered by one´s choice or by a 
contract, hence the marriage contract also in Hegel is not actually a contract. It is called “a 
contract” only because women must somehow be included into the community as a whole.   
Actual contracts are however made within the civil order, between equals, not between parties 
in which the other party is in an inferior position to the other.   As women are excluded from 
the “free” (political) spheres of the community and denied the status of a free, political subject 
(the  status  of  a  citizen),  they  are  not  in  the  position  of  making  actual  contracts  in  general.   
Pateman sees that the way in which women are denied the status of an “individual subject” is 
the base for their subjection in Hegel, as well as with most traditional Western philosophers.     
Patriarchal marriage (determined through a “sexual contract”)  appears as the only alternative 
for a woman to live a respectable “adult” life in the Hegelian community,  instead of being a 
matter of “contracting in”. (Pateman, 1988 116-131, 173-181) 
 
Hegel speaks of the difference of the ethical lives and “interests” of men and women: 
 
 
The  difference  between  the  ethical  life  of  the  woman  and  that  of  the  man  
consists just in this, that in her vocation as an individual and in her pleasure, her 
interest is centred on the universal and remains alien to the particularity of 
desire; whereas in the husband these two sides are separated; and since he 
possesses as a citizen the self-conscious power of universality, he thereby 
acquires the right of desire and , at the same time, preserves his freedom in 
regard to it. (PhS §457) 
 
 
It appears that male “desire” (men´s intentions and interests)  is acceptable because it strives  - 
123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and finds its ultimate satisfaction – in reciprocally recognitive, equal relations with others. It 
strives for the constitution of  “shared objectivity” (i.e. a free state, explicated in Hegel´s 
Philosophy of Right).  In other words, men are built so that they strive for freedom and 
equality even that they can “err” along the path towards this goal. Even that male desire can 
assume parochial forms, as it can take place as relations of Lordship and Bondage, it 
nevertheless strives for being satisfied in free and equal relations with others. It can learn 
(dialectically) from its errors as it is pushed by its internal contradictions to take into account 
the demands for recognition, presented by contradicting others. As women´s possible 
intentions (“desires”) cannot even potentially recognize the claims of  contradicting others  – 
and hence cannot be in the service of constituting objectivity for reciprocally recognitive 
selves - they must be contained in the family. Feminine incapacity for synthesizing dialectics 
(i.e. uniting contradictory thoughts of things) makes them incapable for constituting shared 
objectivity  with  free  others.  Family  appears  as  a  realm  of  non-contradiction  in  PhS.   This  
means that family relations are not contradictory. For that matter they cannot also be free, in 
the manner of being equal.  As the women (constituting the guardians of the family relations) 
cannot mediate between contradicting thoughts, the family relations are not “dialectical”. This 
means that they cannot be turned into equal, free relations, as is the case in relations in which 
both parties are (mutually recognized as) free self-consciousnesses.   
 
In Hegel, the capacity to mediate between contradicting thoughts denotes the conceptual 
capacity for dialectical thinking,  in the manner of synthesizing dialectics, i.e. sublation, 
Aufhebung. In “sublation” the contradicting thoughts are united. Because women cannot unite 
internally with contradicting otherness  family relations are immediate relations which Hegel 
describes as “natural”. Conceptually mediated relations are also such in which  one finds itself 
as a particular being.  This is not the case in family relations. Further, because of the female 
immediacy, family  is not an internally speculative part of the community as a whole. Family 
does not contain in it (through its internal speculation) the other parts of society (i.e. the parts 
of civil  society and the state) as rational  othernesses.  Even that the Hegelian community is  
rational and free, family constitutes an un-free and un-rational realm within it.  Hegel writes 
of young male children as the ones who leave the realm of Family to find their true nature in 
the other parts of society: 
 
The brother is the member of the Family in whom its Spirit becomes an 
individuality which turns towards another sphere, and passes over into the 
consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and 
therefore, strictly speaking, negative ethical life of the Family, in order to 
acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself and actual. He 
passes from the divine law, within whose sphere he lived, over to the human 
law. But the sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the household and 
the  guardians  of  the  divine  law.  In  this  way,  the  two  sexes  overcome  their  
(merely) natural being and appear in their ethical significance, as diverse beings 
who share between them the two distinctions belonging to the ethical substance. 
(PhS §458-459) 
 
For  Hegel,  the  ethical  Spirit,  or  ethical  substance,  has  two parts  to  it.   There  is  the  natural,  
unconscious, intuitive part (the feminine) and the self-conscious, human, rational part (the 
male). Thus natural (the feminine) and human (the male) constitute different ethical realms 
for Hegel.   
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The difference of the sexes and their ethical content remains, however, in the 
unity of the substance, and its movement is just the constant becoming of that 
substance. The husband is sent out by the Spirit of the Family into the 
community in which he finds his self-conscious being. Just as the Family in this 
way possesses in the community its substance and enduring being, so, 
conversely, the community possesses in the Family the formal element of its 
actual existence, and in the divine law its power and authentication. Neither of 
the two is by itself absolutely valid; human law proceeds in its living process 
from the divine, the law on earth from that of the nether world, the conscious 
from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy – and equally returns whence 
it came. The power of the nether world, on the other hand, has its actual 
existence on earth; through consciousness, it becomes existence and activity. 
(PhS 460) 
 
In PhS Hegel writes that  there are recognitive relations and ethical relations in family, too.  
Family constitutes especially for women and the female children its own individual, singular 
universe (as for women there is no outside of family). Also in this universe the parts are 
constituted as ethical parts of the whole, even if not rationally as internally speculated parts 
(as is the case when contradicting parts are mediated as parts of a whole).   For Hegel, women 
can strive ethically for the best of the family – even if not of larger wholes, i.e. of the whole 
society. A  woman can be very ethical, in a “natural” way, when it comes to the woman’s own 
family. Hence a woman is capable of keeping an ethical household, which, as ethical, is not 
simply  a  matter  of  feelings.  This  includes,  for  Hegel,  the  idea  that  a  woman cannot  see  her  
family as this particular family instead as a universe of its own (PhS §451) Hegel writes: 
  
In the ethical household, it is not a question of this particular husband, this 
particular child, but simply of husband and children generally; the relationships 
of the woman are based, not on feeling, but on the universal. (PhS §457)  
 
Because her own family constitutes woman´s whole ethical universe  she cannot strive for the 
best  of  “other”  families.  Other  families,  with  their  own  “Penate  gods”  constitute  their  own  
universes, and women cannot mediate between these contradicting universes. Thus, family is 
a universe which cannot become a particular universe.  Family and family relations cannot be 
constituted for such a “sublated” universality which is internally mediated with contradicting 
thoughts concerning the family.  This corresponds with the idea that women cannot mediate 
between contradicting thoughts. Thus family and family relations in Hegel seem to stay stable 
forever. Family does not change historically (in spite of the appearances) as it cannot relate 
internally to contradicting thoughts concerning itself and its constitutive relations.  Hence 
wives  and  husbands  cannot,  for  Hegel,   become  each  others  equals,  in  the  same  manner  in  
which Lords and Bondsmen become equals  in Hegel´s theory of Lordship and Bondage. 
Family is a realm of immediacy and nature in contrast to the historically changing realms, 
inhabited by male citizens.  Hegel writes that woman cannot accept other (contradicting) 
Penate gods, only the ones guarding her own family As such, she cannot strive for the best of 
“other” families, wifes, husbands, children etc., only for the best of her own family. (PhS 
§457, §474-475). 
 
Simone de Beauvoir criticised Hegel´s idea of femininity as something stable and natural in 
her book The Second Sex (1949). In Hegel men are seen to actively become what they are – to 
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develop from immature masculinity towards mature manhood, higher rationality and freedom.  
Men make themselves into what they are through active  participation in various rational 
activities (including philosophy) together with other selves. The female passivity contrast 
with this male dynamism. Women just are “naturally” (always already) what they are. As 
women are immediate beings, they remain also always the same, as they cannot mediate with 
contradicting otherness. The capacity to mediate with contradicting otherness is seen by 
Hegel  as the necessary prerequisite for  self-change (as is explicated in the previous sub-
chapters in this chapter). De Beauvoir argues against Hegel that women become women 
instead of being women. In other words, femininity is culturally and contextually produced 
and constructed. Girls are carefully raised up, through various means of guidance and 
education, to become the “naturally subordinate” beings which they are. (De Beauvoir, The 
Second Sex, see e.g. pp. 84-91) 
 
The “youth”, or the “men of pathos” constitute an important and an interesting category in 
Hegel. These men live in a somewhat ambivalent, transitory realm between the family and the 
rational, public realms of the  society. These men constitute a class of “immature manhood”, 
men of “pathos”, who have a similar inclination of immediacy toward their own nation as 
women have toward their own families. Hegel writes in a somewhat frustrated manner how 
this type of manhood, especially the Youth, are admired and supported by women.    
 
Womankind – the everlasting irony (in the life) of community – changes by 
intrigue the universal end of the government into a private end, transforms its 
universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the 
universal  property  of  the  state  into  a  possession  and  ornament  for  the  Family.  
Woman in  this  way turns  to  ridicule  the  earnest  wisdom of  mature  age  which,  
indifferent to purely private pleasures and enjoyments, as well as to playing an 
active part, only thinks and cares for the universal. She makes this wisdom an 
object of derision for raw and irresponsible youth and unworthy of their 
enthusiasm.  In  general,  she  maintains  that  it  is  the  power  of  youth  that  really  
counts (PhS §475).   
 
Through the Youth a somewhat feminine type of thinking enters the public realm and assumes 
the form of  a sort of nationalist pathos. Through the Youth, the Spirit of the Penates is taken 
to the level of the nation.  
 
The Youth comes away from the unconscious Spirit of the Family, and becomes 
the individuality of the community.(PhS §473) 
 
The brave youth in whom woman finds her pleasure, the suppressed principle of 
corruption, now has his day and his worth is openly acknowledged . Now, it is 
physical strength and what appears as a matter of luck, that decides on the 
existence of ethical life and spiritual necessity. Because the existence of ethical 
life rests on strength and luck, the decision is already made that its downfall has 
come. (PhS §475) 
 
A natural (feminine) set of mind strives for particular ends because its particularity makes up 
(for it) a universal end. This attitude makes up the set of mind of the “brave Youth”. The 
individual consciousness of  the  Youth   contrasts  with  the  “mediated  self-consciousness”  of  
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the mature manhood. Even that Hegel clearly considers mature manhood  the most important 
feature of the community as a whole, the Youth constitutes for him an important “other” 
power through which the nation has an understanding of itself as an individual nation. The 
individual consciousness of the youth is also important for the historical life – and the 
dialectical movement - of the community.  The Youth strive for the best of the community, or 
nation,  in  a  somewhat  similar  manner  of  “immediate  devotion”  as  the  women strive  for  the  
best of the Family. As the Youth cannot mediate their thought of the community with “other” 
thoughts of the community,  they have a non-dialectical  attitude (of a sort  of “either-or”) for 
the preservation of their own thought of the community. .  (PhS §475 -476). As such, the 
attitude of “Pathos” of the youth resembles the attitude of “Desire”, which was explained 
earlier in this chapter on Hegel. Alike “Desire”, “Pathos” does not  mediate internally with 
contradicting otherness.  
 
..the movement of human and divine law finds its necessity expressed in 
individuals in whom the universal appears as “pathos (…) As a moment of the 
visible community its activity is not confined merely to the underworld, or to its 
outer existence, but it has an equally visible existence and movement in the 
actual nation. Taken in this form, what was represented as a simple movement 
of the individualized “pathos” acquires a different look, and the crime and 
consequent destruction of the community acquire the proper and characteristic 
form of their existence. Human law in its universal existence is the community, 
in its activity in general is the manhood of the community, in its real and 
effective activity is the government. It is, moves, and maintains itself by 
consuming and absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates, or the 
separation into independent families presided over by womankind.(PhS §475) 
 
 
For Hegel,  the nation possesses in the youth its nationalist -  or, as concerns also possible 
internal conflicts, its separatist -  power.  The Spirit of  pathos, as something individual, will 
take the nation or the community into destruction (i.e. into wars against other communities)  
which however are seen by Hegel as important phases in the  historical movement  of the 
nation or community  towards higher (i.e more internally complex) forms. Also the Youth 
grow more universal (in terms of mediating internally with contradicting thoughts concerning 
the nation)  in wars as they are confronted with the possible destruction of the community. As 
such, wars constitute a sort of “struggle for recognition” taken to the level of the nation. By 
becoming into contact with the moment of “abstraction” (the community as “void”, 
destructed) the Youth find their internal  conceptual and rational capacities and, also, are able 
to unite dialectically with contradicting otherness. As such,  separatist thoughts of the nation 
can become united dialectically.  
 
The community, however, can only maintain itself by suppressing this Spirit of 
individualism, and, because it is an essential moment, all the same creates it and, 
moreover,  creates  it  by  its  repressive  attitude  towards  it  as  a  hostile  principle.  
However, this principle, being merely evil and futile in its separation from the 
universal end, would be quite ineffectual if the community itself did not 
recognize the power of Youth (the manhood which, while immature, still stands 
within the sphere of individuality), as the power of the whole. For the 
community is a nation, is itself an individuality, and essentially is such for itself 
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by other individualities being for it, by excluding them from itself and knowing 
itself to be independent  of them (PhS §475). 
 
Governed by the Youth set of mind alone the community would not develop historically from 
its primitive forms into more internally complex “sublated” forms. However, because the 
Youth are males, their “Penatean” set of mind does not constitute an unchangeable fact. 
Whereas a Penatean consciousness is a stable, timeless fact in women, in men it can become 
mediated with contradicting otherness and thus change into mature manhood.  An attitude of 
Pathos towards one´s community (alike the attitude of “Desire”)  can go over its limits if it 
exists in a male mind. In Hegel,  the community is to unite (by historical, dialectical 
sublation) various contradicting thoughts (of the community) into a rich, internally varied idea 
of the community. The development of the community (the nation)  resembles the way a 
subjective consciousness develops in PhS from parochial forms towards free self-
consciousness and reciprocal recognition (explained earlier). (PhS §455-457, 461)    
 
The mature men – constituting the rational government of the nation – will in time raise the 
nation from its peril (after its being taken down by the individuality  of the Youth). The 
mature men will “sublate” the Spirit of pathos  and thus maintain and dialectically develop the 
community.  However,  Hegel  sees  that  the  Spirit  of  the  Youth  –  through  the  Spirit  of  the  
Family – remains always an inherent and necessary power in the society.  It appears that the 
historical movement of the nation takes place as a dynamic between  “mature manhood” and 
“immature manhood” .  
 
Hegel writes that in Family, and in the Feminine, the Spirit passes over into abstract 
negativity (PhS  §452).  In  Hegel,  the  feminine  as  “abstract  negativity”  sets  hence   an  un-
conceptual contradiction (a self-contradictory duality) within the Spirit as a whole.   As 
“abstract negativity” (in contrast to internally negated, subjective entities) femininity  
constitutes a problematic abstract entity in Hegel´s philosophy. Femininity is not seen, by 
Hegel,  as a particular abstract negativity (particular, subjective abstraction) which is 
constituted in the subjective thinking of it.  Femininity is not seen, by Hegel,  to be related to 
its subjective thinker (i.e. to Hegel himself). In other words, Hegel does not see femininity to 
be constituted for the self as well as to other selves. Hegel does not “return” his thought of 
femininity to its thinker and see it as a conceptual construction. As such, Hegel treats his own 
particular thought of femininity as the unlimited truth of feminity and the women. As such, he 
treats femininity (or “womanhood”, as he describes femininity) very differently than he treats 
other thought entities. In general Hegel argues that what things are (thought to be) in 
themselves  is always constituted subjectively and historically for themselves.  
 
As a non-subjective negativity (i.e. an abstract negativity) femininity stays forever same (for 
Hegel) even that communities and nations (i.e. those parts of communities which are seen to 
be subjectively constructed) can become historically changed, more complex, free and 
rational (for Hegel).   Only subjective (conceptual) entities are seen by Hegel as movable, 
changeable, capable of becoming different.  Femininity as such, and Family, does not change 
historically as it does not have the internal structure of conceptuality which would make it 
capable  of  changing.  It  is  important  to  remind   that  for  Hegel  actual  change  is  always  
dialectical, i.e. internal;  it takes place subjectively, for itself.  
 
Whereas the (male) Youth can find their rational maturity (inherent in them always already) 
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in wars, and in the rational activities with other selves,  the womankind remains unmoved 
even when faced with the “moment of abstraction” in wars, i.e. the destruction of their 
families,  husbands,  children  and  their  heroes,  the  brave  Youth.    For  Hegel,  the  Spirit as a 
whole is not a fully self-conscious whole. Neither is Spirit fully movable  in Hegel. Instead, it 
has its historically movable (male) part and its stable (female) part. It appears that just some 
part of Spirit is properly conceptual i.e. internally speculative, while the other part is not. 
However, for Hegel, Spirit makes up a whole which is a unity.  
 
Problematically – compared to what  Hegel says about other “unities”, made of “parts” -  
Hegel  argues that Spirit is a whole, made of a “not self–conscious” part and a “self-conscious 
part”.  Given Hegel´s general rejection of dualisms, this is a surprising view. Hegel does not 
seem to remember his criticism against the Kantian dualism and realize that his own division 
into the “self-conscious” and “unconscious” parts of the Spirit is itself consciously done – i.e. 
that this division exists for Hegel himself and for his fellow philosophical “we”.  As was 
explained earlier in this chapter, Hegel criticised the Kantian “thing” because it was made of a 
“subjectively known part” (thing for us) and a “not subjectively known part” (thing in itself). 
Hegel himself seems to have transferred the same problem into his notion of “Spirit”. Hegel´s 
Spirit is divided into the realm of subjects (constituting thus its subjectively known  part) and 
into the realm of non-subjects (a part not known subjectively). Hegel does not seem to 
remember here his criticism against Kant. According to this criticism all divisions, made by 
subjects, are fully subjective (including both parts of the division).   
 
For Hegel Spirit is constituted by its male part (internally speculated and thus conceptually 
known for us) and its female part (immediately known, i.e. not conceptual for us, resembling 
the Kantian “thing in itself”). This apparent Hegelian duality shows itself further  in his 
notions of Family as an entity and family relations. It also shows itself in the way Hegel sees 
the  relations  between  family  and  other  realms  of  the  society  (the  male  realms  of  the  civil  
society and the state). These three realms - corresponding with what Hegel basically says 
about “singularity”, “particularity” and “universality” – make up the whole of Spirit. Whereas 
the other parts of the whole (the civil society and the state) are internally speculated parts of 
the whole - as they are inhabited by free self-consciousnesses - the Family is not. Even that in 
the Youth, the “singularity” of the family becomes mediated with “particularity” and 
“universality”, in women it does not. Hence the Hegelian Spirit is a dualist whole, resembling 
in this sense, the Kantian “thing”.     
 
According to what was explained above as “reciprocal recognition” for Hegel, women are not 
reciprocally recognized by Hegel or the “philosophical we” in PhS. A basic part of the “non-
recognition” of women in PhS is that Hegel does not acknowledge women as “internally 
negated” “free objects” (i.e. subjects). The relation between men and women (as well as the 
relation between Family and the other parts of the society) constitutes hence a relation of 
Lordship and Bondage in Hegel´s philosophy. A core aspect of Hegel´s attitude towards 
women is that  women are not acknowledged as free self-consciousnesses (consciousness 
capable of relating to contradictory otherness through internal mediation). 
 
In PhS, women´s knowledge is not considered real knowledge of things. Real, actual 
knowledge is for Hegel conceptual, rational knowledge as things are ultimately conceptually 
constructed.  As such, what things really are is known “beyond” women. Real knowledge is 
produced by men, capable of knowing things through contradicting otherness.  In his theory 
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of Lordship and Bondage Hegel sees that the core part in the constitution of the 
“bondage/slavery” of the otherness  – i.e. in the silencing and the refutation of otherness -  is 
that Other knowledge of things is considered not real. Hegel describes women´s “immediate”  
knowledge of things as not real. His attitude towards women corresponds with what he 
himself says of an “enslaving” (not free, not reciprocally recognitive) attitude towards 
otherness.  De Beauvoir said sixty years ago: 
 
Certain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of 
master and slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman. The 
advantage of the master, he says, comes from his affirmation of Spirit as against 
Life through the fact that he risks his own life; but in fact the conquered slave 
has known this same risk.(…) He says: “The other consciousness is the 
dependent consciousness for whom the essential reality is the animal type of 
life; that is to say, a mode of living bestowed by another entity”.(…) Men have 
presumed to  create  a  feminine  domain  –  the  kingdom of  life,  of  immanence  –  
only in order to lock up women therein. (de Beauvoir 1980, 96-97)     
 
 
2.4.2. The story of Antigone in PhS 
 
 
When discussing the two realms of the Human and the Divine Law, Hegel discusses also the 
classic Sophocles´ play of Antigone.  The story of the crime, committed by Antigone goes, in 
short, as follows. Antigone´s brother, Polyneices, has died while waging a war against his 
own brother´s Eteocles´ regime in Thebes. Polyneices claims to be the rightful inheritor of the 
kingdom. Both Polyneices and Eteocles however die. The maternal uncle of the dead brothers 
considers Polyneices a wrong-doer and, consequently, not worthy of a proper burial. Creon 
wants Polyneices´s body to be left unburied and to be ravaged. This is when Antigone, the 
devoted sister of Polyneices, acts. She buries her brother,  even that she knows that it is 
strictly against the will of the ruler of the kingdom, Creon.  Later she becomes punished by 
Creon, closed into a tomb where she dies.   
 
Hegel discusses Antigone, as a part of his discussion of the distinction between the ethical 
realms of the human and the divine laws. For Hegel, the act of Antigone (to give a proper 
burial  to  his  brother)  is  ethical  when interpreted  from the  point  of  view of  the  ethics  of  the  
Family. Inside the Family, the kinship ties of blood are privileged above all the rational, 
ethical and moral reasonings of the state. Hegel describes a sisters devotion to her brother: 
 
The loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the sister and her duty towards 
him is the highest. (PhS §457)  
 
Hegel describes how the brother and the sister are, in their different ways, connected to the 
two realms of immediacy (family)  and the mediated rationality (state) 
 
The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly speaking, 
negative ethical life of the Family, in order to acquire and produce the ethical 
life that is conscious of itself and actual. He passes from the divine law, within 
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whose sphere he lived, over to human law. But the sister becomes, or the wife 
remains, the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law. In this 
way,  the  two  sexes  overcome  their  (merely)  natural  being  and  appear  in  their  
ethical significance, as diverse beings who share between them the two 
distinctions belonging to the ethical substance. (PhS §458- 459) 
 
By breaking the rule of Creon, Antigone seems to have committed a crime against the rules of 
the state. However, Hegel discusses whether Antigone´s deed is actually a crime or not.  
Actual crimes are committed against the rational human law, inside the human ethical realm, 
i.e. inside the state.  They are committed by subjects, of whom the state expects rational 
behaviour, because, after all, they are rational beings and this can be expected from them.  
However, can Antigone, a woman, be considered to commit crimes within the rational realm?   
According  to  Hegel,  Antigone  can  be  said   to  break  the  law,  as  an  actual  deed  against  the  
ruling of Creon, the rightful head of the state,  is nevertheless done. Yet,  which law does she 
break, or does she break any law? Hegel clearly has some difficulty to explain how Antigone 
can be said to be guilty, so that this explanation can be understood as a coherent part of  
Hegel´s own description of  the distinction between the two ethical realms of the state and the 
family.  In Antigone´s character and in her deed, the two realms come to intertwine in ways 
which Hegel has some difficulty to explain, as he nevertheless cannot give a conceptually 
mediated explanation of  the relation between the two realms, nor of Antigone´s deed.  
 
By explaining Antigone´s deed or crime Hegel resorts to call it an act of individuality.  Hegel 
also seems to consider it a feminine perversion or ridicule of the universal, human  realm.  
However, Hegel seems to be forced to understand the both sides in the Antigone story. Hegel 
understands the universal laws of the Family (Antigone)  as well as the universal laws of the 
state  (Creon). By not being able to resolve these two contradicting parties dialectically 
(which he could do if the conflict would take place within the human realm, between rational 
self-consciousnesses) Hegel argues that there is a somewhat hostile relation between the 
realms of the human law and the realm of Family (PhS § 475). 
  
According to Hegel, the state needs (the labour) of the Family, in producing the power of the 
state.  However,  the  state   cannot  but  repress  the  law  of  the  Family,  and  especially  the  
womankind, because the state needs to act rationally. It needs to, ultimately, control the power 
of individuality by rationality.  This creates a hostile relation between men and  women.  
Whereas the male members of the Family, sons and brothers,  develop to understand why it is 
necessary for their individual power to be sometimes repressed,  when they are young, 
immature and “pathetic”, the women do not develop such reflective self-consciousness. A 
rational law – which remains forever external for women - is thus forced upon women.  
Women are always in a hostile relationship with the rational state, because it is necessary that 
the divine law of the women is controlled externally by a law, in which they cannot find 
themselves.  Because the  women themselves are not capable of acknowledging  the  validity 
of the law, forced upon them, the women constitute the internal “enemy” of the rational state.  
The relationship is reciprocally hostile because neither party can find itself in the law of the 
other  one.  The  rational  state  cannot  recognize  the  claims  of  women  (e.g.  the  claim  of  
Antigone, to give a decent burial to her brother) as rational claims, emerging from within the 
human realm.  Hegel´s treatment of the deed of Antigone resembles how Hegel describes the 
attitude of  the “Lords” towards the deeds of the “Bondsmen”. The labour of the Bondsmen is 
necessary, however, the Bondsmen themselves cannot participate into determining the 
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meaning of their own labour. Their labour is determined beyond the Bondsmen themselves. If 
the Bondsmen do something by themselves, something which is not determined by the Lords, 
it  is  considered  unreal  or  unessential.   The   deeds  of  the  Bondsmen  remain  outside  of  the  
rational realm (for the Lords) as long as there is no reciprocal recognition between these two 
parties.  
  
Hegel argues in his theory of the Lordship and Bondage that “Lords” externalize into the 
bondsmen those parts of themselves which they do not acknowledge as belonging to 
themselves. The Lords “labour” the refuted yet necessary parts of themselves through the  
bondsmen.  This seems to happen in Hegel´s own philosophy through the “labour” done by  
the women and the Family.  What are the features which Hegel considers important yet which 
he does not want to situate into “subjects”,  into the “rational manhood” or into the  rational 
state? Looking at his theory of the importance of the Spirit of the Youth it appears that Hegel 
labours the Spirit of “individuality” and “immediacy” (i.e. the incapability to mediate between 
the self and the contradicting other) through women. The Youth are immature as they live in 
an ambivalent realm between femininity and the proper male humanity. Raised by the 
Penatean women, the Youth cannot unite contradicting thoughts concerning the nation, 
instead, they can accept only one individual thought concerning the nation. In Hegel, this kind 
of “individual” attitude toward a political whole (a nation) is important as concerns the 
historical dialectics of political wholes..    
 
Hegel hence seems to labour “political pathos” (an “either-or” attitude) through women. 
Families produce forever new generations of Youths who - at each historical level in the 
development of the nation -  cannot tolerate contradicting thoughts concerning the nation. In 
the “either-or” attitude the contradicting thoughts are not united through dialectical sublation 
(negation and preservation) in which the both thoughts are both preserved and changed.  
Instead, in the immediate (feminine) “either-or” attitude (resembling the one of “Desire” in 
the dialectics of subjective consciousness),  the other thought is preserved unchanged and the 
other thought is rejected. Because the Youth will always be raised up in the “Penatean” spirit 
of the family,  the development of the nation will always require wars (a sort of “struggle for 
recognition” at the level of political wholes). Because the women will always equip the Youth 
with an attitude of Pathos/”Desire” towards contradicting other political thoughts (of the 
nation), historical movement of the nation will always take place through relations of 
Pathos/Desire (lack of reciprocal recognition between different political groups) and, 
consequently, through wars.  
 
It appears that in Hegel´s philosophy women “labour”  individual  “Penatean” political 
mentality. For Hegel, the women will always admire the “brave youth” and raise young male 
children to be “Penatean”, because they do not  appreciate mature manhood and rationality.  
Women and  the  realm of  family  stays  forever  same in  this  sense.     It  appears  that  Hegel´s  
views of the national state as an individual entity which has a restricted capacity to go over its 
individual limits (for example, Philosophy of Right, § 330-340 where Hegel rejects Kant’s 
peace plan), into a more “global”  governmental level,  is rooted in his theory of the Family 
Spirit as an element of the national state. These less appealing aspects of Hegel’s philosophy 
–  the  degrading  treatment  of  women  and  the  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  system  of  nation-
states – seem to be interconnected.  
 
Also the  family bonds of love, where the parties do not relate to each other rationally,  
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instead where the they are “totally devoted to each other” seems something which Hegel 
labours through women. Hegel says that the husband is not this particular husband for  his  
wife, instead, the only husband in the universe.     
   
It is important to see that Hegel and his fellow philosophical “we” in PhS render all those 
dualisms (relations of Lordship and Bondage) which they themselves are conscious of into 
conceptually  mediated   parts  of  the   subject   and  also  as  parts  of  the  rational  society.  The  
bondage of women does not belong to these dualisms. Thus it seems that Hegel was unable to 
recognize how his view on women violated against the very principles he formulated in PhS.  
It is however also important to remember that Hegel lived in times when women were (in all 
European nations as well  as globally) confined into the family and set  under the custody of 
their male relatives.  Most thinkers in Hegel´s times shared Hegel´s views on women and the 
Family.  In this sense, Hegel is clearly a child of his time. 
133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Two French interpretations of Hegel 
 
3.1. Alexandre Kojève 
 
3.1.1. The Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel  
 
 
Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève´s lectures on Hegel, delivered  in 1933-39 in 
France,   had a major influence on how some of the most prominent contemporary  
philosophers -  including many feminists - interpret Hegel (on this influence, see e.g. Weir 
1996, 1-32; Grosz 1989, 1-6, 9;  Williams 1997, 380-9; Hutchings 2003, 61-4, 70-2, 102). 
These lectures have been edited and published as Introduction to the Reading of Hegel; 
originally in French, 1947. Especially Kojève´s interpretation of Hegel’s realm of the self-
conscious Spirit as the End of History has become famous. In France, Kojève’s interpretation 
has been enormously influential, although often unacknowledged. He has actually been 
considered the one (besides Jean Hyppolite) who made  Hegel known in France, at a time 
when there was little interest in Hegel in France.  It has not only had an influence on the way 
Hegel is read, but on many other substantive issues as well. Stuart Barnett (1998) writes: 
 
The impact of the Hegelianism fostered by Kojève also manifested itself in a 
preoccupation with certain issues, with a certain state and method of inquiry. In 
this sense, this impact was to have a far-reaching consequences. Indeed, we still 
live in the thrall of this brand of Hegelianism. (p. 19-20) 
 
Butler is clearly influenced by the French tradition which reads Hegel through Kojève. 
According to this tradition, all particular subject-identities – and in general all 
particularizations of things – denote a repressive attitude toward others. Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray and Jacques Derrida 
among others have been influenced by this tradition.   This has been discussed by e.g. by 
Allison Weir (1996; see Weir’s discussion of Butler as a thinker influenced by the same 
tradition as e.g. Sartre, de Beauvoir, Lacan etc. pp. 112-134 ). Stuart Barnett remarks that the 
structuralist and post-structuralist critique of Hegel in France was also conducted under 
Kojève’s continuous influence: 
    
Hence, within Kojève’s Hegel were the very seeds to this wave of anti-
Hegelianisms. In the final analysis, perhaps one version of Hegel was 
confronting another in the philosophical sea change of the late 1960’s. (p. 21-
22) 
 
Thus, the anti-Hegelian arguments put forth by Levinas, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard etc. have 
largely been made within the interpretative framework established by Alexandre Kojève (see 
also SD;  Descombes 1998; Williams 1997, ch. 15). 
 
In 1943, Kojève wrote another Hegel-inspired work, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, 
which, however, remained unpublished until 1981. It is a rich and complex work in which 
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recognition has a central role. However, Kojève’s influence is almost entirely based on his 
lectures and on their published version. Therefore, Kojève’s Outline is largely ignored in this 
study, although as a philosophical and political work, it may be even more interesting than his 
Introduction. 
 
Judith Butler analyzes Kojève´s interpretation of Hegel in SD. She sees it as one possible 
interpretation, and says that she does not intend to enter into a debate of whether it is right or  
wrong (SD,73). However, she notices that Kojève departs from Hegel at some important 
points; for example she claims that Kojève emphasizes the individual and abstract aspects of 
the self over the collective aspects more than Hegel´s original theory does. She also notes that 
Kojève´s normative idea of “democratic Marxist” collective individuality,  based on his 
interpretation  of  Hegel,  appears  as  a  disembodied  project   which  suffers  from  
abstractivity.(SD 78) 
 
Butler writes that Kojève “halts” Hegel´s Phenomenology at the end of Lordship and 
Bondage. She apparently refers to the end of historical movement, which Kojeve sees to take 
place when the realm of Desire (i.e. Master-Slave-system) comes to its end, preceding the 
entrance  into  free  self-consciousness  and  reciprocal  recognition.  In  SD  Butler  does  not  yet  
develop her own subject-theory or political theory. Instead, she focuses on analyzing how 
Hegel has influenced the subject-theories of other thinkers, like e.g. Kojève.  In her later 
works it becomes clear that the Kojèvian way to halt the historical and political movement of 
the subject by the subject’s entering  reciprocally recognitive relationships with others 
structures  also  Butler´s  own  subject-theory  and  political  theory.   In  her  later  works,  e.g.  in  
PLP (51-53)  CHU (12,174), Butler (1995a,38-54), Butler (1995b 130-131) and BM (113-
116)  she  criticises  the  Hegel’s  theory  of   reciprocally  recognitive  subjects  for  its  way  to  
internalize its outside as a differential part of itself, hence ending historical movement and 
radical politics. Butler says that – as concerns her won subject-theory - she  suspends the 
narrative in  PhS before its resolution into the realm of free self-consciousness (PLP 34, 51-
53) and continues, henceforth, through what she calls as the “Althusserian reversal of Hegel”. 
It is argued in this study that the background to Butler’s  Althusserian reversal of Hegel lies in 
her Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel.  (These themes are discussed  further in ch. 5. )  
 
Butler’s analyses in  SD show that the prominent French philosophers, which she analyses, 
have been influenced by the Kojèvian reading of Hegel, even that Butler herself does not  
identify this tradition as specifically Kojèvian. Nevertheless, her descriptions of the theories 
of the Hegelian-inflected thinkers like Sartre, Lacan and Foucault show that all these thinkers 
include a few fundamental Kojèvian ideas into their subject-theories. For example, they 
regard Hegel’s free society (of the reciprocally recognitive relations) as a non-political, static 
realm where the subject is in an utopian, self-satisfied identity with I’s object and where there 
is  no contradicting outside or Other,  which could change the subject.   In these theories  this 
supposedly Hegelian utopia  is opposed by a heterogenuous, dynamic realm which is not 
conceptually coherent but complex, political and changeable.  In this realm there still exist 
contradicting Others for the subject. The subject represses and excludes the Others. However, 
the repressed and excluded others enable the subject to change. The subject remains 
conceptually incoherent, and does not manage to conceptualize itself, or the Other, in a 
satisfactory  way,  even  that  this  is  what  it  ceaselessly  “desires”  to  do.   The  conceptual  
alternatives posed by these thinkers  are, then, a static Utopia and continuous misrecognition, 
repression and struggle.  Kojève’s way to emphasize the Lordship and Bondage-section in 
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PhS makes the contrast between the struggle and the end-state as central, and when the end-
state is abandoned, what remains is the conflictual aspect of Hegel’s theory, including the 
“necessary errors” of the one-sided forms of consciousness. This tradition of reading Hegel 
has influenced, especially through psychoanalytical thinkers like Lacan, the mode of thought 
which is called as French post-structuralism or “postmodernism”. It has influenced also the 
radical democratic theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe  (see ch. 6). 
 
According to my knowledge, no-one has so far compared these two Hegelian thinkers, Kojève 
and Butler,  in detail. In chapter 5.  I try to show that there is indeed a certain fundamental 
similarity  in  their  interpretations  of  Hegel´s  realm  of  free  self-consciousness  and  reciprocal  
recognition. Their normative attitudes towards this realm are nevertheless fundamentally 
different. Butler does not think that this realm is either possible or desirable.  For Butler, the 
Hegelian (or, actually Kojèvian) free self-consciousness and its realization as the “universally 
homogeneous State” are not appealing ideals . In this Butler thinks similar to e.g. Sartre and 
Foucault  who read Hegel through Kojèvian lenses. The main reason why Butler rejects the 
Hegelian “free community” is that, for Butler,  there is no external, radical Other to it.  It has 
internalized its Other as a differential part of its own world.  Because there is no external 
(radical, contradicting) Other to it, it is un-political.    
 
Butler writes in SD that Kojève introduces the possibility that  historical  action (i.e.  political  
action) and metaphysical satisfaction may not imply each other mutually. Subjects will be 
constituted by “Desire” – implying a repressive attitude toward others - as long as there is 
politics and historical change. As will be explained in this chapter, both Kojève and Butler 
share that kind of interpretation of Hegel, according to which historical change and politics  
belong  to  the  realm  of  Desire  and  that  these  activities  end  in  the  realm  of  free  self-
consciousness and reciprocal recognition. When the subject receives a universal recognition 
(from all possible other points of views)  for its own self-knowledge, which is what it desires, 
the  realm  of  Desire  (and,  Master-Slave-relations)  comes  to  its  end.  The  subject  becomes  
satisfied, which means that history and politics ends. Butler shares with Kojève the idea that 
political action includes “slavery” as its necessary element (argued in detail in ch.5).
  
 
For Kojève, the Hegelian subject is ultimately an Individual in the sense of being a fully self-
determining being.  This Individual is a “free nothingness”, in the sense that it can overcome 
any restrictions (as particular identities) placed upon it by time, history, culture and other 
selves.  In PhS this self gradually becomes and realizes what  it  is,   i.e.  it  becomes  a  free  
nothingness, which it always is. It becomes  recognized as a free nothingness for itself and for 
all  others,  and  finds  its  realization  as  the  universal homogeneous State, a sociality between 
free Individuals.   
 
For Kojève, in Hegel´s realm of free self-consciousness  (free Individuality) the subject has 
turned everything that is external to it into internal features of itself. It has realized that it is 
fundamentally  a  sort  of  a  “free  nothingness”,  as  it  is  not  restricted  externally  (outside  of  its  
own free choice-making) by any otherness. It sees itself as a negating power, an 
individualistic mover, who strives to “negate” or question every limit - as substance or as a 
particular identity - it comes across.    
 
Kojève writes about the activity of “negation” in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: 
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But thanks to negativity, an identical Being can negate or overcome its identity 
with itself and become other than it is, even its own opposite. In other words, the 
negating being, far from necessarily “representing” or “showing” (as a 
“phenomenon”) its given identical “idea” or “nature”, can negate them itself and 
become opposite to them (that is, “perverted”). Or again, the negating being can 
break the rigid ties of the fixed “differences” that distinguish it from the other 
identical beings (by “freeing” itself from these ties); it can leave the place that 
was assigned to it in the Cosmos. In short (as Hegel puts it in the first edition of 
the Logik), the being of negative or negating Being, dominated by the category 
of Negativity, consists in “not being what it is and being what it is not”  (IRH, 
200) 
 
 
In this interpretation, the particular, context-dependent, historical and limited subject turns 
into an un-limited Individual in the realm of self-conscious Spirit. The “end  of history” is the 
realm of an individual who is universally free from any limits pressed externally upon it. 
Being determined as a particular subject would mean for Kojève that the subject continues to 
be determined externally, i.e. enslaved and limited by external otherness.  This is the case 
during its historical movement, preceding the realm of self-conscious Spirit.  
 
Kojève writes about the historical process as the progress of emancipation: 
 
Generally,  speaking,  it  is  the  Slave,  and  only  he,  who  can  realize  a  progress,  
who can go beyond the given and – in particular - the given that he himself 
is….; possessing the idea of Freedom and not being free, he is led to transform 
the given (social) conditions of his existence – that is, to realize a historical 
progress. (IRH 50)  
 
 
In the realm of free self-consciousness the selves acknowledge themselves and each others as 
Individual free nothingnesses;  consequently  slavery has ended. The realm of free self-
consciousness is the realm of realized unlimited individuality. For Kojève, unlimited 
individuality in its actuality means the same as reciprocal recognition. Reciprocal recognition 
means  that   nobody  questions  the  validity  of,  or  sets  external  criteria  to,  the  universal  
knowledge of itself or any one of the others. By reciprocal recognition, the Individual, which 
is a free nothingness, is recognized as such, and thus there is no need for the active labor of 
negation any more, at least in any conflictual way.  Because there remains no piece of “other 
knowledge” -  knowledge which is set beyond the selves own knowledge -  which is used as a 
normative  criteria  or  standard   in  reference  to  which  the  self-knowledge  of  any  one  of  the  
selves  would  be  measured,   there  is  no  need  for  conflicts  between  any  oppositions.  
Oppositions are not needed. When the selves cease to “know” themselves and others on the 
basis  of  the  Master-Slave-division,  there  are  no  more  reasons  for  conflicts.  Historical  
movement, as conflictual,  is thus seen to belong to the realm of one-sided recognition, i.e. to 
the realm of  Master-Slave- relationships and Master-Slave-based epistemology.  (IRH, 224-
226) 
 
For Kojève, a total self-knowing and perfectly free self-consciousness, which is not divided 
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into the Master-Slave-system of knowledge, takes place as the philosophical “Wise Man”. In 
fact, the Wise Man is Hegel himself. Kojève writes: 
 
To be perfectly and completely self-conscious is to have at one´s disposal – at 
least virtually - an encyclopaedic knowledge in the full sense of the word. In 
defining  the  Wise  Man,  the  Man  of  absolute  Knowledge,  as  perfectly  self-
conscious –i.e. omniscient, at least potentially – Hegel nevertheless had the 
unheard-of audacity to assert that he realized Wisdom in his own person. (IRH, 
76) 
 
For Kojève, in the realm of reciprocal recognition there is no need for conflicts because all the 
selves have been now granted the universal recognition (as a fully self-Mastering individual) 
which is what the (earlier) fights between the selves were all about. Fights with others were 
also always internal conflicts, i.e. self-contradictions, based on the Master-Slave-divided 
thinking and knowledge. Hence the historical movement was not conflictual only between the 
individual selves, but also self-conflictual, inside the selves. It was motivated by the strive to 
become free from slavery, i.e. the desire for reciprocal recognition,  which was also a desire to 
become free from Master-Slave-based epistemology.  Because finally the self has (as a free 
individual)  become conscious of all the knowledge which is formative of itself - historically, 
presently and futurally - and because its knowledge of itself has gained universal recognition, 
the selves are freed from that inner pull or desire, which caused the conflicts. There are no 
restrictions for the free Individuality of everybody and so there are no restrictions which could 
be removed by further political action. One may summarize that because there is no slavery, 
there is no historical movement, and no politics in the Hegelian realm of free self-
consciousness (interpreted in the Kojèvian manner).  
 
It is also a part of the Kojèvian-Marxist inheritance to emphasize the violent nature of these 
struggles for recognition thus making Hegel to look both as a successor of Machiavelli and a 
predecessor of Marx. Politics is a struggle for recognition, and this struggle is conducted in 
terms of oppression, rebellion and war. Indeed, Williams (1997, 11) claims that “for Kojève, 
recognition is synonymous with the unequal recognition of master and slave”. This, however, 
is not quite true. As shown above, Kojève has a notion of universal recognition, but he 
equates it with the End of History and the disappearance of all (significant) differences. It is, 
however, true that Kojève sees the struggle for life and death as an inevitable stage which 
precedes recognition. Against this, Williams reminds that for Hegel, love is one possible form 
of recognition (idem.).  (Also Hegel, in his Encyclopaedia, limited the violent struggle for life 
and death to the “primitive state of mankind”).  
 
The desire behind the conflicts was always the desire for freedom, which did not yet exist. It 
was a desire on the part of the enslaved, un-speakable, non-existent universals (which were 
forced to produce, or materialize the existence of others, not the existence of themselves) to 
be included into the domain of those who “speak for themselves”.  Only slaves can desire 
freedom (i.e. to be able to be the free nothingnesses, which they ultimately are)  because they 
do not have it. Yet, when they are granted what they desire, they cease to be slaves and they 
do not fight with their oppressors any more (as there are no oppressors either).   As such, they 
are  fully  satisfied  with  the  way  they  are  known.   The  historical  movement,  stirred  also  by  
epistemological slavery, meant that there was a constant struggle over what is the universal 
truth about the subject.   
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The desire to become free from being “externally known” and being externally mastered  is 
the goal which makes the slaved selves (i.e. the slaved universals) to transform both the way 
they are “known” and also the way their self-knowledge is realized at the social level, as the 
state.  The enslaved selves transform their self-knowledge until finally they include all 
otherness into them, and thus become free, satisfied and non-conflictual. As long as there is 
an   external  otherness,  there  is  a  desire  towards  the  overcoming  of  this  otherness  (as  a  
restriction) . As long as there is external otherness (slavery)  there is a possibility for the 
selves  to  become  other,  different  (in  a  contradicting,  radical  way)  than  what  they  are  now.   
However, when all otherness becomes overcome and included into the self, the self (i.e. its 
self-knowledge and its reality as the State) cannot become other,  i.e. it cannot change, move. 
This Kojèvian interpretation of slavery as a necessary element in historical and political 
movement appears also in Butler´s subject-theory (IRH 90, 98, 191; see also e.g. BM 113-116 
and ES 89-92), how Butler interprets the role of “external and repressed otherness” in 
political movement,  similarly with Kojève)       
 
For  Kojève,  the  “total  wisdom”  of  the  Wise  Man  or  any  totally  free  self-consciousness  
corresponds with  the idea of the “universal homogeneous State”. The absolute knowing, 
practiced by the free self-consciousnesses in the free State, has no particular, historical 
character.  It cannot change or be enriched. There are also no differences in the knowledge, 
possessed by the individual self-consciousnesses. The “free nothingness”, which the Kojèvian 
free Individual is, cannot be differentiated (as regards its particular substance or self-identity) 
from the other free Individuals. If there were any such differentiation, there would also be the 
Master-Slave-distinction. Any differentiation would mean that there would be some “higher” 
system of internal differentiation (above the Individuals) on the basis of which such 
differentiation would be possible. Kojeve explains this also in the following way: 
 
We have seen that perfect self-consciousness equals omniscience. In other 
words, the Wise Man´s knowledge is total, the Wise man reveals the totality of 
Being through the entirety of his thought. Now, since Being obeys the principle 
of identity to itself, there is only one unique totality of Being, and consequently 
only one unique knowledge that reveals it entirely. Therefore there is only one 
unique possible type of (conscious) wisdom. (IRH 81)  
 
 
Unlimited free individuality is thus realized through reciprocal recognition for Kojève. It 
gains its objectivity as a universal state which recognizes the free, equal individuality of all its 
members. This state cannot be an internally differentiating whole because that would mean 
that the state does not recognize the full freedom of its citizens. If the state would place some 
system of particular identification above the Individuals, it would mean that all the 
Individuals were not recognized as fully free, yet instead slaved and restricted by this “higher 
knowledge”.  
 
Elsewhere in his Introduction, Kojève says that at the End of History “no divergence of 
opinion is possible”, among the Wise Men (IRH 98). Indeed,  “the Wise Man is no longer 
“individual” in the sense that he would be different from all others” (p.238). The End of 
History means also that  “Man” disappears. Kojève writes about this: 
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The disappearance of Man in the end of History, therefore, is not a cosmic 
catastrophe; the natural World remains what it has been from all eternity. And 
therefore, it is not a biological catastrophe either: Man remains alive as animal 
in harmony with Nature or given Being. What disappears is Man properly so 
called – that is, Action negating the given, and Error, or in general, the Subject 
opposed to the Object. In point of fact, the end of human Time or History – that 
is,  the  definitive  annihilation  of  Man  properly  so-called  or  of  the  free  and  
historical individual – means quite simply the cessation of Action in the full 
sense of the term. Practically, this means: the disappearance of wars and bloody 
revolutions. And also the disappearance of Philosophy; for since Man himself 
no longer changes essentially, there is no longer any reason to change the (true) 
principles  which  are  at  the  basis  of  his  understanding  of  the  World  and  of  
himself. (IRH 158-159)  
 
 
The  Wise  Man ceases  to  be  a  subject,  opposed  to  the  Object.  This  means  that   all  possible  
interpretations of the terms, by which the Wise Man “reads” its object are taken as equally 
valid.  There  is  no  normative  standard,  no  limits,  to  what  words  mean.  This  means  that   the  
Wise Man ceases to read objects from some specific point of view, i.e. from historically, 
culturally limited subject-positions. Limited subject-positions were part of the Master-Slave-
distinction. The Wise Man does not  see “objects” at all.  Objects do not exist for it, as there is 
no differential system on the basis of which objects would be defined, formed or “produced” 
for  it.  The  Wise  Man  is  in  an  immediate  harmony  with  its  object,  alike  the  nature  is  “one”  
with itself.  In this sense, the self-relationality, self-reflectivity and internal doubleness of 
thinking disappears. There is no mediation in the Hegelian sense of the term: the world is not 
understood through something else than itself. The self-reflective structure of thinking 
disappears as there is no differentiation between the self and the other for the thinker itself any 
more.   This means that the selves see themselves and each others as free nothingnesses, not 
as particular men.  Because there is nothing to be known above or beyond the knowing of the 
individuals themselves, there is nothing which could question or be used as a criteria to 
measure the knowledge of  or the meaning of the words used by,  the individuals. (IRH 190-
194).  
 
Kojève writes: 
 
This means that Hegel´s discourse exhausts all the possibilities of thought. One 
cannot bring up any discourse in opposition to him which would not already be 
a part of his own discourse, which would not be reproduced in a paragraph of 
the System as a constituent element (Moment) of the whole. Thus we see that 
Hegel´s  discourse  sets  forth  an  absolute truth, which cannot be negated by 
anyone. And therefore we see that this discourse is not dialectical, in the sense 
that it is not a “thesis” that can be “dialectically overcome” (ibid. 194) 
 
For Kojève, disagreements  concerning the “universal truth” belong to the realm of 
epistemological slavery. When all interpretations of the universal are approved by everyone, 
there cannot be opposing parties, conflicts over the content of the universal. As said earlier, 
there are no differences of opinion between the Wise Men. The Wise Man is an un-
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differentiated (i.e. un-limited, absolute) individual.  There are no particular, limited universals 
(i.e. particular selves) anymore. Particular universals are always parochial universals and thus, 
for Kojève, they belong to the  Master-Slave-system.   
 
Therefore Man, even as a philosopher, is definitively satisfied by the adequate 
description of the real in its totality which is given by the science of the Wise 
Man: hence he will never again oppose what has been said by the Wise Man, 
just as the Wise Man  no longer opposed the real which he was describing. Thus 
the Wise Man´s non-dialectical (i.e. non-negating) description will the absolute 
truth, which will engender no philosophical “dialectic” and will never be a 
“thesis” against which an antithesis will come in opposition. (IRH 192) 
 
 
Kojève nevertheless says that the Wise Man does not become an animal in the End of History.  
He continues to speak and to think. However, as he does not negate for himself any more (i.e. 
he does not “read” or see particular objects any more, as he has ceased to look at things from 
any specific point of view) he does not identify with particular identities any more. He does 
not see himself, or the other free selves, as particular men. It appears that to the extent that the 
Wise Man speaks and thinks by particular words, the particular substance of the words is 
something fully external for him, in the sense, that  he does not identify with particularity any 
more. Identifying with particularities belongs to the realm of dependency (non-freedom), 
slavery and history. (ibid. 220, 238) 
 
In Kojève, reciprocally recognitive selves are for themselves and for each others first and 
foremost free nothingnesses. This means that their sociality as “shared knowledge” makes up 
a non-particular, non-differentiating, “non-positionalizing” whole.  The self-knowledge of 
these “nothingnesses” can not be synthesized into a particular whole, as they do not see 
themselves or others as particulars. Nor can there be any expectation for them of finding the 
“truth”  of  themselves,  at  least  as  a  truth  with  a  particular  substance  to  it.      Freedom from 
being externally determined and enslaved means for Kojève that the individuals are not 
determined by any such collective knowledge, which would mediate their self-knowledge as a 
part of a particular whole. Further, freedom in practice takes place as a making of free 
choices, which are not restricted by any external determination. These choices take place, in a 
Sartrean vein (influenced by Kojève), not as rationally determined before-hand by some 
particular subject as their agent, but instead at the moment of “now”. They actualize at the 
moment they are done.   Freedom is an activity of making choices which are not determined 
outside the actual activity itself.    
 
As is explicated in chapter 2.1,7., Hegel´s subject gathers together its epistemological parts 
and meets, in a way,  its “universal knower” or “truth” in the end of PhS. Hegel also says that 
the subject comes to know its otherness as an internal otherness. The otherness, which moved 
and changed the subject “from outside” is thus turned (in reciprocally recognitive 
relationships) into an internal otherness, which knows and changes the subject internally, self-
consciously, in a conceptually mediated way.   For Kojève, this means that the dialectical 
history and the process in which the self becomes other to itself ends.  Because the subject 
mediates conceptually between itself and the Other, the history of its changing self-
knowledge meets its end. Both Butler in SD (77) and Williams (1997, 12) see Kojève’s 
interpretation as an affirmation of “liberal individualism”. Given the homogenous, static 
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nature of his final state described above, this judgment can be accepted only with 
qualifications. Ultimately, his final state is a version of the communist utopia, although, as in 
Marx, it can be reached only through the extreme individualism of the modern capitalist state. 
The outlook of Kojève’s unpublished study on law, OPR, is much more individualistic. There, 
the “universal homogeneous State” is conceived as legally regulated state where all conflicts 
between individuals and groups can be mediated through a legal “third”. Thus, law is 
supposed to replace politics. Although all differences are not supposed to disappear in this 
version of the End of History, OPR preserves the two fundamental theses of Kojève’s theory: 
history can be interpreted as a struggle for recognition, and the final stage of history is the 
emergence a fundamentally apolitical world. It is difficult to say which version of the End of 
History thesis represents Kojève’s more mature thinking. Although OPR was written in 1943, 
four years after Kojève’s famous lecture-sessions, he left OPR unpublished, but authorized 
the publication of his lecture-notes (IRH), and added some comments to them, including a 
long footnote in which he describes the End of History. In any case, the version of the thesis 
presented in IRH is the one which has really been influential.        
 
For Kojève, the historical movement continues because, and as long as, the subjects desire for 
recognition but remain dissatisfied. However, any time when they are recognized, this 
recognition takes place in some historical, social situation in which the subject is also seen as 
an object, i.e. identified as “this particular man here”. Such recognition (i.e. being also 
identified as a particular man) does not satisfy the subject’s need, which ultimately is to be  
recognized as a universal Individual, i.e. a free nothingness. The desire for satisfactory 
recognition can be satisfied only in the universal homogeneous State, in a community of Wise 
Men, which is a community of universal  Individuals, not of particular men.  In IRH Kojève 
argues that men cannot be satisfied through being recognized through civil law (as always a 
particular civil law) nor by their political existence.  For Kojève, when recognition is 
facilitated by some particular identification of the subjects involved, the recognition cannot be 
free and universal and hence not satisfactory. (In OPR, however, legal recognition has a 
fundamental role.) 
 
Kojève writes:  
 
In fact, Individuality can be fully realized, the desire for Recognition can be 
completely satisfied, only in and by the universal homogeneous State.   For, in 
the homogeneous State, the specific-differences” (Besonderenheiten) of  class,  
race, and so on are “overcome”, and therefore this State is directly related to the 
particular man as such, who is recognized as citizen in his very particularity. 
And this recognition is truly universal, for, by definition, the State embraces the 
whole of the human race (even in its past, through the total historical tradition 
which this State perpetuates in the present; and in its future, since henceforth the 
future no longer differs from the present in which Man is already fully satisfied). 
By fully realizing Individuality, the universal and homogeneous State completes 
History, since Man, satisfied in and by this State, will not be tempted to negate it 
and thus to create something new in its place. But this State also presupposes 
that the totality of the historical process has gone by, and cannot be realized by 
Man from the outset (for the State, and Man himself, are born from the Fight, 
which presupposes a difference and cannot take place in universal 
homogeneity). (IRH 237) 
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3.1.2. Kojève´s “dual ontology” and the rejection of Hegel´s philosophy of Nature 
 
 
As will be explained in this chapter, Nature is a necessary part of the Hegelian “triplicity of 
knowing”.   Kojève´s specific interpretation of Hegel is in important ways based on his 
rejection of Hegel´s philosophy of Nature. Because Kojève  rejects  nature as something 
conceptual and dialectical, he ends up rejecting also Hegel´s triplicity of knowing. As such, 
for Kojève, there is no particular theory (“third”) which could connect the self and the other, 
or, the Wise Men, together as particular beings.  
 
Kojève´s distinction between a free self-identity (i.e. the Wise Man´s self-identity),  and an 
un-free, historical self-identity  is theorized by him also as the “dual ontology” between the 
historical and political realm (a limited, particular self-identity) and nature (immanent self-
identity).  
 An important part of the Kojèvian reading of Hegel is his rejection of Hegel´s dialectics of 
“nature” or “substance”.  Kojève argues that a truly faithful interpretation of Hegel demands 
the rejection of Hegel´s idea that nature is something conceptual and takes part in dialectics.  
Kojève adheres to what he calls a “dualist ontology”. He sees that the nature or the real in its 
totality is something merely “positive”, in immediate identity with itself.  Whereas Nature 
denotes  the  realm  of  immanent  self-identity,  the  thinking  selves  denote  the  realm  of  the  
conceptually mediated self-identity, the “negative”. The conceptual selves are not fully self-
identical.  However, that is what they desire. In the realm of the negative, selves strive after 
freedom, denoted ultimately by the full self-identity, i.e. the immanent self-identity. As was 
explained earlier in this chapter on Kojève, when selves know themselves fully and freely,  
they have a similar self-identity like the Nature has. They have an  immanent identity with 
themselves.   (IRH, 216-217)        
 
For Kojève, a truthful interpretation of Hegel means that an ontological  distinction is made 
between, on the one hand,  the phenomenological realm, denoting negativity, dialectics and 
history, and, on the other hand, the non-dialectical realm of the self-identical Nature. In fact, a 
part of Nature belongs to the realm of the negative and part of it belongs to the realm of 
immanence, full self-identity. A distinction is made between the appearing 
(phenomenological) nature and the non-appearing (non-phenomenological) nature. Nature as 
an appearing Nature belongs to the synthesis of Spirit and it is delineated in conceptual 
thought.    Kojève sees that the appearing Nature (e.g. natural sciences) takes part in history 
and dialectics.  
 
 
What is dialectical, according to Hegel, is the concrete Real – that is, Totality or 
the total Synthesis, or, better, Spirit. In other words, it is not given Being (Sein) 
itself that has a dialectical structure, but revealed Being (Begriff). Now, revealed 
Being implies, on the onological level, two constituent elements: Being as 
revealed (Identity,  Thesis)  and  Being  as  revealing (Negativity, Antithesis). 
Consequently, on the metaphysical level, two Worlds must be distinguished, 
which are inseparable but essentially different: the natural World and the 
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historical or human World. Finally, the phenomenological level os constituted 
by the reflection of natural empirical existence (external Consciousness, 
Bewusstsein), which is in turn reflected in itself (Self-consciousness, 
Selbstbewusstsein). Now Hegel expressly says that Negativity is the specifically 
dialectical constituent element. Identity is not at all dialectical, and if Totality is 
dialectical, it is only because it implies Negativity. Moving from this ontological 
level to the metaphysical level, one would then have to say that the Real is 
dialectical only because the natural world implies a human World, Nature being 
not at all dialectical in itself.  (IRH, 216)  
 
 
Kojève sees that the total nature is divided into two worlds  – to the conceptual one which 
appears for us – and which takes part in the dialectical movement. The other part, or actually 
the full totality in itself, is not dialectical.  
 
In fact, what Kojève says about nature is not all in contrast to what Hegel says. Also Hegel 
says that some natural aspects like “death” constitute an absolute difference for us as 
particular  beings,  something  which  sets  a  non-conceptual  limit  for  us.  What  is  however  
important here in what Kojève says about the self-identity of nature is that this kind of non-
conceptual self-identity is something what selves strive after, and, which they reach in the 
realm of satisfaction, i.e. free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition.  However, the 
interpretation of Hegel, supported in this study, contrasts with the Kojèvian interpretation. 
According to how Hegel is interpreted here, Hegel does not argue that subjects become 
satisfied when their particular subjectivity disappears. The realm of free self-consciousness 
and reciprocal recognition denotes a conceptual, internally differentiated  realm. This is also 
emphasized in Taylors reading of Hegel (see e.g. Taylor 1975, 76-79, 214-221). It was utterly 
important for Hegel to preserve the internal conceptuality and differentiations of Being, 
which, in Kojève´s interpretation vanish, in the realm of the End of History.  
 
The idea that there are no “ontological dualities” (e.g. between a conceptual realm and nature) 
was important for Hegel. The background of  why Hegel repeatedly and strongly emphasized 
this can be understood on the basis of his insistent criticism against what he saw as the 
Enlightenment  dualism  (e.g.  Kant).  The  idea  was  to  state  that  all  dualities,  themselves,  are  
always thought dualities. They are particular, conceptual, self-relational constructions. They  
are also dialectical because they do not exist only for one (sovereign) self, instead for others 
too. (see also Taylor 1975 on this theme, pp. 76-80). 
 
Hegel argues that free, reciprocally recognitive selves identify with nature and see themselves, 
in a way, particularized and “known” by the nature.  Yet, at the same time, it is utterly 
important for Hegel to preserve the idea that the selves are free, self-determining (self-
particularizing) beings. The selves are not known by any such nature which is beyond them.  
Thus, the selves are not known (particularized, subjected) by anything which is not, in turn, 
known by the selves  (see about Hegel´s idea of the self as its own third, 2.1.5.).  How, then,  
is it possible that the selves can see themselves and others both as un-limited (not externally 
subjected) and as limited (subjected through the other) is theorized by Hegel as the self-
conscious triplicity of knowing. This is the same as Absolute Knowing.  Free, reciprocally 
recognitive selves know themselves, other selves and things in general by way of Absolute 
Knowing.  The triple construction of knowing takes place as an active rationality between its 
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parts,  so  that  the  parts,  in  a  way,   engage  in  reciprocal  rationalization  of  each  others.   The  
rational  triplicity  of  knowing–  as  the  connecting  third  party  -  enables  the  selves  to  see  
themselves, other selves and things as both limited (particular) and unlimited (not 
permanently known by any one party alone, as in dualities, e.g. in the “ordinary” subject-
object-relations).  Things are particularized and identified on the basis of a shared rationality, 
which is not “beyond” any one of its parts, because the triplicity is reciprocal.  Nature, 
material substance is, necessarily, a part of this triplicity, which Hegel repeatedly emphasizes.  
Further,  this  triplicity  of  knowing  –   the  way  things  are  particularized  in  the  realm  of  
reciprocal recognition - has its objectivity in the State, which, as is seen in the Philosophy of 
Right, is internally differentiated.  
 
In contrast to Hegel´s triplicity of knowing,  Kojève clings to an idea of “ontological duality”. 
Ontological  duality   is   important  also  for  some  other  philosophers,  like  Sartre,  whose  
distinction between “Being” and “Nothingness”  has been influenced by Kojève (Sartre 2001; 
see e. g. Descombes 1998, 48-54) . Also Lacan´s theory of the “Real” is influenced by the 
Kojèvian reading of the Hegelian self as an internally multiple construction.  For Lacan, the 
ultimate,  full  self-identity  of  the  subject  -   which  he  calls   the  “Real”  -  cannot  be  reached  
conceptually, because that would denote an end to the linguistic subject. For Lacan, a full 
self-identity takes place as a state of psychosis. Psychosis denotes a realm of non-
communicative, absolute singularity and individuality, resembling the Kojèvian End of 
History, i.e. the realm of the Wise Man. (On Kojève’s influence on Lacan, see Roudinesco 
2006,  especially pp. 26-8, and Shepherdson 2006.)  
 
Kojève argues that some parts of  Hegel´s philosophy of Being are “erroneous”.  He sees that 
this error stems from Hegel´s “bourgeois, Schellingian imagination”.  In the next quotation, 
Kojeve criticises aspects of Hegel´s philosophy of Being, presented in Hegel´s  
Encyclopaedia and Logic:  
 
 
On the one hand, Hegel sets forth in it a metaphysics of Nature, in which Nature 
is described as a frankly dialectical reality having the same threefold structure as 
the human reality, which is described in the metaphysics of Man or of “Spirit”. 
On the other hand, in the Ontology itself, that is, in the Logik, Hegel does not, so 
to speak, take account of the fact that the total Being or the “Idea” (=Geist) 
which he is describing presents on the one hand a dialectical aspect, which 
transmits its dialectical character to the totality of Being,  but which is itself 
Action (Tun) and not Being (Sein), and on the other a fundamentally 
nondialectical aspect, which is static given-Being or natural Being. All this, in 
my opinion, is an error on Hegel´s part. (IRH, 217) 
 
 
It is apparent that Kojève treats in a trivial way something which for Hegel is a necessary part 
of conceptuality and dialectics. In fact, according to Hegel, if the full Being of things is not 
seen as something rationally and conceptually constituted (at least potentially, or ideally),  the 
thinking remains divided into the system of  Master and Slave. For Hegel, if the reality can be 
understood, it has to share the rational structure of thinking itself.  Kojève´s dualist ontology 
between the realm, which appears for us, and the realm which does not appear for us in itself  
resembles the Kantian distinction which Hegel criticised. For Hegel, the Kantian distinction 
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was the principle of pure self-consciousness.   
 
However, whereas Kant did not have any such utopia in his mind, where the distinction 
between the “thing for us” and “thing in itself” would disappear, Kojève indeed saw such 
utopia (the End of History) approaching us.  It seems that Kojève´s dual ontology has a 
temporal existence to it, as it seems to disappear in the End of History. This duality appears to 
belong to the realm of history.   In the realm of history and politics,  the selves are not fully 
self-identical, which means that they relate to themselves and others through conceptual, 
linguistic and dialectical mediation.  In the End of History the dual ontology apparently 
disappears as the selves become immanently self-identical, instead of being mediately 
(conceptually,  linguistically)  self-identical  any  more.   In  the  End  of  History,  the  selves  
become like Nature, fully self-identical, stable and non-political. In other words, the political 
realm disappears in the End of History.  The dual ontology takes place as long as there is the 
realm where the selves are not fully self-identical.  
 
Very importantly, the realm of conceptuality and limited (particular) self-identities is, for 
Kojève, also the  realm of necessary Master-Slave-distinctions. The selves strive to free 
themselves from the violent Master-Slave-relations, and for Kojeve this means also that the 
selves free themselves from conceptuality, politics, particular identities etc. It is, however, 
clear that for Hegel, history does not end to a “homogeneous universal State” which would 
erase all the differences between its citizens. Even a quick glance to his Philosophy of Right, 
or   Introduction to the philosophy of History reveals that the State envisaged by Hegel 
preserves all internal differences. Moreover, different nations have their own States. Hegel´s 
State is complex, plural and internally differentiated. Hence it appears as symptomatic that 
Kojève,  in  his  Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,  hardly  refers  to  Hegel´s  Philosophy of 
Right at all. When analysing identity and difference in general, Hegel says: 
 
It is important to come a proper understanding of the true meaning of Identity; 
and, for that purpose, we must especially guard against taking it as abstract 
Identity, to the exclusion of all Difference. That is the touchstone for 
distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of 
philosophy. (Enc. I, § 115, Zusatz)   
 
While Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel has many fascinating aspects, it is deeply problematic, 
both as an interpretation of PhS and as an independent philosophical view.  His interpretation 
of  Hegel  is  often  so  distorted  that  he  seems  to  be  using  “Hegel”  only  as  a  means  for  
expressing his own ideas. However, the self-referential nature of PhS, discussed in ch. 2, 
makes Kojève’s “End of History” more understandable, at least in one sense. For Hegel, 
history is the development of the Spirit, i.e. of human thinking. This development is 
essentially a growth of self-consciousness. Hegel’s own philosophy, as formulated in PhS, is a 
decisive contribution to this development, for it is, first time in history, able to tell us all this. 
Hegel is the first thinker who understands what Absolute knowing is, thus making it possible 
for others, too. According to Kojève, there can be no qualitatively new stages in the 
development of Spirit after Hegel’s invention. We only have to wait that this philosophy 
becomes shared by all. The fundamental mistake in this logically impeccable reasoning is 
Kojève’s supposition that Hegel’s Absolute knowing can be characterized as a static state, as 
a permanent state of mind which could be reached by individuals at some particular moment. 
According to the interpretation defended in this work, Absolute knowing is an ongoing 
146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
process, which requires the continuous co-existence of limited, partially conflicting 
viewpoints which interact and together produce absolute knowledge. What Ikäheimo says 
about certain other interpretations of Hegel seems to apply to Kojève´s, too: 
 
Does Hegel say that somehow after renouncing or sublating the particular 
determinations of consciousness the master and servant transform into 
consciousnesses which have nothing left of particularity? Do they transform into 
gods? No. Even if  certainly one point of universal self-consciousness (…) is to 
account for the fact that we can become habituated in thinking the world from a 
universal point of view, this does not mean that nothing of particularity would 
be  left.  The  point  is  only  that  on  a  cultivated  level  of  consciousness,  also this 
attitude is present. (Ikäheimo 2000, 85) 
 
To  this,  I  only  want  to  add  that,  for  finite  beings  who are  not  gods,  the  “universal  point  of  
view” is not a separate “viewpoint”, but rather their ability to take the other viewpoints into 
account.  
 
An analysis of Butler’s Kojèvian inheritance is discussed further in chapter 5. Before that 
another theorists, Louis Althusser,  is introduced, who has also influenced Butler’s thought. 
The two theorists, Kojève and Althusser, appear to be interconnected  as important theoretical 
figures in Butler’s thought. Butler’s  Kojèvian reading of Hegel in seen, in this study, to pave 
way to how Butler adheres to Althusser’s theory of Interpellation. A Kojèvian interpretation 
of Hegel is seen as the background of why Butler suspends Hegel’s narrative (in PhS) at the 
same point where Kojeve halts it (i.e. at the point where the Hegelian subject enters the “non-
political” realm of reciprocal recognition). A Kojèvian reading of Hegel prepares Butler for 
what will be later explained as Butler’s  “Althusserian reversal of Hegel” (see chapter 5.).  
First  Althusser’s  subject-theory  is  explained  in  a  more  general  manner,  in  the  next  sub-
chapter. 
 
 
3.2. Louis Althusser 
 
3.2.1. Althusser’s theory of interpellation 
 
Louis Althusser´s theory of the ideological, linguistic subject-formation is one of the major 
reference-points in Butler subject-theory. Althusser is primarily a Marxist theorist. However, 
he also intends to develop Marx´s theories.  He says, for example,  that Marx did not theorize  
sufficiently how fundamentally the subjects are formed by ideology. Althusser’s “structural-
psychoanalytic” Marxism is intended to give a more profound account of how ideology 
assumes a psychic and a linguistic or symbolic structure.  Althusser made his diploma-study 
(in 1948)  on Hegel, yet, later he became a severe critic of Hegel and of the Hegelian 
“subjectivist” influence in Marxism.  He rejects Hegel´s idea of subjects as epistemological 
totalities, i.e. capable of knowing themselves. Althusser develops his subject-theory in 
reference to theorists of psychoanalysis like Freud, but especially to Lacan. It may be argued 
that when the French thought turned against Hegel after the mid-60’s, Althusser’s influence 
was decisive.  However, many of his views can be fully understood only in the context of his 
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activities in the French Communist Party. His criticism of Hegel was related to his campaign 
against the “humanistic” tendencies which become more prominent among the Communists 
after the denunciation of Stalin in 1956 (on Althusser’s politics, see Elliott 1987). It was also 
related to his opposition to Sartre’s theory of the subject, inspired by Kojève and by 
Heidegger. According to Grosz (1989, 16), Althusser’s work has to a large extent fallen into 
disrepute; nevertheless she sees in Althusser a powerful, if reluctantly acknowledged source 
in the development of contemporary political theories of power (for example, of the theories 
formulated by Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe; see ch. 6).  
 
As is said already in this study, Butler claims to make an “Althusserian reversal of Hegel”. 
This reversal takes place at that point in PhS, when the Hegelian subject would otherwise 
conduct a “dialectical reversal” (as Butler puts it) and turn into a self-consciously mediated 
“third” in reciprocally recognitive relationships with others. Butler´s way to discuss 
Althusser´s  theory of Interpellation is in a way two-fold. Actually, Butler´s way to conduct 
an Althusserian reversal of Hegel is two-edged, as it becomes in turn reversed against 
Althusser as well.  After criticising Hegel through Althusser, Butler is quite quick to turn to 
criticise Althusser through Hegel.  
 
While Althusser purports to reject Hegel as well as the Hegelian Marxism of Alexandre 
Kojève, it is interesting that the Hegelian and Kojèvian elements actually enter to his system 
from a backdoor. As we shall see, Althusser’s subject-theory is largely based on Lacan, and 
Lacan himself was strongly influenced by Kojève. After studying Kojève’s seminars, he 
planned to write with Kojève a joint study on Hegel and Freud. It was never published, but 
Kojève’s survived draft contains some of the fundamental concepts later used by Lacan: the 
“I” as subject of desire; desire as revelation of the truth of being, and the ego as site of illusion 
and source of error. Under Kojève’s influence, Lacan abandoned the Freudian conception of 
desire as a biological phenomenon and replaced it with a Hegelian conception in which the 
desire is the original source of self-consciousness and takes the Other as its primary object 
(Roudinesco 2006, 28; Casey and Woody 1983, 80).  Like Hegel, Lacan maintained that the 
subject needs the Other in order to become a subject, and uses the Master-Slave dialectic as 
the model of human (individual) development. Like Kojéve, and unlike Hegel, Lacan sees 
aggressivity and struggle as an inevitable moment of this development. Like Kojève, Lacan 
sees human being as constituted by lack. (ver Eecke 1983; Casey and Woody 1983, 84-5). But 
Lacan rejects Hegel’s Absolute Knowing because, again under the influence of Kojève, he 
interprets it as a claim for “final insight” or “definitive version of truth” (Casey and Woody 
1963, 87).  Casey and Woody conclude their analysis of the Hegel-Lacan relationship with an 
interesting comment: 
 
Freud, the long-since-dead father of psychoanalysis, had already reached the 
reluctant conclusion that civilization and discontent are inseparable, that the 
subjection of man to culture foredooms him to what Hegel called “the unhappy 
consciousness”, the “consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely 
contradictory being” [PhS, p. 126]. Lacan reinforces Freud’s grim conclusion 
that the contradiction is insuperable, that history can promise no final 
reconciliation, no splendid synthesis, not even an arena of the attainment of 
authenticity; cuttings and splittings, human lives in tatters, are all that remain in 
this darkened vision. (Casey and Woody 1983, 111) 
 
148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to my analysis, this version of Unhappy Consciousness which emerges as a 
reaction  to  Kojève’s  one-sided  reading  of  Hegel,  is  transmitted  to  Althusser,  and  partly  
through him, to many other structuralist/poststructuralist thinkers.  
   
In this chapter I first give an account of Althusser’s theory of Interpellation. The theory of the 
interpellative formation of subjects is a part of a larger essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” (first published in 1970). I also explain Althusser´s distinction between 
“ideologically formed subjective knowledge” and “scientific objective knowledge”. This 
distinction is an important part of Althusser’s subject-theory.   An important element of 
Althusser´s “scientific Marxism” was its idea of science as knowledge above ideology and 
ideologically formed subjects.  Later I discuss Althusser´s relation to Butler´s theory of the 
ek-static self and the theory of performativity.   
 
According to Althusser the subject is formed when it is “hailed” or “called” by an 
authoritative “voice”. At that moment the not–yet-subject - called by Althusser a concrete  
individual - is made into a concrete subject.  
 
As a first formulation I shall say: all ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the 
subject; (...) I shall then suggest that ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a 
way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 
“transforms” the individuals into “subjects” (it transforms them all) by that very 
precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be 
imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) 
hailing “Hey, you there!”. (Ideol. 162-163) 
 
To be a subject means to be “positioned” by the linguistic system. In fact, by learning a 
language, the individual is both positioned as well as provided a position, a view-point, from 
which to look at itself, others, and the world in general.  Without this view-point, which is 
fundamentally what to be a subject means, the individual sees nothing.   
 
it is in the “Logos”, meaning in ideology, that we “live, move, and have our 
being”. It follows that, for you and for me, the category of the subject is a 
primary obviousness (obviousnesses are always primary)  (ibid.161) 
 
 
individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which 
necessarily leads us to one last proposition: individuals are always already 
subjects. Hence, individuals are “abstract” with respect to the subjects which 
they always-already are.  (ibid.164) 
 
For Althusser, we cannot “reach” ourselves as plain individuals – i.e. as non-ideological 
individuals -  “behind” ourselves as ideologically formed subjects. Any such “reaching” 
would necessarily take place linguistically, i.e. in ideological language.  In this sense, the 
individual as a not-yet-subject is an empty abstraction for us (as subjects).  Even an unborn 
child is appointed a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which 
it is “expected”. Althusser writes that “any familial ideological configuration is, in all its 
uniqueness, also highly structured”. (Ideol. 164-165)       
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When the subject learns to speak, it enters a realm of ideological system of communication. It  
receives an ideological  world-view, given to it by language, which is always already a social 
phenomenon. What is thought and spoken is always already ideological. Language - as 
always a social phenomenon - is also an ordering system of hierarchies, classifications, values 
etc.  The subject sees a world because it sees those things in it which can be described in the 
ideological language. It never just sees things; it always already sees the “order of things”.  It 
sees  what  things  are  valuable  and  what  things  are  not.  It  receives  an  idea  of  what  subjects  
should be like, never just what they are like.  The ideological subject-position as a view upon 
the world is not only descriptive, but also normative. Subject sees the very language, by 
which  it  thinks,   as the external world.  The subjects, their self-understanding, and the 
external  world,  which  they  see,   are  always  formed  by  an  ideological  power,  not  by  a  
language which just neutrally mirrors the extra-linguistic world as it is.  
 
For Althusser, subjects, as well as genders, and actual material things in general are effects of 
power (Ideol. 156,161). This very influential idea – of “things” being the results (in Hegelian 
words) or effects (in more contemporary words) of  subjective thinking can be traced back to 
Kant and Hegel. With Kant, thinking actively synthesizes thoughts (various material, 
including also bodily stimuli) into “things”. For Hegel, influenced clearly by Kant, “things” 
(including subjects themselves as particular, identifiable objects for themselves) are results of 
the active synthesizing “labour” of thinking.  This idea can be found in much of the 
contemporary thinking of subjectivity, e.g.  in the poststructuralist and postmodern thinking. 
This idea is central in the subject-theories of e.g. Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and Butler.  
 
Butler comments in PLP (PLP, 2-5, 34; see also SD) that Foucault, whom Butler classifies as 
a Hegelian-inflected thinker, is clearly influenced by Althusser’s subject-theory. Althusser´s 
subject-theory precedes Foucault´s subject-theory as Althusser published some of his central 
works already in the middle of the 1960´s. Both Althusser and Foucault are central points of 
reference in Butler´s own subject-theory. Butler modifies her basically Hegelian subject-
theory to a great extent in reference to both of them. However, the basic ideas, found with 
Foucault (who was Althusser’s student and a friend),  are already found with Althusser 
(except that Foucault does not adopt Althusser´s distinction between ideology and science, a 
theme discussed in the next sub-chapter).   
 
One of Foucault´s central  Althusserian ideas is that things (including subjects) are 
“discursive effects of power”.  Foucault receives this basically Hegelian idea through an 
Althusserian interpretation. For Foucault, in line with Althusser, power is seen to take place 
as language. Power as language – i.e. as a discourse - is never neutral but always normative, 
restrictive and repressive.  It produces subjects, yet, it also “subjects” (dominates and 
controls) the subjects.  Butler comments on the relation between Foucault and Althusser (e.g. 
in PLP) that even that Foucault´s formulation of  the “linguistic power” is different than 
Althusser´s formulation of ideological language, the basic idea of the linguistic constitution of 
subjects is similar. For both of these thinkers, power as discourse produces “things” and 
“subjects” in reference to itself.  Power produces the subjects it needs in order to materialize 
itself, give actual life to itself, and to reproduce itself. According to both Althusser and 
Foucault, discursive power, which remains not conceptualizable for the subjects themselves, 
is both the “origin” of subjects as well as the “repressor” of subjects. With Butler, this idea 
becomes developed into her theory of the performativity of things (taken up in the chapter 4.). 
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According to Althusser (like later with Foucault and Butler)  ideological language produces 
subjects in order to maintain and reproduce itself (Ideol. 158-160).  
 
the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time 
and immediately I add that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all 
ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 
“constituting” concrete individuals as subjects. In the interaction of this double 
constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing but its 
functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning. (ibid. 160) 
 
Ideological language denotes the immediate  “programme” by which the subject thinks and 
speaks. In this way,  ideology turns itself into a living practice or an everyday ritualistic way 
of living. Ideology is a highly  unconscious element of subject´s lives. It denotes the 
immediate conditions of people´s lives. It is something universal and all-pervasive;  it exists 
in all societies.  It denotes  the guiding principle of  peoples  lives  and  the  very  idea behind 
peoples actions.  As such, it is clear, according to Althusser,  that for the subjects themselves,  
ideology is not  ideology, but  “nature”,  “anatomy”,  “the will of God” or “the eternal truth of 
things”  (Ideol. 158;  For Marx 222-223, 233-234; Theor.prac.29) 
 
you and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals 
of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, 
individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects.  (Ideol. 162-
163) 
 
Althusser often describes ideological subjectivity in reference to religion, usually Christianity 
(he was  actually a Catholic as well as a Hegelian before his conversion to Marxism in the late 
1940’s). He also draws on the psychoanalytical theories of Freud and Lacan. His discussion 
on the “small “s” and the capital “S” is important for his theory of how ideology assumes a 
psychic structure. In this theory he draws both on Christianity and the psychoanalytical 
theories. Althusser refers to Lacan´s theory of the “mirror-phase” (found also with Freud) in 
which a subject needs to reflect itself from another subject to realize that it is a subject.  The 
subject, found in the mirror, is also always already a gendered subject. The mirror hence 
initiates the process of the “subjecting” of the individual which is always already also a 
“gendering” of the individual.  Althusser, in reference to the psychoanalytical theory, sees the 
becoming of a subject as a process of becoming gendered. This means that the individual 
enters  the  realm  of  the  order  of  “Phallus”  when  it  enters  the  realm  of  being  a  subject.   
According to Althusser, individuals never become just subjects but they also become “posited 
subjects” (Hegel would say: determinate, particular beings)  by their gender, the social and 
economic  status  of  their  family,  the  surrounding  culture  etc.   This  is  important  for  the  
Althusserian idea that being a subject means that one has a view-point (a subject-position) 
from which it looks at itself, other subjects and the world.  
 
Lacan´s “linguistic” psychoanalysis is an important point of reference as Althusser develops 
his theory of the subject as a “Logos” or a “category”. With Freud, when a child becomes a 
gendered subject, it passes through an Oedipal phase and enters a patriarchal realm. With 
Lacan, when a child learns to speak, it enters a realm of “symbolic order”, which is also the 
realm of the order of the Phallus. For Althusser, especially in reference to Lacan, the subject 
151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enters an (ideological) symbolic order when it learns a language. The subject mirrors itself 
from the Other (which provides always already an ideological “image” of the subject) and 
thus internalizes ideology as a theory of what kind of a  “subject” it is.  When an individual 
learns a language as an infant, it enters a realm of “symbolic order”, not just language, but an 
ideological language. For Althusser, via Lacan, the linguistic subjects bear first and foremost 
their Father’s Name. (Ideol. 152, 164-165, 168-169). 
 
Especially with Lacan,  rather than with Freud, Althusser finds the idea - important in his 
theory of Interpellation -  that the subjects themselves cannot conceptualize the primary 
relation which constitutes them as conscious beings.  In reference to the discussion of 
“thirdness, the Lacanian theory suggests that when subjects act as internal thirds (interpreters 
of their own complex psychic structures) something which constitutes them fundamentally 
remains necessarily “unread” or necessarily “missed”.  With Lacan, our particular attempts 
(in actual therapeutic practice or by particular psychoanalytical theories) to read the primary 
relations of our subjectivity always miss  their intended object. Our readings always describe 
an imaginary, instead of a real object. This idea has a Kantian flavour; as Kant says in The 
Critique of Pure Reason (B 422; A346/B404), the self is unable to conceptualize itself, 
because it can understand things only through the categories which are its own products. 
(Kant would, of course deny that such a conceptualization would be possible for 
psychoanalysis  or  “science”.)   Both  for  Lacan  and  for  Althusser,  our  everyday  self-
understanding is necessarily erroneous; what is peculiar for Althusser is that this necessary 
error has a political significance.  
 
Althusser discusses Freud and Lacan in his article “Freud and Lacan” (first published 1964). 
Especially the Lacanian idea of the primary relation as a “lost referent” or a “not validly 
interpreted referent” seems to influence Althusser in an important way.  
 
 
Herein  no  doubt  lies  the  most  original  aspect  of  Lacan`s  work,  his  discovery.  
Lacan has shown that this transition from (ultimately purely) biological 
existence  to  human existence  (the  human child)  is  achieved  within  the  Law of  
Order,  the  law  I  shall  call  the  Law  of  Culture,  and  that  this  Law  of  Order  is  
confounded in its formal essence  with  the  order  of  language.  what  are  we  to  
understand by this formula, at first sight so enigmatic? Firstly, that the whole of 
this  transition  can  only  be  grasped  in  terms  of  a  recurrent  language,  as  
designated by the language of the adult or child in a cure situation, designated, 
assigned and localized within the law of language in which is established and 
presented all human order, i.e. every human role. (FL 193) 
 
 
Further, in the same article, Althusser sees that Freud´s view is somewhat similar to Hegel´s 
idea (i.e. that subjects can become known to themselves), at least in the limited sense in which 
Freud thinks that the human psyche could be interpreted by the “psyche itself” in a 
psychoanalytical therapy. Althusser argues that whereas Freud saw an ego (including the 
unconscious) as something psychoanalytically interpretable, Lacan is more correct when he 
states that any particular interpretation of the psyche remain within the realm of the symbolic 
order. For Althusser, the importance of psychoanalysis lies in it as a scientific practice (more 
of the difference between ideology and science in the next sub-chapter).   Psychoanalysis as a 
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scientific practice should analyze  the particular psychoanalytical descriptions given e.g. of 
the  formation  of  the  ego  –  of  which  Althusser  discusses  e.g.  Freud´s  theory  of  the  Oedipal  
phase – as historical objects of scientific analysis, not as timeless truths as such. In this sense, 
Althusser criticises Freud. Althusser sees that Freud mistakenly  assumed that  the Oedipal 
Phase  constitutes  a  somewhat  universal  and  timeless  psychic  law  of  all  humans.  (FL,  189-
196) 
  
With Althusser, the primary,  interpellative relation, not known to the subject itself,  is always 
also – seen at the level of particular individuals - a historical one and has a particular content 
to  it.  For  Althusser,  the  interpellative  relation  may  take  the  form  of  a  (Freudian)  Oedipal  
scene, yet  not necessarily.  For Althusser, ideology can take different historical forms and 
hence the call, constitutive of subjects,  is not necessarily an “Oedipalizing” call.  As said 
already, at least Althusser detects a difference between Lacan and Freud on this issue and 
sides  with Lacan rather than with Freud. For Freud, the subject can become conscious of its 
primary repressive relations  and thus receive somewhat self-consciously conducted therapy 
for itself (at least in the psychoanalytical process). (FL, 186-193). Althusser´s idea of 
psychoanalysis as a (scientific) practice, in which the psyche should not be assumed to have 
any a priori substance (in terms of e.g. the Freudian Oedipal scene) and Althusser´s criticism 
against Freud is echoed in Butler´s criticism of psychoanalysis. 
 
Lacan´s theory is important for Althusser´s distinction between “ideology” (the realm of 
subjects and subjective, historical thinking) and “science” (the non-subjective realm of 
objective  or  scientific  knowledge),  which  will  be  taken  up  further.   With  Lacan,  Althusser  
finds an idea that the constitutive relation, by which subjects become intelligible subjects 
remains necessarily an unconceptual “lost referent” for them. For Lacan,  this primary relation 
is the relation between the sexes. Subjectivity exists as the  rule  of  Phallus.  This  rule  
constitutes a psychic structure which always remains something indeterminate, or absent for 
the subject itself. This means that for subjects, there is no relation between the sexes. A 
relation between the sexes is absent because the other sex is absent. This means  that there is 
no “other sex”, besides the rule of the Phallus or Father  in language. The linguistic notion of 
a “female” or “woman” is an image, produced by the rule of the Phallus. As the female sex is 
absent from language, there is actually no gender- differentiation or a gender-relation.  All 
relations  take  place  inside  one  sex,  under  the  rule  of  the  Father.   As  such,  the  rule  of  the  
Phallus can be explained only (already) inside of it, not from the view-point of an “outside” to 
it.  In other words, Phallus is co-extensive with language. There is no Other or “outside” to 
the rule of patriarchy.  As any actual attempt to oppose the rule of the Phallus would mean 
also opposing the language and intelligibility itself– and the subject - any such attempts would 
take  place  as  “psychosis”.   As  such,  Phallus  -  and  the  linguistic  realm  which  it  orders  -  
appears  as a sovereign rule. The Phallus permeates subjects - as intelligible beings  - totally.  
 
The Lacanian idea, that the primary relation of the subject-formation is always a “lost 
referent” (called by Lacan as “Real”),  appears as fundamental for Althusser, even that 
Althusser  does  not  discuss  this  relation  as  a  gender-relation  very  deeply.  In  fact,  in  
Althusser´s Marxist theory, the emphasis which Lacan places upon sex (as the primary 
unknown relation) is placed by Althusser on the relations of production.  Nevertheless, for 
both Lacan and Althusser, the symbolic order, which every infant internalizes when it learns a 
language,  is a totality, where gender-relations and other relations are parts of a same whole. 
Via Lacan, Althusser argues that the primary relation, which forms the subject, remains 
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unconceptual for the subject itself. Hence the primary “interpellation”, which comes from the 
ideology, and turns the individual into a subject, remains something absent for the subject 
itself.  Through Lacan, Althusser argues that any attempt at conceptualizing this primary 
“turn”, or a relation, takes always already place inside the ideological system itself. Any such 
attempt actually reproduces the ideology.  Accordingly, Althusser argues that there is no 
“outside” of ideology for the subjects themselves. This idea sets the foundation not only for 
Althusser’s  theory  of  Interpellation  but  also  for  his  distinction  or  actually  dualism  between  
“ideology” and “science”.  (Ideol. 152-165; cf. also Assiter 1990, 124-129)   
 
The mirror – or, the Other - from which the not-yet-subject looks at itself and where it finds 
who it is, is called by Althusser the capital ”S” . The capital “S” is an ideological Idea of a 
Subject. By mirroring itself from the capital “S” the individual internalizes also the symbolic 
order, ideology, as its own psychic structure.  As said already earlier, Althusser makes a 
distinction between a small “s” and a capital “S”. The not-yet-subject needs to identify with a 
“subject”, mirror itself as a “subject”,   in order to see itself as a subject. To do this, there 
must  be   an  idea  of  another  subject  for the not-yet- subject.   In  order  for  there  to  be  a  
multitude of subjects, there must be an idea of a Unique, Absolute, Other  Subject, i.e. God. 
Althusser discusses the relation between the small “s” and the capital “S” (ultimately God) 
also on the basis of Christianity. (Ideol. 165)  
 
The internal relation between a small “s” and a capital “S”, which belongs fully to the realm 
of ideology, produces the internal self-reflectivity of the subjects. By this reflectivity, the 
ideological power is internalized as a moral and ethical self-control. The mirroring of itself 
from “ideology” (the capital “S”) becomes a highly unconscious everyday practice for the 
subject. Consciousness of responsibility is created by this self-reflective doubleness. For 
Althusser, a subject (as a small “s”) can understand himself as  the responsible location of his 
thoughts and the responsible agent behind his actions  only if he identifies with an Idea of a 
Subject (denoted ultimately by God) as the origin of His Deeds.   Identifying with the Idea of 
a Subject is an important part of ideology. Ideology assumes actually a psychic structure by 
this internal distinction between a small “s” and a capital “S”.  The Absolute Subject 
functions  as  a  normative  ideal  for  all  subjects,   and  the  origin  of  the  sense  of  guilt.    In  
Christianity   the  normative  model  of  what  all  subjects  should  be  like  is  provided  by  Jesus.    
With Althusser, the subjects are led by an internal, self-reflective control, and a sense of guilt, 
provided by the figure of Christ.  All this serves the purposes of ideology. (Ideol.165-170;  
For Marx 232-233) 
 
It then emerges that the interpellation of individuals as subjects presupposes the 
“existence” of a Unique and central Other Subject, in whose Name the religious 
ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects.  (Ideol. 167) 
 
Importantly, Althusser sees that the relation between the subject, or self, and the Other 
belongs completely into the realm of ideology. The other subject, with which the subject 
identifies with, is  an ideological subject, and not, like with Hegel, a source of freedom from a 
parochial, “limited knowing”.  Althusser criticises Hegel´s subject-theory for its idea that 
particular subjects can know themselves totally.  Hegel´s  idea  of  particular  subjects  as  
epistemological totalities is the target of Althussers criticism.  For Althusser, a realm of 
subjectivity is necessarily a realm of distorted, limited  and repressed knowing. For Althusser, 
Hegel´s idea of Absolute Knowing (as the knowing of subjects),  or Hegel’s idea of Freedom, 
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are just ideological myths which ideology uses for its purposes (For Marx 236-237). In a 
lecture on Marx and Hegel, Althusser, while taking a somewhat more positive stance towards 
dialectics, specifically attacks Hegel’s notion of the negation of negation or Aufhebung 
(MRH, 181). According to Althusser, this notion makes Hegel’s dialectics teleological, so that 
Absolute Knowing becomes the aim of the historical process. (In the same text Althusser even 
praises Stalin for dropping the “negation of negation” from the canon of Marxism, although 
he does not tell us why the Soviet dictator did not like this dialectical principle).     
 
According  to  Althusser,  the  subject  is   subjected to the language at the same time when it 
learns the language. The image of the “other subject” (the capital “S”) functions as a vehicle 
in this subjection. Thus, the other subject is first and foremost an imaginary one, an illusion, 
created by ideology. This means also that for Althusser, there cannot be anything like the 
Hegelian “reciprocal recognition” (which for Hegel is a basis of freedom from “limited 
knowing”).  With Althusser,  subjects are externally (ideologically) formed and they see 
themselves and other subjects necessarily  in bondage – i.e. inside ideology. The subject itself 
(for itself) as well as all the others are imaginary ones.  In this sense, Althusser´s subjects are 
similar to what Hegel´s subjects are like, in the narrative of PhS, before they enter the realm 
of  freedom, i.e.  reciprocally recognitive relationships with other subjects.  What Althusser 
says about subjects resembles what Hegel says about “bondage” in his theory of the Lordship 
and Bondage in PhS.  The knowledge of the slave´s  (the Bondsmen) is limited and repressed.   
It takes place under the rule  of the Other (the Master).    The slaves do not know their own 
formation which takes place, primarily, as the Master-Slave-system. The relation between the 
Master  and  Slave  is  not  a  conceptual  relation  for  the  slaves.  Alike  Hegelian  slaves,   when  
Althusser´s  subjects recognize each others, this recognition takes necessarily place under 
epistemological slavery. The recognition is a one-sided recognition, i.e. done under the 
slavery of the Other (the Master, or, the ideology).  When the slaves (i.e. subjects, with 
Althusser) turn to look at themselves and others, the look is conducted from the point of view 
of  the  Other  (the  Master,  ideology).   Althusser´s  subjects  see  an  ideological  self,  and  an  
ideological other because the seeing itself takes place inside ideology (inside a Master-Slave-
system).  (Ideol. 161, 168)  
 
In this view, there is no Hegelian “reciprocal recognition” between the self and the Other. Nor 
are the Althusserian subjects capable of taking the relation between the subject and the 
ideology as an object of conceptualization. All objects (e.g. the constitutive relation between 
the subject and the ideological, linguistic power)  which exist for the subjects themselves, are 
ideologically formed objects. In short, the Althusserian subjects remain slaves to the extent 
that they are subjects. This resembles what Kojève argues about particular subjects. With 
Hegel, in contrast, subjects are able to conceptualize the primary relation which constitutes 
them, in a free and rational way,  in reciprocally recognitive relationships. In reciprocally 
recognitive relationships Hegelian subjects become free from enslaving limits (externally 
placed and, thus, repressive)  as their limits become rationally accessible for them. With 
Hegel, there is indeed also a “turn to look at” the primary relation, by which the subjects are 
constituted as subjects. Butler calls this Hegelian turn a “dialectical reversal” which for Butler 
is an imperialistic turn, as through this turn the subject internalizes all differences as parts of 
itself, suffocating the radical Other  
 
As is argued in this study, in the chapter 5., that Butler (as well as also Lacan, Foucault, Sartre 
etc.) read the Hegelian “turn” (into reciprocally recognitive, free relations between selves) in a 
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Kojèvian way, and rejects it.  In this study, the Hegelian “turn” by which the primary subject-
constitutive relation is rendered a self-conscious concept is interpreted differently as in the 
Kojèvian tradition. As is explained in chapter 2, in the narrative of PhS a dialectical “turn” 
takes place, by which the primary, subject-constitutive relation - which has so far been 
unknown for the subject itself – turns from an unknown relation into a conceptual relation.   
Hegel´s “self-conceptualizing turn” (rejected e.g. by Lacan, Althusser, Foucault and Butler) is 
conducted by a self – called by Hegel as an Unhappy Consciousness or the Enlightenment 
Reason -  who has so far thought of itself as constituted by an unknown primary relation,  yet, 
who realizes now, at this point, that this is what it thinks of itself. Importantly, the turn, by 
which the Hegelian subject in PhS enters reciprocally recognitive relations, is conducted by 
such a subject who has already been conscious of itself as an “ek-static” subject but who has 
so far thought  that the ek-static relation (between the self and the Other) cannot be 
conceptualized by particular subjects themselves.  When this self realizes that it thinks that 
subjects are constituted by an ek-static  relation which is unknown for the subjects 
themselves,   the  self  realizes  that  the  unknowingness  of  this  relation  is  actually  something  
“known” by it. The unknowingness exists as a something which is known for itself.    
 
For Hegel,  acknowledging the Other as a  free self-consciousness is a necessary prerequisite 
for the reciprocal recognition between the self and the Other. This means, for example,  that 
subjects should not see subjects in general (either themselves or others) as formed by such 
powers which are not conceptually accessible for them.   One version of  repressing the Other 
(i.e.  treating  the  Other  as  one’s  inferior,  as  a  “bondsman”)  takes  place  as  the  Unhappy  
Consciousness. It represses the Other by seeing all subjects (including itself, to the extent that 
it is a subject) as constituted by internal repression.  Because the Unhappy Consciousness 
thinks that everything what subjects think, know and say of themselves, and of the world, is 
done under internal repression, it treats the knowledge of subjects as an inferior, in relation to 
its own “pure” (abstract) knowledge.    
 
With Althusser, via Lacan´s Kojèvian-inflected subject-theory, there is no such thing as the 
Hegelian free self-consciousness, or reciprocally recognitive relationships.  For Althusser,  
subjects can never conceptualize the primary relation, constitutive of them as subjects.  For 
Althusser,  subjects are fooled by the ideology to think that when they recognize themselves 
or others, they actually see what they are like.  The subjects do not understand that they fail to 
recognize the other in real,  because  all  their  recognitions  are  distorted  by  ideology.   Thus,  
Althusser re-interprets the Hegelian idea of recognition as a repressive mechanism, as 
necessary misrecognition. Althusser writes how: 
 
ideology gives men a certain ‘knowledge’ of their world, or rather allows them 
to ‘recognize’ themselves in their world, gives them a certain ‘recognition’; but 
at the same time ideology only introduces them to its misrecognition. Allusion-
illusion or recognition-misrecognition – such is ideology from the perspective of 
its  relation to the real. (Theor. Prac., 29; emphasis in the original. See also FL 
201.) 
 
Althusser sees Hegel as a pre-scientific thinker who, in his theory of recognition, anticipates 
the correct theory of subject-formation: 
 
Hegel is (unknowingly) an admirable ‘theoretician’ of ideology insofar as he is a 
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‘theoretician’ of Universal Recognition  who unfortunately ends up in the 
ideology of Absolute Knowledge. (Ideol. 168, fn. 22) 
 
What remains in common for both ideas is the other as a source of self-identification. The 
subjects themselves, according to Althusser,  do not realize that their own knowledge is 
“limited”, distorted, one-sided. With Hegel, an important step, in the narrative of the subject´s 
becoming free from enslaving limits (the Master-Slave-system), takes place when subjects 
themselves are seen to be capable of realizing that their own knowledge is limited because 
they are historical beings who repress the Other. In other words, according to Hegel, subjects 
can become limited beings  for themselves, and, perhaps even more importantly, ek-static 
beings for themselves.   In contrast to Hegel, for Althusser, the subjects are limited only as 
such, i.e. in themselves.  In other words, for Althusser, the subjects themselves cannot 
conceptualize their own primary limitation.  As such, the subjects are not seen to be limited 
for themselves, instead, they are seen to be limited externally. For Hegel, when somebody 
sees others as externally limited (instead of seeing them limited, i.e. subjected, for 
themselves)  this somebody thinks of itself and others on the basis of a Master-Slave-system. 
From Hegel’s view-point, Althusser and Lacan remain in the Master-Slave epistemology.  
 
With Althusser, the individual, which is no subject before it is “called” by the authoritative 
power, is transformed into a subject, when addressed by the power. This power calls the 
individual to be a “subject” by making it look at its image from the ideological mirror.  This 
“call” gives actually an intelligible life to the individual , as it learns to think and 
communicate with others. It also becomes a responsible locus of its actions, thoughts and 
intentions. It also receives a place as “somebody” in the social whole.  On the other hand, the 
subject is, from the very beginning, subjected to the power, or repressed by the power, as 
Althusser says. The subject however cannot oppose the ideology, which is its origin,  without 
opposing its whole existence as a subject. The subject thinks of itself and the whole world in 
terms of this language. Whatever it thinks, it thinks always already inside this language. Thus, 
any possible opposing of this ideology takes always already place inside this ideology itself.  
 
..what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street) in 
reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems 
therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe 
themselves by definition outside ideology:one of the effects of ideology is the 
practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: 
ideology never says, “I am ideological”. (…) ideology has no outside (for itself).  
(Ideol. 164-165) 
 
The language cannot be escaped into any such place outside or beyond of it which would not 
be just another place inside this language.   
 
For Althusser, ideology only exists by constituting concrete subjects. It does not have 
existence outside the subjects. It exists by forming  such subjects which – by their everyday 
life as a repeated, ritualistic, institutionalized practice -  reproduce  the  relations  of  the  
ideology. Ideology exists as long as there are ideologically formed subjects who give life to it 
and who reproduce it.  Ideological State apparatuses denote the large-scale material existence 
of ideology.  State apparatuses are the physical, material existence of ideology. These 
apparatuses are first and foremost systems of relations. The hierarchical relations – the class 
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system - must also be continuously reproduced. The state apparatuses is the medium for this.  
When plurality of subjects are related  hierarchically together, their inter-related practices take 
the form of state-level apparatuses.  Examples of this kind of apparatuses are Church, 
Philosophy, School (i.e. the educational ideological apparatuses),  Marriage, Family, and 
Army.  Althusser  lists  various  state  apparatuses  of  a  modern  capitalist  society.   There  is   a  
“communications apparatus”, “political apparatus”, “cultural apparatus” and “trade-union 
apparatus”. For a Marxist theorist like Althusser, the most important aspect of the State 
Apparatuses is that they  reproduce the relations of production. The State apparatuses 
function as State power, which is a repressive power. (Ideol. 128,134,141,156).  
 
In a given society, people participate in economic production whose mechanism 
and effects are determine by the structure of the relations of production; people 
participate in political activity whose mechanisms and effects are governed by 
the structure of class relations (the class struggle, law and the State). These same 
people participate in other activities – religious, moral, philosophical, etc. – 
either  in  an  active  manner,  through  conscious  practice,  or  in  a  passive  and  
mechanical manner, through reflexes, judgements, attitudes, etc. These last 
activities constitute ideological activity; they are sustained by voluntary or 
involuntary, conscious or unconscious, adherence to an ensemble of 
representations and beliefsa – religious, moral, legal, political, aeasthetic, 
philosophical, etc. – which constitute what is called the “level” of ideology. 
(Theor. prac., 23-24). 
 
 
3.2.2. Ideology and Science 
 
 
As said in the previous sub-chapter, for Althusser, ideology is not ideology for the 
ideologically formed subject themselves. Instead, ideology appears for them as the world out 
there (or as “nature” or “the truth of things”). However, in order for it to be possible to talk 
about ideology at all, ideology must be ideology for somebody.  Althusser theorized the 
question of “for whom ideology is ideology?”. Obviously, there must be some level, at which 
ideology  is  seen  as  ideology,    otherwise  it  could  not  be  discussed  about  at  all.  (Ideol.162,  
Theor.prac.24-25). Althusser writes.  
 
…the  author,  insofar  as  he  writes  the  lines  of  a  discourse  which  claims  to  be  
scientific, is completely absent as a “subject” from “his” scientific discourse (for 
all scientific discourse is by definition a subject-less discourse, there is no 
“Subject of science” except in an ideology of science. (Ideol. 160) 
 
Here, Althusser makes his crucial distinction between “ideology” and “science”. This denotes 
a distinction between subjective understanding and objective knowledge. This also denotes a 
distinction  between  ideological  symbolic  orders  -   the  languages  of  subjects  -  and  the  non-
subjective, scientific language. In fact, Althusser does not talk about scientific language, as 
science is for him a critical practice, which takes the ideological languages (i.e. historical 
symbolic orders) as its objects of analysis. Subjects, subjective knowledge and ideological 
symbolic orders constitute imaginary, illusory beliefs of things. Yet, this is something which 
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the subjects themselves cannot know of themselves. Subjects themselves do not know that the 
images, which they see, are images. Subjects take them as the factual world. The images can 
be known to be images, and the ideology can be seen as ideology,  only by knowledge which 
is beyond the subjects. Subjective knowledge denotes the realm of limited, distorted, 
imaginary consciousness (Ideol. 154-155). The distinction is crucial for Althusser, for it 
explains how his own theory is possible.  
 
In contrast to Hegel´s subjective knowledge, Althusser’s subjective knowledge is not limited 
for itself, instead, it is limited  for science. The limitedness of the subjects is not seen by the 
subjects themselves. In contrast to Hegel, with Althusser, science  (or, the ultimate knowledge 
of subjects and of the limits) is not a conceptual part of subjectivity. Instead, according to 
Althusser, the scientific, real  knowledge of subjects,  is external to subjects and subjective 
knowing. According to Hegel,  if subjects are seen to be known by something which is 
necessarily beyond the capacity of the subjects themselves, the subjects are enslaved. They 
are epistemologically patronized.  For Hegel, in a patronizing epistemology, there is a non-
conceptual (external) relation between subjects and other things.   With Althusser, real 
knowledge of subjects is external to the subjects themselves and denotes hence a non-
subjective knowledge.  Nevertheless, with Althusser, both of these forms of understanding 
(subjective and non-subjective knowledge) contain indispensable knowledge of subjects and 
of  the  whole  world.   Ideology  and  science  are  constitutive  parts  of  subjects,  yet,  these  two  
parts are not seen, by Althusser, to be conceptually connected to each other.   
 
ideology is as such an organic part of every social totality. It is as if human 
societies could not survive without these specific formations, these systems of 
representations (at various levels), their ideologies. Human societies secrete 
ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical 
respiration and life. Only an ideological world outlook could have imagibned 
societies without ideology and accepted the utopian idea of a world in which 
ideology (not just one of its historical forms) would disappear without trace, to 
be replaced by science. (For Marx, 232) 
 
For Althusser, there will always be ideology and, consequently,  subjects. There will also be 
science, a knowledge of ideology, above the ideology itself. In contrast to Kojève´s Hegelian 
Marxism, Althusser´s Lacanian Marxism does not anticipate the disappearance of the limited, 
distorted knowledge, produced by limited subjects. According to Althusser, even in a “class-
less” society, there will always be ideology (i.e. limited knowledge of things, in Hegelian 
words, “knowledge in bondage”)  because that is always the way how particular subjects 
relate to themselves and to the world, in their everyday circumstances and their social life.  
 
In a classless society, as in a class society, ideology has the function of assuring 
the bond among people in the totality of the forms of their existence, the relation 
of individuals to their tasks assigned by the social structure.; (.. .) We also 
understand that ideology gives men a certain “knowledge” of their world, or 
rather  allows  them  to  “recognize”  themselves  in  their  world,  gives  them  a  
certain “recognition”; but at the same time ideology only introduces them to its 
misrecognition. (Theor.prac. 28-29)   
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The scientific way to look at things, or actually theorize things is not, according to Althusser, 
conducted at all by subjects. It is a subject-less practice. In the realm of science, the 
subjectivity of the scientists is, in a way, “bracketed off”. (Ideol. 162) 
 
This knowledge of the mechanism of economic and political structures can 
derive only from another practice, distinct from immediate economic or 
political practice, scientific practice –  in  the  same  way  that  knowledge  of  the  
laws of nature cannot be the product of simple technical practice and perception, 
which provide only empirical observations and technical formulae, but is, on the 
contrary, the product of specific practices – scientific practices – distinct from 
immediate practices. (Theor.prac. 24) 
 
For example, psychoanalysis, as a scientific practice, does not take any historical, cultural 
theory of the structure of psyche (like e.g. Freud´s theory of the Oedipal scene) as a non-
historical, universal psychic Law. In contrast, science sees that “laws of psyche” are 
ideological laws and it analyses them as such.  Ideology can be – and it should be - theorized 
by science in a way which is not distorted by ideological subjectivity. This is the reason why 
Althusser criticises Freud’s manner to take the Oedipal psychic structure as a somewhat non-
historical, universal fact.  And this is why Althusser rejects Hegel. Althusser argues, against 
Hegel, that real knowledge of subjects (including the real history and philosophy of subjects) 
is not attainable for the subjects themselves.  Ideology (i.e. limited knowledge) is ideology for 
science, which takes the stance of a non-subjective critical practice. Limited, one-sided 
knowledge is seen as such only when it is discussed by knowledge which is not limited and 
not one-sided. Only non-subjective knowledge can be un-limited.  E.g. the Oedipal scene can 
be seen to produce – when it is analyzed scientifically, without any priori subjective 
assumptions - one historical type of imaginarily gendered consciousness. Because science is 
not practiced by subjects, it denotes an ideology-free-realm. Through science, there can also 
be  a  study  of  the  history  of  ideology,  of  genders,  of  family  structures  and  of  the  class  
struggles which develop in societies.  When subjects discuss history, this subjective history is 
distorted, because it is seen subjectively, i.e. ideologically. It serves the purposes of the 
ideology. For Althusser, the actual history of ideology is external to the ideology itself. The 
subjects cannot thus know themselves, because their ideological formation, including their 
history and the prospects of their future (in terms of the class struggles which they are part of 
) is external to themselves. (Ideol. 150-151) 
 
Althusser has also criticised Kojève (see SD, xvi, fn. 12).  In contrast to the Kojèvian, totally 
non-subjective utopia, for Althusser, there will  always be limited consciousness, at least in 
the sense theorized by the Lacanian psychoanalytical theory.  Althusser argues that even a 
class-less society - which may be free from class-repression -  is nevertheless not a 
transparent society. No society is completely determined by science as it cannot, for example, 
constitute the actual bonds between the people  or between the people and their world. As 
argued already above, for Althusser, the primary relation, which makes subjects actual (living 
feeling, experiencing) subjects is, via Lacanian psychoanalytical subject-theory, always an 
ideological relation. (Theor.prac.24)  
 
Consequently, for Althusser,  there will also always be subjective, limited politics,  conducted 
by ideological subjects. Limited subjects will always strive only for limited ends. Yet, in 
contrast  to  the  limited  politics  of  the  subjects,  there  is  also  Marxist,  non-subjective  politics,  
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called as a Marxist practice.   Hence, the ideological “limited” politics is something else than 
the Marxist politics, which is based on science and is therefore a scientific practice. 
(Theor.prac.24-26)  
 
Althusser criticises Hegel for his subjective totality. He rejects the idea that a subject could 
know itself the way Hegel´s free self-consciousness does. As explained in the chapter 2, with 
Hegel, the relation between the subject and the other constitutes a relation by which the selves 
can overcome their limits. With Hegel, un-limitedness and the freedom from repression can 
be reached through a relation between the subject and the Other. With Hegel, the “other” - in 
relation with whom the subject can reach un-limitedness and become free from repression -  is 
another subject. With Althusser, all subjects and all conscious, interpersonal relations between 
the subjects belong to the realm of ideology. Hence, un-limitedness and freedom from 
ideology cannot be reached - by the subjects themselves - through their mutual relations 
between each others. It could be said, in Hegel´s words,  that all the Althusserian subjects are 
Bondsmen, distinct from the science which knows what subjects are like.   Whatever the 
Althusserian subjects know about themselves or the world is known while in bondage  - i.e. 
under the repression and false consciousness of the ideology. 
 
Ideology also appears as necessary for the transformation of societies. In fact (Marxist) 
political practice is based  upon it. Althusser writes about this: 
 
ideology is not an aberration or a contingent excrescence of History: it is a 
structure  essential  to  the  historical  life  of  societies.  Futher,  only  the  existence  
and the recognition of its necessity enable us to act on ideology and transform 
ideology into an instrument of deliberate action on history. (For Marx, 232) 
 
For Althusser, ideology is necessary for Marxist political practice. This is the case even in a 
class-less society, because in every society there will always be distorted knowledge, which 
needs to be critically analyzed and acted on.  Ideology constitutes  an important instrument for 
Marxist  politics.    It  is  at  the level of ideology  that  the actual pressure,  the demand for the 
transformation of the society is felt, lived and experienced.   Science can never play the role 
of conceptualizing the experienced bond between the men and the conditions of their 
existence. Althusser writes:  
 
it is in ideology that this demand is expressed, that this distance is measured, 
that this contradiction is lived and that its resolution is “activated”. It is in 
ideology,  that the class-less society lives the inadequacy/adequacy of the 
relation  between  it  and  the  world,  it  is  in  it  and  by  it  that  it  transforms  men´s  
“consciousness”, that is, their attitudes and behaviour so as to raise them to the 
level  of  their  taks  and  the  conditions  of  their  existence.  (For  Marx,  235;  by  
“men”, Althusser refers to human beings in general ) 
 
The subjects themselves, who live the relation between themselves and the world, and feel a 
need for the transformation of their lives,  cannot analyze their experiences from a non-
distorted point of view. The analyses made by the subjects,  and the politics, conducted by the 
subjects on the basis of these analyses, are all made in the realm of the ideology. Thus, the 
politics, of the subjects, just reproduces the ideology itself.  Only a non-subjective analysis 
can come up with such a political program, which does not reproduce the ideology.  This non-
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ideological politics is a critical practice, which does not take any subjective “truth” as the goal 
it strives for, yet, it takes such goals as the objects of its critical praxis.  
 
It  appears  that  by  the  distinction  into  “ideology”  and  “science”   two  realms  of  politics  are  
constituted, a limited one and an unlimited one - between which there is an external relation. 
Intentional politics is conducted in both realms. In the ideological realm, subjects strive for 
their  “distorted”  goals.  In  the  other,  non-ideological  realm,  the  distorted  politics  of  the  
subjects is used as an instrument for the transformation of the society.  The critical agent of 
this  transformation  is  the  Party,  equipped  with  the  correct  scientific  theory.  It  mediates  
between science and the political practice.  
 
Especially in the late 1960’s and the 1970’s Althusser’s version of Marxism was very 
influential in radical circles, in France as well as in the UK.  His “patronizing Marxism” also 
received severe criticism.  For example, Alex Callinicos writes in Althusser’s Marxism (in 
1976): 
 
...the notion that the masses necessarily live in ideology, and that it will 
therefore be necessary to continue to exist a group of those adept in the sciences 
in order to guide them, derives from this position. Thus conceived, the theory of 
ideology can serve as a justification for the bureaucratic state capitalism in the 
Eastern bloc (Callinicos 1976, 101)  
 
Ted Benton presents a similar critique in his book The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism. 
According to Callinicos and Benton, the political aspect of Althusser´s Lacanian  Marxism is 
that the subjects are seen as incapable of actual radical politics. This Lacanian Marxism 
appears for the critics as a sort of patronizing “therapy”, given to the subjects from above, 
from a “therapeutical science”, which necessarily always knows more about the subjects than 
the subjects themselves.   The subjects themselves are “duped” by their own distorted 
subjectivity (Benton 1984, 106-107).  
 
Feminist theorists in general have criticised Althusser (see e.g. Assiter 1990, 124-129;   Grosz 
1989, 2-16, however, sees him as relevant even for feminists).  They have argued that a 
subject-less science, alike the traditional philosophical figure of a transcendental (male) 
scientist, or a philosopher, always denote  masculinist utopias from which women are closed 
off. Feminists, including Butler, have been always criticizing distinctions made between 
“objectivity and freedom” and “subjectivity and non-freedom”. For feminists, these 
distinctions denote a distinction made between the private realm of women and the universal, 
public realm of men.   
 
It is also argued that Althusser’s Interpellation appears as  a total power. Ted Benton argues: 
 
...in the context of Althusser´s identification of “ideology” with “ruling 
ideology” there is no basis for “interpellations” of oppositional forms of 
subjectivity. Individual human subjects can be no more than willing “dupes” of 
the social system. (Benton 1984, 107) 
 
Both Benton (1984, 107) and Assiter (1990, 127) remark that Althusser’s Interpellation-
theory is conceptually problematic: in order to be interpellated as particular subjects, 
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individuals have to possess some general capacities of subjects. (Emperor Caligula could 
declare  his  horse  a  Consul,  but  even  he  could  not  make  it  a  subject!)  They  have  to  able  to  
recognize themselves in the “mirror” of ideology. Thus, the theory of Interpellation does not 
really explain all aspects of subjectivity, but only of the particularity of subjects.   
 
Althusser´s idea of a subject-less science has been severely questioned, and not only by 
feminists.  Most critics of Althusser argue that science  is produced by scientists,  and 
scientists are also always subjects. Science does not just analyze historical objects, instead,  it 
is itself  conducted in a specific time and place. Moreover, the whole distinction between 
science and ideology presupposes some criteria of distinction. Althusser argues, for example, 
that the early writings of Marx (written under the influence of Hegel) were still ideological, 
while his later writings are “scientific”. There is a definite border between the two realms. 
But, as Descombes (1998, 123-6) remarks, Althusser does not tell how they are to be 
distinguished, and any attempt to provide the criteria seems to be circular – that is, the criteria 
are provided by the (Althusserian) science which already presupposes the distinction. 
 
Nor  does  it  seem possible  that  real  politics  (in  contrast  to  the  politics  of  the  subjects,  who 
strive for imaginary, ideological goals) would be conducted by a subject-less practice. The 
Althusserian  Party  is  also  run  by  human  subjects,  not  by  an  impersonal  Theory.   Althusser  
says that, for example,  the trade-union-movement or the fights for freedom and equality, 
which the subjects consciously engage in, take place always already inside the ideology itself. 
These efforts just reproduce the ideology instead of opposing it. The politics,  consciously 
conducted by the subjects,  cannot problematize the actual cause behind their problems. The 
actual problem, via Althusser´s Lacanian analysis, remains a “lost referent” for the subjects as 
conscious beings.   The actual reason behind the class-system,  the repressive relations of 
production, or the patriarchal family-structure remains a lost referent for the subjects. The real 
cause behind the problems, experienced by the subjects, is the repressive symbolic order, 
which cannot be questioned by the subjects. For Althusser,  any conscious effort, on the part 
of the subjects, to politicize the unequal situation they live in constitutes an ideological 
practice. (see e.g Theor.prac. 22-31).  
 
The political aspect of Althusser’s epistemology is that it denies the possibility of politics as a 
democratic practice. Because it is a subject-less practice, it cannot be criticised by “others”, 
i.e. by  other subjects. There is no pluralism to it, no “other points of views” from which it 
could be looked at and opposed.  Other points of views belong to the realm of “limitedness” 
(particularity, subjectivity. Politics that can be opposed by other points of views belong to the 
realm of the politics of the subjects. The views expressed by the subjects themselves, are 
interpreted  by  the  science  –  or  by  the  Party  informed  by  the  science  –  as  symptoms  of  the  
underlying problems,  not as potentially valid contributions to democratic discussion. Because 
the scientific politics is not subjective, it has no limits or an outside to it - or actually it does 
not  recognize  any  outside  to  it.   Based  on  a  patronizing  epistemology,  it  does  not  take  the  
criticisms -  coming from the distorted minds of the subjects – seriously.   The Althusserian 
scientists place their own expertise above the knowledge of the subjects. Seen from a 
Hegelian point of view,  the Althusserian scientists appear as “Masters”, who cannot take the 
subjects  as  their  equals.  In  Hegelian  terms,  Althusser´s  theory  constitutes  a  system  of  one-
sided recognition, where only the scientists (or the Party leadership, as long as it follows the 
correct line) are granted universal recognition. Universal knowledge is for Hegel knowledge 
which is recognized  to correspond with its object. As such it is similar to what for Althusser 
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is scientific knowledge. Whereas the knowledge of the subjects is described by Althusser, via 
Lacan,   as  imaginary  and  distorted,   the  knowledge  of  the  scientists  is  described  as  real.  
Looked from the point of view of Hegel´s subject-theory in PhS, Althusser´s subject-theory 
constitutes a pure self-consciousness i.e.  an Unhappy Consciousness.  Althusser´s subject-
theory constitutes a sort of “pure epistemology” (purified from particular subjectivity) on the 
basis of which “pure politics” (purified of subjective goals) is conducted.  
 
Hegel´s idea,  that subjects are “totalities”, or that the knowledge of the subjects corresponds 
totally with its object, constituting thus the identity of the subject and its objects (in the realm 
of free self-consciousness and reciprocal relationships)  means that subjects are not 
epistemologically enslaved.  For Hegel, in order not to keep some group of people, or subjects  
in general in epistemological bondage is to see them  as  “totalities”, i.e. as real for 
themselves.  This means that the subjects are not seen to be “theorized” or “realized” 
externally (by philosophy, science etc.), but that the subjects are seen as potentially competent 
“theorists”  of  themselves.   According  to  Hegel,  if  we  see  the  knowledge  of  the  Others  as  
necessarily and always already “distorted”, “unreal”, or “necessarily not accessible for the 
subject itself”, as Althusser describes the knowledge of the subjects, we posit these subjects in 
epistemological slavery.     
 
As said already above, subjects appear as instrumentalized for the Althusserian Marxist 
scientists. Althusser himself says that the subjects “produce material”, e.g. various ideological 
practices and relations of production,  which is then analyzed and worked on by the scientists. 
Althusser writes about this: 
 
 
It (science) does not “work” on a purely objective “given”, that of pure and 
absolute “facts”. On the contrary, its particular labour consists of elaborating its 
own scientific facts through a critique of the ideological “facts” elaborated by an 
earlier ideological practice (For Marx, 184)  
 
 
The Science itself does not experience any particular pressures for the transformation of the 
society. Such pressures can be felt - as particular, identifiable pressures -  only by the 
subjects. Because the science does not think of things  on the basis of any identifiable 
(historical,  subjective,  particular)  ontologies,   principles  or  ideas,   it  can  be  in  contact  with  
particular things (including particular feelings and experiences) only through the minds of the 
subjects. The scientists need the subjects to be able to have “objects” of analysis  - as “pure” 
objects cannot be taken as objects of analysis. No particular things exist for the scientists, as 
they take particular things as products of ideological symbolic structures. Scientists see that 
particular things exist for subjects - as the ideological thinking of the subjects - not for 
themselves. Scientists cannot, however, work on pure, non-subjective, unlimited things – i.e. 
on things as they exist (or actually non-exist) for the scientists. Hence, the scientists work on 
objects which are provided (laboured) for them by the subjects. In Hegelian terms, the 
subjects are used as the Bondsmen (labourers) for the scientists and for the scientific politics.  
The scientists place themselves above the subjects, yet, depend on the subjects to be able to be 
in contact – also politically - with a particular world.       
 
Althusser sees that the “pressure for transformation” is “felt” in the ideological realm, by the 
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subjects. Yet, the subjects themselves are not taken as equal participants in the (scientific) 
analysis of what the “pressure, being felt” implies, and how the transformation of the society 
should henceforth be conducted. Politics (as a scientific practice) is hence conducted in a 
realm beyond the very subjects, whose own experiences  are being analysed, and whose own 
world is to be “worked” and transformed as the result of the analysis. Science (or the Party) 
thus “mediates”, or acts as a “priest” (to use a somewhat Hegelian choice of words) between 
the subjects (the particular, limited world) and the real, the un-limited and the not-distorted  
world.   The Marxist scientists thus appear as  “therapeutic” analysts and politicians, who first 
listen  to  the  subjects  and  analyse  their  situation  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  scientific  
expertise, then come up to a conclusion of what is wrong with the subjects, and then carry out 
a therapeutic programme (i.e. Marxists scientific  practice) to ease the pressures of the 
subjects. It seems that, by purifying Marxism from its Hegelian aspects, Althusser also 
purifies it from its democratic aspects. True, even Hegelian Marxists (like Lukács) have been 
willing to accept the dominant role of the Party as the “educating dictator”. But their Marxism 
at least contained a promise of a Hegelian Aufhebung of the subject-object distinction when 
the people in the distant future are finally able to govern themselves (Lukács 1972; Schmitt 
1985, 52-62).  
 
Althusser’s psychoanalytical distinction between ideology and science appears to constitute a 
corresponding distinction inside politics. In other words, a psychoanalytical and “therapeutic” 
distinction becomes constituted inside politics. This appears as a specific contemporary 
version of patronizing politics, characteristic perhaps for a culture permeated by  
psychoanalytical thinking.   There is the “traumatized”  politics (the distorted politics of the 
subjects) and the scientific politics (i.e. the analytical practice, which is supposed to be a 
“neutral party” in the cure, given to the traumatized subjects).  Epistemological asymmetries 
justify political asymmetries.  
 
As Marxists, Althusser and Kojève seem to represent the opposite ends of the scale. Kojève 
appropriates Hegel and praises the active, negating subject; Althusser refutes Hegel and 
makes the subject merely as an instrument of Ideology. However, both thinkers are wrestling 
with  the  same  problem.  Even  if  Marx  and  the  Marxists  reject  Hegel’s  view  of  history  as  a  
development of (collective) self-consciousness, they, like Hegel, must be able to explain the 
epistemic status of their own theory. It is especially important for them. On one hand, they 
want to explain the development of consciousness – including theories, like that of their own 
– as products of something which lies beyond the (present) consciousness. On the other hand, 
they suppose that their own theory not only describes the world correctly, but is able to 
change it. So, they are bound to explain how their own theory is possible. And there seems to 
be only two consistent alternatives available. They can postulate the independent viewpoint of 
Science, as Althusser does, or they can return to Hegel and suppose that the historical process 
they describe explains the viewpoint from which it can be seen correctly (Kojève, and in a 
very different way, Lukàcs).  However, I try to argue that even non-Marxists may have to face 
a similar choice.       
 
I have discussed these critical points in detail, because Butler’s they may be potentially 
relevant for Butler’s theory, too. Althusser’s influence to Butler has not generally been 
discussed in the commentaries (see 4.2. and 5.1.1.). Alike the critics of Althusser, Butler is 
very critical towards any such distinctions (epistemological or political) as Althusser´s 
distinction between ideology and science. As such, it may seem paradoxical that Butler takes 
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just Althusser as a key theorist in her subject-theory. However, Butler´s way to refer to 
Althusser assumes a quite limited range. She for example does not discuss Althussers 
distinction between ideology and science.  Instead she refers mainly just to his theory of 
Interpellation, which she does not fully agree with.  Nevertheless, referring to Althusser´s 
theory of Interpellation, without discussing it as a part of the distinction between “ideology” 
and “science” appears as problematic on Butler´s part.   
166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Butler 
4.1. Introduction to Butler 
4.1.1 “Ek-static terms” and “ek-static politics”  
 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse how Butler’s  theory of the ek-statism of thought 
things (including subjects themselves as objects of thinking) and her “performative politics” 
are related to Hegel’s subject-theory and the Hegelian-inflected subject-theories of  thinkers 
like  Alexandre  Kojève.   Butler  describes  the  performative  politics  as  “a  process”  and  a  
“movement itself” or a “critical movement”. Butler’s political writings are mainly of 
subjective identities or sexual identities. However, she says that her performative politics does 
not take any particular notion of a “subject”, sexual identity or a gender-difference as its point 
of departure. Instead, she claims that all particular notions of subject or sexuality are  “closed” 
and  based on what the notions violently silence and exclude. All particular notions of 
subjects and of things in general are in the need of “radical mobilization”. They are in the 
need  of  “putting  themselves  into  a  critical  process”.  Butler  claims  that  she  does  not  herself  
make any “ontological assumptions” or normative statements concerning the existence of any 
specific subjective or sexual “natures”.  For Butler descriptions of subjects or things as 
particulars are formed in normative cultural contexts. In this she adheres closely to Foucault 
and also to Althusser (as is further explained in ch.3).    
 
As readers of this study may understand, it is quite complex a task to analyse a critical and a 
political theory which does not take any specific normative idea of a “goal to be reached” as 
its starting point.  This poses a challenge for the analysis because Butler does not only analyse 
political  thinking.  Instead  she  also  criticises  it  and  wants  to  change  it.   She  does  not  only  
analyze the thought of those who make “ontological assumptions” of the world outside of 
language, or who have specific normative ideas of goals. Butler criticises various normative 
and political thoughts, and, she also has her own  political programme to provide, the “critical 
movement itself” i.e. “performative politics”. Yet, what is a critical and a political programme 
like which does not strive for any particular normative goals? How is criticism conducted if it 
does not commit itself to any normative ideal or criterion?  Going through Butler’s writings 
convinces one that the base of Butler’s criticism is to criticise various normative modes of 
thinking (or descriptions of the world) on the basis of what these theories or descriptions 
themselves refute and silence.  In Butler’s politics the idea is, first, to make various normative 
thoughts concerning subjects and things aware of their own “internal violence toward 
otherness” and, second, to change these thoughts through their own internal otherness.  A 
concern for the Other is central in her works.  
 
Butler’s refusal to make any ontological or rational assumptions of subjects and things by 
herself includes the aspect that she is critical when others make them. As explained e.g. in the 
chapter 4.1.10, her idea of “performative politics” is intended to “trouble” and “subvert” such 
assumptions, as this kind of assumptions always, for Butler, attempt to be what they cannot 
be, i.e. constitute a complete and final self-knowledge.  Critical readings of other thinkers 
make up the bulk of Butler’s theoretical works.  
 
Criticizing and politicizing various theories on the basis of what these theories themselves 
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refute appears as the basic critical, political and also theoretical goal for Butler. This goal 
constitutes the ground idea in Butler’s performative politics as a “critical movement”.  She 
frequently reminds in all her books that “terms” should be opened up for their internal 
otherness and that this project does not have an end. Instead, it is a continuous process.   
These  ideas  seem,  at  first,  highly  abstract,  not  at  all  easy  to  comprehend.   What  are  these  
“terms” and what are these “internal others”?  Over again Butler reminds that for her things or 
properties like “woman”, “heterosexuality”, “homosexuality” or even “democracy” are, 
firstly, “internally ek-static terms” and, secondly, that these terms are “processes” or 
“movements”. Things are thus already “processes” even that also her politics takes “a criticial 
process” as its goal. This study focuses on Butler’s thought of “things” as “processual” and as 
“internally ek-static terms” and on her politics as “a critical movement itself”. Butler’s 
performative politics (as a critical movement) is based on her idea of things as processual ek-
static terms. In short, her idea of various entities or properties (like “woman”, “sexuality”, 
“gender-difference”, democracy”, “human” etc.) as ek-static terms means that these terms are 
internally multiple constructions which include e.g. such necessary aspects as “the normative 
subject-position” and “the refuted other” in it (the idea of things as ek-static terms is further 
explained in chapter 4.1.1).  Butler’s theoretical roots in Hegel and in thinking influenced by 
Hegel (thinkers like Kojève, Lacan and Foucault) emerge as most important.  The theory of 
the “internal otherness” and the processes caused by it in subjective thinking was first 
provided by Hegel.  PhS is the central text of this theory, as well as the Encyclopedia 
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1830).   Butler’s first published academic study, her 
dissertation  thesis  SD  (1987)  analyzed  how  Hegel’s  theory  of  the  “internal  otherness”  -  
especially as it is presented in PhS as the mutual dynamic between “Desire” and 
“Recognition” - has influenced prominent contemporary subject-theories.  Butler’s later 
works are based on the same basically Hegelian subject-theory (i.e. subject as internally 
multiple and processual) which is already present in SD.  
 
Readers of this study may wonder why so little is said here of Butler´s thought of gender- 
identities, as she is known especially as a theorist of gender. The reason is that this study 
concentrates on Butler´s thought of things, including sexual identities, as internally processual 
ek-static  terms.  When  Butler´s   ek-static  terms  are  analyzed,  it  would  be  misleading  to  say  
that the subject of analysis is Butler´s “theory of sexuality”, or, for that matter, of any other 
particular entity.  Butler explicitly refutes the idea that there are such “objects” like sexualities 
which await “out there in the reality” (outside of language) to be discovered and explained.  
Butler argues that all particular notions concerning subjectivities or sexualitites are 
constituted in normative, subjective thinking and, as such, these notions are formed by what 
they exclude and “refute”.  
 
Butler has been often identified, in a somewhat straightforward manner, as an anti-Hegelian 
or  an  anti-Kantian  thinker.  She  is  often  associated  with  the  French  postmodernist  or  
poststructuralist thinkers, who tend to be anti-Hegelians (while still struggling with Hegelian 
ideas). One reason for this may be that people who are interested in  feminist-, or queer-
studies, or interested in the postmodernist thinking,  and who read Butler as a theorist in these 
fields dislike Hegel and also know little of him. Disliking Hegel for feminist reasons is easy, 
as becomes clear also in the chapter 2.3.4. Many readers of Butler are not likely to be readers 
of Hegel. Consequently, the theoretical links between Butler´s “processual gender-politics”  
and Hegelian dialectics of subjective consciousness are not easily seen.  Nor is Butler´s “re-
appropriative gender performativity” seen as rooted in Hegelian “negation of negation” (i.e. 
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sublative dialectics). However, coming into contact with one´s “radical otherness” is the basic 
idea  in Hegel´s dialectics of subjective consciousness in PhS.  In this dialectics contradictory 
thoughts (of a thing) are united together in a way which goes beyond what either of the 
contradicting views themselves would have been able to predict in advance.   Theorists like 
Sara Salih or Moya Lloyd who have written introductory books on Butler´s thinking 
acknowledge the fundamental importance of Hegel, although they do not analyze the relation 
between the two thinkers in detail.  (see Salih, 2002, 43; Lloyd  2007, 13-22).     
 
Butler indeed started her academic life as a Hegel-scholar. Her first published book was her 
dissertation work Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France 
(1987). It analyzed Hegel´s influence on some of the most prominent twentieth century 
French philosophers like Sartre,  Foucault  and Lacan. In SD and later also e.g.  in BM,  PLP 
and  UG  she  theorizes  the  ideas  of  thinkers  mentioned  above,  and  also  thinkers  like   Luce  
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva by analyzing them from the point of view of the Hegelian “ek-
static” subjectivity.  She finds out especially in SD, but also in her later books (e.g. in PLP 
and UG) that the “Hegelian subject” travels across centuries in the works of these “post-
Hegelian” theorists. (e.g. SD vii-xiv, 185-186, 198, 227; UG 131-151,236-241, PLP 34, 53-
54).  
 
Butler herself  clearly acknowledges her theoretical background as a “Hegel scholar”.  As is 
explained further in this chapter 3, Butler acknowledges her theoretical roots in Hegel. Also 
Hegelian-inflected thinkers like Foucault,  Lacan and Freud are important for Butler.  Butler 
argues especially in SD that thinkers like Foucault and Lacan (and many others influenced by 
these thinkers like e.g. Irigaray, Zizek) build on the Hegelian theory of  subjects as ek-static, 
internally beyond themselves. In PLP Butler e.g. argues that regardless of Foucault´s 
significant moves beyond dialectical logic, he remains, as Butler says, “unwittingly tethered 
to the Hegelian formulation” as concerns his idea of “subjection” (see PLP 34). Indeed, many 
of the central Foucauldian ideas can be seen to have a Hegelian origin. In Foucault, like 
basically in Hegel, particular subjectivity is constituted in particular, historical, normative 
discursive  contexts.  Both  thinkers  also  agree  that   there  is  more  to  subjects  than  these  
particular normative contexts.     
 
The Foucauldian idea that subjects are multiple (internally heterogeneous) can be seen to 
build on Hegel´s idea that thinkers and thinking as such are made of aspects  which go beyond 
and contradict with the normatively constituted particular subjectivity. These aspects of selves 
(i.e. the particular normative subjectivity and the aspects which go beyond it)  are mutually 
contradictory and they can be alien to each others. Also the Foucauldian idea that subjects are 
influenced by “powers”, unknown to them, and that subjects emerge in amidst of these 
powers  can  be  seen   (as  Butler  sees  in  SD  and  in  PLP)  to  build  on  Hegel´s  idea  that  
“otherness” influences subjects.  However, as is argued in this study,  e.g. in the chapter 3, a 
specific Kojèvian reading of Hegel can be seen to be behind Foucault´s idea that particular 
subjectivity is necessarily produced in relations of “violent subjection”. For Foucault, subjects 
are necessarily produced in subjection  to powers external to the subjects themselves. Because 
the subject is constituted by something (the other) which it necessarily violates, when it tries 
to  relate  to  it,  or,  when  it  tries  to  conceptualize  it,  subject´s  constitution  is  unknown  (non-
conceptual) for the subject itself.  It is argued in this study that Kojèvian Hegelianism is not 
only behind Foucault´s theory of subjectivity, but also behind Lacan´s, Butler´s and a few 
others subject-theories, like e.g. Mouffe´s (see chapter 6).  In Kojevian Hegelianism particular 
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subjectivity is seen to be necessarily formed through a repressive relation to the other. 
Because the subject cannot mediate conceptually its relation with the other, without 
repressing the other, the constitution of the subject remains both violently constituted, and, 
un-conceptual (see Butler´s  analysis of  Foucault´s Hegelian roots in SD, 217-231; PLP 34) 
 
Butler´s claim that thinkers like Foucault, Lacan etc. are ultimately “Hegelians” is agreed 
with in this study.  Butler also argues that many other prominent “post-Hegelian” thinkers like 
Sartre and Deleuze remain connected to the Hegelian subject-theory, even that these thinkers 
themselves often reject Hegelian (rational, systematic and idealistic) thinking.   (UG 148; SD 
xiv-xv, 147-151, 175-176;  PLP 3-5,34,58)  
 
According to Butler, the Hegelian “ek-static subject” which reappears in the theories of 
Foucault, Sartre etc. is never able to disconnect itself from Hegel, even that most of the “post-
Hegelian” theorists explicitly refute Hegel´s rationalism. Butler argues that  because 
“disconnection” (i.e. “negation”, in Hegelian terms) and especially the idea of “overcoming 
oneself”  (the idea of dialectical Aufhebung as  the  “negation  of  the  negation”)   are  Hegel´s  
ground ideas, it appears  difficult not to stay within Hegel´s formulations if a basic theoretical 
link with Hegel´s ek-static subjectivity is accepted. The basic point in Hegel´s subject-theory 
is  to  go  beyond  oneself  through  contradicting  (or,  as  Butler  would  say,  radical) otherness. 
Seeing subjects and things as complex constructions, made of mutually radical and 
contradicting elements is a core (Hegelian-inflected ) idea in much of contemporary thought. 
Also the idea that things move because there is contradictory, mutually antagonistic elements 
in them is a Hegelian-rooted thought in much of contemporary philosophy, e.g. in the 
postmodern thought.  Butler sees that this thought is not quite capable of “overcoming” 
Hegel. Much of contemporary talk of “conceptual change” or “internal change” is based on 
the sublative dialectics of Hegel, even that often Hegel´s ideas are explicitly rejected.   
 
Conceptual change is actually somewhat a synonym to Hegel´s sublative dialectics in which 
the  idea  is  to  preserve  (continue)  the  “old”  thought  of  some thing  (and  thus  stay  within  the  
same concept) while also changing the concept internally through radical or contradicting 
otherness. This idea is echoed especially strongly in postmodernist theories of parodic change 
and parodic politics which  is  seen  to  be  also  a  synonym for  the  “queer”  politics.  Even  that  
many queer-theorists would explicitly reject any connection to Hegelian conceptual change, 
the idea of parodic queer -politics resembles in many ways the basic idea in Hegel´s sublative 
dialectics. Importantly, Butler is seen as a leading queer-theorist.  In postmodernist or queer-
parodic politics the central idea is to change some thought of things (e.g. a thought of sexual 
identities)  through  radically  different  (called  as  parodic)  otherness.  In  parodic  politics  
contradicting (radically related) elements are united together in order to produce something 
radically new. A basically very Hegelian argument is often made i.e. that particular identities 
are internally contradictory, beyond the particular, culturally normative identity. Various 
“gender-blending” etc. strategies are presented as examples of parodic politics.   Parodic 
otherness  resembles  what  Hegel  says  of  contradicting  otherness  and  what  Butler  says  of  
radical otherness. Parodic other cannot be seen to be “different” as it is not differentially 
related to the thing whose other it is. (see on postmodern parody e.g. Hutcheon 1985; 
Hutcheon 1988; and on Queer parody e.g. Grosz 1994; Kleinhans 1994;  Meyer 1994; 
Butler´s queer-political ideas are explained further e.g. in chapter 4.1.10) 
 
Hegel´s ek-static subjectivity thus continues its process of overcoming itself in much of the 
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contemporary philosophy. This philosophy claims to have overcome Hegel, which is indeed a 
very Hegelian idea. This is what Butler sees happening in the subject-theories of e.g. Foucault 
and Lacan. (on Lacan see e.g. SD xv, 198).  In her own theory  of ek-static subjectivity Butler 
does not claim  to  disconnect  with  Hegel.  Instead  she  clearly  claims  to  adopt  her  idea  of  
subjects  and  things  as  “internally  ek-static  terms”  from  Hegel.  She  also  says  that   in  many  
ways she builds her subject-theory and political theory upon Hegel´s processual subject-
theory.  Actually, Butler discusses with  Hegel in all her books.  Besides Hegel, Butler 
discusses (mainly, yet not solely) with those theorists in the theories of whom, according to 
Butler, the “Hegelian ek-static subject” continues its travels by “negating” and “preserving” 
itself in various ways. (ibid.)   
 
The basically Kantian-Hegelian idea that the subject  as well as things are internally multiple 
and that they include internal otherness appears as the core theoretical and argumentative unit 
all throughout Butler´s works, including her political thought. Butler´s basic notion 
concerning subjects and things in general is that they are internally beyond themselves.  For 
Butler,  things  are  always  “outside  of  themselves”.  Butler  calls  this  also  as  internal alterity.  
This basic ek-statism is theorized throughout Butler´s works   on the basis of, first, the 
basically Kantian-Hegelian way of seeing all thought things as subjective, historical and 
limited (including the self itself as a thought subject for itself). For Butler, like for Kant and 
Hegel,  subjects  and  things  are  formed  of   “parts”.  As  said  already  above,  an  important  
description of the “partial” formation of subjects and things is made here by Kant. This is the 
distinction between “thing for us/thing in itself”. For Butler things and subjects are formed of 
the “subjectively known part” which Butler typically calls as “subject-position”, “the 
temporal  site  of  identity”  or  plainly  as  “subject”.  There  is  also  another  part  to  subjects  and  
things, i.e. the “outside” of the subject-position,  the otherness or the “constitutive outside”.   
 
Secondly,  Hegel´s  criticism  of  Kant  is  the  base  for  Butler´s  critical  readings  of  various  
thinkers, like Foucault, Lacan, Althusser and Irigaray and a few other.  These criticisms are 
discussed throughout this chapter. Butler criticises through Hegel the Kantian distinction 
between “subject for us” (i.e. subject as a subjectively and historically thought subject) and 
“subject in itself” (subject as beyond or outside of what it is for some spesific subjects living 
in spesific historical contexts). Hegel opposed the Kantian distinction by arguing that the 
distinction itself (and not only its other part, i.e. the part of “thing for us”) is subjective, 
historical and limited. Hegel modified the Kantian distinction into the question of recognitive 
relations between the  “self´s knowledge of things”  and “the Other´s knowledge of things”. 
For Hegel, universal, real knowledge of things can be attained if selves recognize the 
knowledge of Others as valid.  Here  the  idea  of  freedom appears as an important, ethical 
aspect of the theory of knowledge. In reciprocally recognitive relations the epistemologically 
enslaved knowledge of the Other becomes freed. The silenced and patronized knowledge of 
the Other is recognized basically as an equally valid knowledge (of subjects and things). The 
Other is recognized as a valid contributor (equally valid with others) to how things are known.  
It  can  be  also  said  that  “otherness  is  given  room  inside  of  things”  as  the  Other´s  views  of  
things are being considered valid. In reciprocally recognitive relations things are hence known 
freely, which means that the internal, constitutive otherness (of things) is not 
epistemologically enslaved.  
 
Hegel´s notion of the Other, or otherness, is in many ways the central question in many 
Hegelian-inflected philosophies, including Butler´s. Hegel describes otherness e.g. by saying 
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that it is a “free object”, object capable of resisting the “objectifications” of others. Hegel also 
says that before one finds itself in the other in reciprocally recognitive relationships, one does 
not know its own self  and lead a satisfactory life.   Hence, the Other (and one´s own self)  is  
found by recognizing the Other as a free being, capable of objectifying its own self and the 
whole universe internally. It appears that for Hegel, the Other is “radically different” from me 
because it is neither me,  nor a mute instrument of my desires. In this sense, the Other is like 
me; we both are the centres of our respective universes and unwilling to let the other to define 
what we are. Paradoxically, the Other is “radically different” because it is (in this respect) 
similar to me. It could be even said that because the other is too similar with me (i.e. it is a 
being who objectifies the universe instead of being a differentiated object in my universe) it is 
radically different from me. Inanimate objects, trees, animals or even small babies are not 
“radically different”. In Butler´s theory the question of radical difference is a central one. 
 
As is explained e.g. in chapters  4.1.7- 4.1.8, even that Butler joins Hegel in his criticism of 
Kant, Butler thinks, via thinkers like Foucault, Althusser and Lacan, that  subjective 
knowledge of things (i.e of entities like “sexuality” which is the main context in which Butler 
conducts the Kantian-Hegelian debate) always fails in its attempt  to describe its object in full. 
Butler adopts from Hegel the idea that subjective descriptions of subjects and things attempt 
to be universal and final descriptions and that these  descriptions are always universal and 
final for themselves,  in  one  way  or  the  other.   Hence,  subjective  (  limited)  descriptions  of  
subjects and things attempt to describe their object unlimitedly, in full, in complete. They 
intend to render their own norm (of subjects and things) into a universal norm – a norm for all 
- of how subjects and things are thought of.  Departing here from Hegel  Butler says that the 
subject´s striving for universality and “unlimitedness”  necessarily fails. The subject fails in 
its intention to gain universal (full, complete) knowledge of subjects and things as its 
knowledge is always constituted by “refuted otherness”. Hegel, in contrast, thinks that this 
attempt (for free, universal and full knowledge) is based on the subject´s already inherently 
being free, striving to know things fully in a community of free, reciprocally recognitive  
selves.   Hegel  also  thinks  that  this  freedom   can  be  achieved  by  the  subject.  Also,  in  PhS,  
when the subject achieves freedom (by rendering its refuted other into an equal other self) it 
unites with the “philosophical we” who have all the time known that the subject and the other 
are equally free.  
 
As will be explicated especially in the later chapters of this chapter 4, the Kantian distinction 
into “thing for us/thing in itself” remains also important for Butler, as Butler criticises  Hegel, 
in  turn,  through  a  distinction  which  resembles  the  Kantian  one.  In  short,  Butler  does  not  
accept the basic Hegelian idea that subjective, limited, context-dependent knowledge  (i.e. 
what subject is for us in our various contexts) can constitute universal, unlimited and real 
knowledge  (i.e. what subjects and things are in themselves). Butler’s not accepting this is 
based on Butler’s rejection of the Hegelian “free self-consciousness”. Butler does not accept 
the Hegelian idea  that because subjects can conceptually and rationally relate to what the 
radically different others know of things,  subjects can attain universal knowledge (which is 
the basic idea in actual, free self-consciousness, the necessary condition for reciprocally 
recognitive relationships; see chapter 2.3.).  For Hegel, subjective knowledge of things is 
always limited, because it can relate conceptually to the contradicting knowledge of others, it 
can go over its limits. In this sense, in Hegel, limited knowledge of things can reach universal 
and unlimited knowledge.  
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In Butler, the subjective (otherness-refuting) thinking never reaches the level of its storyteller.  
It appears that Butler´s otherness-refuting thinking never learns to know (of subjects and 
things) what Butler knows. In Butler, the otherness-refuting thinking  never (itself) becomes a 
thinker who is aware that all thinking is based on radical otherness and who does not want to 
refute any otherness.  This important theme is taken up in the next sub-chapters. 
 
 
4.1.2  The discursive and historical formation of subjects and things   
 
 
It can be said that an internally ek-static term is the basic theoretical, argumentative, 
epistemological and political unit for Butler. Butler does not have any specific “theory of a 
subject” or “of sexuality”, even that she has become famous for her views on gender and sex.  
Her views about sexuality and subject are instances of her general theory of ek-static terms. 
 
But what in fact is “a term” for Butler?  It appears that any thing or property which is thought 
of, spoken of, or seen as an object  is a term for Butler. So, for example  “woman”, “body”, 
“materiality” , “heterosexuality”, “Queer-politics”, “democracy”, “universality”, 
“performativity”, “power”, “psychoanalysis” etc. are all “terms”. Butler appears to emphasize 
the  character  of  a  thing  or  property  as  an  ek-static  term  also  by  referring  to  it  as  “a  thing  
itself”.  Butler refers to “woman” as an ek-static term of “woman itself” (e.g. in GT, 33), to 
body as a “body itself” (GT 129),  to “democracy itself”(ES 90) and to “universal itself”(ES 
89; CHU 268,179).  
 
For Butler, things and properties are terms, which sound rather nominalistic. She does not 
want to draw clear distinctions between objects, concepts, and the related linguistic entities.  
However, Butler’s terms have a Hegelian structure. They are first and foremost   internally ek-
static constructions.  Butler’s Hegelian roots are shown strongly here. Through the idea of the 
internal ek-statism, Butler’s terms are similar constructions as Hegel’s “concepts”. They are 
structured by a constitutive, primary relation between the self and the Other.  There is a 
relation between the “subject-position” (i.e. what the self is for itself as a determinate object) 
and the “other” inside Butler’s terms,  like  in Hegel’s concepts.  Like in Hegel, this relation is 
contradictory, or, as Butler says “radical”.  
 
Similar to Hegel, for Butler things are subjectively thought constructions (“terms”) which 
however always include a contradictory, ek-static relation between the historical self of the 
term (denoting the initial thinker, subject, of the term) and the “Other”. Like for Hegel, for 
Butler things exist for historical subjective thinkers, i.e. for situated subjects, or, “subject-
positions”.  Term is in this sense a subjective, historical and hence “limited” construction. 
However, there is more to terms, besides their historical and cultural limitedness. Like for 
Hegel, for Butler terms are not fully determined by their time and place, or by their individual 
thinkers. Terms are “outside”, at least partly,  of what they are for any specific subject or for 
any specific culture. They are capable of change and movement, because the aspect of 
contradictory otherness is internal to them. What does the internal otherness means? Butler 
takes here after Hegel’s idea of concepts as self-reflective constructions.  
 
As is explained in chapter 2, for Hegel selves are capable of changing their idea of 
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themselves. This ability is based on their capacity for self-reflection through the Other. For 
Hegel, all actual change is dialectical and takes place as Aufhebung, through the Other.   
Selves can alter their views of themselves and of the world because they can relate internally 
to the Other’s thoughts of the world.   
 
What makes the contradictory other important for both Butler and Hegel is that it is internally 
(instead of externally) related to the “subject” of the term.  The “subject” of the term 
(referring  with  Hegel  and  Butler  both  to  the  thinker,  subject,   of  the  term as  well  as  to  the  
content and form of the term) is influenced and changed because of its relation to the Other. 
Internal change is what Hegel calls as dialectical change, and as said above, all actual change 
is dialectical, internal change for Hegel.  It means that the “subject” (referring to the thinker 
itself  as  well  as  to  the  subjective  content  of  its  thoughts,  i.e.  the  terms  it  thinks  )  changes  
through  the  Other  self-consciously,  i.e.  for  itself.   Dialectical  change  is  in  this  a  change  of  
which the thinking self is conscious of.   
 
Alike Hegel’s concepts, Butler’s terms exist for subjective, historical  thinkers,  however,  at 
the same time, these same terms exist for a contradicting other, or, as Butler says,  for a 
radical outside. Because the contradicting other is internally related to  the  “subject”  of  the  
term, neither is the thinking subject,  or the terms (which the subject thinks of) fully 
determined by any specific  limit (be it time, place, ideology etc.).  The internal 
contradictoriness of terms render Butler’s terms very similar “living” constructions as Hegel’s 
concepts. As Hegel’s concepts, Butler’s terms are limited by their limited subjects and by 
their history and culture, however, these terms are also free from these limits. The internal 
contradictoriness, called by Butler as “radicality”, “alterity” or “ek-statims” is the key for 
what appears as very Hegelian “freedom” - in terms of the contradictory, dialectical relation 
between the self and the other.    There is a dialectical movement to them, caused by the 
mutual communication between the self and the other.  
 
Throughout her writings Butler theorizes terms, which she finds politically important, by 
analyzing them as internally ek-static constructions. Butler concentrates on the modern 
western societies where such terms like “subject”, “human” and “gender” appear as politically 
central.  In Gender Trouble she calls contemporary Western   societies as “heterosexual 
matrixes”, referring to the normative heterosexuality and the refutation of the radical Other - 
not only women but also homosexuals, ethnic others etc. Women, homosexuals and also 
ethnic and religious others appear as “refuted” and “silenced” in the Western societies.  Butler 
finds that the contemporary Western way to refute certain “others” like homosexuals is based 
on how  terms like “subject” and “human” are being constructed and understood. Terms like   
“subject” construct the basic self-understanding or self-reflection of thinkers. The way people 
see themselves and others -  and their  mutual relations with others -  is  based on the way the 
self-reflective terms like “subject” are structured. Both Hegel and Butler think that in order for 
people to be able to live in relations in which others are not refuted,  the basic self-reflective 
notions should be seen as internally complex  or contradictory. In short, these notions should 
be seen as “internally ek-static”.  
 
Hegel argues all along PhS that in order for people to be able to acknowledge other 
(contradictory) points of views concerning any things, they should first see “otherness” 
(contradictoriness) as something internal to themselves as subjects. In short, they should 
recognize the Other as another, equal consciousness of the world. In a similar vein as Hegel, 
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Butler finds that the refutation of (contradicting, radical) others is based on how the thinking 
subjects see themselves. If thinkers see themselves as non-contradictory (non-ek-static)  
beings, they look at others from a non-ek-static point of view, which does not allow the other 
to  be  radically  other.  They  read  the  other  from the  point  of  view of  their  own non-ek-static  
“language”.   
 
Butler sees, similarly as Hegel, that the way a thinker sees itself (as a subject) is carried into – 
or included into - how the thinker sees itself, others and the world.  In other words, the way a 
thinker conceptualizes whatever entity it thinks of is based on how it conceptualizes itself. For 
Butler, through Hegel, one should acknowledge the validity of contradicting thoughts 
concerning whatever it thinks of, including itself.   
 
Butler makes a similar discovery as Hegel,   i.e. that the refutation of others is based on the 
thinkers incapacity to acknowledge themselves and others as contradictory (ek-static) beings. 
Thinkers who acknowledge themselves and others as contradictory beings, are capable of 
what Hegel calls as “free” or “reciprocally recognitive” relations with others. According to 
Butler, thinkers who acknowledge the internal “radicality” or “ek-statism” of themselves, and 
terms in general, are able to live in more democratic relations with others. With both thinkers, 
the acknowledgement of the internal ek-statism of things – which Hegel calls a recognitive 
attitude toward the Other and which he contrasts with an attitude of “Desire” -  is hence 
placed as a goal.  It is shown as a positive alternative to otherness-refuting, parochial and 
“enslaving” relations with others. For the both thinkers, thinkers who see themselves as non-
contradictory  beings,  end  up  always  refuting  some  others.   Both  theorists  see  that  when  a  
thinker sees itself as a non-contradictory being, it has an “enslaving” attitude toward others. 
Hegel calls this attitude “Desire” whereas Butler calls it often as an “imperialist” or 
“colonialist” attitude. This choice of expressions indicates that Butler shares Hegel’s 
“appropriation”-model of understanding. In understanding, people make objects in some 
sense as their own (cf. PR, Addition to §4).      
 
Throughout her writings, Butler analyzes politically relevant terms like “subject” and 
“sexuality” as ek-static constructions. Butler discusses how the “ek-static” relation  between 
the “subject-position” and the “other” is being constructed i.e. whether the ek-static relation is 
refuted and silenced or acknowledged when some term (like woman) is thought.  If the 
internal ek-statism is denied and forced into non-ekstatism, the radical, contradictory others 
are being silenced and repressed.   In contexts where the ek-statism is denied, the aspect of 
“subject-position” makes up the culturally legitimate and normative part of the term. 
Radically  other  points  of  views  onto  the  term  make  up   the  culturally  wrong,  un-normal  
aspects of the term.  
 
In my view, Hegel has given us an ek-static notion of the self, one which is, of 
necessity,  outside  itself,  not  self-identical,  differentiated  from  the  start.  It  is  the  self  
over here who considers its reflection over there, but it is equally over there, reflected, 
and reflecting. Its ontology is precisely to be divided and spanned in irrecovable ways. 
Indeed, whatever self emerges in the course of the Phenomenology of the Spirit is 
always at a temporal remove from its former appearance; it is transformed through its 
encounter with alterity, not in order to return to itself, but to become a self it never 
was. (UG, 148)    
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The internal ek-statism is also called as internal alterity by Butler. It describes a self who is, 
as Butler says, “since the beginning”, given to terms which are beyond this self. The internal 
alterity – or, the radical relation or the radical difference - between what Butler also calls as 
“subject-position” and “constitutive outside” resembles basically closely of what Hegel says 
of the internal contradictoriness  of selves and things. The internal otherness means that selves 
and things include aspects which need not have any common measure with each others (as 
differential systems). In this sense, these aspects are unknown for each others.  They  are  
unknown,  “unreadable”,   for  each  others,  because  they  are  not  internal  parts  of   any  larger  
interpretative system (a universal), which would include them both, and in reference to which 
they  could  identify,  particularize  (“read”)  each  others  –  at  least  not  in  any  simple  or  non-
contradictory  sense.    In  Hegel’s  and  Butler’s  terminology  a  thing,  or  a  self,  or  an  aspect   
which is Other in relation to something is not “different” to the one whose Other it is. “Other” 
is not one of the ordinary objects (i.e. one “particular” among others)  inside  one’s internally 
differentiated system of interpreting the world (i.e. one’s “universal”).   Nevertheless, for 
Butler, via Hegel, one is internally related to one’s Other, because one is an ek-static 
construction. The construction, which one ultimately is, reaches beyond one’s own internally 
differentiating universe.  And when this “beyond”, or “outside”, is seen to be internal to 
oneself, one can be seen as internally outside oneself, outside of one’s universe.  As ek-static, 
one is, as Butler says, internally “outside oneself”: partly unreadable for oneself, not fully 
identical with how one reads oneself or the world. 
 
Butler writes of the internal relation between oneself and one’s “beyond”, or, internal outside: 
 
To persist  in one’s being means to be given over from the start  to social  terms 
that  are  never  fully  one’s  own.  Those  terms  institute  a  linguistic  life  for  the  
“one” who speaks prior to any act of agency, and they remain both irreducible to 
the one who speaks and the necessary conditions of such “speech” (PLP 197) 
 
 
For Butler, various objects and properties like  one’s  subjective identity exist always within 
historical and cultural “interpretative fields” which she also calls as discourses. Theories are 
for Butler examples of object-formative discourses: 
 
..theory operates on the very level at which the object of inquiry is defined and 
delimited, and there is no givenness of the object which is not given within an 
interpretative  field  –  given  to  theory,  as  it  were,  as  the  condition  of  its  own  
appearance and legibility (CHU 274)   
 
  
For Butler, all thinking is necessarily discursive. Discourses are bounded, historical and 
cultural contexts of thinking. They are similar to the Hegelian “particular universes” (where 
thinking assumes the mode of “Consciousness as understanding”) or the Kantian “thing for 
us”. For Butler, all theoretical and philosophical thinking is discursive, conducted by 
discursively formed subjects. Thinking is always conducted by selves who are discursively 
formed and discursively posited into subjects. Discursively formed subjects constitute 
positions of thinking. All thinking is conducted by such subject-positions.  Discourses thus 
form subjects and these subjects constitute “positions of thinking”. The subjective positions of 
thinking are formed and also in many ways controlled by the discourses. When discursive 
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subjects think of entities or properties like “subject” or “gender-difference” or “human” or 
“democracy” – or, actually, when they constitute these entities in their thinking – the 
formation of these entities is always  controlled and guided by the discourse.   
 
Importantly, external entities and properties “out there” (e.g. material sexually differentiated 
bodies)  are  also  formed  discursively.  Material  world  out  there  is  for  Butler  -  in  a  very  
Hegelian manner - constituted in the thinking of selves. As regards its existence as an 
internally differentiated whole, it exists in the thinking of socially (discursively) formed 
subjects.   
 
Butler writes:  
 
To “concede” the undeniability of “sex” or its “materiality” is always to concede 
some version of “sex”, some formation of “materiality”. Is the discourse in and 
through which that concession occurs – and , yes, that concession invariably 
does occur – not itself formative of the very phenomenon that it concedes? To 
claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or 
exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is 
no reference to pure body which is not at  the same time a further formation of 
that body. In this sense, the linguistic capacity to refer to sexed bodies is not 
denied, but the very meaning of “referentiality” is altered. In philosophical 
terms, the constative claim is always to some degree performative. (BM 10-11)  
 
 
Butler argues above that to concede the un-deniability of “sex” is to concede always to some 
version of “sex”.  To concede that something exists is to always see this thing as a particular 
“something”. Butler’s argument here resembles Hegel’s idea of thinking as an internally 
differentiated construction. For Hegel, we always think things (including ourselves) as 
relational  constructions, in other words, within differential systems.  In order to think some 
thing,  we have to differentiate it from and relate it to other things.  We have to render the 
thing we think into an “it” or into a “something” so that we can think of it.  Hegel argues that 
our thinking – or our consciousness -  is always of  something (PhS §86).  In order for there to 
exist some thing (for us) this thing must be posited as some kind of  circumscribed object, an 
entity, which we can think of and which has definite properties.   This is possible only on the 
basis of an internally differentiated and related system.  Hegel calls these relational systems of 
internal differentiation as “particular universes”.  Hegel’s particular universes resemble, as 
was said above, Butler’s discourses. For Butler, like for Hegel, it is impossible to think of 
anything without forming the thing in some way. We cannot think of things which are totally 
formless and limitless. We always differentiate in one way or the other between those features 
which belong to the thing and those features which do not.   Butler agrees with Hegel on that 
even if we try to purify things from all of their particular content and their relationality with 
other things and render them pure abstractions, we nevertheless think of them  as some sort of 
relational constructions. We cannot think of totally pure abstractions without relating them  to 
any particulars.   Hence we always constitute an inside (i.e. the thing’s content; features that 
belong to the thing) and differentiate it from the outside (otherness; what does not belong 
inside the thing). Without there being a differentiated, particular inside and a differentiated 
particular outside, the thing would not exist as a thing  (for us).  (see e.g. CHU 144-145). 
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What  was  said  above  connects  with  Butler’s  theory  of  performativity. Thinking is 
“formative”, or, as Butler says “performative”. As formative, thinking never just thinks of 
things, instead, it always also participates in the formation of them. As performative, thinking 
can be said to “produce” the very objects it sees and thinks of.  In Butler,  thinking appears to 
be both: it participates in the further formation of the objects, things, it thinks of. Thinking 
also produces the objects which it often claims just to describe (as if they existed completely 
independently or outside of thinking).  However, Butler reminds that things are never formed 
or performed by one sovereign agent, instead, they are performed in discursive and historical 
thinking. Butler emphasizes the internal ek-statism of performative and formative thinking. 
 
Secondly, for Butler, besides being discursively thought and discursively controlled entities, 
thought by discursively formed and controlled subjects, terms are also internally something 
else than what is  thought of them within the boundaries of some discourse. Terms like e.g. 
“subject”, “human”  and “woman”  exist for discursive subjects, however, they exist also for  
“otherness”.  Discourses  are historical and limited.  Because discursive knowledge of things 
is limited, there is, in a way,  “more” to terms, according to Butler,  than what is allowed to be 
known of them by any discourse. This “something else” or “otherness” which is internal to 
terms is called by Butler  as the constitutive outside. It denotes the other part of the ek-statism 
of terms. Butler writes that it is a  “foundationalist fiction” to think that terms could ever 
denote stable, coherent identities:  
 
   
Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject, 
however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the 
assumption that the term women denotes a common identity. Rather than a 
stable signifier that commands the asent of those whom it purports to describe 
and represent, women, even in plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of 
contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley`s title suggests, Am I that Name? is 
a question produced by the very possibility of the name`s multiple 
significations. If one “is” a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to 
be exhaustive, not because a pregenerated “person” transcends the specific 
paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted 
coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender 
intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of 
discursively constituted identities (GT 3) 
 
“Gender is a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully 
what it is at any given juncture in time.” (GT 16) 
 
 
Butler  argues that terms like “woman” are multiple and plural constructions. However, this 
multiplicity does not make up such an internally coherent whole that if we would collect 
together all the parts of this multiplicity or pluralism we were to know what “woman” is like.  
In reference to thinkers like Foucault, Butler argues that terms are not made of “mutually 
agreeing” parts which would make up the term as a coherent concept, a unity.  In fact, there is  
an internal repression to terms like “woman” or “human”. Because the parts, making up the 
ek-statism of the term, are not quite appreciative of each others, at least not fully, there is an 
internal struggle as to what the term is.   
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Butler writes of the ek-statism of things, here of the terms “woman” and “gender”, in 
reference to Foucault: 
 
To expose the foundational categories of sex, gender, and desire as effects of a 
specific formation of power requires a form of critical enquiry that Foucault, 
reformulating Nietzsche, designates as “genealogy”. A genealogical critique 
refuses  to  search  for  the  origins  of  gender,  the  inner  truth  of  female  desire,  a  
genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has kept from view; rather, 
genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating, as an origin and cause 
those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, 
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin. (GT x-xi)  
 
Butler’s theory of the ek-statism of terms has a clear Kantian-Hegelian ground. Terms 
comprise of parts of which the other one is known “for us” while the other one is not. There is 
a somewhat troublesome internal relation or alterity to terms (or, objects)  as the part  known 
for us cannot in any simple way be related to its other part. For Butler, like for Hegel, things 
are made of mutually contradicting elements.  However, Butler largely agrees with thinkers 
like Foucault who explicitly argue that the internal relation is not only made of mutually 
contradicting elements but is necessarily a repressive one.  Hence the internal relation cannot 
be known (for us) as any internally coherent construction as a concept.  
 
Butler writes of the formation of subjects in the introductory chapter of BM: 
 
This text accepts as a point of departure Foucault’s notion that regulatory power 
produces the subjects it controls, that power is not only imposed externally, but 
works as the regulatory and normative means by which subjects are formed.(…) 
To this understanding of power as a constrained and reiterative production it is 
crucial to add that power also works through the foreclosure of effects, the 
production of an “outside”, a domain of unlivability and unintelligibility that 
bounds the domain of intelligible effects. (BM 22-23) 
 
In reference to Foucault, Butler argues that subjects are formed in a violent subjugation to 
discursive power, called often by Butler plainly as power. Apparently because the discursive 
power is multiple in a non-identifiable way  and because it consequently cannot be identified 
to come from some specific source, it is called (in a somewhat abstract way) only as “power”. 
This power is productive as it renders the not-yet-subjects into loci of thinking and also loci of 
agency. However, this subjection necessarily entails a repressive aspect. Subjects are thus 
formed through foundational violence. As the internal otherness of ek-static terms (and the 
internal  otherness  of   ek-static  subjects,  or  selves,  as  the  thinkers  of  these  terms)   is  never  
fully acknowledged as valid, a realm of silence (unintelligibility and un-liveability) is 
produced internal to terms. This creates a certain “injury” inside  terms. (BM 8-9; ES 27). 
Butler writes of this in PLP: 
 
I would suggest that the subject who would oppose violence, even violence to 
itself, is itself the effect of a prior violence without which the subject could not 
have emerged. (PLP 64)   
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For  Butler,  the  “objects”  of  thinking,  as  well  as  the  “subjects”  -  as  the  loci  or  positions  of  
thinking  -   are  ek-static.   Subjects  are  ek-static  also  as  intentionally  acting   agents.  The  ek-
statism of terms (as “objects” of thinking) hence corresponds with the ek-statism of the 
subjects of thinking. This idea is very Hegelian  Also for Hegel both the objects and the 
subjects of thinking are made of internal, mutually contradictory parts. Despite of this basic 
agreement between Hegel and Butler,  these two theorists disagree on   how the internal ek-
statism should be thought of. Both agree that there is an internal ek-statism yet they disagree 
how it should be further thought of.  Hegel argues that the internal ek-statism should be 
thought on the basis of reciprocal recognition and rationality. Hegel argues that if nothing is 
said of the thinkers, the subjects,  for whom this ek-statism exists, the ek-statism is reduced 
into another form of parochial non-ek-statism  (into a thinking dominated by an attitude of 
Desire  i.e.  the  silencing  of  contradictory  otherness).   Hegel  argues  that  something  must  be  
said of the “third” (the thinking subject) for whom the ek-statism exists. As a thought thing, 
ek-statism is always thought by a subject, and, hence, something historical and defined by its 
thinker.  In other words, the perspective from which the ek-static nature of objects and 
subjects is seen, should itself be thematized.  Butler argues that any “recognizer” of ek-statism 
is itself an ek-static thinker, a thinker who is “outside of itself”.  For Butler, an ek-static 
thinker fails to fully know its object. Hence, an ek-static thinker conducts a sort of 
“misrecognition” when it  e.g.  tries to thematize itself  as an ek-static thinker.   This theme is 
further explicated in chapter 5.   
 
4.1.3. Agonistic terms 
 
 
For Butler, ek-static terms are necessarily beyond or outside of any specific description. If 
e.g. a term like “woman” is described as a particular entity or category and information is 
provided of what kind of features belong and do not belong to it (denoting thus an idea of 
gender-difference) the term is always more encompassing: it is always larger than any specific 
description of it.   What remains outside of the description is radically unknown for  this given 
description. A  radical  outside  of  some  specific  definition  of  some  term  does  not  have  a  
common  measure  with  the  differential  system,  from  which  it  is  excluded,  and,  thus,  it  is  a  
radical Other.  In other words, the temporally, culturally, discursively limited description of 
some term cannot relate conceptually to Other  descriptions of the term (e.g.  provided by 
futural others). Because no context-dependent or temporal  description exhausts all features 
which may belong to the term, the term is, according to Butler,  a permanent site of agonistic 
struggle, over its meaning. Each description of the term intends to fix the term according to 
what  it  considers  the  true  meaning  of  the  term.   The  constant  struggle  at  the  borders  of  the  
term  -  in other words, the struggle concerning where the demarcating line between the inside 
and the outside of the term lies – makes the term permanently instable. 
 
What Butler says here means, importantly,  that she opposes Hegel’s basic idea of 
conceptuality. For Hegel, ek-static  thinkers can make a concept (an internally mediated 
conceptual construction) of the mutually contradictory parts of themselves (and other ek-static 
objects).  For Hegel, this is possible in reciprocally recognitive relationships. In reciprocally 
recognitive relationships one’s Other, and the Other of things (the “outside”, constitutive of 
oneself and of things) can be dialectically conceptualized through other self-consciousnesses 
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(see chapter 2. 3).   
 
Butler opposes the idea that terms like “woman” -  or even “democracy” or “justice” -  could 
be seen as conceptually mediated wholes, or e.g. as  dialogical entities, so that complete 
knowledge of a term would be seen to be able to be found as a dialogic futural process. 
Butler’s idea of the impossibility to reach goals through communicative or dialogic means 
amidst mutually respectful selves means also that she is critical of such theorists like 
Habermas,  Benhabib  and  Rawls.   Butler  is  against  such  “coalitional  politics”  (over  the  
meaning of some thing) which does not attempt to describe the particular content of some 
term in advance,  yet nevertheless sees that  it can be found in a futural, dialogic process. For 
Butler, terms are always internally “political” in an ek-static way.  The definition of terms 
cannot be based on a foundational agreement concerning any aspect of the term. If the task is 
to find the meaning of some term like “woman” as a unity (i.e. as a particular meaning) as a 
futural process, there is, according to Butler, a foundational expectation that such “unity” 
exists. If the existence of the term as a particular unity is assumed in advance, such unity will 
emerge as the result. This is due to the foundational assumption (of the existence of the unity) 
serving as the guiding principle of the “futural” process. For Butler this would mean that we 
make  ontological  assumptions  of  the  “extra-linguistic”  existence  of  this  category  -  as  
ultimately a unity - even if we leave the particular content of this unity completely free or 
empty, to be filled in the future. Butler gives the gender-difference as an example.  If gender-
difference is assumed to exist, always already “out there”, various proofs of its existence will 
invariably be found as this difference itself (in the form of a belief in it) serves as the guiding 
principle in the search of it.  For Butler, no aspects of the term – including its very existence 
as a unity of any sort - should in advance be assumed to exist  and thus,  in a way, removed 
outside of political contestation.    
 
Despite the clearly democratizing impulse that motivates coalition building , the 
coalitional theorist can inadverttedly reinsert herself as sovereign of the process 
by trying to assert an ideal form for coalitional structures in advance, one that 
will effectively guarantee unity as the outcome. Related efforts to determine 
what is and is not the true shape of a dialogue, what constitutes a subject-
position, and, most importantly, when “unity” has been reached, can impede the 
self-shaping and self-limiting dynamics of coalition. The insistence in advance 
on coalitional “unity” as a goal assumes that solidarity, whatever its price, is a 
prerequisite for political action. But  what sort of politics  demands that kind of 
advance purchase on unity? Perhaps a coalition needs to acknowledge its 
contradictions and take action with those contradictions intact. Perhaps also part 
of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance of divergence, 
breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of the often tortuous process of 
democratization. The very notion of “dialogue” is culturally specific and 
historically bound, and while one speaker may feel secure that a conversation is 
happening, another may be sure it is not (GT14-15)  
 
 
The internal ek-statism of terms means that there is no internal solidarity over the meaning of 
terms.   A term is  about  a  permanent,  futural  struggle  over  all  its  aspects,  including  its  very  
existence as a “thing”.  A term is hence not about a “dialogue” which would imply that some 
basic mutual solidarity or consensus on its basic features (or on the very existence of it) could 
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be reached.  Continuing the discussion above, Butler argues that a term is  - and that it should 
be allowed to be - a permanently available site of contested meanings.  It  is  beyond itself  in 
ways not contained by any description which (itself) could not be further contested by another 
description.     
 
It would be wrong to assume in advance that there is a category of “women” that 
simply needs to be filled with various components of race, class, age, ethnicity, 
and sexuality in order to become complete. The assumption of its essential 
incompleteness permits that category to serve as a permanently available site of 
contested meanings. The definitional incompleteness of the category might then 
serve as a normative ideal relieved of coercive force.”..; “Gender is a complexity 
whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given 
juncture in time. “ (GT 15)  
 
 
For Butler,   to assume to know the futural  movement of the term as some sort  of harmonic 
dialogue would indeed constitute a specific kind of violence:  
 
To understand “women” as a permanent site of contest, or as a feminist site of 
agonistic struggle, is to presume that there can be no closure on the category and 
that, for politically significant reasons, there ought never to be. That the 
category can never be descriptive is the very condition of its political efficacy. 
In this sense, what is lamented as disunity and factionalization from the 
prespective informed by the descriptivist ideal is affirmed by the anti-
descriptivist perspective as the open and democratizing potential of the category. 
Here the numerous refusals on the part of “women” to accept the descriptions 
offered in the name of “women” not only attest to the specific violences that a 
partial concept enforces, but to the constitutive impossibility of an impartial or 
comprehensive concept or category. The claim to have achieved such an 
impartial concept or description shores itself up by foreclosing the very political 
field  that  it  claims  to  have  exhausted.  This  violence  is  at  once  performed  and  
erased by a description that claims finality and all-inclusiveness. To ameliorate 
and rework this violence, it is necessary to learn a double-movement: to invoke 
the category and, hence, provisionally to institute an identity and at the same 
time to open the category as a site of permanent political contest. That the term 
is questionable does not mean that we ought not to use it, but neither does the 
necessity to use it mean that we ought not perpetually to interrogate the 
exclusions by which it proceeds” (BM 221-222) 
 
  
According to Butler, terms are temporal processes which cannot be described  as causal or 
coherent histories or processes.   
 
Crucially, then, construction is neither a single act nor a causal process initiated 
by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed effects. Construction not only 
takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates through the 
reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of 
reiteration. As a sedimented effect of a reiterative or ritual practice, sex acquires 
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its naturalized effect, and, yet, it is also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and 
fissures are opened up as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as 
that which escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined 
or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm. This instability is the deconstituting  
possibility in the very process of repetition, the power that undoes the very 
effects by which “sex” is stabilized, the possibility to put the consolidation of 
the norms of “sex” into a potentially productive crisis (BM 10).  
 
For Butler, entities like ”woman” are constructions which are themselves temporal processes. 
As Butler emphasizes in the quotation above, the construction which the term is does not only 
take place in time yet it is itself a temporal process. What does this mean? What Butler’s 
theory implies (e.g. in the quotation above) is  that  an external observer cannot observe the 
process by which such terms like “women” become constructed in time. When the temporal 
process of the term is observed by an external unifying subject, who already assumes that the 
term constitutes a unity, the process appears as  a  coherent  process  i.e.  a  history  (for this 
unifying subject). Butler seems to argue that any external subject (for whom the term exists as 
a unity) is itself internal to the process. The discursive subject-position, from which any self-
appointed  “external subject” may observe the process of the term is itself also processual in 
the  manner  of  internal,  agonistic   struggle.  All  those  who  say  something  about  a  contested  
term like “woman” are actually participating in the contest. A neutral meta-comment is not 
possible.  
 
 
4.1.4. Terms as constructions 
 
 
Butler emphasizes that terms are  constructions. Butler  writes  of  the  construction  of  “sex”  
which  can be thought only as some kind of a differentiated entity i.e. in terms of sexual 
difference: 
 
Sexual difference, however, is never simply a function of material differences 
which are not in some way both marked and formed by discursive practices. 
Further, to claim that sexual differences are indissociable from discursive 
demarcations is not the same as claiming that discourse causes sexual 
difference. the category of “sex” is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault 
has called a “regulatory ideal”. In this sense, then, “sex” not only functions as a 
norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that 
is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the 
power to produce – demarcate, circulate, differentiate – the bodies it controls. 
Thus,sex is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this 
materialization takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly 
regulated practices. In other words, “sex” is an ideal construct which is forcibly 
materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, 
but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize “sex” and achieve this 
materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms. That this reiteration 
is necessary is a sign that materialization is never quite complete, that bodies 
never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled. 
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(BM 1-2).  
 
 
For Butler, then, terms are internally agonistic processes which are tried to make appear as 
stable, forever fixed natural facts. This stable appearance is produced forcibly by regulatory 
means. However, as internally political, ek-static constructions, they are not the stable 
constructions which they seem to be. Their internal coherence and stability is thus a certain 
kind of fiction which fails to be what it purports to be. In other words, any internally coherent 
notion of “sex” is nevertheless beyond this coherence as sex is nevertheless an ek-static 
(internally contradictory) term.  
 
Butler’s idea of sex as a movable, internally radical construction has induced criticism. Butler 
addresses this criticism in the beginning of her book BM (pp.ix-12).  Some critics, as Butler 
herself tells in BM, have opposed the idea that the “whole” body would be a linguistic or a 
discursive construction. Critics oppose the idea that the whole materiality of sexed bodies – or 
the materiality of any thing - would be linguistically constructed.  Butler addresses this 
critique in several ways through reviving Hegel’s critique against the Kantian differentiation 
into “thing for us/thing in itself”. According to Kant, some part of “thing” exists as subjective 
and historical, internally differentiated discursive systems (as a “thing for us”, denoting a sort 
of shared construction). However, for Kant, there was also the  “thing in itself”, denoting the 
thing as a real referent,  as it is beyond subjective, limited knowledge of it.  Hegel criticised 
Kant’s differentiation into the parts of “thing for us” and “thing in itself” and argued that not 
only  the  other  part  (of  the  thing)  exists  as  a  constructed  entity,  instead,  the  whole  
differentiation itself is a constructed, historical entity. Butler says, holding a same 
argumentative line:   
 
The moderate critic might concede that some part of “sex” is constructed, but 
some other is certainly not, and then, of course, find him or herself not only 
under some obligation to draw the line between what is and what is not 
constructed  ,  but  to  explain  how  is  it  that  “sex”  comes  in  parts  whose  
differentiation  is  not  a  matter  of  construction.  But  as  that  line  of  demarcation  
between such ostensible parts gets drawn, the “unconstructed” becomes 
bounded once again through a signifying practice, and the very boundary which 
was meant to protect some part of “sex” from the taint of constructivism is now 
defined by the anti-constructivist´s own construction. Is construction something 
which happens to a ready-made object, a pregiven thing, and does it happen in 
degrees?  Or  are  we  perhaps  referring  on  both  sides  of  the  debate  to  an  
inevitable practice of signification, of demarcating and delimiting that to which 
we  then  “refer”,  such  that  our  “references”  always  presuppose  –  and  often  
conceal  this  prior  delimitation?  Indeed,  to  “refer”  naive  or  directly  to  such  an  
extra-discursive object will always require the prior delimitation of the extra-
discursive. (BM 11).   
 
For Butler, things cannot be differentiated into those parts which are socially and discursively 
constructed and into those which are not. Any such differentiation takes itself place in 
discursive language.  The extra-discursive referents themselves are also discursive formations.  
The next quotation is a part of Butler’s criticism against the distinction made between “sex” 
and “gender”; a distinction used in much of gender-studies and in feminist studies.   In this 
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distinction a differentiation is made between “sex” denoted as something natural and extra-
linguistic (as a sort of “sex in itself”) and the socially constructed “gender” (as a sort of “sex 
for us”).    
 
“…the “sex” which is referred to as prior to gender will itself be a postulation, a 
construction, offered within language, as that which is prior to language, prior to 
construction. But this sex as prior to construction will, by virtue of being 
posited, become the effect of that very positing, the construction of construction. 
If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to this “sex” 
except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed 
by gender, but that “sex” becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, 
retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct address. 
(BM 5).  
 
All this does not, however, mean for Butler -  as it did not mean for Hegel either -  the same 
as  to  say  that  “real”  things  do  not  exist  at  all.  Nor  does  it  mean  to  argue  that  discursively  
formed things are completely subjective, psychic formations. To say that things are 
discursive, historical and normative formations does not equate saying that “everything is 
language”. Butler rejects this kind of linguistic determinism (see e.g. BM 6).  Butler writes of 
this: 
 
If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the 
mimetic or representational status of language, which claims that signs follow 
bodies  as  their  necessary  mirrors,  is  not  mimetic  at  all.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  
productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch as this 
signifying act delimits and contours the body that it them claims to find prior to 
any and all signification. This is not to say that the materiality of bodies is 
simply and only a linguistic effect which is reducible to a set of signifiers. Such 
a distinction overlooks the materiality of the signifier itself. Such an account 
also fails to understand materiality as that which is bound up with signification 
from the start; to think through the indissolubility of materiality and 
signification is no easy matter. (BM 30). 
 
What Butler appears to say is that she does not claim that there are no real things, however, 
she says that we - as always already socially formed, discursive beings - have no access to 
what things are outside of language. Butler speaks here of “the materiality of the signifier 
itself”. Here Butler appears to speak of a same thing as what Hegel spoke of in his criticism 
against Kant. Any word, however abstract it may be  (e.g. words like “universality”,  
“universal ethics”, or, “thing in itself”) has a history behind it. What the category or word is 
for us is  a  result  of  various  historical  changes.  Also  the  very  “us”,  or  “I”,   for  whom  the  
category, or signifier, exists (even as an abstraction) is a historical, particular, limited 
subjective  entity.   The  subjective  we,  or  I,  for  whom  all  signifiers  exist,  is  related  to,  and  
influenced by the other. These materialities (aspects of subjectivity, history, context, culture, 
contradicting others etc.) are bound up with any signification .   
 
 
 
185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.5. Colonialist masters and subordinated others  
 
 
In CHU Butler calls the basic processuality of terms as an interpretative, translational 
political process. The meaning of a term is processually translated, interpreted within a field 
of radical relations. This implies the double constitution of terms like “woman”. First the 
terms can be seen to be produced within somewhat internally coherent differential systems. 
Secondly, these terms can be seen to become translated radically through radical otherness. 
Thus, the terms are not simply repeated in an identical way. The specific universalizing 
discourses (i.e. the socially shared differential systems where  specific identities are given to 
terms) come into contact with radical others (i.e. with views that have no common measure 
with the differential system from which they are excluded). When terms become interpreted 
by radical others, they take on meanings which break radically with the previous meanings 
and previous identities of the terms. Seen as this kind of radically interpretative processes, the 
history  of  terms  cannot  be  presented,  according  to  Butler,  as  a  coherent history but instead 
only as a radical history. The term  changes radically as it becomes processually translated by 
radically relational “others”.  As such, the way how this translation proceeds cannot be known 
in advance by any external observer. It cannot be seen to take on any specific course. Butler 
writes of this process in reference to how the Hegelian process of Lords (masters, or as in the 
next quotation “colonial masters”) and the subordinated one’s (Bondsmen) take place in PhS:  
 
Translation can have its counter-colonialist possibility; for it also exposes the 
limits of what the dominant language can handle. It is not always the case that 
the dominant term as it is translated into the language (the idioms, the discursive 
and institutional norms) of a subordinated culture remains the same upon the 
occasions of translation. Indeed, the very figure of the dominant term can alter 
as it is mimed and redeployed in that context of subordination. Thus, Homi 
Bhabha`s emphasis on the splitting of the signifier in the colonial context seeks 
to show that the master – to use Hegelian parlance – loses some of his claim to 
priority and originality precisely by being taken up by a mimetic double. 
Mimesis  can  effect  a  displacement  of  the  first  term  or,  indeed,  reveal  that  the  
term is nothing other than a series of displacements that diminish any claim to 
primary authentic meaning (…) Both the form and the content of universality 
are highly contested, and cannot be articulated outside the scene of their 
embattlement. Using Foucault´s language of genealogy, we might insist that 
universality is an “emergence” (Entstehung) or a “non-place”, “a pure distance”, 
which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common place. (CHU 37-
38) 
 
Butler argues that the process of the term (of politically important terms like “human” ) 
consists of  “emergences” which are in “pure distance” to each others.  Thus, the various 
universalist   meanings   given  to  the  term  emerge  in  contexts  which  are   in  pure  (non-
particularizable,  non-differential)  distance  to  each  others.  The  process  consists  of  phases  
which  are  radically,  ek-staticly   related  to  each  others.    The  meanings  do  not  follow  from  
each other in any coherent, conceptual or rational manner as is the case in ordinary rational 
processes,  instead, the meanings emerge somewhat unexpectedly and contingently.   
 
In the quotation above Butler calls the radical translative process also as mimesis. Radical 
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mimesis is another name for Butler’s performative politics. Mimesis is also at times equated 
with parodic change. In the quotation above, Butler implies that mimesis can reveal  that “the 
term is nothing other than a series of displacements that diminish any claim to primary 
authentic meaning”.  Butler argues  that it is not always understood how the  terms are 
nothing but  series of radical displacements.  Their “new places” are not conceptually related 
to their previous, “older places”. For Butler, this radical nature of terms is concealed by 
“colonialism”, of which the Hegelian dialectical change is one example (see e.g. Butler, 
1995a, 35-42) Each universalist discourse appears as a colonialist master who tries to 
naturalize its  own  view  of  what  things  are  like,  or,  its  own  view  of  how  things  develop  
historically and rationally.  Discourses try to render their own view of terms a universal norm. 
An essential feature of this is the attempt  to make certain identities seem as natural and as 
ontological facts whereas radically other identities are shown as unnatural perversions.  Often 
discourses  present  their  own  identities  as  the  laws  of  God.  E.g.  in  religious  discourses  the  
subordination of women and the un-naturalness of homosexuality is often legitimated by 
appealing to a ruling of God.  Butler argues that when subjects repeat the discursive norm of 
what is natural or what is sanctioned by God, the resulting identities look like stable facts. 
They seem to be timeless ontological truths.  Their nature as radical processes is concealed 
and violently repressed.  
 
Butler criticises the assumption that “subject” is a stable construction, made of “natural” parts 
or features.  
 
There  is  no  subject  prior  to  its  constructions,  and  neither  is  the  subject  
determined by those constructions; it is always the nexus, the non-space of 
cultural collision, in which the demand to resignify or repeat the very terms 
which constitute “we” cannot be summarily refused, but neither can they be 
followed in strict obedience. It is the space of this ambivalence which opens up 
the possibility of a reworking of the very terms by which subjectivation 
proceeds and fails to proceed. (BM 124) 
 
 
According to Butler, these colonialist attempts cannot totally repress the internal radical 
otherness  of  terms.  As  such,  the  identities  and  the  material  bodies,  produced  by  these  
discourses, never remain self-identical in time.  Discourses are ek-static complexities in which 
things are in constant agonistic, ek-static change. The discourses fail to produce bodies 
completely, finally,  according  to  their  own  rules.  This  connects  to  the  theme  of  
performativity. 
It appears that because terms are ek-static (i.e. they include radical otherness, and, they are 
radical processes) certain violence takes place when some internally coherent (i.e. non-
radical,  non-ekstatic)  discourse  tries  to  make  its  own (non-radical)  view of  terms  seem as  a  
universal, timeless truth. Violence is done against the ek-static structure of terms. As radical 
otherness becomes foreclosed, violence is done against the “full” construction of the term as it 
nevertheless includes radical otherness. Butler writes of this: 
 
Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a 
highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance 
of substance, of a natural sort of being.  A political genealogy of gender 
ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of 
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gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the 
compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of 
gender. To expose the contingent acts that create the appearance of a naturalistic 
necessity, a move which has been a part of cultural critique at least since Marx, 
is a task that now takes on the added burden of showing how the very notion of 
subject, intelligible only through its appearance as gendered, admits of 
possibilities that have been forcibly foreclosed by the various reifications of 
gender that have constituted its contingent ontologies. (FT 33) 
  
Butler’s theory of the ek-static structure of subjects and things (for Butler, terms) reveals a 
multilayered construction which is basically Kantian. yet even more Hegelian. For Butler, 
things exist as discursive objects. They exist as social and normative constructions, 
resembling the Kantian  “thing for us”. Yet, things are larger constructions than what is 
known of them as the “thing for us” . There is also the “otherness” which is a constitutive part 
of a subject or a thing.  As concerns Butler’s theory of the “otherness” and its relation to what 
the things are “for us”, Butler draws on Hegel.  For Butler, there is a radical relation between 
what is known of things by  “we”, who share some discursive, normative, internally coherent 
view  of  the  thing,  and  the  “others”  whose  views  of  things  are  not  differentially  related  (by  
some common normative measure) to “our” view of things. Consequently, an 
acknowledgement of the Other is in a central role with Butler. Butler recognizes the validity 
of the Other,  as well  as the validity of the “Other of the Other” view of things,  and, in this 
sense, draws from Hegel’s theory of  reciprocal recognition. Butler acknowledges the validity 
of both the self and the Other, which are, mutually, each others Others.  In Hegel’s reciprocal 
recognition both the self and the Other are acknowledged as valid knowers of the thing, so 
that neither party is seen to be below or above the other. 
 
What is distinctive in Butler’s theory is, that the “colonial” master-slave relationship is 
unavoidable. The  “colonialists”  (whom  Butler  addresses  as  “masters”,   in  a  recourse  to  
Hegel’s theory of Lordship and Bondage) do not see what things are (really) like, i.e. that they 
are ek-static processes. They imagine that there is some specific particular,  natural, stable 
identity  to subjects and things – which is normative just because it is natural. They imagine 
(mistakenly) that this nature constitutes a particular unified identity  which stays identical 
over time.    Thus, whereas for Butler things are ek-static, Butler sees that things are non-
ekstatic for the colonialists.  In fact – seeing  things as non-ekstatic constitutes the colonialist  
attitude.  As said  before, what Butler says of the colonialist attitude resembles closely what 
Hegel says of the attitude of “Desire”.   
 
Of course, Butler is not against discursive subject-positions or against particularizing thinking 
as such. She clearly thinks, like Hegel, that particularizing thinking (thinking which is limited 
by its particular subjectivity, cultural or temporal particularity etc. factors) cannot be disposed 
of. However, Butler attacks  the colonialist attitude toward otherness, which, importantly, she 
sees as a necessary feature of discursive thinking. In fact, she sees it as a necessary feature of 
subjects as such. For Butler, discursive thinking is colonialist as it is not appreciative or 
recognitive of otherness. It sees only itself and thus its capacity of seeing is parochial. It 
cannot see “beyond” itself into the realm of  the ek-statism of things. It is universal and final 
for itself.  It resembles also what the attitude of the “Lords” is (in PhS) towards the enslaved 
others in relations of Lordship and Bondage.    
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In the quotations above it appears that for Butler the process by which the terms move 
temporally is necessarily a struggle and it necessarily contains “colonialist” attempts, 
discursive attempts to subordinate the otherness. However, Butler’s own ideas of otherness, 
explicated above, can be clearly seen as recognitive, in Hegel’s sense.   
 
What differentiates Butler from Hegel is that Butler does not see particular subjects as 
capable of  recognition.  Whereas her own thought is  based on the recognition of the internal 
ek-statism of things, she sees subjects as not capable of a similar recognitive attitude. In fact, 
her theory is  based on the thought that historical subjects attempt to repress the internal ek-
statism - which she herself acknowledges.  This suggests that Butler’s own position is, in a 
way, an impossible position, an abstract position.  Her own attitude and her own concern for 
the Other – and, for the Other of the Other - is not (for her) reachable for  particular subjects. 
A specific dynamic is created, in Butler’s theory, between Butler’s own recognitive attitude 
toward the Other, and, the non-recognitive attitude toward the Other of the colonialist 
subjects.    
 
.  
4.1.6.  Performativity.   
 
 
Performativity is perhaps the most famous of Butler’s concepts.  It means, in short, that 
discursive terms like “woman” or “gender-difference” are performative -   productive, 
objectifying -  of  themselves.  Butler  theorizes  especially  how  gender-specific  or  sexually  
specific terms are performative of themselves. However she suggests that all  kinds of terms 
(like “human”, “subject”, “ethnicity”,  “democracy”, “justice”, “freedom”) are performative 
terms.  To  say  that  terms  are  performative  of  themselves  means  that  they  render  themselves  
into objective,  “externally” existent entities.  A fundamental idea here is that discursive terms 
become  a  social  reality.  In  other  words,  objective  reality  is  discursively  constituted.  Terms  
constitute or produce themselves as objective, concrete and  real things “out there”. Social 
reality as a whole (as a differential system) is discursively constituted.   
 
For Butler, terms constitute an internally differentiated “externality” which is social: terms 
constitute hierarchical and authoritative communities. This means that when babies are born 
into the differential, social systems and learn the corresponding discursive language, they 
become discursive subjects.  Butler’s theory of the “interpellative” social and discursive 
performativity is in many ways theorized through Althusser and also through Foucault (see 
chapter 5.).   
 
Butler’s performativity includes the idea that terms produce phenomenological objectivity in 
relation to themselves. As phenomenological,  terms like e.g. “woman” or “gender” appear  
to be “out there” for  the  discursive  thinkers  of  these  terms.   Because  terms  are  discursive  
constructions, it is actually the discourse, rather than the individual terms,  which renders 
itself into objective existence. A discourse (i.e. a sort of “particular universe”) with all its 
internal relations, positions and differentiations. appears together with the appearance of any 
one of  its internal terms.  In order for any one “thing” (i.e. a term) to actually appear (i.e. be 
seen as a separate entity) a whole discursive totality must appear, in some way.  In order for 
things to appear as “separate” entities they must be  differentiated from and related to other 
189 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
things.   
 
Butler develops her idea of performativity in discussions with many thinkers,  e.g. with J.L. 
Austin, Althusser, Foucault and Hegel.  However, it is argued here that Butler’s theory is 
rooted deep in Hegel, as concerns the basic elements of her thought. Butler’s theory of 
performativity is  based on her Hegelian-inflected theory of the internal ek-statism of things. 
Through Hegel Butler develops a theory according to which the objective materiality of 
things is not only discursively performed - i.e. rendered into stable, internally differentiated 
social systems.   
 
For Butler, through Hegel, the objective reality can be seen because  it  is  discursive,  i.e.  it  
consists of differential particulars. These differential particulars can be identified as 
particulars as they are related to each others in a system of signification.  However, there is 
more to objective reality than the “stable” entities which we can see out there.  The objective 
reality  also  “moves  away”  from the  particular  entities  as  which  they  are  seen,  i.e.  as  which  
they appear for us “out there”.   Hegel argues that objectivity  “moves” because there is more 
to  it  than  what   is  seen  (of  it)  by  the  “discursive  eye”  (or,  in  Hegel’s  terminology,  by  the  
Consciousness as Understanding). The objective reality is “ek-static” or, in Hegel’s words, 
conceptual. It is made of mutually contradictory elements, e.g. of otherness.  The background 
of Butler’s “multiple, ek-static performativity” lies to a large extent in Hegel. An important 
normative aspect of her Hegelian-inflected performativity is that,  according to Butler,   the 
internal otherness of terms should be given the possibility to materialize, to become validly 
objective. Otherness, in its material existence,  should not be considered illegitimate “filth”, 
something which does not belong to the realm of valid objects. In Hegel’s words, objective 
reality should be constituted not only by one “Lord” - or “colonialist”-  self.  The enslaved 
selves (the others in bondage) should be  recognized as valid contributors to how the 
objectivity is constituted.  In other words, objectivity  should correspond to its concept (i.e. to 
its ek-static nature) and be constituted by both the self and by the contradictory (in Butler’s 
words, “radical”) other.    
 
Butler discusses the Hegelian, internally contradictory constitution or formation of external 
objectivity already in her first book SD. As is seen in her later books  Gender Trouble,  
Bodies that Matter and especially in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality  she adopts the 
basic Hegelian elements into her own theory of performativity. There is then -  based on the 
Hegelian-inflected “ek-statism” - more to things than what they seem to be, or, how they 
appear as objects for us. The appearing part of a thing (i.e. the thing as an object out there) 
corresponds to how the thing exists (discursively) “for us”.  However,  the formation of the 
thing as an object out there -  as well as the formation of the thing as a discursive entity - is 
for Butler, like for Hegel,  a contradictory process. The process is not controlled or 
determined in advance by any one particular discourse or culture,  instead, it is led by 
mutually contradictory powers. (see BM, 233-242; SD 25-28).  
 
As  said  already  earlier,  for  Butler,   the  system  of  thinking  of  an   individual  self  is  formed  
discursively and historically. However, as ek-static, it is not fully determined by any particular 
discursive normativity. Selves are influenced, moved and rendered instable by many 
discursive powers.  Correspondingly, also the objective reality is  discursively formed, 
however,  it is not fully determined by any specific discourse. The temporality (i.e. the 
historical formation) of objective reality is not closed or “finalized” by any specific discourse. 
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What appears for the discursive thinking (or, as Hegel would say, for the Consciousness as 
Understanding) to be the external objectivity is effected by otherness.  
 
Butler theorizes performativity especially in the context of gender-identity and sexuality. 
Hence, she concentrates on theorizing how the body is performed and especially how the 
body becomes  sexualized. For Butler, sexual bodies are formed in accordance to discursive 
norms. The bodies which we can see “out there” are always discursively formed (even if not 
completely performed)  bodies.  When we look at ourselves and others we never just see plain 
bodies, pre- or extra-discursive, natural bodies, bodies “in themselves”.  The embodied 
actuality of one’s discursively differentiated life and one’s identification of oneself as  
woman, man,  “white”, middle-class etc. takes place as the everyday practice  of following 
discursive norms of  bodily existence. We enact into  something  existent  (i.e.  embody)   the 
discursive gender-differentiation by acting in a feminine or masculine or in some other 
differentiated  way.    According  to  Butler,  there  is  a  normative  discursive  and  cultural  pull  
towards coherently embodied identities. A discourse represses contradictory otherness and 
accepts only its own internally differentiated idea of various subjective identities. A specific 
discourse accepts that only its own identities are  embodied, i.e. turned into reality.  The 
embodiments of other, contradictory subjectivities are considered wrong, perverted, sick etc.    
There is a rule that the embodied identities must correspond coherently, identically (without a 
flaw or a contradiction) to the dominant discursive and cultural norms. What Butler says of 
the forced non-existence of otherness resembles closely Hegel’s description of how otherness 
is deprived of the right to its own existence in relations of Lordship and Bondage (see chapter 
2.2.5 on this)    
 
An essential  aspect of a coherent (sexually differentiated) body is that it obeys the discursive 
rule of the right heterosexual desire. Butler writes about this: 
 
According to the understanding of identification as an enacted fantasy or 
incorporation, however, it is clear that coherence is desired, wished for, 
idealized, and that this idealization is an effect of a corporeal signification. In 
other words, acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or 
substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of 
signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of 
identity as a cause. Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are 
performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport 
to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs 
and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggest that 
it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its 
reality. This also suggests that if that reality is fabricated as an interior essence, 
that very interiority is an effect and function of a decidedly public and social 
discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface politics of the 
body, the gender border control that differentiates inner from outer, and so 
institutes the “integrity” of the subject. (GT 136) 
 
 
For Butler, like for Hegel,  the basic element in performativity is the contradictory relation 
inside ek-static terms.  For Hegel, the objective world as something phenomenological (as 
appearing for its thinkers) is contradictory and changing. That what appears for us as 
191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
objective is always internally related to its contradictory otherness, and this ek-static relation 
results into a historical change of the phenomenological world. Also social institutions are ek-
static and historical. This change is dialectical, i.e. contradictory. It does not follow any non-
contradictory plan known in advance. Butler theorizes performativity in reference  to 
Hegelian contradictory  (dialectical) change of objective thingness in many of her books but 
especially in CHU (see e.g. pp.14-41, 144-148, 174, 270-273; Butler’s discussion with 
Hegel’s dialectical  constitution of objective world is explained further in chapter 5.1).  
 
 
For Butler, there are always contradicting ideas concerning e.g. how various social 
institutions should be organized (e.g. authoritative institutions like the government, legal 
systems, schooling etc). The way the social institutions are organized is in many ways based 
on ideas concerning terms like “human”, “person” or “citizen”.  The  dispute or the 
negotiation over what the content of these  terms are  is in many ways shown as the dispute 
over how external public institutions are organized.  The social institutions –  the social world 
in general – can be ultimately seen as the  objectification of such concepts like “human” or 
“citizen”.    
 
Butler’s performative politics adheres, basically, to a same goal than Hegel. The idea in 
Butler’s political, ek-static performativity and in Hegel’s reciprocally recognitive constitution 
of objectivity is to make radical otherness something that “matters” i.e. something which is 
recognized as “existent” and as a “valid being”.  However, Butler’s project  can be also seen 
as a very different project.  A central part of it is that whereas Butler herself intends to make 
the Other a “matter-formative” power, a power which participates in the formation of the 
objective world, she sees particular subjects as incapable of such recognitive attitude toward 
the Other. She sees that particular subjects, living in particular places and times, are 
colonialists, as to their object-formative intentions. Historical subjects always want to form 
the world according to their own parochial world-view – hence situating  the Other into a 
realm which does not “matter”.   An important background for Butler’s political 
performativity  (i.e. intentionally contradictory  performativity) is  her theory of the basic 
contradictory, ek-static performativity of things. This theory of performativity includes the 
idea that no individual performative is a sovereign formative power.  It never succeeds to 
fully form the objects it intends to form.  This is explained in the next sub-chapter.     
 
 
4.1.7. Criticism of Austinian sovereign performatives  
 
 
By the term “performativity” Butler refers to the famous speech-act theory of J.L. Austin.   
Austin’s book How to Do Things With Words (1962) is usually considered the key text when 
performativity is discussed.  However, the core themes of Butlerian performativity are quite 
absent in Austin’s theory. Such missing Butlerian themes are the “unknowingness”, involved 
in all performativity,  as well as the contradictory processuality of performativity. For Austin, 
performatives are conventional and often ritualistic acts in which conventional rules must be 
strictly followed in order for the performative to succeed to “enact” what is said. Butler, in 
contrast,  emphasizes the way performatives break with conventions and contextual rituals 
(see e.g. ES 147).  In fact, for Butler, performatives always fail to enact – at least fully – what 
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is being said. Because all performatives include the aspect of contradicting otherness, they 
never turn into identically corresponding  objective reality “that” what is being said. 
Basically, Austin distinguishes between two types of utterances pertaining to performativity, 
those that describe or report on something and those that, in saying, actually perform (enact) 
what is being said. An example of the first, which Austin calls constative utterances,  would 
be: “It is a sunny day” or “I went shopping”. When you say that “I went shopping” you report 
on something being done; you are not actually doing it by the act of saying. Yet, when a man 
stands in front of a registrar in a Register Office and says “I do”, answering a question “Do 
you take this woman to be your wedded wife?”, then the man is actually performing the 
action by making the utterance. Statements like this are called performative utterances  by 
Austin. (Austin 1962, 4-6) 
 
For Austin, performative speech-acts  necessarily take place in conventional, institutionalized 
and in many ways ritualistic procedures. Austin emphasizes that the circumstances must be 
appropriate in order for the performative to succeed in enacting the intended state. For 
Austin, the performative can fail if good many other things besides the so-called performative 
words,  do  not  go  right.    In Austin, performatives are thus exposed to failure if the 
circumstances are not intact. (Austin 1962, 7-14).     
 
Butler criticises Austin – often in reference to thinkers like Althusser and Foucault – and 
argues that even descriptive (constative) utterances are performative  utterances. Also 
utterances, which only report on some event having happened,  actually enact, perform the 
event – at least in some ways. They  form (even if not fully performing) that extra-linguistic 
objective  event  which   they   themselves  only  intend  to   describe.  Butler  uses  the  following  
example to explain this: 
 
Gender norms operate by requiring the embodiment of certain ideals of 
femininity and masculinity, ones that are almost always related to the 
idealization of the heterosexual bond. In this sense, the initiatory performative, 
“Its  a  girl!”  anticipates  the  eventual  arrival  of  the  sanction,  “I  pronounce  you  
man and wife.”. Hence, also, the peculiar pleasure of the cartoon strip in which 
the infant is first interpellated into discourse with “Its a lesbian!” (…) To the 
extent that the naming of the “girl” is transitive, that is, initiates the process by 
which a certain “girling” is compelled, the term or, rather, its symbolic power, 
governs the formation of a corporeally enacted femininity that never fully 
approximates the norm..(BM 232) 
 
Thus, the “fact” of marriage is not only created in the marriage ceremony, as Austin thought, 
but also by all the individual utterances which refer to “their marriage” or “our marriage”. 
Without the constant use of such expressions, that particular marriage relationship would not 
exist. Hence, although there is no conscious performative intent behind such utterances (the 
speakers are just trying to refer to something they take as an independent fact), the utterances 
actually have a performative function. For Butler, already when we are born we are 
performatively enacted e.g. into gendered, sexually differentiated  life. In a similar vein, we 
are born also into many other differentiations which are often also hierarchical 
differentiations, concerning race, social class etc. We are born into culturally bounded 
discursive life which is full of various normative daily conventions of e.g. how to be a proper 
heterosexual person or a proper citizen of a free and democratic state.  Names, given to us, 
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and names by which we describe ourselves and each others  are thus, very importantly, norms.   
 
The performative is not a singular act used by an already established subject, but 
one of the powerful and insidious ways in which subjects are called into social 
being from diffuse social quarters, inaugurated into sociality by a variety of 
diffuse and powerful interpellations. In this sense the social performative is a 
crucial part not only of subject formation, but of the ongoing political 
contestation and reformulation of the subjects as well. The performative is not 
only  a  ritual  practice:  it  is  one  of  the  influential  rituals  by  which  subjects  are  
formed and reformulated (ES 160) 
 
 
For Butler, we see the world to a great extent through the lenses provided by the discourse we 
are born into.  These lenses in many ways (per)form the world, our selves and other people as 
something objective for us.  Importantly, hence,  performative speech-acts and performative 
language cannot be distinguished from non-performative speech acts as there actually is no 
non-performative language. There is  no such non-ideological (power-free) language which 
would  describe the world as it is formed outside of language. We have no access to 
“thingness” outside of how it is per(formed) by those discourses into which we are born (see 
Butler’s Althusserian and Foucauldian modifications of Austin especially in ES 1-5, 14-28, 
145-51). For Butler, the everyday life of discursive subjects is itself an on-going ritualistic, 
performative procedure. For Butler, we e.g. perform “womanliness” or “gender-difference” 
and various other normative differentiations by way of everyday ritualistic life. Because we 
are  discursively named as e.g. “women” or perhaps  as “members of nobility” etc.  we 
reiterate the discursive and cultural normative convention  of what it is to be a woman – 
consequently, we appear to ourselves and to others as women  (explained further in the 
chapter 3.2.1 on Althusser).   
 
Performativity is thus not a singular “act”, for it is always a reiteration of a norm 
or  a  set  of  norms,  and  to  the  extent  that  it  acquires  an  act-like  status  in  the  
present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repretition.. 
(…) Within speech act theory, a performative is that discursive practice that 
enacts  or  produces  that  which  it  names.  According  to  the  biblical  rendition  of  
the performative, i.e. “Let there be light!”, it appears that it is by virtue of the 
power of a subject or its will that a phenomenon is named into being. (BM 12-
13).  
 
For Butler, in contrast to Austin, there is not any identifiable “doer” or a “subject” (as a 
sovereign, controlling agent) behind performative acts. A performative does not have any 
identifiable subject as its origin or cause. A performative naming and forming of things is not 
controlled  or  determined  by  any  one  “name-giver”  .  The  particularization  of  the  world  (the  
formation  of  things  into  particular  objects)  takes  place  amidst  conflicting  powers  which  all  
have particularizing, object-forming intentions. They all want to name the world and form 
objects according to what they think of them.  This theme is theorized by Butler especially in 
ES. In ES Butler writes that performativity is actually a conflictual chain of performativity, a 
contradictory, ek-static process. Butler speaks of performativity also as a catachresis, a 
multiplicity which cannot be identified in any determinate, specific way. Performativity is 
about internal ek-statism because the very words which name and form things are ek-static 
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words.  In the next quotation, Butler speaks in favour of the process of the performativity of 
homosexuality: 
 
..,one of the tasks of a critical production of alternative homosexualities will be 
to disjoin homosexuality from the figures by which it is conveyed in dominant 
discourse, especially when they take the form of either assault or disease. 
Indeed, as much as it is necessary to produce other figures, to continue the 
future of performativity and, hence, of homosexuality, it will be the distance 
between something called “homosexuality” and that which cannot be fully 
interpellated through such a call that will undermine the power of any figure to 
be the last word on homosexuality. And it is that last word, I think, that is most 
important to forestall. (ES 125-126) 
 
In order to prevent homosexuality (or any other  entity) from being fully, finally “made”  or  
“named” by some specific discursive name, any name should be thought as not final.  Instead, 
any formation of homosexuality (or, any other entity or property) should be thought as 
incomplete, not fully or finally descriptive or “interpellative” of the entity, it tries to enact into 
being.  This is important, because any discursive term, taken as it is interpreted in the 
discourse  (as  a  non-contradictory  description)  refutes  the  ek-statism  of  the  term.  The  
Althusserian concept of “interpellation” is discussed especially in the chapter 3.2. 
  
For Butler, all discursive speech is more or less performative and all speech is authoritative. It 
gains its authority by citing the cultural, normative conventions of naming (and  forming) 
things. However, for Butler, no name-giving, object-formative authority is sovereign, 
universal or time-less. Things are not formed universally and timelessly according to the 
norms of some specific particular discourse. All speech is, as Butler says ex-citable, denoting 
the internal ek-statism of speech.  
 
Understanding performativity as a renewable action without a clear origin or end 
suggests that speech is finally constrained neither by its specific speaker nor its 
originating context. Not only defined by social context, such speech is also 
marked by its capacity to break with context. Thus, performativity has its own 
social temporality in which it remains enabled precisely by the contexts from 
which it breaks. This ambivalent structure at the heart of performativity implies 
that within political discourse, the very terms of resistance and insurgency are 
spawned in part by the powers they oppose (which is not to say that the latter are 
reducible to the former or always already coopted by them in advance) (ES 40).  
 
Butler distances her view from that of Austin (for whom performatives are strictly context-
dependent in order to succeed) and argues that performativity is an internally ek-static process 
which breaks with any individual discursive context. No normative context has a  sovereign 
authority to name the thing. Butler’s internally ek-static, processual formation (or, 
performation) of things resembles, importantly,  Hegelian dialectics (which is more 
thoroughly explained in the next sub-chapters). Both in Butler’s context-breaking  
performativity  and  in  Hegelian  dialectics  the  way  a  thing  is  formed  can  break  with  any  
specific way (of naming and forming it) and become a new construction by being moved by 
contradicting otherness. As Butler says in the quotation above, the very terms of resistance 
(i.e. terms which form and name some thing in a radically other way) are spawned in part by 
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the powers they radically oppose. Butler often gives the term “queer” or “queering” to 
describe this kind of radical opposition.   (ES, 38)  
 
Butler’s theory of performativity is based on the idea that performatives constitute intentional 
(purposive, decisive, deliberate) acts (ES 140-141, 33-34,39; BM 12-18)  and that ek-static 
selves are the agents of these acts. Performative intentionality is ek-static (internally 
contradictory) intentionality.   Any “forming” (or performing) of things is internally effected 
by other, conflicting intentions.  Because  the  other  intentions  cannot  be  brought  into  a  
conceptual unity with the intentions whose otherness they constitute ,   the actual result  (i.e.  
the formation of things) fails to be identical with the agents own intentions. According to 
Butler,  there  is  no  “God”  or  any  specific  “nature”  or  “timeless  reason”  according  to  whose  
will the formation of things would proceed.  Butler writes of performativity:       
 
  
Performative acts are forms of authoritative speech: most performatives, for 
instance, are statements that, in uttering, also perform a certain action and 
exercise a biding power. Implicated in a network of authorization and 
punishment, performatives tend to include legal sentences, baptisms, 
inaugurations, declarations or ownership, statements which do not only perform 
an action, but confer a binding power on the action performed. If the power of 
discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of 
performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as 
discourse. Importantly, however, there is no power, construed as a subject, that 
acts, but only, to repeat an earlier phrase a reiterated acting that is power in its 
persistence and instability. This is less “act”, singular and deliberate, than a 
nexus of power and discourse  that repeats or mimes the discursive gestures of 
power. Hence, the judge who authorizes and installs the situation he names 
invariably cites the law that he applies, and it is the power of this citation that 
gives the performative its biding or conferring power. And though it may appear 
that the binding power of his words derives from the force of his will or from a 
prior authority, the opposite is more true: it is through the citation of the law that 
the figure of the judge’s “will” is produced and that the “priority” of textual 
authority is established. Indeed, it is through the invocation of convention that 
the speech act of the judge derives its binding power; that biding power is to be 
found neither in the subject of the judge nor in his will, but in the citational 
legacy by which a contemporary “act” emerges in the context of a chain of 
binding conventions. (BM 225) 
 
 
4.1.8.   Identities as necessary errors  
 
 
For Butler, discursive attempts to produce an internally coherent objective reality, e.g. 
coherent and stable sexually differentiated bodies never succeed fully.  These performative 
attempts fail to produce, or enact, the bodies they attempt to produce. The performative 
production of such bodies fails necessarily. These performatives succeed only partly, and 
only temporarily, because discursive identities, and discursive external bodies, denote only 
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one aspect of ek-static terms.   Butler writes of this: 
 
Gender  ought  not  to  be  construed  as  a  stable  identity  or  locus  of  agency  from 
which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in 
time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts. The 
effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must 
be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and 
styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self (…) 
Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts which are internally 
discontinuous, then the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed 
identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, 
including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of 
belief. Gender is also a norm that can never be fully internalized; “the internal” 
is a surface signification, and gender norms are finally phantasmatic, impossible 
to embody.  (GT 140-141) 
 
For Butler, the discursive attempt to produce bodies which would be permanently coherent 
(non- contradictory) and stable fails because objects are only temporarily  coherent or stable. 
Terms are coherent, non-contradictory and stable only at the discursive sites of knowing. 
When terms are looked at from the point of view of some culturally and temporally specific 
discourse,  they look as  if  they  were stable and non-contradictory. However, the discursive 
point of view onto terms is parochial; it fails to “see” or describe all of the term, because the 
term is not only a discursive construction instead an ek-static construction.  Even that they 
may appear temporarily coherent and stable they are not always or universally stable. As 
such, there is no gender-identities or any other subjective identities which would be embodied 
into permanently coherent bodies. The instability of external objectivity (including human 
bodies) is due to its being a process which does not follow any non-contradictory 
developmental course. 
 
The distinction between expression and performativeness is crucial. If gender 
attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or produces its 
cultural signification, are performative, then there is no pre-existing identity by 
which an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real 
or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be 
revealed as a regulatory fiction. (GT 141)  
 
In Austin, performative speech-acts may fail to enact what is being said. This can happen if, 
for  example,  the  marriage  ceremony  is  not  followed  according  to  the  rule  of  the  ritual.  In  
contrast to Austin, Butler argues in reference to thinkers like Derrida, Althusser and Foucault 
that actually performative speech-acts always fail. They fail to enact what is being said, 
because there is an internal otherness to all performative “saying”. The performative “saying” 
is ek-static. It always includes an ineffable/un-sayable otherness which effects what is said. 
Hence the “results” or “products” of the performative sayings fail to fully conform to what is 
said discursively. What is said includes the discursive part but also the “unsaid”, repressed 
otherness.   
 
For Butler, the bodies exceed the speech-acts (i.e. the interpellations)  by  which  they  are  
discursively formed (or, performed).  In the next quotation Butler uses Althusserian 
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terminology which is explained further in chapter 3.2. Said here in short, for Althusser 
subjects are formed and rendered into culturally intelligible  subjects by being called 
(interpellated) into social life. This happens basically at the same time when the child learns 
to speak. Language is seen here as a sort of ideological, internally differentiating  system.  
The  linguistic  entities  (like  e.g.  “woman”,  “man”  as  well  as   various  other  status-  and  class  
stratifications) and the hierarchies between them  are produced by the language itself. When a 
child learns to speak it internalizes this ideological, social (discursive) system. Butler argues 
of the way bodies exceed the interpellative performative, here in reference to Shoshana 
Felman: 
 
The body, however, is not simply the sedimentation of speech acts by which it 
has been constituted. If that constitution fails, a resistance meets interpellation at 
the moment it exerts its demand; then something exceeds the interpellation, and 
this excess is lived as the outside of intelligibility. This becomes clear in the way 
the body rhetorically exceeds the speech act it also performs. (…) That the 
speech act is a bodily act does not mean that the body is fully present in its 
speech. The relationship between speech and the body is that of chiasmus. 
Speech is bodily, but the body exceeds the speech it occasions; and speech 
remains irreducible to the bodily means of its enunciation” (ES 155-156).  
 
As said before, Butler´s theory of performativity is based on her theory of the internal ek-
statism of terms. Because there is “otherness” (i.e. radical, contradictory otherness) in every 
term, terms as performatives never fully result into coherently intelligible, discursive bodies. 
The terms as well as the “externalizations” (the material objectivities) of these terms  exceed 
the discursive subject-postion, because the discursive subject-position covers only the other 
part of the term. The radical other constitutes resistance to any attempt to render the external 
reality of terms according to only the other part of the term. As such, performativity includes 
resistance, struggle. Bodies exceed and also resist any discursive attempt to perform them into 
stable, discursive bodies, into a life which is identical  with the discourse. Butler writes that 
the body is never fully present in discursive speech.  There is always some “surplus”, a 
“remainder” (of the body) which fails to be included into any discursive description or into 
any performative enactment of the body.  Because this exceeding surplus denotes radical 
otherness (i.e it is in some ways ineffable) , it cannot be achieved by trying to dialogically (by 
mutually recognitive communication) gather together as much information of bodily life as 
possible. This surplus resists being included into any possible collection of  “sayable”, 
“describable” information. Butler writes that the relationship between speech (i.e. discursive 
speech, as any speech is discursive speech) and the body is that of “chiasmus”, denoting a 
certain kind of ambivalent and also antagonistic relation (see of the theme of “exceeding 
performatives” also e.g. BM 220-221). 
 
For Butler, there is violence in any attempt – even to a dialogic attempt -  to perform 
internally coherent bodies. This means that bodies are permanently political entities. The 
violence causes resistance and demands (struggle) for recognition on the part of the others.  
This aspect of radical and processual politics should not be foreclosed by claiming that a final 
and an all-encompassing description of the body has been discovered as this discovery would 
also become a norm of how actual bodily life should take place.    This violence corresponds 
with the violence inherent in any discursive attempt to present some stable, coherent (non-
contradictory) description of some term as all-inclusive and final (BM 220-221) 
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Butler argues that any speech – and correspondingly any bodies – are excitable. She writes of 
this: 
 
In the law, “excitable” utterances are those made under duress, usually 
confessions that cannot be used in court because they do not reflect the balanced 
mental state of the utterer. My presumption is that speech is always in some 
ways out of control. (ES 15) 
         
 It must be emphasized that Butler is not against discursive speech or discursive bodies 
(indeed, as she herself grants, it is difficult to see what it would mean to be against discursive 
speech or bodies). She says that all speech is invariably discursive. This means that we cannot 
dispose of making differentiations between linguistic entities and dispose of making these 
differentiations in discursive systems i.e. “particular universes”. Without differentiated 
entities we could not think at all. Butler’s idea is hence not to stop thinking in terms of 
discursive language, instead, the idea is to open discursive language more open and more 
appreciative of radical otherness.   
 
Butler argues, interestingly, that particular temporal identities are necessary errors (BM 230).  
Particular identities are, firstly,  necessary because we could not think of things, nor see them,  
without identifying them as particulars. This, of course, is very Hegelian thought. However, in 
contrast to Hegel, particular identities are for Butler errors as well.  For Butler, all coherent 
identities and coherent bodies fail to fully describe the ek-static nature of their own selves. 
Instead, there is an erroneous (colonialist) attitude according to whom all discursive identities 
describe their objects fully and finally. The colonialist attitude is erroneous because it does 
not acknowledge the  ek-static nature of things.  
 
It seems that for Butler particular identities are both necessary and erroneous because she 
connects particular (discursively formed) identities necessarily with the attitude of 
“colonialism” - i.e. with the refutation of otherness. There can be no particular, discursive and 
normative identities without colonialist attitudes towards otherness. Because a particular 
identity  do  not  acknowledge  that  it  does  not  constitute  the  final  truth  of  the  term,  it  fails.  
Correspondingly, Butler appears to  consider discursive bodies (the bodies we identify  “out 
there”) also as necessary, yet also as colonialist errors. The bodies are enacted into external 
(identifiable) existence) by “colonialist” words and by colonialist attitudes. As such, the 
bodies are colonialist, and erroneous.   Butler’s manner of associating particular identities and 
particular bodies necessarily with the “enslaving”, erroneous attitude toward otherness is 
seen, in this study, to be rooted in Butler’s Kojèvian reading of Hegel. (more of Butler’s 
Kojèvian reading of Hegel in the chapter 5.).  
 
 
4.1.9. Becoming conscious of the internal otherness   
 
 
For Butler, even that we cannot dispose of a discursive, otherness-refuting language and 
otherness-refuting and violent sociality (at least not fully), we can become more open to 
otherness. In the next quotation Butler speaks in favour of becoming more open to sexual 
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otherness: 
 
...precisely because certain kinds of “gender identities” fail to conform to those 
norms of cultural intelligibility, they appear only as developmental failures or 
logical impossibilities from within that domain. Their persistence and 
proliferation, however, provide critical opportunities to expose the limits and 
regulatory aims of that domain of intelligibility and, hence, to open up within 
the very terms of that matrix of intelligibility rival and subversive matrices of 
gender disorder.  (GT 17) 
 
According to Butler, we cannot comprehend such gender identities which would fully fail to 
conform to prevailing norms of cultural intelligibility. Such gender identities would not be 
even  thinkable for us because they would not assume an objective form. We can only think of 
things which assume some form of differentially constituted  objectivity.  However, as Butler 
argues above,  the persistence and proliferation of the “failing” and the “non-logical” gender-
identities may expose the limits and the regulatory aims of the dominant culture.  
 
For Butler, discursive notions of things - made under discursive “law” -  and discursive 
performative intentions are as such neither  right  or  wrong.  Hence,  for  Butler,  when  the  
parochialism and the colonialist aims of dominant discourse are exposed as being not 
universally and timelessly stable or “true”, they are however not exposed as having been 
wrong, either.  Further, nothing can be said to become “liberated” or “emancipated” when the 
refuted otherness is acknowledged as valid. There is no true nature of things which can be 
found by the acknowledgement of some specific otherness.  A historically specific otherness 
does not as such contain any timeless “truth” of the thing, or any piece of such timeless truth, 
any more than any other discursively normative thought of the thing. Butler argues here 
against any illusions of the emancipation of the refuted otherness: 
 
The  female  body  that  is  freed  from  the  shackles  of  the  paternal  law  may  well  
prove to be yet another incarnation of that law, posing as subversive but 
operating in the service of that law´s self-amplification and proliferation. In 
order to avoid the emancipation of the oppressor in the name of the oppressed, it 
is necessary to take into accouint the fuill complexity and subtlety of the law 
and to cure ourselves of the illusion of a true body beyond the law. If subversion 
is possible, it will be a subversion from within the terms of the law, through the 
possibilities that emerge when the law turns against itself and spawns 
unexpected permutations of itself. The culturally constructed body will then be 
liberated, neither to its “natural” past, nor to its original pleasures, but to an open 
future of cultural possibilities. (GT 93) 
 
It seems that through becoming aware, i.e. conscious,  of  the  limits  and  the  parochial  
(colonialist) regulatory aims of any discourse (even a liberating discourse)  terms can be, in 
Butler,   internally opened up for otherness.  It is important to remember than no liberating 
discourse liberates or emancipates  the “thing” (i.e. the way the thing is thought and 
objectified) from all otherness-refuting laws.  It is very important for Butler to remind that the 
“alternative” or “new” modes of thinking - which emerge when some dominant discourse is 
being criticised and opened up for otherness - are never themselves fully free from the “law” 
(i.e. the otherness-refuting law). Any opening up for otherness takes always place inside the 
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otherness-refutive law, in one way or the other.  All  “law” and power which produces 
identifiable (i.e. discursive, particular) terms and bodies is always an otherness-refuting law. 
All particular (identifiable, discursive) terms and bodies result from the workings of some 
limiting power – otherwise they could not be differentiated from other entities - and hence an 
otherness-refuting power. Butler’s manner to associate limiting (object-formative) power 
necessarily with otherness-refuting power is discussed in the chapter on Butler and Kojeve 
(Ch. 5).  
 
To  summarize  what  was  said  above,  in  a  somewhat  Hegelian  terminology:  for  Butler,  the  
constitution of things and the constitution of objective reality  always  takes place in relations 
of Lordship and Bondage, under the attitude of Desire (colonialism) toward contradicting 
(radical) otherness. The “law” governing relations between mutually contradictory thoughts 
of things necessarily refutes the contradictions.  This means that some part of the internal ek-
statism is always refuted. Butler does not see that there could be a law which were constituted 
for mutually recognitive self and Other.   In other words, for Butler, in contrast to Hegel, there 
is no way to enter a realm where things would be limited and particular, but where there 
would be recognitive (instead of refuting) relations between selves and others (and where, 
consequently, objective reality could be constituted by reciprocally recognitive selves).   
 
In  Butler,  there  is  no  way  to  move  beyond  the  otherness-refuting and parochial law. Some 
otherness is always refuted because the full internal ek-statism of things can never be, as 
Butler explicitly says, transitioned conceptually into a coherent concept. Relations between 
contradicting (ek-static) thoughts of things can never be conceptualized - unified - so that the 
internal contradictoriness could be preserved. All attempts at the unification result into the 
refutation of some otherness.   
 
However, Butler detects a democratizing potential in the radically performative  movement 
itself. This movement is a process in which things are radically renamed  compared to how 
they were named before. In CHU Butler calls this process as radical translation. In CHU 
Butler theorizes her idea of radical performativity by explicit references to Hegel.  
Nevertheless she keeps in line with how she describes radical performativity also in her other 
texts where she does not refer to Hegel explicitly. The idea of Hegelian dialectics can be 
clearly detected in the next quotation, with the exception that for Butler this movement is 
necessarily a struggle. The basic idea is to preserve the “old” while mixing it with its radical 
otherness. The resulting new form breaks with the old contexts of either one of those mutually 
contradictory parties who come together. Butler writes of radical translation:  
 
There are universal claims intrinsic to these particular movements that need to 
be articulated in the context of a translative project, but the translation will have 
to be one in which the terms in question are not simply redescribed by a 
dominant discourse. For the translation to be in the service of the struggle for 
hegemony, the dominant discourse will have to alter by virtue of admitting the 
“foreign” vocabulary into its lexicon. The universalizing effects of the 
movement for the sexual enfranchisement of sexual minorities will have to 
involve a rethinking  of universality itself, a sundering of the term into its 
competing  semantic  operations  and  the  forms  of  life  that  they  indicate,  and  a  
threading together of those competing terms into an unwieldy movement whose 
“unity” will be measured by its capacity to sustain, without domesticating, 
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internal differences that keep its own definition in flux. (CHU 168). 
 
 
In the quotation above, Butler repeats the general attitude found in what Hegel says of  
reciprocally recognitive relationships.  The idea is to recognize and to sustain the internal 
contradictoriness of things without “domesticating” things under the rule of one 
“universalizing” discourse or context (or, in Hegel’s terminology: under one  “particular 
universe”).   
  
In short, even that there is no final liberation from all of the repressive law, there can be, for 
Butler,  a liberating,  critical  movement by which any specific instance of the law can be 
opened for its internal otherness. Even that the imperialist law can never be fully disposed of, 
specific instances of it can be tried to be “subverted”. Butler suggests that in order for the 
discursive formations (i.e. things as discursive formations) to become mobilized radically 
people should  become aware that things are internally ek-static.   (GT 93). 
 
Butler argues often that terms should become more “open” for their “internal otherness”. This 
raises a question of how does a term become more open for its internal otherness? Do terms, 
words,  really have an internality – an internality which is in many ways non-linguistic, 
silenced, repressed?   Here it is important to remember that  Butler’s theory of terms as ek-
static constructions is rooted in Hegel’s theory according to which concepts are ek-static 
constructions. For Hegel, concepts do not float freely in the sky, instead, they exist for 
thinking selves. Hegel in fact gives “concept” even as a description of a thinking self: self is a 
concept, an internally contradictory, dynamic “mover”. However, like a “concept”, self is also 
– in any given historical and cultural context - a particular construction.  Also in Butler, terms 
are always thought terms, even that Butler clearly rejects Hegel’s conceptuality.  
Nevertheless, it appears that in Butler, like in Hegel, thought terms  (which  Hegel  calls  
concepts) have internalities and “othernesses”. A thinking self  has an ek-static internality,  
which it can become more conscious of, or, as Butler says, “open up for”. Butler’s terms 
appear to have a very Hegelian self-reflective structure in which the one who thinks terms can 
open  up  for  its  own  internal  “thinking”  structure.   Hegel  describes  in  PhS  how  the  self  (as  
conceptual) becomes gradually more conscious – or more “open up for”,  to use a Butlerian 
formulation -   of its internal contradictory nature.  
 
Importantly, for Hegel, a thinking self is always self-conscious as thinkers always reflect 
themselves and the world by contradictory thoughts, in one way or the other.  Yet, a thinker 
does  not  always  see  itself  as  a  contradictory  being,  instead,  it  may  see  itself  as   stable  and  
non-contradictory, as is (in PhS) the case with the Consciousness as Understanding. When a 
thinker becomes more conscious of itself and others as contradictory beings, it develops 
towards free self-consciousness. A thinking self becomes gradually  more free self-conscious, 
to use a Hegelian formulation when it becomes aware of its own and other’s internal 
contradictoriness. This process of becoming more conscious of one’s own contradictoriness 
(i.e. becoming a free self-consciousness) resembles Butler’s description of the  terms opening 
up for their internal otherness. By becoming more self-conscious, or, more open to its internal 
otherness – a self acknowledges the internal contradictoriness of various terms which it 
thinks. A subject (i.e. the thinking self for itself, reflected by itself) is one of these terms.  
 
For Butler, like in Hegel, opening up for one’s internal otherness (or, becoming self-
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conscious)   
4.1.10. Performative politics 
 
 
Butler describes her performative politics as a sort of critically parodic process. What Butler 
says of this specific queer parody resembles what she says of the “radical translation”. It is a 
radically translative process (according to the idea of radical translation explained in the 
previous sub-chapter). The basic idea is to make terms more open for their internal ek-statism, 
instead of interpreting them through some new, different translative apparatus. The idea is not 
to offer a new, different translation or interpretation of some term (like woman) but instead to 
open the old term for its own refuted otherness, its own internal ek-statism. When terms are 
interpreted through some coherent (internally non-contradictory) apparatus, this apparatus is 
recognized  as  the  dominant  “identifier”  of  the  term.  The  internal  dynamism  (caused  by  the  
contradictoriness) is repressed and the term becomes closed into its one and true identity, it 
becomes stabilized. Butler opposes the idea that terms are “identified”, “particularized” – or 
rendered into objective reality - by one dominant interpretative system. Her idea resembles 
Hegel’s idea that things should be constituted by the self and the other,  through a relation 
which is contradictory.    
  
I would argue that it is precisely the expropriability of the dominant, 
“authorized” discourse that constitutes one potential site of its subversive 
resignification. What happens, for instance, when those who have been denied 
the social power to claim” freedom” or “democracy” appropriate these terms 
from the dominant discourse and rework or resignify those highly cathected?? 
terms to rally a political movement? If the performative must compel collective 
recognition in order to work, must it compel only those kinds of recognition that 
are  already  institutionalized,  or  can  it  also  compel  a  critical  perspective  on  
existing institutions? What is the performative power of claiming an entitlement 
to those terms – “justice”, “democracy” – that have been articulated to exclude 
the ones who now claim that entitlement? (…) Or, equally important, what is the 
performative power of appropriating the very terms by which one has been 
abused in order to deplete the term of its degradation or to derive an affirmation 
from that degradation, rallying under the sign of “queer” or revaluing 
affirmatively the category of “black” or of “women”? (ES 157-158)  
 
 
This specific politics is also called by her as subversive citation- or reiteration (BM 223-233), 
critical translation (see  CHU)  and  queering double-movement (BM 220-222, 229). As said 
already,   the  idea is not to replace the old and wrong discursive idea with a new and a good 
or better one. The very idea of seeing things as non-contradictory, coherent unities is itself 
being criticised here.  The idea is, as Butler says, to cite the old notion and thus to continue its 
existence, preserve it, however so that the term’s radical otherness is taken into account in this 
radical citation. Radical otherness, which already is a part of the term (yet often in a repressed 
and silenced form) is recognized as something valid. It is considered a valid aspect of the 
term. It is considered to include valid knowledge of the term. It is in a way freed – or at least 
partly freed - from its forced non-existence.  
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It is important to emphasize that this politics is based on Butler’s Hegelian-inflected theory of 
the  ek-statism  of  things.  In  Hegel  (in  PhS)   a  basic  aspect  of  this  theory  is  the  subject´s  
processual  development  of  taking  the  otherness  of  things  into  account.    In  PhS the  subject  
processually tries to take account of the internal radical contradictoriness of things so that this 
contradictoriness would not be reduced into parochialism. For Hegel, freedom is about  the 
recognition of the internal contradictoriness of things. This is ultimately reached in the 
reciprocally recognitive relationships between mutually acknowledging free selves.  
Consequently, the idea that one non-contradictory (parochial) notion of a thing is replaced by 
another non-contradictory (parochial) notion cannot be the satisfactory answer here. The goal 
is, instead, to form (or, perform) things radically so that the radical nature of terms (ek-
statism) is acknowledged as something valid, instead of being forced under the rule of some 
master which can recognize only its own self. The Hegelian aspects of “Desire” (colonialist 
attitude toward things) and recognition, especially reciprocal recognition (acknowledgement 
of the ek-statism of things)   
 
For Butler, the idea in radically formative (or, performative) politics  is to use the cultural and 
discursive power  of some discursive notion of a thing, yet, the idea is to use it “wrongly”, in 
ways not intended by it. The idea is to expropriate and to re-appropriate the cultural and 
discursive authority  which the old notion carries with it, but redirect this power in ways 
which are radically different (contradictory) in relation to the  old intentions. The old 
intentions are however not fully  replaced by new intentions. Instead, the “ek-static” idea is to 
allow room for the silenced other intentions.  (see e.g. ES 157; BM 232). Yet, what does it 
mean to use the “power” of some term in order to redirect it against its earlier purposes or its 
earlier political intentions?  It seems that the idea is to  re-contextualize, partly, a term. Terms 
(things) gain their meaning inside differential systems. Butler calls these internally 
interpretative  systems as  cultural,  temporal  and  discursive  contexts.  Hegel  describes  similar  
entities as “particular universes”. The idea in Butler´s politics of radical citation, radical 
interpretation (radical performativity)  seems to be to include radical elements into the 
interpretative field  in which the thing gains its meaning. In fact, the idea is to bring the 
thing’s internal otherness (the thing’s own repressed elements) into the field of those 
elements which are acknowledged as valid and “existent” elements of the thing.   
 
Parodic representations and performances can be examples of this politics. In e.g. the drag -, 
cross-dressing - or genderblending performances radical elements are united on a one and 
same body.  Elements  which  are  contradictory,  typically  not  considered  to  belong  to  a  same 
body, become included into a one “interpretative field” (i.e. a body). Consequently, a “male” 
body can include such elements which are traditionally considered as   masculine as well as 
elements which are not considered as masculine.  Also modern  poetry is given as an example 
of a Butlerian radical politics.  In modern poetry language is in a way “broken” and mutually 
contradictory elements are used to describe some thing or a feeling. In a way, such bodies in 
which contradictory elements are mixed in unexpected ways can be called “poetic bodies”.  
 
Julia Kristeva, whose Hegelian-inflected idea of radical poetics Butler discusses in SD (pp.  
argues that bodies are poetic assemblances of drives and needs in  heterogeneous, unstable 
and to a large part unconscious ways. As Butler explains in SD, Kristeva connects with the 
Hegelian-inflected tradition of seeing selves and bodies as combinations of mutually 
contradictory thoughts. Butler situates Kristeva in a somewhat  Lacanian tradition of the  
post-Hegelian speculations of subjectivity. In this study this tradition is traced back to 
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Kojève’s influential interpretation of Hegel.    
 
For Kristeva, any particular or conceptual description of one’s constitution in relation to one’s 
contradictory other is seen as a parochial description - as is typical in the Kojevian tradition. 
Any particular description of one’s relation with one’s radical other constitutes a repression 
(an enslaving) of otherness.  For Kristeva, poetic language provides a medium for the 
articulation of one’s heterogeneous,  “multivoiced” nature. However, Kristeva argues that  
poetic language is always connected to rational language - otherwise it is non-communicable 
“psychotic” speech. The presence of the communicable speech means that  the radical 
otherness becomes always repressed, abjected,  also in poetic language, in one way or the 
other. One’s heterogeneous nature constitutes the unthinkable, the non-assimilatable “non-
object” of the thinking “I”.  It will always be radically excluded (in a non-objectifiable way) 
from the realm of the rational language and the unitary subject. This radical exclusion is 
described by Kristeva as  “abjection” and also as “convulsion” and “defilement”. The 
radically excluded Other (in contrast to the differentially related other) denotes a place where 
the linguistic meaning collapses. The “objects” in it are actually not objects  as they are  
things which have no valid existence or being . They are non-beings (resembling what Butler 
says of the “remainder” or of the “surpluses” which exceed linguistic representation) which 
go beyond language and the realm of actual objects. To the extent that language is seen to 
represent things which exist the radically excluded things exceed language.  Things which are 
“radically excluded” constitute a realm of the pulverization of the linguistic and conceptual 
system of  the subject and the object. In this realm the subject becomes deconstructed as there 
is no subject without no objects - if we think that “subject” is one of its own objects. (Kristeva 
1982, 1-13;).     
 
Butler’s  idea  of  a  language  -  or  actually  of  a  “translation”  -  which  would  allow  room  for  
radical otherness resembles Kristeva’s poetic language. Butler’s  “queer” parody (the 
ambivalent bodies, performed in queer manner) resembles what Kristeva says of the 
ambivalence of the poetic bodies (Kristeva, ibid. 84-89). They both draw on the Hegelian 
tradition in which selves and bodies are seen as ek-static (internally multiple and 
contradictory). They also both draw on the (Kojèvian) tradition of reading Hegel in which the 
relation between the realm of  “particular historical rationality” (e.g. particular subject-
identities) and its contradictory other is seen as a relation of abjection (i.e. repression, 
slavery).  For Butler, like for Kristeva, this repression takes place in all communication.   For 
Kristeva, like for Lacan, any language is necessarily governed by the Law of the Phallus. In 
this Law, the feminine otherness is necessarily something non-existent.  Butler criticises 
Kristeva for her political impotency.  (GT 88-93).  Kristeva associates the linguistic realm of 
culture and politics with the necessary abjection  of  the  maternal body. Butler argues that 
Kristeva situates any opposition to the Law of the Phallus outside of culture and language. 
Butler argues against Kristeva in the same vein as she argues against Lacan. For Butler, even 
that the Other is always repressed, this repressed Other need not always be the “maternal 
Other”. Nor does the repressing “master” need always be a paternal law. Butler argues that 
Kristeva’s own theory reproduces the abjection of maternity which it claims just to describe 
 
The idea in Butler’s performative, queer-parodic politics is to cite some authoritative 
discursive construction parodically, critically, by mixing some radical elements into the 
construction, which the term is.   Thus, the construction is not reproduced according to the 
prevailing dominant cultural norm, yet, it is repeated “wrong”, or actually parodically, i.e. 
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partly wrong.  It is repeated in a parodic manner, in which some of the old, legitimate aspects 
of the term are united with radically new aspects. The parodic citing denotes a “radical 
continuation”, a sort of dialectical change (Aufhebung, in Hegelian terms)  of the term.   
 
For Butler, queer-parodic performances of this kind can also work to expose and to show that 
also the normal cultural  construction was itself a forced repetition of norms, instead of being 
something natural.  
 
 
We no more create from nothing the political terms that come to represent our 
“freedom” than we are responsible for the terms that carry the pain of social 
injury. And yet, neither of those terms are as a result any less necessary to work 
and to rework within political discourse. In this sense, it remains politically 
necessary to lay claim to “women”, “queer”, “gay” and “lesbian”, precisely 
because of the way these terms, as it were, lay their claim on us prior to our full 
knowing. Laying claim to such terms in reverse will be necessary to refute 
homophobic deployments of the terms in law, public policy, on the street, in 
“private” life (…) The political deconstruction of “queer” ought not to paralyze 
the  use  of  such  terms,  but,  ideally,  to  extend  its  range,  to  make  us  consider  at  
what expense and for what purposes the terms are used, and through what 
relations of power such categories have been wrought  (BM 229).    
 
 
The term “queer” is a good example of Butler’s parodic politics. “Queer” was used as a 
derogatory name – in “name-calling” - to abuse sexual minorities like homosexuals. It was 
expropriated and redeployed against its (earlier, derogatory) intentions and adopted into a 
name for  gay and lesbian activist movement.  
 
 
The term “queer” emerges as an interpellation that raises the question of the 
status of force and opposition, of stability and variability, within performativity. 
The term queer” has operated as one linguistic practice whose purpose has been 
the shaming of the subject it names or, rather, the producing of a subject through 
that shaming interpellation. Queer derives its force precisely through the 
repeated invocation by which it has become linked to accusation, 
pathologization, insult. This is an invocation by which a social bond among 
homophobic communities is formed through time. (BM 226).  
 
 
However, Butler also speaks of the possibility of the “queer” itself becoming a parochial 
name and a parochial performative.  Any name, even the “queer”, can become a parochial 
name.  
 
 
One might be tempted to say that identity categories are insufficient because 
every  subject  position  is  the  site  of  converging  relations  of  power  that  are  not  
univocal. But such a formulation underestimates the radical challenge to the 
subject that such converging relations imply. For there is no self-identical 
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subject who houses or bears these relations, no site at which such relations 
converge. This converging and interarticulation is the contemporary fate of the 
subject. In other words, the subject as a self-identical entity is no more. It is in 
this sense that the temporary totalization performed by identity categories is a 
necessary error. And if identity is a necessary error, the the assertion of “queer” 
will  be  necessary  as  a  term of  affiliation,  but  it  will  not  fully  describe  those  it  
purports to represent. As a result, it will be necessary to affirm the contingency 
of the term: to let it be vanquished by those who are excluded by the term but 
who justifiably expect representation by it, to let it take on meanings that cannot 
now be anticipated by a younger generation whose political vocabulary may 
well carry a very different set of investments (BM 229-230)  
 
Any name can become fixed to take on some discursive identity which always is an “error”. 
Hence, it is necessary, as Butler says, to affirm the contingency of the term. Any term should 
be allowed to be, permanently,  a site of political contest. 
 
 
4.1.11. The ambivalent results of performative politics  
 
 
Butler writes of “drag” as an example of radically performative politics. Drag is described by 
Butler as a gender parody or gender impersonation. In drag, natural or “normal” genders are 
mimed in a way in which features from mutually exclusive genders are mixed together on a 
one body. Or, actually, features from genders which are culturally and discursively forced into 
mutual exclusiveness become combined in gender parody. (GT 122-123; BM 229-231)  
 
For Butler, gender is actually always a sort of “drag”. Drag is a sort of ek-static gender which 
genders (and things in general) actually always are. The coherent, non-ek-static gender-
identities are actually, as she calls them, necessary errors. (BM 230)  For Butler, it is 
necessary that there is the aspect of “coherent identity” to things - i.e. the moment of 
identifying things as particulars.  Otherwise we could not think or see them at all. Yet, this  
moment of non-ek-static identity is a necessary error as things are actually ek-static;  they are 
sort of “drags” to start with. For Butler, gender-parody may,  importantly, reveal the ek-static 
construction, which the gender always is. These radical appropriations of gender are not 
“colonizing”  appropriations or parochial translations of gender. As they reveal the ek-static 
constructiveness of gender, by combining mutually exclusive elements together, they do not 
claim sovereign knowledge of gender (GT 122-123) 
 
For Butler, the parodic appropriations of gender may result into the acceptance of the lesbian, 
gay, trans-,  bi-sexual (etc.) identities.   For Butler, e.g. feminine features are not “sovereignly 
owned” by women, hence, they can be displayed also on a male body.  Also, desire for 
women is not the property of men, hence, it can be practiced also by women. (GT 122-123). 
 
 
Within lesbian contexts, the “identification” with masculinity that appears as 
butch identity is not a simple assimilation of lesbianism back into the terms of 
heterosexuality. As one lesbian femme explained, she likes her boysto be girls, 
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meaning that “being a girl” contextualizes and resignifies “masculinity” in a 
butch  identity.  As  a  result,  that  masculinity,  if  that  it  can  be  called,  is  always  
brought into relief against a culturally intelligible “female body”. It is precisely 
this dissonant juxtaposition and the sexual tension that its transgression 
generates that constitutes the object of desire. In other words, the object (and 
clearly, there is not just one) of lesbian-femme desire is neither some 
decontextualized female body nor a discrete yet superimposed masculine 
identity, but the destabilization of both terms as they come into erotic interplay. 
(…) In both butch and femme identities, the very notion of an original or natural 
identity is put into question; indeed, it is precisely that question as it is embodied 
in these identities that becomes one source of thei erotic significance. (GT 123) 
 
 
However, for Butler queer-parodic gender parodies like “drag” are not necessarily or 
unproblematically subversive. Butler writes of the radical potential of “drag”:  
 
 
It serves a subversive function to the extent that it reflects the mundane 
impersonations by which heterosexually ideal genders are performed and 
naturalized and undermines their power by virtue of effecting that exposure. But 
there is no guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of heterosexuality will 
lead to its subversion. Heterosexuality can augment its hegemony through its 
denaturalization, as when we see denaturalizing parodies that reidealize 
heterosexual norms without calling them into question. On other occasions, 
though, the transferability of a gender ideal or gender norm calls into question 
the abjecting power that it sustains.  For an occupation or reterritorialization of a 
term that has been used to abject a population can become the iste of resistance, 
the possibility of an enabling social and political resignification. (BM 231)  
 
 
 
It seems that gender parodies do not always manage to reveal the radical constructiveness of 
gender which is, however, what Butler herself knows to be the (true) construction of gender. 
Who are these people to whom the (actual) nature of gender is to be revealed, and of whom 
we can never be sure  whether or not they are capable of understanding  the genders  right (i.e. 
as ek-static) or not?  
 
Butler writes that “heterosexuality can augment its hegemony even through its 
denaturalization” (ibid.). What Butler writes here could be understood to mean that 
heterosexuality is some kind of a colonialist, parochial agent of its own. Yet, we know that for 
Butler  terms like heterosexuality are ek-static; they go beyond any parochial interpretation of 
them.  Even that there is necessarily  temporarily “colonialist” (discursive, coherent, 
parochial) translations and intentions of them, all translations are nevertheless also “beyond 
colonialism”. They are ek-staticly processual, due to their basic ek-static nature.  For Butler, 
the colonialist attitudes (of gender and also of other terms) are, as she says,  necessary errors. 
Erroneous (refuting, silencing, parochial) attitudes are necessary just because discursive, 
identitarian thinking is necessary.  
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4.2. Critiques of Butler 
 
 
In this chapter I take up a few critiques of Butler. (Here, as elsewhere, I ignore the more 
specific discussion related to, for example, her analysis of sexuality.)  Butler is often 
criticized for her difficult, highly abstract language. She is also criticized for paralyzing 
feminist politics, and politics in general, Butler’s critical analyses of the basic political terms 
such as “subject”, “freedom”,  “human” and  “woman”  have been interpreted  to imply that 
there  is  no  political  hope   –   e.g.   feminist  hope  -   because  our  basic  political  concepts  are  
always repressive of others, regardless of what concepts we choose to use.  In this chapter I 
discuss the critiques of e.g. Martha Nussbaum and Seyla Benhabib. They criticize Butler for 
paralyzing politics, especially feminist politics, with her abstract, postmodernism.  
 
Butler’s Hegelianism has also been discussed, even if very briefly.   I take up Allison Weir 
and Kimberly Hutchings as theorists who discuss Butler’s Hegelian inheritance.  Allison Weir 
seems to be the only theorist who has, so far, located Butler to the Kojèvian tradition. In her 
Sacrificial Logics (1996). Weir argues that Butler draws from the same tradition as  e.g. 
Sartre, de Beauvoir, Derrida and Luce Irigaray.  However, Butler’s relation to the Kojèvian 
inheritance is discussed very briefly and indirectly, amidst a few other theorists. Hegel’s and  
Kojève’s theories are  also introduced only briefly by Weir.  Nevertheless, Weir claims that in 
the Kojèvian tradition the relation between the self and the other is seen as a necessarily 
“sacrificial” relation, a view not supported by Hegel.   Kimberly Hutchings comments 
Butler’s reading of Antigone, focusing Butler’s discussion on Hegel’s interpretation of the 
Antigone story.  
 
Butler  has  been  a  very  influential  theorist  over  the  past  few decades.  It  must  be  noted,  that  
most of those who discuss on her theories tend to share her basic ideas. A characteristic 
feature in the few critical texts is that they are brief. They do not analyse Butler’s views in 
depth.  It seems that the readers of Butler either praise her ideas rather uncritically, or, then, 
reject them completely, with frustrated exclamations made about her difficult style of writing. 
So far no thorough studies have been presented, either by her protagonists, or by her critics, of 
the theoretical background of Butler’s thought. Butler’s roots in Hegel, Kojève and Althusser 
are commented very briefly, if at all. Most theorists see her especially as a Foucauldian 
thinker, influenced also by the psychoanalytical theories of Freud and Lacan. The way Butler 
is embedded in a specific Kojèvian and Althusserian traditions of thought - which have their 
roots in Hegel - has not been discussed at all.   
 
 
4.2.1. Martha Nussbaum 
 
 
The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum published a fierce critique of Butler in her 
article ‘The Professor of Parody’ (1999). Nussbaum criticizes Butler for turning feminist 
politics into abstract and obscure verbalism, with little consequence to the lives of real 
women.  According  to  Nussbaum,  there  is  still  a  lot  to  do  to  make  the  lives  of  real  women  
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better. Hence feminists should make concrete proposals for  social change in terms of better 
laws, education, working conditions and wages for women, as well as sufficient social welfare 
for mothers, child-care etc. Feminists should not forget to focus on legislative action.   
 
Nussbaum worries of the new postmodernist feminism, which she describes as “quieting” as it 
does not encourage women to take concrete action to improve their lives. Nussbaum sees that 
there is a new trend, especially among young feminists, to turn from the material side of life, 
and from real struggles to improve legislation etc.  toward a new type of obscure and highly 
abstract verbal and symbolic politics. This new type of linguistic, symbolic politics makes, for 
Nussbaum, only the flimsiest of connections with the real situation of real women. Nussbaum 
considers Butler a leading figure in this postmodernist politics.  
 
 
Feminist thinkers of the new symbolic type would appear to believe that the way to do 
feminist politics is to use words in a subversive way, in academic publications of lofty 
obscurity and disdainful abstractness. These symbolic gestures, it is believed, are 
themselves a form of political resistance; and so one need not engage with messy 
things such as legislatures and movements in order to act daringly. The new feminism, 
moreover, instructs its memebers that there is little room for large-scale social change, 
and maybe no room at all. We are all, more or less, prisoners of the structures of 
power  that  have  defined  our  identity  as  women.  (;)  All  that  we  can  hope  to  do  is  to  
find   spaces  within  the  structures  of  power  in  which  to  parody them,  to  poke  fun  at  
them, to transgress them in speech.  (Nussbaum 1999, 2-3) 
 
 
Nussbaum argues that it is actually difficult to come to grips with Butler’s ideas, because it is 
difficult to figure out what they are. Nussbaum argues that Butler’s text is dense with 
allusions to other theorists. The problem is that Butler does not explain how she interprets the 
ideas of the theorists she refers to (p. 3). Nussbaum argues: 
 
 
..an initial problem in reading Butler is that one is bewildered to find her arguments 
buttressed by appeal to so many contradictory concepts and doctrines, usually without 
any account of how the apparent contradictions will be resolved. (Ibid. 3)   
 
 
Nussbaum complains that Butler makes casual allusions to other theorists in her texts, and  
this  results  into  a  “thin”  argumentation  where  few  definite  claims  are  made.  When  definite  
claims are not made, things, which are talked of are rendered  obscure, un-theoretical and also 
un-democratic. Other theorists cannot participate in theoretical debates with Butler, because 
Butler speaks of things in such a mysterious, un- theoretical way. The issues (gender, 
sexuality, subject etc.) are mystified and placed beyond critical theoretical discussion. For 
Nussbaum, this results also into a hierarchical situation: 
 
Mystification as well as hierarchy are the tools of her practice, a mystification that 
eludes criticism because it makes few definite claims.  (ibid.4)  
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Nussbaum argues that Butler does not actually say anything new, anything which has not 
been said before. When Butler does make definite arguments, they are arguments which have 
been presented by others before. An example of this is the idea that conventional 
understanding of gender roles is a way of ensuring continued male domination in sexual 
relations. Nussbaum says that this idea has been presented by Catharine MacKinnon and 
Andrea Dworkin already in 1970s and 1980s. Actually, already John Stuart Mill said the 
same. Nussbaum lists several of Butler’s central arguments and shows that others have said 
them before. Nussbaum argues that Butler’s main idea – that gender is a social artifice, which 
does not reflect anything external in nature, and that it derives from customs that embed social 
relations  of  power  -   is  not  a  new  one.   What  makes  Butler’s  ideas  appear  as  new  is  her  
obscure way of presenting them. (ibid 5-6).  
 
Nussbaum  criticises   Butler’s  idea  that  the  distinction  of  a  body  into  two  sexes  is  a  social  
construction. 
 
..it is much too simple to say that power is all that the body is (….) Culture can shape 
and reshape some aspects of our bodily existence, but it does not shape all the aspects 
of it (…) Even where sex difference is concerned, it is surely too simple to write it all 
off as culture; nor should feminists be eager to make such sweeping gesture. Women 
who run or play basketball, for example, were right to welcome the demolition of 
myths about women´s athletic performance that were the product of male-dominated 
assumptions; but they were also right to demand the specialized research on women´s 
bodies that has fostered a better understanding of women´s training needs and 
women´s injuries. In short: what feminism needs, and sometimes gets, is a subtle study 
of the interplay of bodily difference and cultural construction. And Butler´s abstract 
pronouncements, floating high above all matter, give us none of what we need. 
(ibid.9)  
 
 
Nussbaum continues: 
 
Suppose we grant Butler her most interesting claims up to this point: that the social 
structure of gender is ubiquitous, but we can resist it by subversive and parodic acts. 
Two significant questions remain. What should be resisted and on what basis. What 
would the acts of resistance be like, and what would we expect them to accomplish? 
(idem) 
 
 
Nussbaum observes that Butler opposes the social structures which govern gender and sex on 
the basis that these structures are repressive and subordinating. Nussbaum notes that Butler 
does  not  give  any  account  of  the  concepts  of  resistance  and  oppression  that  would  help  us  
“were we really in doubt about what we ought to be resisting” (idem). Nussbaum continues: 
 
Butler departs in this regard from earlier social-constructionist feminists, all of whom 
used ideas such as non-hierarchy, equality, dignity, autonomy, and treating as an end 
rather than a means, to indicate a direction for actual politics. (… ) Indeed, it is clear 
that Butler, like Foucault, is adamantly opposed to normative notions such as human 
dignity, or treating humanity as an end, on the grounds that they are inherently 
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dictatorial. In her view, we ought to wait to see what the political struggle itself throws 
up, rather than prescribe in advance to its participants. Universal normative notions, 
she says, “colonize under the sign of the same”. (idem)  
 
Nussbaum criticizes Butler for political passivism, for a type of “let’s wait and see what will 
happen in politics”- attitude. Nussbaum associates a similar attitude to thinkers like Foucault. 
She argues that when political action does not base itself on any such ideas as human dignity, 
equality, or universal freedom, almost anything can be done under the name of “subversion”.  
Feminists, gays and lesbians can be mocked and parodied, because it is “subversive”.  Also 
antidiscrimination laws,  made to protect the rights of minorities,  can be resisted, because any 
officially and legally defined object (like an anti-discrimination law) is thought to be 
ultimately repressive (idem). 
 
 
4.2.2. A void at the heart of Butler’s politics 
 
 
Nussbaum claims that there is a “void” at the heart of Butler’s notion of politics. This results 
to arbitrary politics, in which anything can be mocked, including the rights of minorities, 
gays, blacks etc. She writes: 
 
This void can look liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly with a normative 
theory  of  human  equality  or  dignity.  But  let  there  be  no  mistake:  for  Butler,  as  for  
Foucault, subversion is subversion, and it can in principle go in any direction. Indeed, 
Butler’s naively empty politics is especially dangerous for the very causes she holds 
dear. For every friend of Butler, eager to engage in subversive performances that 
proclaim the repressiveness of heterosexual gender norms, there are dozens who 
would like to engage in subversive performances that flout the norms of tax 
compliance, of non-discrimination, of decent treatment of one’s fellow students. To 
such people we should say, you cannot simply resist as you please, for there are norms 
of fairness, decency, and dignity that entail that this is bad behaviour. But then we 
have to articulate those norms – and this Butler refuses to do.  (ibid.10) 
 
Butler addresses the problem of “empty politics”, raised by Nussbaum, in her text ‘The 
question of Social  Transformation’ (UG). According to Butler,  it  is  clear that  resignification 
alone (pure empty subversion of whatever object, even antidiscrimination laws) is not a 
sufficient ground for politics.  Resignification needs to be thought in its context. When 
resignification is contextualized, it does not need to be  arbitrary, targeted randomly against 
the minorities themselves.  Butler argues that the goal in the resignification should be to make 
terms more inclusive by resignifying them through excluded otherness. When this “norm” is 
taken as a principle, resignificatory politics need not be “empty”, and, consequently,  
arbitrary. Here Butler seems to speak of the “void”, which Nussbaum identifies at the heart of 
Butler’s politics.  
 
Butler says that: “one can argue that the Nazis appropriated power by taking the language and 
concerns of democracy against itself” (UG 223).  Hence, Butler agrees that, in a sense, Nazis 
acted according to the idea in Butler’s performative politics in which the idea is to turn power 
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against itself and to re-appropriate  political terms radically.   Butler takes up  two examples 
of “subversion” and  tries to show how it  is  possible to say that the other is  good while the 
other is not. The other example comes from South Africa, where, prior to the overthrow of the 
apartheid, black South Africans came to polling stations to vote, even that there was no prior 
authorization for them to vote. They  tried to include themselves into the political community, 
from which they had been excluded. They referred to the  right to vote and claimed that this 
right includes also them, blacks, not only the whites. The terms of universality and citizenship 
were turned against themselves, through being interpreted and resignified by a claim made by 
the excluded others. For Butler, this kind of resignification can work to make central political 
terms and rights more inclusive. Terms may be opened for radical otherness. Another 
example, which Butler offers, concerns Hitler. According to Butler, Hitler was also 
“subversive” for he  invoked rights to a certain kind of life for which there was no 
constitutional or legal precedent, local or international. Butler says, however, that there is an 
important distinction between these two invocations.   For Butler, we can ask ourselves the 
next questions when considering what political action is good and what is not. 
 
When we come to deciding right and wrong courses of action in that context, it is 
crucial to ask: what forms  of community have been created? Hitler sought to intensify 
the violence of exclusion; the anti-apartheid movement sought to counter the violence 
of  racism  and  exclusion.  This  is  the  basis  on  which  I  would  condemn  the  one,  and  
condone the other. What resources must we have in order to bring into the human 
community those humans who have not been considered part of the recognizably 
human? This is the task of a radical democratic theory and practice that seeks to 
extend the norms that sustain viable life to previously disenfranchised communities. 
(UG 225) 
 
By  asking  the  questions  (above)  from  ourselves,  we  can,  according  to  Butler,  draw  the  
conclusion that the South African case represents radical democratic politics, which works to 
render the refuted, excluded  others something viable. As such, it represents what for Butler 
really is performative, subversive politics. It expands radically the  range  of  what  is  
considered viable life and citizenship.  In contrast to the South African case, Hitler’s politics 
furthers the exclusion and the elimination of radical others. 
 
What Butler says here is actually quite close to Hegel’s view. In the quotation above Butler 
speaks in favour of bringing into the human community those humans who have not been 
considered part of the recognizably human. This echoes very closely what Hegel speaks of the 
“free communities”.  In Hegel’s ideal recognition, contradictory others become - mutually - 
acknowledged as having something valid to say about various terms, important in defining the 
community. 
 
However, according to the analysis presented here, there is a problem in the way the excluded 
others become included into the range of “recognizably human” in Butler´s subversive 
politics. For Butler,  there is no conceptual transition (at least no full transition) between what 
is identified by subjects, and what is identified by others, as “human”, or, as “citizenship”. For 
Butler,  we  exercise  colonialism,  if  we  try  to  define  the  radical  Other,  or  when  we  try  to  
conceptualize what the Other says of something like “human”.   When the views of the others 
(concerning such things as citizenship, human, gender etc.) become included into what is 
considered viable, these views of the others should not, however, become conceptualized. If 
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we conceptualize them, we include them into our own conceptual construction of “human”.  
Hence, the inclusion of the others into the realm of what is considered viable (about “human”, 
“freedom” etc.)   does not mean that we could understand, in terms of  identification or 
conceptualization,   what  the  Other  says  of  the  relevant  issues. Hence  we cannot  identify  or  
conceptualize what becomes  included into the community of the recognizably human when 
the others, with their views,  enter into it.   
 
If we think about the inclusion of the others (into the realm of the recognizably human) in the 
same way as Butler does, we cannot actually make out what the others say, what they are, and 
how they may change the “community of the recognizably human”.   The speech of the Other 
remains ambivalent for us. We cannot relate to it conceptually. This is due to what the Other 
is for us, i.e.  what  we  think  of  radical  otherness.   Thinkers  like  Butler  see  the  Other  as  
ambivalent.  If  we  think  of  the  Other  like  Butler,  we  know that  what  the  Other  says  is  
constituted by a further Other what is excluded and silenced by the Other. We know that the 
speech of the Other constitutes a necessary error. We know that what is said (of citizenship, 
viable life, or of human) by the Other is “beyond” the Other, not conceptualizable by the 
Other itself.  At the same time we know that our own way to interpret the speech of the Other 
(including the way the Other excludes its further Other) is constituted by our own internal ek-
statism. Our interpretation of the Other is beyond us. It is constituted by the repression of our 
own constitutive outside.  
 
We cannot conceptualize “the community of the recognizably human” if  we cannot 
conceptualize ourselves or other selves, i.e. the beings who make up the community and who 
define (by their speech and their thoughts) the community and its founding categories and 
principles, e.g. the concept of the “human”. If we cannot conceptualize or particularize what 
the community of the recognizably human is, this community remains un-conceptual – and 
thus  empty  -  for  us.   A  form  of  recognition  of  the  Other  (as  a  member  of  a  community  of  
humans) which does not acknowledge the validity of what the Other says of itself, or of things 
in general, remains an  abstraction. Further, if we think  that our own attempts to recognize 
the Other are bound to fail - because they are based on the refutation of our constitutive 
outside  –  then,  in  effect,  we  do  not  acknowledge  the  Other’s  recognition  of  itself  as  valid.   
Here, both one’s own, and the Other’s  capacities to recognize things and persons  in a valid 
way become rendered  into abstractions. Because neither one’s own self or the Other are 
acknowledged as able to think and speak  of things in a valid way,  actually both one’s self 
and the Other – as well as the human community – become arbitrary abstractions. This may 
result into the arbitrary  politics which Nussbaum speaks of.  
 
 
Nussbaum’s critique of Butler takes up a few important themes. However, it remains rather 
limited in itself. It appears that Nussbaum is mainly frustrated with Butler’s often difficult and 
even mysterious text. It is difficult.  However, Nussbaum does not make a thorough analysis 
of Butler’s arguments in her quite brief article.  For example, no references are  made to 
Butler’s Hegelianism.   
 
       
4.2.3. Seyla Benhabib 
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Seyla Benhabib is a well known contemporary political philosopher. She works as a professor 
of political science and philosophy at Yale University. Benhabib is known as a Kantian-
inflected theorist of democracy, influenced by a Habermasian communicative ethics and also 
by the thought of John Rawls. However, like Butler, she started her academic career as a 
Hegel-scholar.  She  did  her  PhD-study  on  Hegel:  Natural Right and Hegel: an Essay in 
Modern Political Philosophy (1997).  The basic point in both Benhabib´s and Nussbaum´s 
criticism of Butler is that Butler deconstructs the fundamental base in all politics, including 
feminist politics. For both Nussbaum and Benhabib, any actual, political action has to be 
based on some concepts which it gains its principles, motivation and direction. In Butler, 
there are no such concepts and, consequently, Butler’s politics works to paralyze politics and 
silence the concrete claims made by the repressed minorities.   
 
According  to  Benhabib,  the  central  theme  of  the  emancipation  of  women,  gays,  or  any  
minorites. cannot be based on Butler’s thought.   Even that Benhabib agrees with Butler in her 
criticism of the Western philosophical “masculine Reason”, she sees dangerous aspects in 
Butler’s views. When terms like woman or homosexuality  become themselves seen as  
products of  heterosexist suppression,  there is no base for critical feminist or gay politics.  
There is no “woman”,  “homosexual” or a “black” to be emancipated or recognized as equal  
as the very categories themselves are seen to be constituted by a colonialist oppression of 
others. Benhabib writes in Feminist Contentions (1995)  in which Benhabib, Butler and some 
others discuss feminist issues.   
 
Surely  we  can  criticize  the  supremacy  of  presuppositions  of  identity  politics  and  
challenge the supremacy of heterosexist and dualist positions in the women´s 
movement. Yet is such a challenge only thinkable via a complete debunking of any 
concepts of selfhood, agency, and autonomy? What follows from this Nietzschean 
position is a vision of the self as a masquerading performer, except of course we are 
now asked to believe that there is no self behind the mask. Given how fragile and 
tenuous women´s sense of selfhood is in many cases, how much of a hit and miss 
affair  their  struggles  for  autonomy  are,  this  reduction  of  female  agency  to  a  “doing  
without  the  doer”  at  best  appears  to  me  ot  be  making  a  virtue  out  of  necessity.  
(Benhabib 1995, 22)  
 
Benhabib argues that Butler´s (as well as other postmodernists, like Derrida´s) thought relies  
on a thesis of “the death of metaphysics”. According to this thesis, Western philosophy tries 
to gain a position of a “master”,  a privileged position from which it explains the world.  For 
Benhabib,  this kind of generalizing claims about what all philosophy attempts to be cannot be 
made. Benhabib writes: 
 
But is the philosophical tradition so monolithic and so essentialist as postmodernists 
would like to claim? Would not even Hobbes shudder at the suggestion that the “Real 
is  the  ground of  Truth”?  What  would  Kant  say  when confronted  with  the  claim that  
“philosophy is the privileged representation of the Real”? Would not Hegel consider 
the view that concepts and language are one sphere and the “Real” yet another merely 
a version of a naïve correspondence theory of truth which the chapter on “Sense 
Certainty” in the Phenomenology of Spirit eloquently dispensed with? (ibid.24)  
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 For Benhabib, Butler´s postmodern thesis of the “death of metaphysics” flattens out the 
history of modern philosophy. It loses the necessary conceptual base (such concepts like 
human, subject, citizen, equality etc.) of politics. The conceptual and philosophical problems 
discusses in human right issues, issues of minorities etc. are swept away when the central 
concepts are considered to be “colonialist master”-concepts, constituted through what they 
cannot  name  (the  Real,  the  constitutive  outside)  and  what  they  repress  (the  other).  When  a  
human right activist, or the theorist of democracy is seen to think  by terms she cannot know, 
and through otherness she represses, the motivation of politics is lost. Benhabib continues: 
 
Social criticism without philosophy is not possible, and without social criticism the 
project of a feminist theory, which is committed at once to knowledge and to the 
emancipatory interests of women is inconceivable. (ibid. 26)   
 
 
4.2.4. The situated politics 
 
 
Benhabib claims that when postmodernists are faced with criticism, e.g. for their  political 
impotency,  they usually offer “local criticism” as a solution. Local narratives – serving as a 
ground for local criticism - do not claim to hold on to universal truths, and they do not intend 
to offer a solution to all places and contexts. Local narratives and local criticism do not intend 
to be universal. Instead, they are particular, limited. When criticism is local, or, as Butler says 
“temporal”,  it is based on local and historical (temporal) narratives, values and meanings, not 
on universal, timeless principles. Such local narrative could be, for Benhabib, e.g “the Anglo-
Americal liberal tradition of thought,”, “the tradition of progressive and interventionist 
jurisprudence”, “the Judeo-Christian tradition” , “the legacy of the suffragettes” etc. (ibid. 26-
27).  
 
Benhabib, however, criticises the postmodernist’s idea of local narratives. She argues that the 
local narratives are “ideal types”: 
 
They are constructed out of the tapestry of meaning and interpretation which 
constitutes the horizon of our social lifeworld. The social critic does not find criteria 
of legitimation and self-criticism to be given in the culture as one might find, say, 
apples on a tree and goldfish in an aquarium; she no less than social  actors is  in the 
position of constantly interpreting, appropriating, reconstructing and constituting the 
norms,  principles,  and  values  which  are  an  aspect  of  the  lifeworld.  There  is  never  a  
single set of constitutive criteria to appeal to in characterizing complex social 
practices. Complex social practices, like constitutional traditions, ethical and political 
views, religious beliefs, scientific institutions are not like games of chess (…) So the 
first defect of situated criticism is a kind of “hermeneutic monism of meaning”, the 
assumption  namely  that  the  narratives  of  our  culture  are  so  univocal  and  
uncontroversial that in appealing to them one could simply be exempt from the task of 
evaluative, ideal-typical reconstruction.  (ibid 27) 
 
 
Benhabib  seems to argue that the local narratives and situations, through which the 
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postmodernists intend to do situated criticism of e.g. the gender relations, are interpreted   for 
the postmodernists.   Whenever the “local” is seen, it is interpreted at the same time. The local 
narrative, or the local context, is not an external given to be found.  Instead, whenever a local 
situation is seen, it is always seen from a specific point of view, even by the postmodernist 
theorists.   Here, Benhabib´s  criticism against Butler and other postmodernists resembles 
Hegel´s criticism against the “pure self-consciousness”. In PhS, the pure self-consciousness 
thought, in short, that particular objects (e.g. particular subject-identities) exist “for 
Bondsmen”. Pure self-consciousness alienated itself from those situated and limited  
“Bondsmen” who interpreted the world from the point of view of their “local narrative”.  
Hegel, however, argued that even that the pure self-consciousness had found something 
important in finding its reflective capacities, it is nevertheless  itself no less situated than any 
one of the “us”, which it reflects. These themes are taken up in later chapters.  
 
In the same volume where Benhabib’s criticism is presented, Butler answers: 
 
The point articulated forcefully by some recent critics of normative political 
philosophy is that the recourse to a position – hypothetical, counterfactual, or 
imaginary – that places itself beyond the play of power, and which seeks to establish 
the metapolitical basis for a negotiation of power relations, is perhaps the most 
insidious ruse of power. That this position beyond power lays claim to its legitimacy 
through  recourse  to  a  prior  and  implicitly  universal  agreement  does  not  in  any  way  
circumvent the charge, for what rationalist project will designate in advance what 
counts as agreement? What form of insidious cultural imperialism here legislates itself 
under the sign of the universal? (ibid.39) 
 
Butler argues that “power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its 
terms” (ibid. 39). In this, Butler seems to agree with Benhabib, who also claims that any 
social  critic  is   also  a  social  subject.  However,  Butler  offers  a  different  way  to  look  at  
ourselves as situated and local social critics than Benhabib. For Benhabib, the social critic 
should not deconstruct away such philosophical foundations like “rationality”, “freedom”, or 
“human”, because these thoughts anyhow continue to constitute the lives of the real people, 
including the social critic herself, who cannot escape from the tradition of philosophical 
thinking.   For Butler, the way  in which a social critic may situate herself as  constituted by 
the very terms which she criticizes, is to interrogate these terms as internally radical, ek-static 
terms. In this way, a social critic does not place herself beyond the history and the politics of 
these terms.  In CHU, Butler criticizes “Kantian” thinkers like Benhabib for taking e.g. the 
idea of a “universal rational capacity”  as a non-political and a non-historical starting point in 
their political and normative analyses. Butler argues in CHU: 
 
The Kantian presumption that when “I” reason I participate in a rationality that is 
transpersonal culminates in the claim that my reasoning presupposes the 
universalizability of my claims (CHU 15) 
 
Butler argues against Benhabib’s “Kantian” belief in universal reason by referring to Hegel’s 
criticism against  Kant.   Here,  in  the  context  of  Butler’s  discussion  with  her  critics,  Butler’s  
basic line of criticism – Hegelianism,  modified by Althusserianism – becomes again visible. 
Butler criticizes Benhabib’s formalist and abstract reason for its Kantianism, through the  
Hegelian idea that all thoughts are ek-static constructions which include the contradicting 
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other.   However, the critical turn, made through Hegel, is followed by its Althusserian 
reversal. Butler uses her basic critical movement to further modify the Hegelian idea of 
internal ek-statism. For Butler the idea need not to lead to a conceptual, rational synthesis. By 
the Althusserian modification, the Hegelian ek-static relation between the self and the Other 
remains at the level of the struggle for recognition.  
 
Butler insists that our task is to negotiate the theoretically and politically foundational terms 
(like  rational  human,  subject,  woman,  heterosexual)  which  lay  their  claim  on  us,  by  seeing  
these terms as radical ek-static constructions.   We should negotiate – e.g. through a historical 
analysis – our own cultural identities as humans, heterosexuals or, as members of minorities. 
Our task is not to try to do away with foundations (like the category of human) because there 
is no escape from them. According to Butler, we should also not champion for a position that 
goes under the name of anti-foundationalism. Our task is, instead, to interrogate what each 
theoretical move that temporally establishes foundations authorizes, and what it excludes and 
forecloses (ibid.39). Here Butler refers to her general theory of things as radical ek-static 
terms,  and to her theory of  politics as an “Hegelian-Althusserian”, radically critical 
movement. The idea is that terms are used and affirmed so  that their internal, radical ek-
statism is taken into account.  
 
Butler often refers to a “Hegelian synthesis” while criticizing various modes of thought, and 
also when confronting her critics. Hegel’s conceptually mediated ek-statism, which Butler 
considers non-radical and non-political ek-statism, is presented as something which should be 
avoided.  Butler says, when answering Benhabib,  e.g. that:  
 
the Hegelian presumption, that a conceptual synthesis is available from the start is 
precisely what has come under contest in various ways by some of the positions 
happily unified under the sign of postmodernism (ibid.38) 
 
Instead of  the Kantian universalist reason or the Hegelian rationalist synthesis, we have, what 
Butler refers to as a  “postmodern sign”. The “postmodern” refers to a realm, or to a world, in 
which  there  is  a  permanent,  radical   political  contest  –  between contradicting  claims  –  over  
the meaning of various terms and categories. There is no hope of a “Hegelian conceptual 
synthesis” between the ek-static parties,   or any other universal, timeless agreement, over 
what terms mean, between the holders of the mutually contradictory positions.  (ibid. 38-41) 
 
Why does Butler speak about a Hegelian synthesis when criticizing Benhabib? There appears 
to be, for Butler, an ultimate  “Hegelian” problem  in all theories which do not consider their 
own constitutive terms as radical, ek-static structures. The basic difference between Butler 
and Hegel is that Butler rejects the possibility of a  conceptual mediation between the ek-
static  parties  of  the  self  and  the  Other.   Consequently,  for  Butler,  all  theories  which  do  not  
consider  their  own  foundational  terms   radically ek-static structures can, in this particular 
sense, be seen as “Hegelian” and criticized through a recourse to a Hegelian, rationalist 
synthesis.  For Butler, these theories place some terms (such as “subject”, “human”, equality 
etc.)  beyond  radical politics and power. “Being placed beyond radical politics” means, for 
Butler, that terms are put beyond “the struggle for recognition”. Even that these (“Hegelian”) 
theories  do  not  claim  to  possess  a  final  and  a  universal  truth  of  their  central   terms,  they  
nevertheless assume, according to Butler,  that such a universal truth can be found. They take 
these terms, in a Hegelian way, as conceptual constructions into which new elements (coming 
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e.g. from repressed groups) may be included conceptually, as parts of  a conceptual  whole. 
For Butler, this indicates a “master”- attitude, which  necessarily rejects radical forms of 
otherness. The very adherence to conceptuality indicates, for Butler,  a “master-attitude”, 
which is always violent.  Even that the “master” allows the concepts to be  negotiated and 
debated of, criticized and  changed, the criticism and the changes nevertheless take place in a 
conceptual space, inside the (master’s) synthesis.   In contrast to this “Hegelian” way to take 
things as conceptual constructions,  Butler argues that we ought to see  terms as radical, ek-
static structures.    
  
Butler’s critique against rationalist or communicative projects, which do leave enough room 
for radical others is in many ways reasonable. It appears that often critics too easily dismiss 
Butler´s  ideas because they are just too frustrated with Butler´s complex way of writing. 
However, Butler, quite justifiably, notes that we should not expect the silenced others to be 
able to speak to us (of themselves and of the world) in a language which does not leave any 
constitutive “surplus” outside of it. Silenced groups may have been deprived of their own 
speech for so long, and in so profoundly silencing ways,  that their capacity to take their 
selves – and our capacity to interpret them -  as “rational objects” is not possible. Their selves 
are, in this way, lost objects. To expect that repressed groups are able to give rational 
syntheses of who they are and what they want  may well constitute  another instance in the 
process of their enslavement.  Butler quite reasonably calls us to be “post-colonial translators”  
in  our  efforts  to  try  to  interpret  what  the  others  say.   Often   the  enslaved  others  are  
“emancipated”  or  “interpreted”   into  a  new  form  of  enslavement  because  their  new,  
emancipated selves become constructed from the viewpoint of the Western, middle class, 
white heterosexual etc.  points of view. It is clearly true that when it comes to the recognition 
of  others,  we  should  be  careful  not  to  recognize  our  own  ideas  of  them  in  the  place  of  the  
others themselves. The recognition of others is a more complex process than just starting to 
plainly listen to what the others say. Instead, we should constantly interrogate what 
viewpoints onto otherness we privilege and authorize and what  interpretations  we authorize, 
and what may become excluded. (see also CHU 34-41; 178-179). 
 
Butler  is  quite  right  in  reminding  us  that  we  should  pay  attention  to  the  “ek-statism” of  the  
terms in which we translate the speech of the radically other. However, the general critique, 
presented in this analysis  against Butler’s “Kojevian-inflected” theory of ek-statism can be 
repeated  here. It is no doubt true that the speech of the Other may well become repressed  if 
we do not remember that the speech of the Other, as well as our own terms of translation, are 
embedded in relations of politics and power. However, if we  see all the terms always only as 
sites  of  the  Hegelian  struggle  for  recognition,  we  force  both  ourselves  and   the  other  into  a  
new colony of silence. The other is not allowed to  be a valid subject if all particular identities 
which the Other could ever identify with,  are permanently considered  sites of the struggle 
for recognition. If we consider all self-identifications necessary failures, as Butler calls them, 
we surely force both ourselves and all others into a specific colony of forced incompleteness, 
forced failure. In this colony all self-knowledge is considered a failure because it is  known 
that it can never describe its object in a valid way.  Butler’s own views themselves consitute 
one possible form of self-knowledge. The Other is equally deprived of a right for a valid self-
knowledge, if the only valid piece of self knowledge is that all other forms of self-knowledge 
are but necessary errors.  
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4.2.5. Allison Weir 
 
 
Allison Weir criticizes Butler’s thought among others, when discussing on the  Kojèvian-
inflected, postmodernist French thinking. In her book Sacrificial Logics. Feminist theory and 
the critique of identity (1996), Weir argues that French postmodernist thought is strongly 
influenced by the Kojèvian reading of Hegel. According to the views discussed by Weir, 
societies are, in general, productions of the repression of the Other. Weir argues that Butler 
belongs to this group of thinkers. For Weir, the characteristic feature in the Kojèvian-inflected 
thought is that the relation between the self and the Other is seen as necessarily conflictual 
and repressive.  Self-identities are seen to be based necessarily on the domination of the 
Other. Weir argues that e.g.  Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir have been influenced 
by the Kojèvian reading of Hegel’s theory of the relation between the self and the Other. Both 
Sartre and de Beauvoir see this relation as necessarily conflictual and repressive. Any way of 
distinguishing between the self and the Other is considered  violence. Weir argues that as long 
as we accept this “sacrificial logic” as the logic of identity  we will be unable to move beyond 
a  conception  of  society  which  is  always  and  only  violent.  Weir  writes  of  the  Kojèvian  
“sacrificial logics of identity” in feminism:  
   
 Following Kojeve´s preoccupation with Hegel´s master-slave struggle as the basis of 
subjectivity, de Beauvoir assumes that the struggle for domination between self and 
other is essential to the establishment of self-identity. Feminist theorists since de 
Beauvoir have been very critical of this assumption. However, both poststructuralist 
feminist theories which draw on Derridean deconstructions of identity and relational 
feminist  theories  that  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  self  as  a  function  of  connection  are  
ultimately based on the same assumption. (ibid.8)  
  
Weir argues that the Kojèvian reading of Hegel was passed into feminism and further into the 
queer-theory mainly through de Beauvoir. Through de Beauvoir, many feminists have 
adopted the idea that the self ought to strive for an “impossible identity”, one which is defined 
through a constant negativity, a constant mastery over an otherness which, as is also 
acknowledged,  cannot ever fully mastered.  Many feminists have adopted the idea that the 
only way to be a feminist is to constantly “outdo” oneself. One is  to negate and master any 
self-identity which lays its claim on oneself in the various cultural contexts and human 
relations where one finds oneself. This constant “labour of negativity” is considered the 
highest form of freedom and the highest form of  self-realization.  Whenever one finds itself 
as an “object”, one has to negate this objectivity, as all objectivity is considered inessential 
and limiting. (ibid. 18-23).  
 
Weir sees that Butler sticks to  an idea that particular identities can be always subverted, i.e. 
negated,  as in the Kojèvian tradition where freedom is associated with the capacity to negate 
any determinations and definitions given of oneself.  However,  the basic (Kojèvian) idea, that 
particular identities are always based on violent domination  is itself never questioned. The 
notion of the relation between the self and the other as a basis of all self-identity is thus taken 
as an a priori given. Weir argues: 
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By adopting this single, totalizing theory of the logic of identity, Butler herself 
represses any possibility of difference among different forms of identity. (;) Butler 
subverts her own call for a subversion of identity by rendering identity so omnipotent 
and intransigent that the subversion becomes impossible. Thus, it becomes impossible 
to see the affirmations of existential and political identities which provide a sense of 
meaning and solidarity to participants in feminist, gay and lesbian, and black 
struggles… (ibid. 113-114)  
   
For Weir, this leads into a situation where intelligibility as such becomes seen as violence.   
 
Once we define the identity of meaning in language as a form of restruction and 
exclusion, we are thereby defining our social construction, and our capacity to speak 
and interact with each other, as a form of violation. (ibid. 118-119)  
  
 
Weir pays attention to Butler’s Nietzschean idea that there is no identifiable “doer behind the 
deed”. Deeds and speech are, for Butler, ex-citable. Speech and acts are not fully known for 
any reflexive self, because they are constituted by an outside, which the acting and speaking 
self itself cannot conceptually relate to. For Weir, this leads into a problem concerning 
Butler’s own performative politics: 
 
Butler jumps to a discussion of subversive repetition, of parodic performances, which 
can serve to expose and thereby subvert the deceptive workings of the systems of 
power. But how do we move from variations on repetition, which are understood as 
accidental failures to repeat, to practices of parody, subversion, and resistance, without 
resorting  to  a  concept  of  the  reflexive  mediation  of  a  knowing,  critical  subject?  For  
while variation and failure probably do not require critical reflection, parody does. 
Somebody, at some level – and it may only be at the level of the unconscious – has to 
get the joke. (ibid.128) 
 
Weir appears to discuss on one of the central problems of this study. How critical politics is 
possible, if, as Butler says, subject lacks (at least generally and to a great extent) the reflexive 
capacities which would enable it to see things from the point of view of the repressed Other?  
 
Weir criticizes the Butlerian “subject-less” performative politics – that is, Butler’s radically 
critical process which does not have any identifiable doer as its agency. Weir refers here to 
Butler’s ek-static politics, in which the idea is to refrain from  “identity-politics”, e.g. in the 
name of women, blacks or gays. For Butler, if any category is placed above politics – by 
taking it as a starting point, in advance,  of politics – the internal ek-statism of the political 
process is rejected.   
 
Solidarity, then, is rejected as a basis of feminist politics, because it excludes the 
possibility of subversions or disruptions of the group identity, and, presumably of 
disruptions of group actions aimed at the achievement of agreed-upon goals. In other 
words, a coalitional activist group should refrain from affirming any solidarity or 
common purpose, because it might thereby thwart its own subversion. An interesting 
notion, in the abstract, but its difficult to imagine how such a group could actually get 
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anything done. Or why it would want to. (ibid. 129-130).  
 
Weir’s important contribution is to connect Butler to the wider tradition. However, apart from 
this discovery, her criticism appears to follow the same line of criticism as Nussbaum´s and  
Benhabib´s. No further analysis of Butler’s roots in Hegel and Kojève, or in Althusser, is 
made. 
 
It  is   important  to  note  how  difficult  it  is  to  think  of  politics  when  a  reader  tries  to  adopt  
Butler’s own viewpoint to things, as Nussbaum, Benhabib and Weir all try to show in their 
critiques. Each of them try to look at politics, as it would look like from such a person’s view-
point who shares Butler’s thoughts. Whereas Butler speaks of politics mainly from the view-
point of the ek-static terms or of discourses,  these critics speak of politics from a view-point 
of a one who thinks of terms or of discourses  like Butler. Whereas Butler theorizes  politics 
mainly  at  the  discursive  level,  where  the  structural  elements  are,  on  the  first  hand,  the  
discursive subject or the discursive term, and, on the other hand, the Other or the constitutive 
outside,  these  critics  look  at  politics  from  Butler’s  own  view-point,  from  which  politics  
appears rather problematic, too abstract to comprehend.    
 
 
4.2.6. Kimberly Hutchings 
 
 
Those who comment on Butler’s connection with Hegel, and say of it more than a few words, 
usually  comment  on  Butler’s  discussion  of   Hegel’s  interpretation  of   the  Antigone  story  in  
PhS.  
 
Kimberly Hutchings is Professor in International Relations at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. In her book Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (2003) 
Hutchings briefly discusses Butler’s reading of Hegel’s interpretation of the Antigone story. 
As explained in the chapter 2, Hegel discusses Antigone, and the kinship relations of love, in 
his discussion of the womankind in PhS.  In Antigone´s Claim. Kinship between life and death 
(2000) Butler criticizes Hegel’s reading of Antigone  (as is explained in the chapter 2.4.2.) 
 
For Hutchings, Butler’s reading of Antigone, in general, shares ground with that of Lacan. As 
explained also in this study (chapter 3.2.1) women do not exist in language for Lacan. The 
linguistic  realm  of  differential  and  conceptual  relations  denotes  the  realm  of  the  “Phallus”.  
There is nevertheless a distinction into the masculine realm and the feminine realm. 
Notwithstanding, this distinction does not denote a linguistic distinction, or a difference, as it 
cannot be  defined, conceptualized.  “Woman” –  in this case Antigone and her ethics – 
denotes a “lack”.   
 
Hutchings explains what she means by Butler’s “Lacanian” reading of Antigone: 
 
Like Lacan, Butler rejects the idea that divine and human law represent equal and 
opposing forces. For Lacan, ..Antigone´s invocation of the laws of the gods is a 
reaching beyond the limits of possibility and liveability established by the symbolic 
order. Butler accepts this idea but interprets it dynamically as an intervention in and 
222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
perversion of that order, rather than its confirmation through the acknowledgement of 
a permanent constitutive exclusion. In Butler´s view, Lacan´s mistake is that of 
generalizing and idealizing kinship as a fixed symbolic order. This means that, like 
Hegel, Lacan is unable to grasp the impossibilities inherent in what Antigone says and 
does.  (Hutchings 2003, 92)  
 
Hutchings notes that Butler’s Lacanian reading of Antigone takes place through a certain kind 
of criticism of both Hegel’s  and Lacan´s interpretation of Antigone. Butler criticizes Hegel’s 
theory of the two realms, the human and the divine, which structure Hegel’s interpretation of 
Antigone. As is explained in the chapter 2.4.2., for Hegel there is a realm of the human law 
(the law of the rational state) and the divine law (the law of the family and the womankind). 
Butler criticizes both Hegel and Lacan for placing women into the static, un-political, non-ek-
static  realm  of  the  divine  law.  In  both  Hegel  and  Lacan,  there  is  a  distinction  between  
feminine and masculine realms, so that the masculine denotes mediated, communicative 
(social) relations, and the feminine denotes immediacy. Even that in Lacan, in contrast to 
Hegel, the distinction between the masculine  and the feminine takes place within the subject, 
the specific type of gender distinction is found in both. (AC 29, 38-42).  
  
Hutchings writes that Butler’s reading of Antigone draws critical implications not only of the 
sexual difference but also how, in general,  the domain of “liveability” (the domain of the 
human and the rational) is both constitutive and exclusive and how, when “the less than 
human speaks as human”, that domain may be radicalized from within.  Hutchings notes that 
Butler criticizes especially Hegel’s reading of Antigone, but also the reading of Lacan, for 
placing the border between what is conceptual and what denotes the “un-conceptualizable”  
permanently just between the men and women.  
 
In  spite  of  Butler’s  criticism  of  Lacan  and  Hegel,  Hutchings  notes  that  the  radical alterity, 
which  Butler  herself  draws  between the  domains  of  the  state  (the  domain  of  the  social  and  
cultural) and the other, stays within the Lacanian formulation. Resembling Lacan, Butler 
adheres to the idea that there is a distinction between the coherent, self-conscious subjectivity 
(denoting cultural, discursive subjectivity) and the constitutive outside, the other, within the 
thinking subject. This relation is retained even that Butler, according to Hutchings, manages 
to radicalize the distinction. 
 
Her radicalized Lacanianism identifies sex and gender not with any stable content or 
capacities and not with women or men, but with constantly reiterated performances, 
which can challenge as well as conform to the normal conditions of intelligible sexed 
or gendered speech or action. Antigone exemplifies such performances in her many 
contaminated voices, working to pervert the course of justice. (ibid.94)  
 
 
According to Hutchings,   Butler offers a “radically performative play” to politicize the border 
between the “conceptual realm ” and the “non-conceptual other”. Hutchings also notes that 
Butler claims that this border does not have to be permanently drawn between women and 
men, or between any other specific parties, instead, it can vary historically and contextually.  
However, Hutchings  sees that Butler stays within the Lacanian reading of the border between 
what is real and human, and what is non-real and non-human. Hutchings calls Butler’s 
reading of Antigone as “radicalized Lacanianism”. (ibid. 94). 
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Hutchings argues that even that Butler offers radicalization of the border between the human 
and the divine laws, she may be, quite justifiably, criticized for undermining the possibility of 
feminist politics. Hutchings writes: 
 
Butler may be accused of undermining the possibility of any coherent feminist ethics 
or politics by denying any stable ground for responding to the question of the meaning 
of women, sex and gender, and reducing freedom to arbitrariness. The way in which 
critical, sexual difference and postmodernist feminists read and respond to each other 
challenges  their  claim  to  have  refused  the  either/or  choice  to  which  Beauvoir´s  
philosophy is seen to have succumbed.(ibid. 104)  
 
 
Hutchings argues that we have to return to Hegel’s general account of the historical formation 
of self-conscious being in order to find possible “Hegelian” feminist solutions.  (ibid. 104). 
According  to  Hutchings,  Butler,  among  some  other  feminist  critics  of  Hegel,  present  
immanent critiques of Hegel (ibid.95) However, if Hegel himself is considered a historical 
philosopher, his own general theory of the development of self-consciousness in PhS, may 
offer a solution to what can be seen as a duality in his own theory.  Hutchings argues: 
 
A  Hegelian  account  of  knowledge  permits  the  claim  that  it  makes  sense  to  say  that  
Hegel is more wrong about women now than he was when he made his claims, 
because his partial grasp of the position of women has become less and less sustained 
by spirit and the forms of its self-understanding in science and philosophy. (ibid. 109) 
 
Hutchings sees that a possible feminist reading of Hegel becomes opened up from within 
Hegel’s theory itself.  Hutchings argues that Butler misses this with her radicalized 
Lacanianism.: 
 
In seeing Antigone as destabilizing and disrupting the given orders of kinship and 
state, Butler rejects Hegel´s account of Antigone´s relation to human law as one 
implicit in the mutual dependence of nature and spirit, private and public sphere. 
Butler´s  rejection  of  the  ontological  status  of  categories  of  determination  and  self-
determination make her argument difficult to grasp other than as a celebration of a 
power  of  disruption  which  breaks  through,  rather  than  being  always  already  implicit  
within the symbolic and social orders. Antigone comes to stand for “anti-law” in 
Butler’s account (anti-kinship and anti-state), even when she acts through law. But to 
be “anti-law” in this sense is to usurp the place of Creon, of arbitrary and persistent 
legislation, only this time with irony (ibid.101)  
 
 
The critiques of Butler, discussed in this chapter, take up similar themes than the ones  taken 
up in this study. They criticize Butler’s abstract politics and abstract feminism, as well as the 
idea that the relation between the self and the Other is necessarily violent and un-mediated. 
However, the critiques do not do full justice to Butler, as no thorough analysis is made of her 
theories. In this sense, they do not also fully succeed as critiques.  
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5. Butler’s Hegelianism 
 
5.1. Butler and Hegel: interpretation and critique 
 
5.1.1.  The reception of Butler  
 
The depth in which Hegel has influenced Butler´s own subject-theory and especially her 
political theory has been commented on only briefly. Usually  Butler´s connection with Hegel 
has been taken up when various critiques of Hegel, e.g. feminist critiques,  are discussed. 
Butler´s book Antigone´s Claim (2000)  is  discussed  as  a  feminist  critique  of  Hegel.  (see  
Hutchings 2003). Most Butler´s commentators agree that she has been profoundly influenced 
by Hegel (see e.g  Salih 2002, 1, 3-4;  Lloyd 2007, 13-25; Chambers & Carver 2008b 92). 
However, not much more is said about the matter. Usually the commentaries focus on  
thinkers like Foucault and Freud as the main sources of influence.    
 
In their work Judith Butler and Political Theory (2008b) Samuel A.Chambers and Terrell 
Carver describe Butler  as a Hegelian. They write, for example:  
 
… while many post-foundational thinkers reject what they see as the theological 
closure in Hegel´s thought, Butler, working in a similar vein, remains a fierce 
defender of Hegel (ibid. 84) (…) Butler remains a champion of Hegel and insists 
on the continued significance of Hegelian thought. (idem) (…) Butler never 
ceases to write within what one might call  ´the shadow of Hegel. (ibid. 92). 
 
In spite of these forceful pronouncements, Chambers and Carver do not analyse the Hegel - 
Butler-connection at all. Because their book is acclaimed to be “the first to take a thematic 
approach to Butler as a political thinker”, the unstated implication is that Butler´s 
Hegelianism is not relevant to her political theory. I disagree.  My view is that Butler is, 
indeed, a Hegelian, and can be fully understood only as a Hegelian.  
 
Sara Salih writes in her book Judith Butler (2002) 
 
How does Butler move from phenomenology to questions of “femininity” and 
“masculinity”?  Does  this  constitute  a  break  in  her  thought  and  a  change  of  
direction? And what is the result when a brilliant Hegelian turns her attention to 
current debates on sex, gender and sexuality? It would be a mistake to regard 
Gender Trouble as a radical departure from Subjects of Desire, and, although it 
would be equally mistaken to try to plot a straightforward progression in 
Butler´s  thought,  it  is  important  to  be  aware  of  the  phenomenological  and  
Hegelian threads running through all her work. Desire, recognition and alterity 
are still very much on Butler´s mind in Gender Trouble, as is the constitution of 
the subject, the ways in which identity, and in particular gender identity, is 
constructed by and in discourse. (ibid. 43-44) 
 
Salih notes that the central Hegelian themes of Lordship and Bondage and the Hegelian 
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dialectics are  important for Butler. When Butler shifts into questions of gender and sexuality 
she does not move out from the Hegelian themes of  Desire,  Recognition and alterity.  Salih 
sees that these central Hegelian themes are carried into inside the Butlerian themes of gender, 
sexuality and subjectivity.    
 
Salih writes that the notion of “alterity” belongs to Butler´s Hegelian inheritance (see also 
Salih 2002, 133).  In Butler, the notion of alterity corresponds to the notion of  “ek-statism”. It 
refers to the  non-coherent, radically altered structure of terms. Salih sees that Butler analyzes 
also the themes of sex, gender and subjectivity in reference to the structure of ek-statism, or 
alterity.  
 
Salih writes that the Hegelian subject-in-process is a central starting point for Butler´s idea of 
subjectivity. Also Butler´s subject is processual. According to Salih, for Butler the Hegelian 
subject  makes constantly “errors” during its travels. It “fails” repeatedly. It over again thinks 
(at least first) that it has found a universal truth of itself and the world, a full truth, a truth 
without flaws. However, over again the truth turns out to be a half-truth and hence a failure as 
a full truth.  Salih sees that even that Butler remains always somewhat a protagonist of Hegel, 
she also adheres to the thoughts of those who intend to go “beyond” the Hegelian dialectical 
system of  subjective  Spirit.  Salih  sees  that  Butler´s  way to  reach  beyond Hegel  takes  place  
through parodic proliferation, which is another name for Butler´s performative politics.  
 
It  seems  that  it  is  only  through  parodic  proliferation  that  dialectic  will  be  
dismantled, an idea that forms the basis of Butler´s next major engagement with 
the subject in Gender Trouble. (Salih 2002, 40). 
 
Salih goes through the central themes and background theoretical links in her book on Butler. 
However, the book does not say much more, besides  this,  of Butler´s Hegelianism. In this, it 
is alike much of the commentary literature on Butler.   
 
Elena Loinzidou (2007) tells in the introduction of her book Judith Butler. Ethics, Law, 
Politics how 
 
throughout this book, this reading of her work is viewed through Butler’s use of 
performative theory and Hegel’s theory of recognition. (Loinzidou 2007, 7) 
 
Moreover, she admits that Hegel’s phenomenology has been the predominant influence on 
Butler’s conception of the subject (ibid., 47-8), and gives a presentation of the first parts of 
PhS (pp. 62-8). Loinzidou’s most important secondary source - apart from SD - is Kojève’s 
Introduction (Loinzidou 2007, 63, 64, 67, 85 nn. 6 and 7). Consequently, the presentation 
ends  to  the  dialectics  of  Lordship  and  Bondage,  and  then,  the  text  moves  to  Nietzsche  and  
Heidegger. After the end of the chapter 3 Hegel, although considered as important, disappears 
from the scene. 
 
Loinzidou does not make any systematic comparisons between Butler’s and Hegel’s views on 
the subject. However, she pays some attention to Butler’s way to reinterpret Hegel’s notion of 
recognition: 
 
She finds the concept of recognition useful because it produces the subject as the 
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outcome of the agonistic relationship between the subject and its social and 
cultural spheres. (Loinzidou 2007, 77).  
 
 
Also Moya Lloyd (2007) sees that the Hegelian themes of dialectics and of Lordship and 
Bondage are important to Butler, and that these themes run through all of Butler´s work. She 
sees  that Butler´s subject-theory  has a Hegelian base. However, she argues, like Salih,  that 
the Butlerian ek-static subjectivity does not engage with the whole logic of Hegel´s dialectical 
system. In short, whereas in Hegel the encounter between the subject and the Other leads into 
a “higher” knowledge of oneself and the world, in Butler any new knowledge constitutes a 
new form of  error.  Butler´s  ek-static  subject  is  a  subject  who constantly  engages  in  a  “self-
loss”.   Lloyd writes, importantly, that this is due to Butler´s suspending the narrative in PhS 
before the journeying consciousness encounters reason or spirit.  Lloyd writes that this 
“suspension of the narrative” is important, however, she says that she will leave this theme to 
others to debate (p.15-16).  In general, Lloyd writes that Butler rejects the idea of full 
dialectical synthesis and that, in this sense, her work is much closer to that of Foucault and 
Derrida. Loyd writes of Butler´s relations with the latter: 
 
For she, like them, holds on to the idea of the critical force of negativity but 
refuses to link that force to the idea of a dialectic that retains the “power of 
synthesis”, in other words, she subscribes…to what what might be called as 
non-synthetic dialectic. (Lloyd 2007, 19)  
 
Lloyd writes that in  non-synthetic dialectic,  difference cannot be incorporated into identity, 
as, she says, Hegel had assumed. Instead, particular differences, whether historical or 
linguistic, are insuperable. They cannot be overcome, and consequently, the Hegelian 
Aufhebung (as a simultaneous preservation and re-interpretation, i.e.negation) is impossible. 
According to Lloyd the  implication here is that when an identity (a synthesis) is posited, 
difference is denied instead of being overcome by the Hegelian way of preserving it.  Through 
this idea, according to Lloyd, Butler is critical when any single identity (a synthesis) is tried to 
be posited for women, men, sexuality or such notions like “human”  etc. (ibid. 15-19). 
 
Loyd speaks of “Butler´s Hegelian inheritance”, alike the other commentators.  However, 
they all seem, in a way, to take for granted Butler´s own version of her theoretical links with 
Hegel. They quite loyally repeat what Butler herself says of her  Hegelianism. Figures like 
Kojève  and  Althusser   are  not  looked  at  more  closely.  The  theoretical  links  between Butler  
and Hegel are not discussed in detail and no systematic comparisons are made. Nevertheless, 
the commentators present some of the central themes of Butler´s Hegelianism.  
 
Butler´s  subject-theory  has  Hegelian  roots  as  she,  in  general,   adheres  to  the  basic  Kantian-
Hegelian thoughts concerning the subjectivity of thinking and the subjectivity of “things”.  
For Butler, thinking is always subjective. Thinking makes up a subjective interpretative field, 
a particular historical self-referential universe, i.e.  a contextual discourse.  This means that 
subjective thinking is limited by its time and place. It is dependent on its history and its 
cultural context.  Thinking is always limited and hence it “produces”, self-referentially, a 
limited objectivity.  The “thing”, or the “subject”, which the thinking is of – i.e. the object of 
thinking – is hence a subjective, limited object. According to Butler, there is no “givenness of 
objects” outside of subjective, limited fields of interpretation.  We cannot do away with the 
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subjectivity of thinking, as there is no thinking outside of subjective, time-and place-
dependent thinkers. According to Butler,  thinking is also citational (BM 232). It refers to 
various cultural authorities, such as religion, ideology etc.     
 
For Butler, subjects and objects exist, in a basic Kantian manner, for us, However,  this “us” 
for whom various terms (i.e. subjects and objects, including the thinking self itself as its own 
“reflected” object of thinking) exist is structured for Butler in a Hegelian manner, i.e. by the 
ek-static relation between the self and the contradicting other. Thus, the various terms which 
Butler theorizes have a Hegelian structure. First of all, like Hegel in PhS, Butler speaks of 
thought terms (e.g. thought sexuality), not empirical objects. For Butler, like for Hegel, 
thought terms are ek-static structures, because they are thought by an ek-static thinking self.  
The ek-static thinker is itself structured by the ek-static relation between itself (as a 
differential system of thinking) and the Other.   (BM 123-124, 227-229; GT 15-16, 142-149).     
 
Butler says that all her works discuss the Hegelian themes of “Desire” and “Recognition”.  
 
In a sense, all of my work remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian 
questions: What is the relation between desire and recognition, and how is it that 
the constitution of the subject entails a radical and constitutive relation to 
alterity? (SD xiv) 
 
 
This indeed seems to be true. The Hegelian Desire and Recognition denote two different 
attitudes toward ek-static relations and toward ek-static change.  An ek-static relation is 
forced into a non-ek-static relation through an attitude of  Desire (i.e. in relations of Lordship 
and Bondage).  Hegel claims that in reciprocally recognitive relations the ek-static relation is 
preserved as self-consciously ek-static. In reciprocally recognitive relations the parties 
recognize each others as equally capable of thinking the ek-statism of terms. In Hegelian 
terms, they acknowledge each others as equally capable of speculation (see e.g. chapter 2.1.5 
on Hegelian “speculation”). It is  true that Butler discusses all throughout her works the 
possibility of preserving the ek-statism of things.  The goal in her political program is to 
render the radical others less repressed and less excluded, i.e. to render them more existable: 
to render them something which “matters”.  An important part of all her theories is to explore 
ways  in  which   the  ek-statism of  things  could  be  preserved.  In  this  sense,  she  has  the  same 
goal as Hegel. Her discussion with Hegel, and her rejection of the Hegelian solution to this 
problem are important parts of her theory.  
 
 
5.1.2. “Arresting” Hegelian dialectics   
 
 
Butler carries the Hegelian ek-statism into her theories of subjectivity and sexuality, and into 
her political theory. Consequently, dialectics (or, as Butler says, “ek-static process”) is central 
to all her thinking. Dialectics – or, ek-static process -  takes place between mutually 
contradicting parties, i.e. between ek-static parties. However, Butler´s way to suspend the 
Hegelian dialectical process (depicted in PhS) before the travelling consciousness reaches the 
self-conscious dialectics (self-conscious ek-statism) in the realm of reciprocal recognition, is 
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essential for understanding her particular version of Hegelianism.  In the following these 
themes are taken up and discussed in detail. 
 
Butler recognizes the Hegelian roots of her subject-theory, yet, she says that her Hegelianism 
is modified by her way to “arrest” the Hegelian text at a certain point in PhS. In fact, she 
speaks of an “Althusserian reversal of Hegel” which she considers important  (see e.g. ES 5; 
CHU 12; PLP 2-6, 30, 51-53; BM 35,69, 113, 116).  Butler rejects the specific dialectical 
“turn” in PhS which takes place when the self-consciousness  turns from the struggle for 
recognition (an attitude of Desire) into a free, actual self-consciousness (into reciprocally 
recognitive relations).  Butler adheres to the Hegelian ek-static process, in the form it takes 
before the turn into free, actual self-consciousness. Before this turn the ek-static process takes 
place as a struggle for recognition, or, as “movement through slavery”. During the phases of 
the struggle for recognition, the self-consciousness has various different types of Desire-
attitudes toward the contradicting other.   
 
As said already above, in PhS, there can be discerned two types of dialectical movement. 
These  two  types  of  dialectics  correspond  with  two  different  ways,  or  attitudes,  in  which  a  
thinking self deals with contradictions.  Hegel presents basically two ways in which a self can 
deal with the fact that there is mutually contradicting thoughts of the world. A self may deal 
with mutually contradicting thoughts on the basis of Lordship and Bondage (an attitude of 
Desire, one-sided recognition), or on the basis of reciprocal recognition. In relations of 
Lordship and Bondage, consciousness acknowledges only one way to think of things and  
refutes views which contradict with this view.  
 
Both Butler and Hegel agree that the world should be understood as internally contradictory.  
People have mutually contradicting thoughts of the world. People look at the world from 
different perspectives, and these perspectives can be incompatible.  Both thinkers agree that 
the world itself is constituted, or known (for thinking selves) in mutually contradicting ways. 
A Hegelian way to say this is that “the world is for the self and for the Other”. Butler’s way to 
say this is, in short,  that “terms are ek-static”. The internal “ek-statism” – the way the world 
exists for mutually contradicting parties - makes all knowledge concerning the world 
processual. Butler and Hegel agree on that understanding the world is an interactive process. 
This epistemological process takes place so that the contradicting parties influence each 
others, mutually, and make each others views of the world change. Both Hegel and Butler talk 
of  the  process,  by  which  the  world  is  known,  as  dialectical.  For  them,  knowledge  is  not  a  
permanent state of mind. However, they disagree on the nature of this process. Whereas in 
PhS, there is first a one kind of process (struggle for recognition) which turns into another 
kind of process (reciprocal recognition), Butler rejects the latter type of processuality and the 
idea of the reciprocal recognition.    
 
Butler rejects the dialectical turn in PhS, by which the thinking self becomes free. She rejects 
the idea that a thinking subject may acknowledge such views of the world which contradict 
with its own views in a free way, without repressing either its own, or the Other, contradicting 
views.  Butler sees that during the phases of the struggle for recognition in PhS,  all kinds of 
ethical and philosophical positions come, in their turn, criticised and changed, when their 
refuted others destabilize them by their demands for recognition. In a struggle for recognition, 
a change takes place through the contradicting other which has been silenced and repressed. 
(PLP 51-53)   
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In PhS, the turn from relations of Lordship and Bondage into free relations takes place when 
the thinking self becomes aware of its own “thirdness”. By realizing its own thirdness, and by 
realizing that also the contradicting others are their own thirds, it becomes capable of 
reciprocally recognitive relationships. Becoming a self-conscious third does not only mean 
that a self becomes conscious that its own view-point onto the world is one among other 
possible view-points.  This is what e.g. the pure self-consciousness (the “Kantian” thinker) 
realizes and ends up abstracting from all points of views. It cannot decide which way to look 
at the world is valid, as they appear interchangeable, and it appears that they all can be 
negated  through each  others.   In  a  way,  it  rejects  or  relativizes  all  of  them.  By becoming a  
self-conscious third a self realizes that the manner, of the pure self-consciousness, to treat all 
particular views onto the world as contingent constitutes another version of the “enslavement” 
of the Other views onto the world. The world is turned into an empty abstraction and its 
internal “ek-statism” (or, in Hegel’s terms: contradictoriness; its way to exists for the self and 
for the Other) is repressed. Hegel´s self-conscious third realizes, first, that it sees things as ek-
static (i.e. it realizes that it is a consciousness of the ek-statism of things and subjects),  and, 
second, that it is a particular consciousness of the ek-statism of things and subjects. It realizes 
that the Other exists as an interpreted Other for it, in its thinking, as it is, itself, a particular 
consciousness of the Other. It realizes that its own way to see things as ek-static, and its own 
consciousness of the Other,  is  a particular one,  one among others.  It  sees itself  as a third,  a 
seer of the “doubleness” of things, i.e. that they exist for contradicting, ek-static parties, for 
the self and for the Other. And, it realizes that it is not the only consciousness of the ek-
statism of things, it is not the only “third”. Instead, there are other consciousnesses of the ek-
statism of things too. The others are, so to speak, struggling with the same problem.    
 
When this basic reciprocally recognitive self-reflective “turn” is made, the subject realizes 
that the ek-statism of things is preserved in the best way through rational communication 
between itself and other subjects (i.e. between “thirds”) whom the subject treats as its 
epistemological equals.   
 
For Butler, Hegel´s self-conscious third (an actual, free self-consciousness) is problematic. 
Butler writes that when the travelling self becomes closer to the realm of Spirit and freedom, 
Hegel introduces a problematic figure of a “mediator”, “minister” or “priest”. The mediating 
“third” starts to counsel between the parties of the ek-static relation, i.e. the subject  and its 
constitutive outside, the Other. This counselling takes place within the self´s own thinking. As 
a  consequence,  the  Other,  who  was  repressed  and  excluded  before  (during  phases  of  the  
struggle for recognition) is now internalized. This leads to a problematic conceptualization of 
the  Other.   Through  the  conceptual  internalization  of  the  “outside”,  the  radical  political  
potential - associated with Butler especially with excluded, repressed otherness - vanishes 
from the process.  Butler writes: 
 
 
the minister reformulates the dialectical reversal and establishes the inversion of 
values as an absolute principle (…) Before the introduction of the “ mediator” 
and the “priest”, the chapter on the unhappy consciousness appears to proceed as 
if it contained a trenchant critique of ethical imperatives and religious ideals, a 
critique which prefigures the Nietzschean analysis that emerges some sixty 
years later. (PLP 52,53)   
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Butler opposes the “absolute ethical principle” which is constituted by the conceptually 
mediated unity of the ek-static parties (the self and the contradicting other) in reciprocal 
recognition.  A reciprocally recognitive relation constitutes indeed an absolute ethical and 
also epistemological principle in PhS. It is absolute as it is not thought to be determined by 
any such ethical or epistemological “outside” which would be beyond its capacities. Butler, in 
contrast, argues that there is no conceptual mediation (or, transition) between the subject and 
its constitutive outside. For Butler, there is no conceptual mediation for the subject itself 
between the two powers, constitutive of the subject.  The other one is internal (the subject as a 
particular object for itself) yet the other one (the Other i.e. the constitutive outside) remains 
external. The other power is conceptually known for the subject itself while the other power 
remains external, not conceptually known for the subject itself, at least not fully.  The external 
power acts on the subject without the subject itself being able to conceptualize it. Butler 
writes: 
 
There is, as it were, no conceptual transition to be made between power as 
external to the subject, “acting on”, and power as constitutive of the subject, 
“acted by”. What one might expect by way of a transition is, in fact, a splitting 
and reversal constitutive of the subject itself. Power acts on the subject, an 
acting that is an enacting: an irresolvable ambiquity arises when one attempts to 
distinguish between the power that (transitively) enacts the subject, and the 
power enacted by the subject, that is, between the power that forms the subject 
and the subjects “own” power. What or who is doing the “enacting” here? Is it a 
power prior to the subject or that of the subject itself? At some point, a reversal 
and concealment occurs, and power emerges as what belongs exclusively to the 
subject (making the subject appear as if it belonged to no prior operation of 
power). (PLP 15). 
 
According to Butler, there is a conceptually un-mediated  relation between the two powers 
forming the subject. The subject-constitutive ek-static relation cannot become conceptual for 
the subject itself; if it were, it would lose its nature as an ek-static, radical constitution. Hence, 
for Butler, there is the subjectively known, conceptual power, which constitutes what the 
subject is for itself. This power, or agency, is called by Butler a “subject-position” or just a 
“subject”.   Then  there  is  the  external  power  which  also  participates  in  the  formation  of  the  
subject. This external power is not fully conceptualizable by the subject itself. It cannot be 
identified, differentiated or conceptualized by the subject itself, and, in this way, it is not  
internal to the subject. It remains external, at least partly. Thus, subjects are externally 
constituted, at least partly, for Butler. The Other remains at least in some ways external, as it 
is not fully internal to the subjects system of identification and differentiation. It remains 
something external, in the way the Althusserian interpellative address. In short, the subject 
cannot make a conceptual construction (for itself) of the internal power (i.e. the subject-
position) and the external power (the Other), which are both formative, constitutive of itself.  
 
Butler opposes the Hegelian dialectic which, for her, includes every opposition, every 
“outside” and otherness, into internal features of itself. She writes: 
 
The risk here is that the dialectic can work to extend the very terms of 
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dominance to include every aspect of opposition. This is the trope of the 
monolithic and carnivorous Hegel whose “Spirit” incorporates every difference 
into identity.(CHU 174)    
 
 
Butler opposes the Hegelian dialectical turn into the reciprocally recognitive relationships and 
the shift into a new type of an ek-static process. The new type of ek-statism takes place as a 
rational, reciprocally recognitive process.  However, it is important to note here that according 
to the analysis of this study, Butler´s way to interpret Hegel’s “internalization” of the 
contradicting other (in relations of reciprocal recognition) is based on a Kojèvian reading of 
Hegel. At the point when the Hegelian consciousness proceeds into reciprocally recognitive 
relationships, Butler finds it necessary to conduct, what she calls, an Althusserian reversal. 
 
 
5.1.3. Mediation and the third 
 
 
In her article “Longing for Recognition” (in Undoing Gender, Butler 2004) Butler argues that 
the “destruction of the Other”  cannot be overcome by any mediating “thirdness”. The reason 
for this is that the third itself is constituted by the refutation of other thirds.      
 
For if it is the case that destructiveness can turn into recognition, then it follows 
that recognition can leave destructiveness behind. Is this true? Further, is the 
relationship assumed by recognition dyadic, given the qualification that the 
process of recognition now constitutes “the third”, itself based upon a disavowal 
of others forms of triangulation? (UG 134) 
 
Butler sees that the “third” is itself based upon the disavowal of other thirds and other forms 
of “triangulation” (i.e. mediating between the internal parts of the self).  As such, any third is 
actually another “ek-static self” which is always, for Butler, constituted on the “refuted” 
otherness.  
 
If the “third” is redefined as the music or harmony of dialogic encounter, what 
happens to the other thirds? The child who interrupts the encounter, the former 
lover at the door or on the phone, the past that cannot be reversed, the future that 
cannot  be  contained,  the  unconscious  itself  as  it  rides  the  emergence  of  
unanticipated circumstance? Surely, these are all negativities, even sources of 
“destruction” that cannot be fully overcome, sublated, resolved in the 
harmonious music of dialogue. What discord does that music drown out? What 
does it disavow in order to be? (UG 145-146) 
 
Butler believes that no such Other can be found who could give a full description of who and 
what it is. Neither can the self, or the other self, make their selves known as particular 
subjects (either to their own selves or to each others). Hence, the formation of selves cannot 
be rendered speakable, conceptually known, at least not fully. We cannot find an authentic 
self, nor an authentic Other, amongst the various possible descriptions which can be given of 
them. This resembles closely Hegel’s description of  Unhappy Consciousness.  Unhappy 
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Consciousness sees that neither it itself - as it is also a subject - or any others, can give a valid 
description of themselves.  Unhappy Consciousness sees that there is parts, constitutive of 
subjects, which can never be, all of them,  brought into such a unity, which would make up a 
universal and timeless truth, i.e. a complete, “total” concept of the subject.  If this kind of a 
conceptual unity is tried to be constructed, some constitutive Other becomes necessarily 
refuted.   
 
According to Hegel´s analysis of the Unhappy Consciousness, Unhappy Consciousness sees 
that  the moment of “a universal  truth” is  relevant  as concerns the knowledge of  subjects.   
Unhappy Consciousness realizes that subjects are “universalizing” beings, hence, “universal 
truth” is a moment of thinking.  Yet, Unhappy Consciousness thinks that it is never reached 
by the limited subjects themselves. Striving for universal truth is, for Unhappy 
Consciousness, striving for the impossible, as it is always conducted by limited, historical 
subjects. Because the Unhappy Consciousness thinks of subjects, and their knowledge of 
themselves, through a construction like this – i.e. through a construction in which “universal 
truth” (or, a “thing in itself”) is seen as something relevant, yet,  impossible to be reached by 
particular subjects, Unhappy Consciousness practices a Master-Slave (patronizing) 
epistemology.   It  acts  as  an  external  reader  (external  third)  of  the  subjects.  It  knows  that  
subjects (including itself) are unknown (in terms of validly known, i.e. fully, universally 
known) to themselves, because all their constitutive parts (which would make up the universal 
and timeless truth of themselves, and thus describe what they are as things/subjects in 
themselves) are not known for themselves. This actually repeats Hegel´s critique against 
Kantian philosophy (which can be seen as the point of reference behind the metaphoric figure 
of Unhappy Consciousness). With Kant, the ultimate truth of things (i.e. thing in itself) cannot 
be reached by the subjects themselves.    
 
In UG Butler writes that the self and the Other cannot (apparently necessarily)  find, or know,  
each others because neither one knows the way they know themselves or each others:   
 
Can one find the Other whom one loves apart from all the others who have come 
to lodge at the site of that Other? Can one free the Other, as it were, from the 
entire history of psychic condensation and displacement or, indeed, from the 
precipitate of abandoned object-relations that form the ego itself? Or is part of 
what it means to “recognize” the Other to recognize that he or she comes, of 
necessity, with a history which does not have oneself as its center? (UG 146) 
 
  
In the same text from where the previous quotations are from, Butler refers to two 
perspectives of how otherness becomes recognized in PhS. This is what she does also in some 
of her other books,  e.g.  in CHU, when discussing Hegel´s ek-static self  in PhS.  Butler sees 
that the self as internally multiple, ek-static appears in two ways in PhS.  On the one hand, it 
is discussed in a non-teleological way, in which the otherness is not fully known. She refers in 
CHU, and also in UG, to “another kind of Hegel”,  with whom the relation between the self  
and  the  Other  is  not  identified  as  a  definitive  relation,  yet  as  a  movable,  futural   one.  This  
movable, futural Hegelian self is not “total”, “complete” or “final” as Butler says.  Yet, on the 
other hand, the self  is discussed in an all-inclusive, non-futural way, in which all external 
features of the self (including all otherness, in full) are mediated into identity with the self.  In 
CHU she refers to “monolithic and carnivorous Hegel, whose “Spirit” incorporates every 
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difference into “identity”, which means, for Butler, that there is no futural movement or 
becoming radically other any more.  (CHU 174, UG 151, see also BM 113-116).   
 
Butler argues that reciprocally recognitive “dyad” relationship is not fully possible. This is 
because the “third” is based on the refutation of other possible thirds. Butler sees that thirds 
refute other thirds, necessarily. In Butler, self as a third remains, in Hegelian terms, one-
sidedly recognitive, instead of reciprocally recognitive: “Desire” is not turned into reciprocal 
recognition.  For Butler, one way to see the ek-static relation (i.e. one way to act as a third) 
refutes radically other ways to see the ek-static relation. Thus, Butler appears to reject the core 
Hegelian idea behind  reciprocal recognition (the non-Kojèvian reading of it, supported in this 
study) which is that a self-conscious third acknowledges that the Other is another valid third 
(i.e. another self-consciousness, epistemologically equal with it).     
 
Butler argues that any recognition takes always place between particular people, in a 
particular place and time, not between abstract selves. Thus, recognition is bound to be 
facilitated, or mediated through terms – or actually as terms - which are not abstractions, yet 
instead, somethings.  Examples of such terms are “rational human being”, “person”, “citizen”, 
“woman”, “man”, “adult”, “normal”  etc.     
 
Butler questions Hegel´s idea that the identificatory term, through which the recognition takes 
place, could become freed from internal slavery (i.e. freed from its otherness-refuting 
structure).  According to Hegel, the term or the language through which recognition takes 
place can be (at least ideally) constituted for reciprocally recognitive selves. Thus, for Hegel, 
identificatory terms (terms through which objects, “somethings”, are identified or actually 
“laboured”) can become “shared”. This idea repeats the idea of “shared rationality” and 
“shared objectivity” in “absolute knowing”. (see chapter 2.3; Hutchings 2003, 106). Hence, 
for Hegel, the particular and partial “term”  (or  the  particular  and  partial  “theory”  of  what  
things are like), which always acts as the medium in recognition, does not need to refute 
either the self (as a theorist of the term) or the Other (as another theorist of the same thing). 
Things can be known in a partial, limited way, albeit in an “absolute” way. Knowing is 
absolute when it is not conditioned by an external, inaccessible (abstract) “beyond”, in other 
words, when it is not practiced in dualist (Master-Slave) relationships. In contrast to Hegel, 
Butler argues: 
 
..the account of myself that I give in discourse never fully expresses or carries 
this living self. My words are taken away as I give them, interrupted by the time 
of  a  discourse  that  is  not  the  same  as  the  time  of  my  life.  This  “interruption”  
contests the sense of the account´s being grounded in myself alone, since the 
indifferent structures that enable my living belong to a sociality that exceeds me. 
(GA 36) 
  
Butler argues that the terms, by which one makes itself recognizable to the Other (or to itself) 
never fully express the self. The words become “interrupted” by something that is (at least 
partly) indifferent to  the  self,  in  the  sense  of  necessarily exceeding the differentiating 
(particularizing) capacity of the self. Hence, the words become “interrupted” by something 
which remains, at least partly, an “inaccessible beyond” to the self. Consequently, as Butler 
repeats in all her text, the terms by which the self and the Other are recognized are 
permanently ambivalent, ambiquous, contingent. That is, they fail to fully describe their 
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object. They misrecognize their object. The words which facilitate recognition are partly 
constituted by something which is not “speakable” for the self itself, who is doing the 
describing.   For Butler, a non-speakable, “exceeding” surplus denotes the refuted otherness 
of the term in question. It is the “non-existent”, yet “haunting” part of the term in question. 
Butler continues (in the same text from where the previous quotation is taken):  
 
We  can  surely  still  tell  our  stories,  and  there  will  be  many  reasons  to  do  
precisely that.  But we will  not be able to be very authoritative when we try to 
give a full account with a narrative structure. The “I” can tell neither the story of 
its own emergence nor the conditions of its own possibility without bearing 
witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have been present, which are 
prior to one´s own emergence as a subject who can know, and so constitute a set 
of origins that one can narrate only at the expense of authoritative knowledge. 
Narration is surely possible under such circumstances, but it is, as Thomas 
Keenan has pointed out, surely fabulous. Fictional narration in general requires 
no referent to work as narrative, and we might say that the irrecoverability and 
foreclosure of the referent is the very condition of possibility for an account of 
myself,  if  that  account  is  to  take  narrative  form.  The  irrecoverability  of  an  
original referent does not destroy narrative; it produces it “in a fictional 
direction”… (GA 37) 
 
The relation between what is spoken (of some recognition-mediating term, like e.g. “human”) 
by some specific self, and what is not spoken (in terms of completely silenced) of this term, 
by this same self, cannot be defined, by this self itself, in terms of a particular relation. This 
very idea actually summarizes Butler´s rejection of  Hegel´s idea of self as a unified concept 
(a “totality”) for itself.  If the unspeakable (silenced, refuted) part of a term could be rendered 
speakable (conceptual) that would mean that a Hegelian free self-consciousness would be 
constituted. For Butler, it is important that the relation between what is known of terms (such 
as “human” or “woman”)  and what is not known of them is not rendered conceptually 
mediated in the Hegelian manner (this theme relates to Butler´s “Lacanianism” which is 
further discussed in the next chapter on Althusser).  As she often repeats, if all the external 
relations (all otherness) of the terms are rendered internal (known), a return to a Hegelian all-
inclusive synthesis is conducted. As has been explained before, in Hegel, the inclusion of 
“all” (i.e. “absolute knowing”) takes place in reciprocally recognitive relationships.   
 
 
The term gestures toward a referent it cannot capture. Moreover, that lack of 
capture constitutes the linguistic possibility of a radical democratic contestation, 
one that opens the term for future articulations. (ES 108)  
 
With Butler, the refutation of otherness cannot be willed away, nor should it be. 
Consequently, the identificatory terms by which selves recognize themselves, each others and 
things cannot be “shared”. Butler rejects the synthesizing element in Hegel´s dialectics.   She 
is concerned of the refutation of the Other.  Nevertheless, she believes that the refutation, the 
enslavement of the Other is unavoidable. The only alternative to the enslavement of the Other 
would be the End of History, which, for her, is  actually no alternative as it denotes the 
“Hegelian carnivorous Spirit”, in which all otherness is repressed and forced into sameness 
with the self.    
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Butler reminds that there is always a refuted otherness (an internal, unspeakable slave) to all 
terms through which the selves recognize themselves, each others and things in general.  
However, for Butler, this realm of “unspeakable otherness” holds also a future promise for the 
terms, by which selves recognize each others, to become democratized. In a sense, hence, 
terms are “shared” (by the self and the Other, i.e. constituted by the subject and the 
constitutive outside)  for Butler, however, this democracy, sharing, takes place as a “future 
promise”. The situation now is such that this democracy, the sharing of a referent, is strived 
for but not captured, not conceptualized.    According to  Butler,  terms should be mobilized 
through the Other, or, be “opened up for otherness”, as she often says.  However, she reminds 
that we cannot radicalize terms self-consciously, through the Other, so that the otherness 
would not be at the same time destructed in some way. Our self-conscious efforts to radicalize 
terms are always particular, historical and thus limited. As limited and “partial” they are, for 
Butler, refutive of the Other.  Terms should be opened up for otherness, however we should 
always remember that we cannot ever “open” the terms for the Other so that the Other would 
not be excluded from them - enslaved and silenced in them - in some ways. Terms can never 
be shared, constituted equally for the self  and the Other, i.e. become free from slavery. They 
can never become known in an “absolute” way, in reciprocally recognitive relationships, in 
the  Hegelian  sense.   Any  mediation  results  into  a  new  otherness-refuting  term,  into  a  term  
which is constituted by what exceeds its self-knowledge, i.e. by its “surplus”/beyond. 
Nevertheless, Butler has an idea of politics, by which the selves and terms would become 
“democratized” in the sense of becoming opened up for otherness. She calls this a 
performative politics, or a “double-movement”.    
 
An idea of historical (or, futural, as Butler usually says) and political movement (self-othering 
movement  through  slavery) appears as highly important in Butler´s political theory. Hegel 
calls this movement a “struggle for recognition”. With Hegel, in the realm of Master-Slave-
relations,  the  slaves  try  to  free  themselves  from  epistemological  and  other  forms  of  un-
freedom, through a struggle for recognition. They try to become included into the valid and 
authoritative (i.e.  free)  humanity.   This  would  mean that  their  speech  (i.e.  what  they  say  of  
things) was regarded as authoritative and valid, which is the same thing as that they would  
become “speakable”,  “existent” and “real” . 
 
According to Butler, it is necessary not to include all the excluded, disavowed identifications, 
which are formative of the subject as a multiple and ek-static construction, into internal, 
conceptual features of the subject. Opposing this kind of full inclusion of the contradicting 
other into the subject is usually referred to by Butler as a Hegelian synthesis.  Butler writes of 
this: 
 
 
I invest no ultimate political hope in the possibility of avowing identifications 
that have conventionally been disavowed. It is doubtless true that certain 
disavowals are  fundamentally enabling, and that no subject can proceed, can 
act, without disavowing certain possibilities and avowing others. Indeed, certain 
kinds of disavowals function as constitutive constraints, and they cannot be 
willed away. But here a reformulation is in order, for it is not, strictly speaking, 
that a subject disavows its identifications, but, rather, that certain exclusions and 
foreclosures institute the subject and persist as the permanent or constitutive 
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spectre of its own destabilization. The ideal of transforming all excluded 
identifications into inclusive features – of appropriating all difference into unity 
– would mark the return to a Hegelian synthesis which has no exterior and that, 
in appropriating all difference as exemplary features of itself becomes a figure 
for imperialism, a figure that installs itself by way of a romantic, insidious, and 
al-consuming humanism. (BM 115-116) 
 
A Hegelian reciprocal recognition and rational Spirit constitutes for Butler an “imperialism”, 
a “colonialism”, or, “the carnivorous Hegelian Spirit” (ibid; CHU 174). For Butler, the main 
problem in the Hegelian synthesis is that in it the Other is fully and finally included into the 
subject. There remains no critical, radical outside by which the subject could be de-stabilized 
and changed.  Whenever the Other is fully included into the subject (fully conceptualized) its 
radical otherness is imperialistically forced into sameness with the subject. This Butler sees as 
the danger in  PhS, especially at the point when the internal mediator (internal, conceptual  
thirdness) is introduced. (PLP 51-53). Butler writes of the “imperialist violence”, inhering in 
the Hegelian recognition: 
 
Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal 
way; rather, it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a 
certain social existence of the body first comes possible. To understand this, one 
must imagine an impossible scene, that of a body that has not yet been given 
social definition, a body that is, strictly speaking , not accessible to us, that 
nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion of an address, a call, an 
interpellation that does not “discover” this body, but constitutes it 
fundamentally. We may think that to be addressed one must first be recognized, 
but here the Althusserian reversal of Hegel seems appropriate: the address 
constitutes a being within the possible circuit of recognition, and, accordingly, 
outside of it, in abjection. (ES 5) 
 
For Hegel, when things are determined in reciprocally recognitive relationships, they are not 
constituted through the abjection (i.e repression) of the contradictory  other.  For Butler, in 
contrast, any recognition of the Other takes place in a scene which is always already 
constituted through an  Althusserian type of an Interpellative address, in which the 
contradicting other is abjected. Any recognition is here seen as an ideological recognition (see 
ch. 3.2.1. on Althusser’s interpretation of recognition). In an ideological recognition, 
contradicting ways to recognize the Other are repudiated and silenced.  Also the Hegelian 
reciprocal recognition needs mediating terms (such as “person”, “human”) through which it 
takes place. Any recognition takes place through language, which is formed through the 
ideological “enslavement” of the Other. Butler implies that the problem inhering in the 
enslaving ek-static process (resembling the struggle for recognition in PhS) is not resolved by 
reciprocally recognitive ek-static process  or by any Aufhebung. The “result” of any 
dialectical synthesis (i.e. any “sharing” of terms between mutually Other parties) takes always 
place in historical and particular language and, hence, constitutes another enslaving 
construction.  
 
It is important for Butler to remind that any recognition takes place on a social, linguistic 
scene which is formed through the abjection of the Other.  Things, selves and bodies become 
accessible for recognition by being first formed in language, in discourse, which represses the 
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contradicting Other. Consequently, she argues that an “Althusserian reversal” of the Hegelian 
recognitive scene is necessary.  Butler continues: 
 
…to be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, but to 
have the very term conferred by which the recognition of existence becomes 
possible. One comes to “exist” by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the 
address of the Other. One “exists” not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in 
a prior sense, by being recognizable. The terms that facilitate recognition are 
themselves conventional, the effects and instruments of a social ritual that 
decode, often through exclusion and violence, the linguistic conditions of 
survivable subjects (ES 5) 
 
 
Before proceeding further, Butler´s and Hegel´s differences and similarities are shortly 
summarized  here.  Butler  and  Hegel  both  agree  that  the  world  and  the  thinking  self  are  
internally contradictory, or, ek-static. Both thinkers agree that this ek-statism may become 
refuted so that the contradicting other is repressed.  Where Butler and Hegel disagree is the 
question of how the ek-statism of things  should be accounted for or preserved. Hegel argues 
that when a thinking self has become conscious of its own consciousness of the the ek-statism 
of things (i.e. when it has become conscious of its own self as a “third”, as one third among 
other thirds),  the way to preserve this - now already acknowledged -  ek-statism is through a 
rational communication with the other selves (thirds) on an equal basis.  
 
For Butler, thinking selves are incapable of acknowledging the ek-statism of the world and of 
themselves, without rendering  it non-ek-static, i.e. without repressing the radical other. For 
Butler, Hegel makes a mistake to suppose that subjects are capable of acknowledging their 
own ek-statism (what Hegel calls as free self-consciousness) and the ek-statism of the world 
in general. Consequently, Butler rejects Hegelian reciprocal recognition, conceptuality and 
rationality. For Butler, the way to make things change through the radical other is to continue 
the ek-static process, which is similar to the struggle for recognition.  Butler’s thought here is 
based on her view that particular, historical subjects, and particular cultures and discourses 
are “colonialist”: they always repress the Other.  Butler offers an “Althusserian reversal of 
Hegel” as a way to preserve the ek-statism of things. By the Althusserian reversal, the Other 
is not included completely (finally) into the self, instead, any particular world-view and any 
particular view of the subject  is processually radicalized through its repressed other. Through 
the Althusserian reversal  the radical, contradicting potential of terms – the future promise of 
radical democracy - is preserved. In short, what Hegel calls as “absolute knowing” (i.e. the 
“sharing” of things in reciprocally recognitive relations between “ek-static” parties) denotes, 
in Butler’s thought, a future promise of democracy, which is strived for, albeit never reached 
now.    
 
 
5.1.4.  The incompletion of the subject: Hegel and/or Althusser 
 
 
Butler adheres to a specific kind of incomplete relation between the subject and the 
constitutive outside (the contradicting other). This incomplete relation is, according to Butler,  
238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conceptually ambivalent, ambiguous.  It fails to constitute a “Hegelian” conceptual unity of 
the ek-static parties of the subject and the Other.  Butler writes: 
 
 
I understood the “incompletion” of the subject-position in the following ways: 
1)  as  the  failure  of  any  particular  articulation  to  describe  the  population  it  
represents; 2) that every subject is constituted differentially, and what is 
produced as the “constitutive outside” of the subject can never become fully 
inside or immanent. I take this last point to establish the fundamental difference 
between the Althusserian-inflected work of Laclau and Mouffe and a more 
Hegelian  theory  of  the  subject  in  which  all  external  relations  are  –  at  least  
ideally – transformable into internal ones. (CHU 12). 
 
 
Butler´s departing from the Hegelian “complete, synthesizing ek-statism” into an 
Althusserian-inflected “incomplete, non-synthesizing ek-statism” appears as the most 
fundamental theoretical structure in Butler´s subject-theory. Butler indeed explicates, in PLP,  
that her own subject-theory pursues the path that Hegel introduces in PhS, “only to foreclose” 
(PLP 32-34).  In other words, Butler rejects the dialectical turn in PhS, by which Hegel starts 
to discuss the ek-statism as an internal, self-conscious ek-statism, i.e. as a thought ek-statism, 
ek-statism which is (now)  acknowledged by the subject.  Instead of following Hegel, Butler 
continues  on  a  path  in  which  the  self  (or,  the  subject,  observed  in  the  theory)  does  not  
acknowledge the radical other as something constitutive of itself or the world, or worry for the 
sake of the preservation of the ek-statism of things. Butler continues on a path in which the 
subject is not seen as an otherness-recognitive being, i.e. as a being who sees the Other as 
constitutive  of  itself.  Through the  Althusserian  reversal  the  subject  continues  to  be  seen  (in  
Butler’s theory) as a Desiring (one-sidedly recognitive) subject.   
 
However, Butler does not cast Hegel away, at least completely, by her Althusserian reversal. 
Butler´s subject- theory is actually structured by successive Althusserian reversals of Hegel, 
followed by Hegelian reversals of Althusser. As will be explained further, Butler criticises, in 
turn,  Althusser for his “Kantianism”, through a recourse made to the Hegelian idea that all  
powers, formative of the subject, exist as thought powers. As thought, they are thought by 
particular, discursive subjects. Whenever the formation of the subject is thought, it is also 
interpreted, in a cultural, discursive context. Consequently, all thought powers, including 
Althusser’s interpellative power, are historical and contextually limited powers which can be 
altered politically, through the excluded other. All interpellations (i.e. attempts to form an 
object in identity to some “name”) fail to fully constitute the terms they name in identity to 
themselves.  Butler writes:  
 
Interpellation is “barred” from success not by a structurally permanent form of 
prohibition (or foreclosure), but by its inability to determine the constitutive 
field of the human (PLP 130) 
 
Butler´s Hegelian-Althusserian critical movement resembles the way the Hegelian ek-static 
(dialectical) process is structured before the dialectical turn into the self-conscious dialectics 
and reciprocal recognition (which Butler rejects).  In Butler´s  Hegelian-Althusserian ek-static 
process every Hegelian moment of full conceptual unity (the affirmation of identity, e.g. 
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sexual or ethnic identity) is followed by an Althusserian moment.  Every  Hegelian 
conceptual unity is reversed - by an Althusserian reversal – i.e. by being acknowledged being 
formed by an Interpellative (ideological) call, coming from an excluded, repressed other. In 
this process, terms become conceptually constructed (synthesized), however, these moments 
are followed by reversals, when their constitutive exclusions become interrogated and 
exposed. Along the process, each Althusserian moment of a conceptual incompletion is 
followed by a Hegelian moment of conceptual completion.   The idea in the Hegelian reversal 
of Althusser is to show that the Althusserian interpellative “naming” is itself an internally ek-
static, historical and particular power. Butler´s ek-static process contains Hegelian 
(synthesizing, conceptualizing) and Althusserian (non-synthesizing) reversals, followed by 
each other. Synthesizing conceptualizations are made (i.e. terms are “shared” by the 
contradicting self and Other) and,  then these conceptualizations are “troubled” and mobilized 
by pointing to their being constituted by powers which they exclude and refute.  Butler writes: 
 
It is one of the ambivalent implications of the decentering of the subject to have 
one’s writing be the site of a necessary and inevitable expropriation. But this 
yielding of ownership over what one writes has an important set of political 
corollaries, for the taking up, reforming, deforming of one’s  words does open 
up a difficult future terrain of community, one in which the hope of ever fully 
recognizing oneself in the terms by which one signifies is sure to be 
disappointed. This not owning of one’s words is  there from the start,  however,  
since speaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as 
oneself, the melancholic reiteration of a language that one never chose, that one 
does  not  find  as  an  instrument  to  be  used,  but  that  one  is,  as  it  were  used  by,  
expropriated in, as the unstable and continuing condition of the “one” and the 
“we”, the ambivalent condition of the power that binds. (BM 241-242)  
 
 
Butler follows with Hegel in PhS (in the phases preceding the dialectical reversal which 
Butler rejects)  for the trenchant critique which is  placed against all kinds of ethical 
imperatives and religious ideals (i.e. parochial universals, based on one-sided recognition and 
the refutation of otherness).  She sees that before the introduction of the self as a conceptual 
mediator  between  its   ek-static  parts  (i.e.  as  a  self-conscious  third)  Hegel  shows  how  the  
thinking self is (over again) beyond itself,  i.e. led by powers which are not fully known to 
itself, powers excluded and repressed by it.  Any effort, by the thinking self,  to become a 
complete universal, results into another incomplete universal. Thus, all complete, universal 
truths, which the subject presents  are proven incomplete, parochial. She criticises Hegel for 
departing from this pattern of explanation and for stopping this critical narrative at the point 
of the dialectical reversal, in which the relation between the self and the Other is internalized 
by the conceptually mediating “third” (PLP 34,51-53) 
 
With Althusser, the  “linguistic ideology” which  forms the thinking subject,  is an 
epistemological part of the subject’s formation (i.e. it contains such knowledge of the thinking 
subject)  which cannot be  conceptualized fully by the thinking subject itself. On the basis of 
the Althusserian modification of the Hegelian narrative, Butler argues that there always 
remains some type of a constitutive outside to the subject. All universal truths (i.e. all ideas of 
what  the  subject  is,  or,  what  the  world  is  like)  are  formed  by  powers  which  are  not  in full 
conceptualizable by the (conceptualizing)  subject itself.  In this sense,  for Butler, thinking 
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subjects are “known” and constituted, partly, by such epistemological parts, which cannot be 
known by the thinking subjects themselves.  (ibid. see also PLP 15, 34, 51-53; CHU 12; BM 
113-116; GT 144). 
 
Through the Althusserian reversal, Butler continues a similar ek-static process, a movement 
through slavery (struggle for recognition) which takes place before the self, in PhS, becomes a 
self-conscious third, and, enters into reciprocally recognitive relations with the Others.     
 
 
5.1.5. The processual incompletion 
 
 
 Butler explains in CHU what she means by the incompletion of any universality, especially 
by contrasting her idea with the Lacanian “Real”. She sees that Lacan and Zizek (and other 
followers of Lacan, like Althusser and Laclau) understand the notion of the incompletion of  
any universality in a somewhat Kantian way, i.e. as a formal abstraction: 
 
One other way of explaining this incompletion of the subject is to establish its 
necessity through a recourse to a Lacanian psychoanalytic account of it. Zizek 
has suggested – and Laclau has partially agreed – that the Lacanian “Real” is but 
another name for this “incompletion”, and that every subject, regardless of its 
social and historical conditions, is liable to the same postulate of 
inconclusiveness. the subject which comes into existence through this “bar” is 
one whose prehistory is necessarily foreclosed ot its experience of itself as a 
subject. That founding and defining limit thus founds the subject at a necessary 
and irreversible distance from the conditions of its own traumatic emergence.  
(CHU 12)  
 
In the text that follows the quotation above, Butler writes that the Lacanian “Real” appears as 
an incompletion which is a structural necessity of all times, and all subjects, instead of being a 
political and temporal incompletion. This incompletion concerns the gender-difference.  
Butler criticises the Lacanian “Real” in reference to the Hegelian ek-statism.   Consequently, 
she poses a critical question to the Lacanians: 
 
…should not the incompletion of subject-formation be linked to the democratic 
contestation over signifiers? Can the ahistorical recourse to the Lacanian bar be 
reconciled with the strategic question that hegemony poses, or does it stand as a 
quasi-transcendental limitation on all possible subject-formations and strategies 
and, hence, as fundamentally indifferent to the political field it is said to 
condition?  If  the  subject  always  meets  its  limit  in  the  selfsame place,  then  the  
subject is fundamentally exterior to the history in which it finds itself: there is 
no historicity to the subject, its limits, its articulability. Moreover, if we accept 
the notion that all historical struggle is nothing other than a vain effort to 
displace a founding limit that is structural in status, do we then commit 
ourselves to a distinction between the historical and the structural domains that 
subsequently excludes the histoirical domain from the understanding of 
opposition? (CHU 12-13)    
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Butler argues that while terms are incomplete, they are not incomplete in some specific way 
in all times and places. The knowledge of the subject is not limited – i.e. incomplete - in the 
same way universally and timelessly. 
 
This problem of a structural approach to the founding limits of the subject 
becomes important when we consider possible forms of opposition. If hegemony 
denotes the historical possibilities for articulation that emerge within a given 
political  horizon,  then  it  will  make  a  significant  difference  whether  we  
understand that field as historically revisable and transformable, or whether it is 
given as a field whose integrity is secured by certain structurally identifiable 
limits and exclusions. (CHU 13).  
 
 
In the next quotation, Butler argues in favour of a Hegelian way to think of contradictions (i.e. 
ek-static relations). When contradicting “universalizations” are made (through the enslaved 
others) the knowledge (which is contradicted by the enslaved others) should not be cancelled. 
Instead, both forms of knowledge should be granted some acknowledgement. Through the 
acknowledgement  of  the  both  forms  of  knowledge,  the  ek-statism,  or  the  ek-static  relation  
(between the subject and the Other, inside the specific form of knowledge in question) 
becomes  preserved.  For  Butler,  this  means  that  we  should  think  that  the  question  of  
universality, universal knowledge or truth, has not yet been settled. Butler argues that the “not 
yet” provides a proper way to think of universality: 
 
the assertion of universality by those who have conventionally been excluded by 
the term often produces a performative contradiction of a certain sort. But this 
contradiction, in Hegelian fashion, is not self-cancelling, but exposes the 
spectral doubling of the concept itself. And it prompts a set of antagonistic 
speculations on what the proper venue for the claim of universality ought to be. 
Who may speak it? And how ought it to be spoken? The fact that we do not 
know the answers to these questions confirms that the question of universality 
has not been settled. As I have argued elsewhere, to claim that the universal has 
not yet been articulated is to insist that the “not yet” is proper to an 
understanding of the universal itself: that which remains unrealized by the 
universal constitutes it essentially. The universal announces, as it were, its “non-
place”, its fundamentally temporal modality precisely when challenges to its 
existing  formulation emerge from those who are not covered by it, who have no 
entitlement to occupy the place of the “who“, but nevertheless demand that the 
universal as such ought to be inclusive of them. (CHU 39)  
 
 
In Butler, “universals” are temporally specific states, when some term (like sexuality or race, 
or concepts like “human”) becomes fully, universally and finally (finally for itself)  
determined. A universal is timeless for itself. A universal misrecognizes itself for a final truth. 
It fails to see itself as a temporally specific, parochial, partial truth. All its external relations, 
also temporally external, are transformed into internal relations, into present knowledge. For 
Butler, Hegel´s self-conscious concepts are this kind of fully self-known universals: they 
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constitute knowledge in which time has stopped to move, as they have turned all the ek-static 
parts (all aspects of the Other) into parts of  the same conceptual whole. When a thinker 
thinks  of  the  world  as  such  a  concept,  it  knows itself  and  things  in  a  full  and  final  way.   It  
knows itself as a particular subject and its Other as a particular other subject inside a timeless, 
stable universe.  Butler rejects the idea that terms  could be known in a full and permanent 
way like this. Instead, as she says in the quotation above, we should think that the “not yet” is 
a  proper  way  to  think  of  universality.  This  means  that  even  that  we  cannot  escape  making  
universalist claims about terms, we should be ready to interrogate our claims through 
investigating the constitutive outside of our claims.   
 
She argues in CHU, 
 
The open-endedness that is essential to democratization implies that the 
universal cannot be finally identified with any particular content, and that this 
incommensurability (for which we do not need the Real)is crucial to the futural 
possibilities of democratic contestation. To ask after the new grounds of 
realizability is not to ask after the “end” of politics as a static and teleological 
conclusion: I presume that the point of hegemony on which we might concur is 
precisely  the  ideal  of  a  possibility  that  exceeds  every  attempt  at  a  final  
realization, one which gains its vitality from its non-coincidence with any 
present reality (CHU 162).   
  
 
It was said above that Butler´s subject-theory takes place as a kind of theoretical movement. 
This theoretical movement resembles the “moving subject-theory” in Hegel´s PhS, in which 
movement is structured by partly external relations, as it is before the entrance into the realm 
of free self-consciousness. The “unknown part” of the subject, which is not related to 
internally  (i.e.  knowingly,  as  a  particular  or  a  conceptual  part),  but  externally,  as  an  
ambivalent part, or as an unspeakable, non-grounded  part, serves as an important point of 
reference in this “moving” theory. Butler argues:  
 
If the spectrally human is to enter into the hegemonic reformulation of 
universality, a language between languages will have to be found. This will be 
no metalanguage, nor will it be the condition from which all languages hail. It 
will be the labour of transaction and translation which belongs to no single site, 
but is the movement between languages, and has its final destination in this 
movement itself. Indeed, the task will be not to assimilate the unspeakable into 
the domain of speakability in order to house it there, within the existing norms 
of dominance, but to shatter the confidence of dominance, to show how 
equivocal its claims to universality are. (CHU 179).   
 
For  Butler,  the  goal  of  the  ek-static  process  is  “the  movement  itself”.  This  appears  also  the  
goal in Butler´s politics. Butler writes:  
 
To  ask  after  the  new  grounds  of  realizability  is  not  to  ask  after  the  “end”  of  
politics as a static or teleological conclusion: I presume that the point of 
hegemony on which we might concur is precisely the ideal of a possibility that 
exceeds every attempt at a final realization, one which gains its vitality precisely 
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from its non-coincidence with any present reality. (CHU 162) 
5.1.6.  Butler´s criticism of Hegel: the self and the Other  
 
 
Butler argues against the Hegelian model of self-recognition and subject-object-dichotomy: 
 
 
The Hegelian model of self-recognition that has been appropriated by Marx, 
Lukacs, and a variety of contemporary liberatory discourses presupposes a 
potential adequation between the “I” that confronts its world, including its 
language, as an object, and the “I”  that finds itself as an object in that world. 
But the subject/object dichotomy , which here belongs to the tradition of 
Western epistemology, conditions the very problematic of identity that it seeks 
to solve.  What discursive  tradition establishes the “I” and its “Other” in an 
epistemological confrontation that subsequently decides where and how 
questions of knowability and agency are to be determined? What kinds of 
agency are foreclosed through the positing of an epistemological subject 
precisely because the rules and practices that govern the invocation of that 
subject and regulate its agency in advance are ruled out as sites of analysis and 
critical invention?That the epistemological point of departure is in no sense 
inevitable is naively and pervasively confirmed by the mundane operations of 
ordinary language – widely documented within anthropology – that regard the 
subject/object dichotomy as a strange and contingent, if not violent, 
philosophical imposition. The language of appropriation, instrumentality, and 
distanciation germane to the epistemological mode also belong to a strategy of 
domination that pits the “I” against an “Other” and, once that separation is 
effected, creates an artificial set of questions about the knowability and 
recoverability  of  that  Other.  As  part  of  the  epistemological  inheritance  of  
contemporary political discourses of identity, this binary opposition is a strategic 
move within a given set of signifying practices, one that establishes the “I” in 
and through this opposition and which reifies that opposition as a necessity, 
concealing the discursive apparatus by which the binary itself is constituted. 
(GT.144) 
 
 
Butler criticises “the Hegelian self-recognitive model” for violently internalizing  the Other 
into a conceptual  unity with the “I”.  This internalization takes place especially by the self-
conscious Spirit (a self which has conducted the “dialectical reversal”, which Butler rejects) 
as she explains also in her other books, e.g. in BM (113-116) PLP (34, 51-53) and CHU 
(172). For Butler the Hegelian epistemological subject denotes a closure, for according to 
Butler it is a subject who fully and permanently knows itself and the Other. It is a subject who 
tries to conduct a violent, permanent differentiation in advance (in advance of the future) 
between  the  “I”  and  the  Other.   The  outside  (the  Other,  or,  radically  different  kind  of  
epistemology and intentionality)  is violently tried to be sucked into the inside of the subject’s 
own differential system. Violence takes place because the epistemological point of reference 
is determined at some specific point in history (thus “in advance”, as the process is to go on), 
hence allowing for no futural dimension.  
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Butler sees that in the Hegelian ideal recognition a particular subject-object-dichotomy 
becomes  considered  a  permanent  truth  of  all  subjects  and  objects  (i.e.  of  the  whole  world).   
She criticises Hegel for abandoning his dialectical scheme, in which the thinking self is again 
and again forced to reject its view-points as parochial. Butler criticises Hegel for departing 
from  this  model  of  explanation   and  argues  that  any  specific  idea  of  what  the  “I”  and  the  
Other are like  is only temporal and contingent.    
 
Butler criticises Hegel for not exposing the limitedness and parochiality of also that self who 
goes through the dialectical reversal.  (PLP 52; ES 142-144). Instead of exposing the  
parochialism  of  the  self  who  thinks to  be  a  free  and  a  non-parochial  self-consciousness  
(which, for Butler, Hegel should do), Hegel conducts an absolute inversion of the dialectical 
process. In reciprocally recognitive relations the self becomes its own internal mover, i.e. a 
mediator between itself and the contradicting other.  Whereas before it was moved by such 
other,  which  moved  it,   without  its  own  full  knowing  of  it,  now  the  self  labours  the  world  
together with the Other, self-knowingly, conceptually and rationally. The dialectical inversion 
which Butler criticises (and which she replaces by the Althusserian reversal) takes place in 
PhS quite soon after the phase of Unhappy Consciousness and Reason.  Butler writes:  
 
Indeed, at this juncture one might well imagine a set of closing transitions for 
“The Unhappy Consciousness” different from the ones Hegel supplies, a set that 
is, nevertheless, perhaps more Hegelian than Hegel himself (PLP 52)  
 
 
As said before, Butler and Hegel disagree on whether one’s ek-static structure can be known 
self-consciously,  as a particular structure.  Hegel thinks that we (subjective, temporal 
thinkers) can know our ek-static selves un-parochially (so that we do not necessarily repress 
the Other)  even that we know ourselves as partial, context-dependent “conceptual closures”. 
In Hegel, this kind of non-refutive and unlimited– even if still partial and limited – knowing 
takes place as “absolute knowing” (a process of “shared” knowing) in reciprocally 
recognitive relationships.  Hegel thinks that by seeing ourselves and the Others as equally free 
“absolutes” (for whom there is no constitutive yet inaccessible epistemological or ethical 
beyonds/“surpluses”) and by constituting the theory of the world for reciprocally recognitive 
selves,  we can practice un-parochial knowing of ourselves and the Others. Hence, Hegel 
argues (expressed yet in Butlerian terms) that it is possible to practice “self-consciously ek-
static” knowing of objects.   Butler disagrees on the self-conscious knowability of this basic 
structure, especially as considers the moment of the constitutive otherness. In Hegelian terms, 
Butler does not think that “absolute” (reciprocally recognitive, “sharing”) knowing is 
possible. For Butler, there always remains a constitutive “surplus” which is not known for the 
one who is constituted by this surplus. The knowing self is not an absolute, instead, it is 
conditioned  by  what  remains  external  (an  inaccessible  beyond)  for  it.    All  knowing  is  
constituted by what exceeds it, and, this exceeding part is a refuted part. In contrast to the 
Hegelian idea of absolute knowledge, partial knowledge is for Butler, echoing Kojève, always 
“enslaving” knowledge.  Butler emphasizes the temporal aspect in explaining why we cannot 
know the Other fully. We cannot know, internalize the Other in advance. We cannot end the 
ek-static process, which, for Butler, ends in Hegel’s reciprocal recognition in which the ek-
static process proceeds through an internal, instead of an external Other.  
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Hegel himself discusses (as one of the stages in his dialectics of subjective spirit in PhS) the 
kind of consciousness who sees that there is an internal ek-statism (subject-Other-
relationship) to things, but who, despite of this seeing, does not take this relationship to exist 
as a thought relationship, or as a thought alterity for itself (i.e.  to  be  a  particular  alterity,  
constructed in its own thinking). This consciousness which Hegel discusses in PhS in the 
chapter of “Freedom of self-consciousness” (as the Unhappy consciousness) and in the 
beginning of “Reason” (as e.g. “positive scepticism”) is a parochial consciousness, even that 
it sees that things are structured by an internal self-Other-alterity.  This consciousness is 
parochial (one-sidedly recognitive) even that it grasps the idea of freedom and reciprocal 
recognition. It constitutes a one-sided, unfree consciousness of reciprocal recognition and 
freedom because it sees them as formalist abstractions.  For Hegel, a (self)consciousness, who 
sees that there is an internal contradictory relation (a self-Other-relation) to things, but who 
does not posit this alterity for itself (as a particular, subjective construction), needs internal 
slavery (refuted others, Bondsmen) in order to construct and determine,  through the enslaved 
other, this relation which it itself refuses to construct for itself as a conceptual relation. In 
Hegel, always when things are structured through others which are not taken as one’s equals 
(as free others, as other “absolutes”) they are thought in a dualist manner. A thinker who sees 
things being structured by an unknowable relation (a relation, which is beyond particularizing 
subject’s capacity of particularization and conceptualization) needs others through whom it 
can know things as somethings. It cannot itself identify things, because it sees that they (i.e. 
things which are identified) are actually constituted by a relation which is beyond the 
capacities of any “identifying”, “object-defining”  self.  It refuses to identify things because it 
sees identifications as partial and thus refutive. However, even this thinker cannot think 
without thinking of something (i.e. without the identification of things) and thus it needs 
others to “labour particulars” (to identify somethings) for it. Yet, its relation to these others, 
whom it  needs,  is  a  dualist  (Master-Slave)  relation.  It  looks  down upon the  others,  because  
they practice “otherness-refutive” as well as misrecognitive thinking and knowing.  For 
Hegel,  a  thinker  who  thinks  that  it  is  necessarily impossible to provide an identifiable, 
particular form to something through which, or as which (as a basic structure) it nevertheless 
sees particular things  and  the  world,  is  dependent  on  receiving  the  particular  form  and  
substance (to that thing or world which it sees) externally (through object-formative 
Bondsmen, or other thinkers who think of things on the basis of differential (differentiating 
and identifying) systems. Consequently, this thinker ends up into having an alien, external, 
patronizing attitude towards both the other (particularizing) thinkers and the particularized, 
identified things, i.e. the particularized world. This self (as Unhappy Consciousness) refutes 
“subjective” thinking in general, also its own thinking in so far as it practices object-
identificating thinking.  (chapter 2.2.7; PhS § 119-145) 
 
In contrast to Hegel, Butler thinks that if the internal ek-static alterity is known conceptually, 
in the Hegelian sense, it is then a one-sided alterity. For Butler, an alterity which is left  “un-
defined”  or, “permanently ambivalent” is not one-sided, but instead, open to multiple 
interpretations and otherness. (see e.g UG 131-151; CHU 270-276) 
 
5.1.7. Butler’s criticism of Hegel: the idea of time 
 
 
Butler´s criticism of Hegel centers on the question of whether the structure of internal alterity 
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is knowable “in advance” or not.  Butler thinks that the internal alterity can not  be known in 
full, timelessly, because then it is known “in advance”. Subjects may only mistake their 
temporal knowledge for an eternal knowledge.  This knowledge necessarily refutes its 
otherness, echoing the Kojèvian reading of time (chapter 3.1.). Thus, there always remains an 
abjected outside, as well as a futural outside to any determinate knowledge, given of 
internally ek-static things. This is due to the fact that any knowledge is always historical and 
situated.  Any  knowledge  constitutes  a  temporal  “moment”  of  knowledge.   The  temporal  
“remainder” (i.e. the other times, other moments of knowledge), constituting the 
incompleteness of any knowledge cannot be brought into a conceptual unity with the present, 
context-dependent knowledge by any context-dependent thinking self. Hence, knowledge as a 
temporal construction, reaching beyond any specific moment of knowing, cannot be known in 
full for any temporally specific thinker.  The futural possibilities, the “other times” of terms 
remain inaccessible and thus un-conceptualized by any present thinking self, whose capacity 
of conceptualization is restricted by its history and place. (see e.g. GT 141)  
 
For Butler, the “I” who takes itself as an object of knowledge and sets some definitional limits 
to its identity,  thus claiming to know itself, is a changeable, processual “I”.   She writes about 
this: 
 
If identity is asserted through a process of signification, if identity is always 
already signified, and yet continues to signify as it circulates within various 
interlocking discourses, then the question of agency is not to be answered 
through a recourse to an “I” that pre-exists signification. In other words, the 
enabling conditions for an assertion of “I” are provided by the structure of 
signification, the rules that regulate the legitimate and illegitimate invocation of 
that pronoun, the practices that establish the terms of intelligibility by which that 
pronoun can circulate.(GT 143).  
 
According to Butler, the particular substance of the thinking “I” and the terms, which exists in 
the thinking of this “I” change in unforeseeable ways, not rationally known before-hand.  This 
is meant as a criticism against the Hegelian dialectical (conceptually mediated) movement 
which is in identity with the thinking “I”, i.e. which is known for the I” because it proceeds 
rationally. Butler criticises Hegel for positing a self-conscious self (after the dialectical 
reversal,  at  the  point  of  which  Butler  departs  from  Hegel)  who  knows  its  past,  present  and  
future.   According to Butler´s criticism,  the Hegelian self-conscious self is an “I” from 
which a time, identical with the I itself, originates from. This “I” mediates its past, present and 
future, as well as all relevant parts of itself, into an identity with itself. This means that 
everything which is epistemologically relevant for it, “speaks” for it conceptually.  Nothing 
remains “unspeakable” for it.  Its ek-static process (the process by which it goes through 
changes) is internal to itself – and there is no outside for this “I”. It is an “absolute” as 
concerns its temporal constitution. It is not conditioned by any temporal “outside”. Its “other 
times” are known to it now. This means that it cannot change in time. The Hegelian “I” stands 
before  of  its  future.   It  controls  time and,  as  such,  its  history  has  ended  (see  the  chapter  on  
Kojève  for  a  discussion  of  this  theme).   Because  the  Hegelian  self  thinks  of  the  process  of  
subject-formation as a rational process, it is able to conceptually reflect on the entire process.  
  
Butler criticises the idea that a self could relate conceptually with the timeless, universal 
rationality of things, and as such be able to grasp the future of things already now, in advance, 
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at some specific historical situation and cultural and linguistic context.    
 
To a certain extent constitutive identifications are precisely those which are 
always disavowed, for, contrary to Hegel, the subject cannot reflect on the entire 
process of its formation. (BM 113)  
 
Continuing to criticise the Hegelian kind of a thinking subject, who knows its internally 
complex structure as a coherent and rational synthesis, Butler argues:  
 
It seems important, then, to question whether a political insistence on coherent 
identities can ever be the basis on which a crossing over into political alliance 
with other subordinated groups can take place, especially when such a 
conception of alliance fails to understand that the very subject-positions in 
question are themselves a kind of “crossing”, are themselves the lived scene of 
coalitions difficulty. The insistence on coherent identity as a point of departure 
presumes that what a “subject” is is already known, already fixed, and that that 
ready-made subject might enter the world to renegotiate its place. But is that 
very  subject  produces  its  coherence  at  the  cost  of  its  own  complexity,  the  
crossings of identifications of which it is  itself composed , then that subject 
forecloses the kinds of contestatory connections that might democratize the field 
of its own operation. (BM 115) 
 
However, as Butler continues, she admits that conceptually closed identities cannot be 
escaped (or, the necessary moment of a closed identity cannot be escaped) because thinking 
always takes place as a particular thinking of things as particular things.  In this she refers to 
the basic Hegelian structure of internal alterity, in which both the “limited subject” (for whom 
things as particulars appear to) and the “ek-statism through contradicting other” (in relation to 
which  things are not fully determined by their particularity) are both seen as necessary parts: 
 
None of the above is meant to suggest that identity is to be denied, overcome, 
erased. None of us can fully answer to the demand to “go over yourself!”. The 
demand to overcome radically the constitutive constraints by which cultural 
viability is achieved would be its own form of violence.But when that very 
viability is itself the consequence of a repudiation, a subordination, or an 
exploitative relation, the negotiation becomes increasingly complex. (BM 117-
119)      
 
Importantly, also Hegel speaks of a process, in which both sides of an ek-static relation (self 
and Other) are to be taken into account. This is the idea behind Hegel´s reciprocal recognition. 
In reciprocally recognitive relations new things (concepts) emerge when the ek-static parties 
are influenced by each others. Butler´s queer-performativity draws from this idea. New things 
are produced performatively when ek-static parties influence each others, so that neither one 
becomes cancelled by the other. In Butler´s queer-performativity, the idea is to produce new 
terms, new bodies etc. so that these new terms contain aspects from mutually contradicting 
elements. This production takes place as an on-going radical process.   
 
Following a basically Hegelian criticism against one-sided parochial universals and one-sided 
recognition, Butler argues that one limited identity (constituting a universalization of what it 
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is to be e.g. a “human”) should not be replaced by another limited identity. Instead, the 
possibility for existence should be provided for the both. When both of these mutually 
contradicting world-views are granted an acknowledgement, a room is given to the internal 
ek-statism of the world.   
 
That identification shift does not necessarily mean that one identification is 
repudiated for another; that shifting may well be one sign of hope for the 
possibility of avowing an expansive set of connections. This will not be a simple 
matter of “sympathy” with another´s position, since sympathy involves a 
substitution of oneself for another that may well be a colonization of the other´s 
position as one´s  own.  And  it  will  not  be  the  abstract  inference  of  an  
equivalence based on an insight into the partially constituted character of all 
social identity. It will be a matter of tracing the ways in which identification is 
implicated in what it excludes, and to follow the lines of that implication for the 
map of future community that it might yield (BM 118-119) 
 
For Butler, if the both, i.e. the historical subject-position (i.e. a momentary subject-position) 
and the Other are taken into account (within some term like “woman”), the resulting term is 
beyond itself in a way which cannot be known as a particular concept “in advance”.  Butler 
basically adheres to the Hegelian idea of reciprocal recognition, in which both parties making 
up a contradictory relation are acknowledged as valid. However, Butler contrasts Hegel in 
insisting that there is no conceptual mediation between the ek-static parties “in advance”.  The 
aspect of temporality is relevant here. There is also a constitutive temporally ek-static relation 
to terms. Because all conceptual mediations are historical (i.e. they are made by subjects who 
live in some specific, limited time, “in advance” of future), they cannot conceptualize such 
ek-static parties which are temporally Other to each other. Consequently, the resulting term is 
not a concept, an identifiable “thing” (for Butler).  Or, as terms nevertheless are temporally 
identified, the identification of the resulting term is based on some new discursive, temporally 
limited  form,  including  a  refutation  of  the  Other.  Identifications,  made  “in  advance”,  fail  to  
conceptualize all the ek-static aspects (including the temporal othernesses) constitutive of the 
term.  They fail to become “shared” between the self and the Other, in the Hegelian sense, 
because for Butler all terms are conditioned by what is  inaccessible, unknown (also 
temporally) for them. When conceptualizations are made “in advance” (of the future), the 
constitutive aspect of the future becomes refuted.  
 
Butler´s way to recognize the temporal ek-statims of terms by way of regarding all temporally 
particular identifications of terms as repressive colonisations (repressive of the “other times” 
of terms) resembles, basically, what Hegel says of the pure self-consciousness, especially of 
Unhappy Consciousness.  The Unhappy Consciousness sees that things are structured by an 
ek-static relation, and it acknowledges the validity of the contradicting views concerning the 
term -  yet it refuses to conceptualize the relation between the contradicting parties.  The 
things which emerge (for the Unhappy Consciousness) as a result of the way it constructs 
them  out  of  ek-static  aspects  are  empty  abstractions.   As  was  explained  in  the  previous  
chapter,  the  reason  for  this  is  that  the  Unhappy  consciousness  refuses  to  see  itself  as  a  
particular subject, and its own way to gather things up from contradicting aspects as a 
particular way to gather things up from contradicting aspects.    
 
In a way, a distinction between “Thing for us in advance” and “Thing in itself infinitely”, 
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resembling the Kantian distinction between “Thing for us” and “Thing in itself” becomes 
made here. For Hegel, the dilemma of this sort of “Kantian” thinker is that when it refuses to 
conceptualize the ek-statism of things which it sees, it depends on external “Bondsmen” i.e. 
labourers of particular objects, in order to see particularities in the present. At the same time 
when it depends on the Bondsmen (which are always temporally limited Bondsmen) it looks 
down upon them, because it considers them limited, “failing” consciousnesses. 
 
 
5.1.8. Butler’s criticism of Hegel: reading Antigone  
 
 
Butler’s  subject-theory  and  her  political  theory  are  based  on  Hegel´s  subject-theory,  i.e.  the  
theory of self-consciousness. Self-consciousnesses are ek-static beings, i.e. beings who are 
constituted through a constitutive relation with the contradicting other. These beings are 
proper subjects, which in Hegel´s theories means that they are self-reflective beings; free and 
rational beings. However, as is explained in chapter 2, Hegel has also a theory of beings 
whom he does not include into the realm of subjects and self-consciousness. These beings are 
women. 
  
As is exclipated in the chapter 4.2,  feminists have criticised Hegel especially for his 
degrading way to confine women to the private sphere, and for excluding women from the 
public and political realms. Hegel´s theory of the “womankind” takes place partly through  
Hegel´s reading of the Antigone-story (in PhS).  Butler, among other feminists, have criticised 
Hegel´s theory of women.  
 
Even that Butler´s subject-theory and her political theory are criticised in this study, it is easy 
to  join  her  –  and  other  feminists  –  in  her  critique  against  Hegel’s  theory  of  women.  Butler  
discusses in her Antigone’s Claim (2000) mostly Hegel´s and Lacan´s reading of Antigone – 
as well as also the somewhat Lacanian feminist reading of Antigone by Luce Irigaray. 
 
Butler criticises Hegel’s reading of the acts, speech and the deeds of women as not belonging 
to the public, social and political realm. Basically, Butler criticises Hegel’s theory of women 
on the basis of her Hegelian-inflected theory of ek-statism. Butler criticises Hegel’s way to 
render women as the absolute outside of the political realm. Women constitute the realm of 
the un-conscious. The speech and the deeds of the women are beyond rationality and 
conceptuality – hence, women are rendered un-speakable, non- existent beings. (AC 38-39)  
 
Butler notes that the  realm of the rationally human is constituted by the realm of the non-
human in PhS. The realm of the rational self-consciousness depends on there being the realm 
of the non-rational non-consciousness. In order for there to be proper subjects and proper 
humans, there must be those who are excluded from proper subjectivity and humanity.  Even 
that the womankind – with its Penatean gods and its non-rational law - constitutes the enemy 
of the rational law, this enemy appears as internal and necessary.   
 
Antigone  passes  away as  the  power  of  the  feminine  and  becomes  redefined  as  
the  power  of  the  mother,  one  whose  sole  task  within  the  travels  of  Spirit  is  to  
produce a son for the purposes of the state,a son who leaves the family in order  
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to become a warring citizen. Thus citizenship demands a partial repudiation of 
the kinship relations that bring the make citizen into being, and yet kinship 
remains that which alone can produce male citizens (ibid. 12). 
 
Butler  writes  of  the  way  the  Other  (the  women)  is  silenced  in  Hegel´s  reading  of  the  
Antigone. The silencing takes place for a large part by Hegel’s idea of the “Penatean law of 
the family”. Women are the guardians of this law and doomed to the same un-conceptual 
silence than the family law.  
 
This law, we are told, is in opposition to public law; as  the unconscious of 
public law, it is that which public law cannot do without, which it must, in fact, 
oppose and retain with a certain necessary hostility. Thus Hegel cites Antigone’s 
word, a citation that contains and expels her at onece, in which she refers to the 
unwritten and unfailing status of these laws. The laws of which she speaks are, 
strictly speaking, before writing, not yet registered or registerable at the level of 
writing. They are not fully knowable, but the state knows enough about them to 
oppose them violently. (ibid. 38-39) 
 
 
Butler is quite right in claiming that the Hegelian rational state (in PhS) is constituted by there 
existing the excluded, repressed others. The non-ekstatic realm produces necessary aspects of 
the rational realm, e.g. the individualism of the immature youth, needed in war. By equipping 
the young men with the right attitude of “pathos” and “individualism” – necessary in war -  
women contribute for the self-maintenance of the state. Butler writes: 
 
From this discussion of the hostility toward the individual and toward 
womankind as a representative of individuality, Hegel moves to a discussion of 
war, that is, a from of hostility necessary for the community’s self-definition. (;) 
The community’s necessary aggression against womankind (its internal enemy) 
appears to be transmuted into the community’s aggression agaimst its external 
enemy; the state intervenes in the family to wage war. The worth of the warring 
male youth is openly acknowledged, and in this way the community now loves 
him as she has loved him. (AC 37). 
 
Butler argues that women constitute the necessary internal enemy of Hegel´s rational state – 
without which the state could not be what it is (for Hegel, in PhS). For Butler, Hegel’s theory 
includes a degrading reading of the women and the kinship relations in general. Hegel 
interprets women by a dominating speech, in which no room is given for the women 
themselves.  Hegel  does  not  realize  that  his  reading  of   women  and  family  relations  is  
constituted on what it excludes and silences. It is  easy to agree with Butler’ s account here.  
 
In her book on Antigone Butler proceeds from her critical reading of Hegel to a critical 
reading of  Lacan’s interpretation of the Antigone story. As is explicated in the chapter 3.2, 
the relation between the two sexes constitutes an un-definable relation for Lacan. Resembling 
thus Hegel’s account of women, according to Lacan, women do not exist. Because the relation 
between the sexes cannot be defined in systematic language, women denote a sex which 
escapes a coherent, linguistic definition. Consequently, communicable language constitutes a 
realm which is governed by the law of the Phallus. Like for Hegel, for Lacan, too, women, or 
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the feminine, constitutes an internal “trouble” in the communicable, rational realm. The 
rational realm has its unconscious side, which makes the rational realm unstable. The 
difference between Hegel and Lacan is that for Hegel, in PhS, the young males may develop 
out from their “feminine” immediacy and individualism, by becoming members of the 
rational state.  They leave the family and become rational members of the state. Even that the 
womankind remains a power of the community – and the Spirit - as a whole, as it includes the 
realms of the un-conscious and the conceptual self-consciousness,  the unconscious does not 
remain an internal psychic aspect of the mature, rational men. For Lacan, in contrast, each 
linguistic, conceptual individual  contains its unconscious side and its conscious side. Thus, 
for Lacan, there is an internal conflict between these two spheres,  within the realm of “the 
symbolic”,  which renders  systematic language unstable. (AC 40-44)   
 
For Butler, Lacan’s reading of Antigone is able to radicalize Hegel’s reading, as Lacan 
situates the unconscious into the realm of the rational self-consciousness (ibid. 47). However, 
for  Butler,  Lacan’s  reading  of  the  Antigone  repeat  Lacan’s  basic  arguments  concerning  the  
relation between the sexes and the structure of the communicable language as the realm of the 
Phallus (ibid. 50-55).  Butler criticises Lacan accordingly, for mainly for similar reasons, 
(explicated more thoroughly in the chapter 3.2.).    
 
In  the  chapter  4.2.6.   I  referred  to  Hutchings`s  description  of   Butler’s  own  reading  of  the  
Antigone story as ”radicalized Lacanianism”. According to Hutchings, Butler joins Lacan by 
seeing that the realms of the “conscious subject” and the “constitutive outside” are included 
into all thinking and into all terms. These aspects are related to each other by a primary, ek-
static bond, which cannot be defined conceptually.  However, unlike Lacan, Butler does not 
associate the unconscious, excluded side necessarily with women, and the systematic, 
conscious  side  with  men.    Nor  does  she  think  that  some  specific  kinship  relations  (those  
which break with the norm of patriarchal heterosexuality) must always constitute the 
unconscious, excluded and repudiated relations of all human societies. It ought to be 
remembered that Antigone was a member of a somewhat “queer”,  incestuous family, as she 
was her father’s half-sister and her brother’s aunt. 
 
Butler’s reading of the Antigone story follows her overall theory of the ek-statism of terms. 
Butler retains the idea that there is the part of the “subject-position” (conceptual self-
consciousness)  and  the  radical  other  within  all  thinking  and  all  terms.  She  builds  upon  the  
Hegelian dualism, which exists between men and women and between the public sphere (the 
state)  and  the  private  sphere  (family)  in  PhS.   Through  a  critical  psychoanalytic  reading,  
Butler however radicalizes the Hegelian dualism. Nevertheless, because of her basic 
Kojèvian-inflected theory of the subject, she finds it necessary that there remains the split 
between the legitimate, conceptually definable side and the illegitimate, conceptually un-
definable side within the subject as well as within the society. For Butler, those who reside in 
the two realms  ought to change, and we should not think that women, gays, blacks etc. stay 
forever the residents of the unconscious realm.  However,  Butler takes for granted the basic 
existence of these realms. For without them, the radical- democratic politics, in which politics 
is pursued through the excluded and silenced other, would not be possible.  For Butler, the 
radical promise of the Antigone story is that she is able to trouble and redefine the terms  of 
the rational realm.  However, Butler closes her book on Antigone  by arguing that the terms, 
which become radicalized by radical others such as Antigone, will never assume any stable 
definition: 
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in acting, as one who has no right to act,  she upsets the vocabulary of kinship 
that is a precondition of the human, implicitly raising the question for us of what 
those preconditions really must be. She speaks within the language of 
entitlement from which she is excluded, participating in the language of the 
claim with which no final identification is possible. (AC. 82)   
 
  
5.2. Butler and the Kojèvian interpretation 
5.2.1. Butler on Kojève  
 
 
It is argued in this study that Butler adheres to a specific “Kojèvian” tradition of reading 
Hegel without (apparently) acknowledging it.  Butler’s Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel 
makes  Butler  reject  the  possibility  of  Hegel’s  reciprocally  recognitive  relationships  and  the  
realm of non-slavery, freedom.  She “suspends” the Hegelian narrative at the same point 
where Kojève sees the history end, at the point where the subject enters into reciprocally 
recognitive relationships with  others. Butler suspends the narrative, yet remains within the 
basic Hegelian subject-theory (i.e. the theory of the subject as ek-static). As will be explicated 
in this chapter, Butler’s  way to remain within the Hegelian subject-theory - after suspending 
the narrative through a Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel -  is conducted through a recourse 
made to Althusser’s theory of Interpellation. Butler’s “Althusserian reversal of Hegel” has its 
background in a Kojèvian  reading of Hegel.  
 
Butler’s Kojèvian-inflected reading of Hegel is characterized by a few important features.  
One  of  these  features  is  the  fear  of  the  Kojèvian  “End  of  History”.   The  End  of  History  
denotes the non-changeable realm of the  “Wise Men”.  Kojève interprets Hegel’s  ideal 
society and the free state (in which there is reciprocally recognitive relationships) as the end 
of  all  politics  and  all  change. For Kojève, historical change ends by the ending of the 
refutation of otherness. There is no historical change and no politics when there are 
reciprocally recognitive relationships. In Kojève, the prerequisite for historical change is that 
subjects are equipped with an attitude of Desire toward others and that there are relations of 
Lordship and Bondage. (see ch. 3.1.1.)     
 
Another feature, typical in Kojèvian-inflected interpretations of Hegel is that “particularizing 
thinking” (what Hegel would call as “Consciousness as Understanding”) inevitably excludes 
some others and,  that this exclusion is always repressive (on this reading and its roots in 
Kojève see Weir 1996). When thinking selves see themselves and others as particular subjects 
– or things as particular things – they necessarily not only exclude but also more or less 
violently repress contradicting others. They refute other interpretations of themselves, of each 
others and of things in general. They refute such other interpretations which have no common 
measure with the differential system on which their own view of things  is constituted.  In 
Kojève, particular  subjects (i.e. thinkers who identify themselves and others as particular 
subjects) cannot mediate conceptually with others without refuting them. All efforts to take 
otherness into consideration result just into new ways of refuting otherness. Hence, history is 
continuous struggle. This resembles closely how the dialectical change - in subjective 
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consciousness structured by internal otherness - takes place in PhS before the emergence of  
reciprocally recognitive relationships between selves.    
 
It will be argued in this chapter that the Kojèvian tradition of interpreting Hegel is developed 
further in the views of thinkers like Butler. It appears that Butler gains her  basically Hegelian 
theory of  internally eks-static thinking - yet through Kojèvian lenses - especially from such 
thinkers as Foucault, Lacan and Althusser.  Butler develops her theory of internal ek-statism 
to a large extent in discussions with these Kojèvian-inflected thinkers.  Althusser’s theory of 
subject-formation (the theory of Interpellation) is rooted in Lacan’s (Kojèvian-inflected) 
subject-theory.  Even that Butler also criticises Althusser, Foucault and Lacan as well as such 
thinkers as Zizek and Irigaray (who also have  Kojèvian-inflected subject-theories, primarily 
through Lacan),  Butler does not question the basic Kojèvian notions concerning the internal 
ek-statism of thinking (explained briefly above). It is significant that while in SD, Butler 
describes and discusses in detail the French post-War reception of Hegel’s thinking, she fails 
to analyze in depth the fact that the Hegel admired, criticized and rejected by the leading 
French thinkers is actually Hegel seen through Kojèvian lenses. A simple explanation of this 
omission is that Butler herself shares the received French interpretation: her Hegel is more or 
less the same as Kojève’s Hegel.  
 
In a book review, “Postructuralism and Postmarxism” (1993), Butler formulates the 
poststructuralist version of Kojève’s Hegelianism:  
 
Rather, the “end” toward which history has been thought to be moving has 
proven illusory; it is either permanently deferred or postponed, use the 
deconstructive terminology, or it has been exposed as an impossible ideal. In 
this sense, these positions, which we might loosely call poststructuralist, differ 
from  the Kojèvian hypothesis recently echoed by Fukuyama, that history has 
come  to  and  end  and  that  we  dwell  now  in  a  posthistorical  time.  The  
poststructuralist position, if it is a position, argues that this “end” is in the future, 
but – and this is the crucial twist – in a future which is in principle unrealizable. 
The promise of history is one that is destined to be broken. The end of history is 
an impossibility; it never happened, and it will never happen. It is an ideal, and 
if it were to take place, it would immediately be vanquished in tis ideality and, 
hence,  cannot  be  understood   on  the  order  of  the  event.  (Butler  1993b,  4;  
emphasis in the original) 
 
In this passage, Butler presents the Kojèvian hypothesis and shows how the poststructuralist 
position emerges from its (limited) critique. She does not, however, discuss on how far this 
the “end of history” interpretation is actually supported by Hegel. In the next pages (pp. 5-7) 
she simply calls Kojève’s hypothesis as “Hegel’s” or “Hegelian”.  
 
In another book review - of Michael S.Roth’s  Knowing and History. Appropriations of Hegel 
in Twentieth-Century France (1990)  - Butler writes of  Hegel in an explicitly Kojèvian 
manner. In this text, Butler argues that Hegel made a claim that history came to its end in his 
model of reciprocal recognition. Butler says:  “Hegel’s claim that history has reached an end 
in 1807 is taken seriously by those who survive that closure”. Butler hence takes as some sort 
of a given fact, that Hegel made a claim that history has come to its end in 1807. At the end of 
the text she comments; 
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The paradox of the Hegelian production and rejection of the post-Hegelian is 
precisely the problematic initiated by Hegel’s claim that history is at an end. (p. 
258; emphasis here) 
 
By “those who survive that closure”, Butler refers to Kojève, amongst some other 
philosophers.  Butler  hence associates the “end of history” with the Hegelian reciprocal 
recognition.  When the subject enters into reciprocally recognitive relations with other 
subject, the history ends, because then the telos of the historical process, or actually progress, 
becomes explicit for the subjects themselves. There remains no excluded, repressed groups 
who could redirect the historical process in ways which would not be known already. (ibid. 
249-252) These two book reviews appear as key texts; in them, unlike in her books, Butler 
clearly defines her own position in reference to that of Kojève.   
 
Butler emphasizes, all throughout her texts, that politics is a futural process, and, that the 
futural (or, historical) process, through an excluded, repressed other, never meets its end: 
 
 
The end of history is an impossibility; it never happened, and it will never 
happen. It is an ideal, and if it were to take place, it would immediately be 
vanquished in its ideality and, hence, cannot be understood on the order of the 
event. (;) On the contrary, in a sense that will become important to interrogate, 
the unrealizability of the end of history is precisely what guarantess futurity, for 
if  history  were  to  have  an  end,  a  telos,  and  if  that  end  were  knowable  in  the  
present, then the future would be known in advance of its emergence, and 
history, a postulation that invariably takes place in the present, would assimilate 
that end to the present and so foreclose the very history that the postulation 
anticipates. (Butler 1993b,4) 
 
 
For  Kojève  the  End  of  History  was  something  truly  ideal  and  welcome.  Butler  retains  the  
ideality of this “Hegelian complete, final knowledge” in her theory as a sort of “negative 
goal”. It constitutes a sort of “necessary error”, as an ideal and as a goal. Complete, final 
knowledge is a goal, which ought not to be reached, but which is necessarily strived for, at 
least by some, in order for there to be politics. All politics, as a futural process, depends on 
there being subjects who try to end this process -  by striving after final knowledge. Thus, the 
existence of the futural politics depends on there being subjects who try to end the futural 
politics, i.e. in Kojèvian terms, who try to end the history by finding the ultimate truth and 
realizing the ultimate ideal. It appears that Hegelian absolute knowledge – as a state of 
epistemological satisfaction and the end of Desire – is a foundational political entity in Butler,  
in the curious form of a “necessary error”. 
 
Hegelian absolute, complete self-knowledge (knowledge which is “shared” between the ek-
static parties, the self and the Other, in other words, knowledge which is not conditioned by 
what is refuted by it) and reciprocally recognitive relationships exist in Butler’s theory as 
something retained yet rejected. The Kojèvian threat of the End of History, the End of Subject 
and the End of Politics is escaped by processual denial of the validity of subjective 
knowledge. Self as a being who conceptualizes and presents knowledge of its own ek-statism 
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(and thus acts as a “mediating third” of its own constitutive contradictions) becomes turned, 
in Butler, into something which appears as a constant threat, something to be escaped. 
Thinking self as a conceptual synthesizer (mediator) of its ek-static parts is a constant threat 
because  –  as  the  subject-theory  is  nevertheless  a  Hegelian  one  –  it  is  what  the  subjects  are  
seen to strive for. In Hegel, thinkers strive for freedom, for complete knowledge of their ek-
static selves and the world,  by trying to connect with those parts of themselves which they do 
not (yet) have knowledge of. Butler’s model of politics is fundamentally based on the 
Hegelian subject, who tries to connect with those parts of its ek-static self, which it does not 
(yet) have a knowledge of. Butler’s model of politics (ek-static movement) requires a 
Hegelian subject, who tries to connect with its Other. However, it appears that through a 
Kojèvian interpretation of the Hegelian subject, Butler’s politics is a project of “striving for 
the impossible”. By the Kojèvian threat of the “End of History” the basically Hegelian subject 
cannot,  and  should  not,  reach  the  goal  which  it  strives  for.   The  goal  cannot  be  cast  away  
because the ek-static politics is dependent on  an  attempt  to  reach  it.  Consequently,  the  goal  
becomes retained in Butler’s political thought as a necessary error. The politics depends on 
this error being made. However, the particular political subjects themselves, striving for this 
goal, must not consider it an error. In Butler, paradoxically, subjects  necessarily and 
genuinely have to strive for something which they cannot and should not reach.  This complex 
idea is echoed in the next line, by Butler: 
 
The constitutive instability of the term, its incapacity ever fully to describe what 
it names, is produced precisely by what is excluded in order for the 
determination to take place (BM 218) 
 
 
5.2.2. Historical movement and politics through slavery and Desire   
 
 
Kojève did not see the realm of free self-conscious Spirit as a violent, otherness-refuting 
realm. In contrast, he considered it a kingdom of harmony, without slavery.  However, Butler 
and some other contemporary philosophers who read Hegel´s free self-consciousness in line 
with  Kojève,  see  it  differently.  In  short,  what  is  seen  by  Kojève  as  the  final  end,  is  seen  by  
Butler  and  a  few other  post-modern  thinkers  as  a  threat.   Indeed,  the  whole  post-modernist  
view of Hegel as a “totalizing” and “finalizing” thinker, who ultimately wants to suppress all 
differences, can be seen to be based on a Kojèvian reading of Hegel.  For Butler, Hegel´s free 
self-consciousness is a self-same subject, who cannot recognize the Other. Because this self 
thinks that it has no situationality and particularity (i.e. no limits to its knowledge), it extends 
itself violently and imperialistically everywhere, across places, contexts and times.  It cannot 
acknowledge such other knowledge which would not be already a part of its present 
knowledge. It does not allow any  dependency on otherness to itself for example  as a future 
where it is beyond or different to its present self.   
 
 
In Hegel, the field in which oppositions turn out to have presupposed each other 
is one that is led into crisis when the practice of nomination becomes so 
profoundly equivocal that nothing and everything is meant by the name. It is 
unclear what is resistance, what is Fascism, and the understanding of this 
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equivocation precipitates a crisis of sorts, one which calls for a new organization 
of  the  political  field  itself.  This  can  be  called  a  crisis  or  a  passage  of  
unknowingness,  or  it  can  be  understood  as  precisely  the  kind  of  collapse  that  
gives rise either to a new nomenclature or to a radical reinscription of the old.  
The risk here is that the dialectic can work to extend the very terms of 
dominance to include every aspect of opposition. This is the trope of the 
monolithic and carnivorous Hegel whose “Spirit” incorporates every difference 
into identity.   (CHU 174) 
 
This “trope” resonates with the Kojèvian reading of Hegel. With both Kojève and Butler, the 
realm  of  Spirit  is  a  place  without  critical  otherness,  or  futural  movement  caused  by  this  
otherness.  The reason for this is that the self has become an all-inclusive system. There is no 
other, no outside, who could move it, displace its knowledge of itself and make it different. 
Echoing Kojève, this means for Butler that there is no “refuted otherness” (i.e. slaves, 
unknown otherness)  any  more.  In  criticism against  Hegel´s  realm of  reciprocal  recognition,  
Butler sees it important to remember that there is a refuted otherness to any self-knowledge. 
In other words, there is an unspeakable and non-existent, enslaved other, to any self-
consciousness.  As will be explicated e.g. in the next sub-chapter Butler´s criticism against 
Hegel ´s (supposedly) totalizing free self-consciousness serves as a core  argument in Butler´s 
criticism against various subject-theories,. 
 
I invest no ultimate political hope in the possibility of awoving identifications 
that have conventionally been disavowed. It is doubtless true that certain 
disavowals are fundamentally enabling, and that no subject can proceed, can act, 
without disavowing  certain possibilities and avowing others. Indeed, certain 
kinds of disavowals function as constitutive constraints, and they cannot be 
willed away. But here a reformulation is in order, for it is not, strictly speaking, 
that a subject disavows its identifications, but rather, that certain exclusions and 
foreclosures institute the subject and persists as the permanent os constitutive 
spectre of its own destabilization. The ideal of transforming all excluded 
identifications into inclusive features – of appropriating all difference into unity 
– would mark the return to a Hegelian synthesis which has no exterior and that, 
in appropriating all difference as exemplary features of itself, becomes a figure 
for imperialism, a figure that installs itself by way of a romantic, insidious, and 
all-consuming humanism. But there remains the task of thinking through the 
potential cruelties that follow from an intensification of identification that 
cannot afford to acknowledge the exclusions on which it is dependent, 
exclusions that must be refused, identifications that must remain as refuse, as 
abjected, in order for that intensified identification to exist. (BM 115-116, 
emphasis mine).   
 
Butler does not consider temporally and culturally limited thinkers capable of  saying 
anything – anything  which does not constitute, as she defines it, a “necessary error”  -  of the 
relation between their own (present, particular) knowledge of the world and temporally Other 
knowledge of the world.  In Butler,  knowledge is formed of radical relations, of which the 
radical temporal relations are highly relevant and constitutive ones. Yet, the temporally 
limited thinkers themselves are seen by Butler as incapable of saying anything which does not 
fail, of their own ek-static temporal constitution. Their ek-static temporal constitution goes 
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beyond their limited capacity to understand ek-static relations. Their capacity to understand 
ek-static relations is limited, however, it is not limited in the Hegelian way of being limited 
for themselves (internally, conceptually), but instead, limited externally. Temporally specific 
knowledge  is  constituted  externally  (at  least  partly  externally)  by  Other  times.  Butler  is  
critical when subject-formative, ek-static temporal relations are defined, e.g. when “Other 
times” are conceptually mediated with the limited, particular times of the limited subjects 
(e.g. in the form of a coherent history).  Butler insists frequently e.g. that the future should 
remain undefined. Because the future is radically other to the present time, it should not 
become defined by the present. For Butler, various conceptualizations of temporal processes 
always fail to describe their object in full, i.e.  they  fail  to  describe  the  temporally  ek-static  
constitution of subjects and things.    
 
What  is  important  about  these  ek-static   temporal  relations  is  that  Butler  sees  them  as  
constitutive, however, as beyond the epistemological capacities of temporally limited subjects 
themselves. The way radically other times are constitutive of the subjectively known, 
particular time (the present) is thus normatively an external relation, constituting an external 
temporal constitution, of particular subjects.  The constitutive relations between mutually 
Other (ek-static) times becomes, hence, placed into a realm beyond the capacities of particular 
subjects, because particular subjects are seen as temporally limited, yet not limited for 
themselves.  Because e.g. the future is seen as this kind of an “other time” – as it is for Butler 
– it constitutes a founding temporal aspect which never becomes  limited (for thinkers like 
Butler).  Because the future cannot be defined by particular subjects in any non-failing way, 
the unknown (abstract, or “pure”) future constitutes an un-political aspect of subjects (for 
thinkers who think of it like Butler).  All “specific, limited times” (and all temporally specific 
knowledge) are constituted by temporally Other and normatively “pure” (abstract) aspects 
which are beyond the capacities of the temporally limited subjects. The “Other times” 
constitutes hence an abstract temporal constitution of the subjects. The future, after all, has no 
particular properties.  
 
For Butler, as for Kojève, the future becomes included into the present  in the Hegelian realm 
of reciprocal recognition.  The temporally ek-static constitution of historical subjects comes to 
its end, when there are no Other times any more. The present time and the present knowledge 
become unlimited, absolute. Butler’s way to escape the End of History is to keep reminding 
that things should not be defined “in advance”. However, if this idea is generalized, it 
becomes empty. All defining is defining “in advance”. The result is not that the Others (living 
in Other times, e.g. in the future) are somehow set free to define things in their own “futurally 
Other” ways, but that no-one is allowed  to define anything. Because the advice (not to define 
things in advance) is given to subjects in all times, there will be no such future in which 
things are allowed to be defined. All times, also the futural time, take place “in advance” of 
their own future, and thus the advice not to define things “in advance” has to be applied to all 
times. In this way, the “pure future” becomes turned into a “pure present” which extends itself 
limitlessly, to all possible temporal directions.  In fact, the necessarily non-definable “Other 
time”  (be it the future or any other Other time, seen as constitutive of the time of the subject) 
turns all times into non-definable times. The result is not really distinguishable from the End 
of History.  
 
As a short interval summary,  it appears that  Butler builds her subject-theory and political 
theory on the Hegelian “ek-static self” and on the self-othering-through-slavery process in 
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PhS. She does not in any way deny that she builds her subject-theory on Hegel.  In contrast,  
she says this repeatedly in her texts. Additionally, an important aspect of Butler´s subject-
theory is to avoid the “return to a Hegelian synthesis which has no exterior.”  Hence, while 
she takes some aspects of Hegel´s subject-theory in PhS  as basic elements of her own theory, 
she rejects other parts of them and uses them as warning examples. Hegel´s free self-
consciousness – interpreted in a Kojèvian way -  is used in her subject-theory as a negative 
ideal  to  be  avoided.  At  the  same time,  Butler  sees  that  it  is  necessary,  for  political  reasons,  
that this ideal is indeed a positive ideal, a goal which is genuinely strived for at least for some. 
Subjects who strive after impossible goals (e.g. after “temporally other” goals, which cannot 
and should not be reached) appear as necessary instruments for the preservation of politics.  
 
 
5.2.3. Final knowledge  
 
 
Throughout her works, Butler criticises, not only “Hegel´s permanent self-identity”  but also 
various other theoretical and political ideas, for giving a full  and permanent  identity to their 
subject of study.  Butler´s main interest is with theories which theorize sexuality and gender-
relations, e.g. feminist theories, queer theories and theories of democracy. As was explained 
in the previous sub-chapter,  Butler´s criticism can be seen to operate mainly on the basis of 
her criticism against (Hegelian) all-inclusive self-consciousness.  Butler sees, like Kojève, 
that Hegel´s free self-consciousness has internalized all its epistemological parts into itself 
(including such otherness, which could actually make it radically other than what it is already) 
and that its (“self-othering”) movement has stopped.  Hence there remains no radical political 
power outside of it, which could function as a critical limit to its self-knowledge. For Butler, 
Hegel´s free self-consciousness holds its otherness and also its future in self-identity with it, 
because its otherness and its future are  conceptual, rational aspects of it (for itself) already.  
Hegel´s free self-consciousness moves only internally, self-knowingly (i.e. non- ek-statically)  
and thus its future is already “owned” by it. There are no conflicts and no politics to free self-
consciousness. As for Kojève, it has no future which could not be told already now. (see e.g. 
BM 113-116, ES 5)  
 
Butler criticises various theories for presenting  “full, final knowledge” of e.g. “woman”, 
“sex” or “human” .  She criticises various theories for trying to fix the internal ek-statism of 
the term (i.e. “woman”) into a total, permanent self-identity. Also, she criticises them for 
trying to end the movement of the term, for trying to be the final explanation of the term and 
for forgetting that there always remains an outside/otherness, which cannot be known by any 
temporal,  particular description of the term.   Butler does not approve of the ek-static 
structure  being turned into such syntheses, to which no “unknown, futural  otherness” would 
be seen as constitutive of. Unknown, or partly unknown otherness is the same as “refuted 
otherness”, similar than the “enslaved universal” in the Lord-Bondsman-relations in PhS.  In 
PhS, the enslaved otherness denotes knowledge which does not “speak”, which is non-
existent and which does not “matter” or “appear”,  because its own meaning-giving, and 
object-formative,  system is not acknowledged as a valid one . 
 
Butler´s criticism - which has its base in her criticism of the Hegelian full self-knowledge,  as 
it is interpreted by her, in a  Kojèvian way -  is presented by her towards very different kinds 
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of  theories.   It is also presented by Butler against “post-structural” ideas of “non-identity”. 
As Butler convincingly shows, it can be presented against any kind of subject-theory which 
does not analyze the subject in the same (“self-othering”) way as it is done in PhS, during the 
phases of the struggle for recognition, i.e. during “history”.  These theories are criticised by 
Butler for the fact that these theories do not see themselves as incomplete and do not 
acknowledge their own limited nature.    
 
Butler also speaks of what she considers to be an Other-acknowledging way to think of a term 
like “human”. This is similar to what she considers to be the a radically democratizing or 
radically political  way to think of various terms like ”sex”, “subject”, “woman”, or  
“universality”.  The  role  of  the  unknown (refuted)  otherness  appears  as  fundamental  for  any  
actual politics.    
 
 
Have we ever yet known the “human”? What might it take to approach that 
knowing?  Should  we  be  wary  of  knowing  it  too  soon?  Should  we  be  wary  of  
final or definitive knowing? If we take the field of the human for granted, then 
we fail to think  critically – and ethically – about the consequential ways that the 
human is being produced, reproduced, deproduced. This latter inquiry does not 
exhaust the field of ethics, but I cannot imagibe a “responsible” ethics or theory 
of social transformation operating without it”….” the necessity of keeping our 
notion  of  “human”  open  to  a  future  articulation  is  essential  to  the  project  of  a  
critical international human rights discourse and politics. We see this time again 
when the very notion of the “human” is presupposed; it is defined in 
advance.(UG 222).  
 
 
To claim that the universal has not yet been articulated is to insist that the “not 
yet” is proper to an understanding of the universal itself: that which remains 
“unrealized” by the universal constitutes it essentially. The universal begins to 
become articulated precisely through challenges to its existing formulation, and 
this challenge emerges from those who are not covered by it, who have no 
entitlement to occupy the place of the “who”, but who, nevertheless, demand 
that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them. The excluded, in this 
sense,  constitutes  the  contingent  limit  of  universalization.  “....”  It  is  this  
otherness by which the speakable is instituted, that haunts its boundaries, and 
that threatens to enter the speakable through substitutions that cannot always be 
detected. (UG 191) 
 
 
Butler´s normative model in these criticisms is the Hegelian subject´s self-criticism (through 
the refuted other) in PhS. Hegel´s subject criticises itself processually through its refuted, i.e. 
enslaved other. The self and the Other do not stay the same along the process and hence the 
criticism also changes, according to what the excluded Other is.  The present “universal” 
system of self-knowledge is always taken as the target of criticism, from the point of view of 
that which is refuted and excluded by it.  Various forms of self-knowledge become turned 
radically other, in relation to what they were before.  The subject is “haunted” and 
transformed over again by its own parochial, incomplete self-knowledge, structured by an 
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internal slavery.  Whenever it thinks that it has reached full knowledge of itself, and thus 
become self-identical, it finds out that this is not the case. It has just ended up in a new kind of 
parochial  self-knolwedge  as  there  emerges   a  new “otherness”,  which  is  not  yet   part  of  its  
self-knowledge. Thus, the self criticises itself, along a temporal process, for that what remains 
unknown by it. Butler criticises various theories because they do not acknowledge their own 
limited validity (i.e. practise the sort of self-criticism, through the Other). She criticises e.g. 
structural feminism (i.e. feminism which takes some description of “woman” as its rallying 
point) for what remains unknown by it and illegitimate for it.   She sees that feminism which 
posits some idea of what woman is,  forgets that  it  is  only a temporal idea,  and that there is  
always “otherness”, and an unknown future, to any particular description of any given term ( 
see e.g. GT 1-5).  
 
The same type of criticism is presented by Butler against “post-structural” or postmodernist 
theorists  also.   Butler  criticises  e.g.   Derridean  or  Foucauldian  feminism  for  trying  to  fix  a  
fully unknown “non-identity” for terms such as “woman”.  She sees that there is an unknown 
outside to these theories themselves, which cling to a full unknowingness of the subject. This 
criticism is quite like Hegel´s criticism of pure self-consciousness in PhS (see chapter 2.2.11).  
Butler sees that also when  things are permanently, fully unknown by some theory, there is an 
“End  of  History”  if   this  is  taken  as  the  full,  final  truth.   She  e.g.  sees  that  Derrida´s  
“signifiers”  “float”  too  freely  (to  use  a  Derridean  terminology).  Hence,  Derrida´s  signifiers  
are alike the words in the Hegelian realm of free self-consciousness: anything and nothing is 
actually meant by them. (ES 147-151).  
 
Butler criticises the French, post-structural feminist philosopher Luce  Irigaray for a similar 
reason  than  she  criticises  Derrida.  Irigaray  is  seen  as  one  of  the  theorists  who  build  on  the  
Kojèvian tradition (see e.g. Weir 1996, 1-5, 90-111).  Irigaray argues that “woman” is 
something which is in constant “flux”. This “flux” escapes determinate self-identity. Woman 
cannot be known as an object which has a determinate position to it. For Irigaray, it is 
characteristical for a phallist subject-object-epistemology to think that things are objects with 
stable positions, with determinate borders around them. Irigaray argues that things are not 
“one”  in  this  way.   For  Irigaray,  woman is  not  limited  by  borders,  as  it  ambivalently  flows  
like “jouissance”.  Butler argues that Irigaray´s femininity is without any limits, hence, it 
allows  no  critical  outside  to  it.   It  does  not  allow the  existence  of  any  Other  knowledge  of  
woman, or the feminine. It sets a permanent, full, un-limited  un-knowingness to women, and 
forgets that if something is described as fully unknown, this is a self-relational, temporal 
gesture, which is made in some historical language. For Butler, this kind of full un-
knowingness constitutes its own version of full and permanent knowingness. Butler criticises 
Irigaray also for reproducing old patriarchal myths, according to which women belong to the 
realm of “immanence” and  “nature”. For Butler, Irigaray’s philosophy  paradoxically repeats 
the ancient patriarchal myth of women as beings who are non-logical, non-rational and un-
political “fully natural”  beings. (see e.g. BM 39-49, and,  GT 101-106; PLP 2-3,11; CHU 
144, 151,167).   
 
The criticism which Butler presents against Hegel´s free self-consciousness can be also be 
presented against e.g. Habermasian and Rawlsian theories. In these theories there is an idea to 
leave the  particular identities of subjects un-described, however  there is some idea of 
universal reason or rationality (as e.g. rational communication, which is seen as the inherent 
capacity of everybody). These ideas are criticised by Butler for forgetting that there remains a 
261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
refuted  part  ,  that  of  “  limited  subjectivity”  which  is  constitutive  of  the  reason  which  (in  a  
Kantian vein) claims to be empty of particular subjectivity. Butler´s criticism against e.g. 
Habermas resembles closely Hegel´s criticism against Kantian transcendental, abstract, formal 
reason.  When  Butler  criticises  the  Habermasian   reason  for  its  formalism  and  abstractivity,  
she  tends  to  refer  to  Hegel´s  criticism  of  Kant.  (see  e.g.  CHU  15).  Importantly,  Hegel´s  
criticism against the Kantian “empty reason” is a part of his criticism of pure self-
consciousness, taking part before the entrance into free self-consciousness. In free self-
consciousness the Kantian reason is internally mediated with its otherness, i.e. the particular 
historical subjectivity.  
 
In fact, according to Butler whenever a theory holds on to any kind of a description, which 
this theory itself does not admit as being incomplete and as constituted by something which 
this theory itself excludes and refutes,  this description  can be criticised for “ending the 
history”. 
 
 
5.2.4. “Pure being”  
 
 
Kojève´s and Butler´s way to interpret Hegel´s free self-consciousness and the community of 
free selves resembles interestingly what Hegel himself says about “pure being”, which, for 
Hegel,  is  the  same  as  “empty  undifferentiated  nothing”.   Hegel  connects  pure  being   to  
abstract thinking and with “pure self-consciousness”, which is a phase in PhS preceding the 
entrance into free, actual self-consciousness and the community of reciprocal recognition.  
Pure self-consciousness  -especially just before its entrance into free self-consciousness -  has 
knowledge of all its parts, however, only as abstract notions, as empty nothingnesses. For 
Hegel, when things are taken as pure, non-particular abstractions (as they exist for pure self-
consciousness, according to Hegel) everything and nothing is meant by them. (SL 82-85,98)   
In his  Science of Logic, Hegel writes: 
 
Being,  pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate 
immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it 
has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be 
held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be 
distinguished in it or by which it could be distinquished from an other. It is pure 
indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can 
speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. (SL 82) 
 
Consciousness by making abstraction can, of course, fill itself with such 
indeterminateness also and the abstractions thus held fast are the thoughts of 
pure space, pure time, pure consciousness, or pure being. It is the thought of 
pure space, etc. – that is, pure space, etc, in its own self –  that  is  to  be  
demonstrated as null: that it is as such already its own opposite, that its opposite 
has already penetrated into it,  (SL 98) 
 
 
In PhS Hegel sees that there is a moment of “pure I” or “emptiness” internal to any subjective 
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thinking. He calls this a moment of abstraction. If “pure I” dominates thinking as its main 
point of reference, it results into an abstract and formal thinking in which nothing and 
everything  is  meant  by  words.   “Pure  I”  is  associated  in  PhS  with  pure  self-consciousness,  
universal (abstract) individuality and absolute, individual  freedom.  It is also associated with 
choices made at “pure will” and  things known by non-particular “pure knowing”. “Pure I” 
corresponds with an unlimited culture, in which “pure language” is being spoken, and in 
which there cannot be differentiations made between the Individuals.  This unlimited and 
unchangeable sociality appears as very similar to Kojève´s universally homogeneous State. 
For  Hegel,  pure  self-consciousness  takes   the  form  of  a   negating  activity  towards  any  
particular determination and identity, given of it, echoing how Kojeve describes the free 
Individual. However, Hegel does not join Kojève in his praise for this kind of free 
Individuality. Instead, Hegel rather joins Butler in her criticism of it. Actually Kojève´s and 
Butler´s interpretation of Hegel´s free self-consciousness has more in common with Hegel´s 
description of pure (still un-free) self-consciousness (consider e.g. Kojève´s view that the 
Wise Man cannot be differentiated from each others!). 
 
For Hegel, pure self-consciousness takes the form of a hostility towards subject-object-
relations (i.e. the realm of Consciousness as Understanding), particularity, differences and 
otherness. This resembles closely how Butler critically describes Hegel´s realm of free self-
consciousness and its realization as the State. (PhS §197-213, §792).   
 
Hegel is very critical of all ideas based on undifferentiated self-same wholes and umediated 
relations and in this sense he thinks like Butler.  Hegel does not see this kind of a 
“homogeneous” situation of “un-differentiated individuality” as the ultimate perfection. 
Instead, Hegel sees it, like Butler sees it, as a realm of a Master-Slave-division. This is 
actually what Hegel repeats over again in PhS, as this kind of thinking constitutes for Hegel 
one version of parochiality, the refutation of otherness.  Hegel thinks, like Butler, that the 
movement of things (their becoming other) has ceased in such a realm. This is linked, for 
Hegel, with the abstractivity of the pure self-consciousness. As particular things do not exist 
for it, it cannot comprehend movement. There exists nothing for it which it could see to move. 
Things are abstractions for it and abstractions cannot be seen to move, as they cannot be seen 
at  all,  to  start  with.  They  are  not  particular  somethings  which  could  be  seen  either  to  stand  
still, or to become different from what they were before. Hegel argues that movement cannot 
be seen in itself, as a “pure movement”, without there being something (particular, limited, 
non-abstract), existing for the thinker itself, which moves.  Hegel repeats over again in PhS 
that abstractions are unchangeable.  Pure self-consciousness – for whom things  mean 
everything and nothing -  is able to see things at all, or the movement of them,  only if it looks 
at things from the point of view of somebody who does not think of things the way it does. It 
can see things move, or stand still, or become changed,  if it looks at them from the point of 
view of particular thinking, metaphorically, through thinking which is in  bondage, i.e. 
context-dependent, historical thinking.  In this sense, Hegel thinks like Butler. He sees that 
self-same thinking, which does not allow for the existence of an outside to itself, refutes 
otherness. As is explicated in the chapter 2 on Hegel, thinking which sees itself and others as 
“free nothingnesses”  (i.e. not differentiated from others: as pure I´s) depends on externally 
produced differentiation, particularity (i.e. enslaved otherness) in order to be able to think at 
all, as its own language means everything and nothing.  For Hegel, as for Butler, a pure 
Individual is necessarily internally divided on the basis of lordship and bondage, and hence it 
can see things at all, to start with, only through some Other thinking, beyond it.  It depends on 
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the Other, i.e. particular subjects,  also to labour  temporal changes for it. It can comprehend 
historical movement only through the eyes of Bondsmen, as Bondsmen denote the realm of 
seeing historically and contextually limited particulars.  In order for a pure Individual to 
comprehend temporal changes - things becoming other in time –  it must think of things and 
looks at things through the eyes of the Other (i.e. the particular subjects).   
 
Hegel emphasizes all through his philosophy of subjective spirit (in PhS and also in Enc. III) 
that if the internally contradictory self becomes conscious of its parts, yet does not “return” 
(relate) those parts to a particular, historical subjectivity, its self-consciousness and its 
freedom is only an abstract notion, i.e. an empty individual nothingness  This is what takes 
place in pure self-consciousness and in the self-same, pure State (exemplified for Hegel in the 
absolute freedom/Terror of the French Revolution).  According to the reading, supported in 
this study, Hegel´s free self-consciousness, in contrast to pure self-consciousness,  knows 
itself as a particular concept, as a particular “something”. The self is differentiated from other 
selves,  even that the selves,  in reciprocal recognition, do not place any “external otherness” 
beyond themselves, or subjects in general. The terms that facilitate recognition - also in 
reciprocal recognition - are particular and limited terms. The selves recognize themselves and 
others as free self-consciousnesses, however, as particular free self-consciousnesses. Subjects 
continue to see things (including themselves and others) on the basis of subject-object-
relationality.   
 
Hegel argues that the particularity of things is determined rationally in relations of reciprocal 
recognition. The selves identify themselves, each others and the whole world  through shared 
rationality,  which  is  always  a  particular,  historical  rationality.   According  to  Hegel,  the  
rational “theory” of particularity can potentially limitlessly differentiate itself, become Other 
to itself, because it is a particular, historical rationality. As is said also elsewhere in this study, 
and as is explicated in the chapter on Hegel, this study supports a different line of interpreting 
Hegel´s free self-consciousness, and its objectivization in the rational state, than Kojève and 
Butler.  In this study the realm of free self-consciousness, and Absolute Knowing, is 
interpreted in a similar way than e.g. by Hutchings (Hutchings 2003, 106),  Ikäheimo 
(Ikäheimo 2000, 85), or by Charles Taylor. According to Taylor, the rational whole 
(epistemological and material) as which Hegel´s free self-consciousnesses know and realize 
themselves and each others takes place as particular rationality which is historical and which 
can endlessly ( at least potentially) become other in relation to what it is at some given time. 
The way things become other in the realm of Absolute Knowing is different than in the realm 
of parochial consciousness (which is led by refuted otherness). Nevertheless, the becoming 
changed and the becoming different through  contradiction does not end in the realm of free 
and absolute Knowing  (Taylor 1975, e.g. 103-109). As Hegel says in PhS: 
 
...nor  is  Spirit  a tertium quid that  casts  differences  back  into  the  abyss  of  the  
Absolute and declares that therein they are all the same.. (PhS §804) 
 
 
Butler´s subject-theory appears to be built partly on the approval of Hegel´s subject-theory 
and partly on its rejection.  Butler herself says that she “arrests” Hegel´s text in PhS before its 
resolution  into  self-conscious  Spirit,  and  continues  from  there  with  what  she  calls  an  
“Althusserian reversal” (see PLP 32-43; ES 5; BM 113-116). However, Butler also seems to 
preserve the “Hegelian self-same synthesis” (as she interprets it, in a Kojèvian way) as a 
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figure to be avoided. In fact, as said before, the Hegelian synthesis - the figure of “complete 
knowledge” - cannot be disposed of as Butler’s Hegelian subject-theory and Hegelian-
inflected model of politics fundamentally depends on  it.   What  is  also  important  is  that  in  
reference to this Hegelian “figure to be avoided” she criticises Althusser, and actually all 
those theorists, in reference to whom she criticises Hegel´s all-inclusive, total  self.  Even that 
she criticizes Hegel´s all- inclusive self in reference to Althusser (and also Foucault, Lacan 
etc.), she nevertheless finds an all-inclusive self also in these theories. Hegel´s theory of pure 
self-consciousness and his criticism of the “Kantian” formalist thought serves as the 
argumentative base in Butler’s criticism against these theorists, through whom she criticises 
Hegel.  Even that Butler uses these theories in her criticism of Hegel´s supposedly otherness-
refuting  conceptual  synthesis,  these  theories  nevertheless  constitute  for  Butler  their  own  
“otherness-refuting-synthesis” when taken as such,  alone by themselves. Consequently, taken 
alone as subject-theories, they appear as “full and final  syntheses” which also need the sort of 
“self-othering-through-internal-slavery”, which Butler adopts from PhS as the normative 
model of theorizing things in a democratizing way.    
 
An important part of Butler´s criticism against Hegel´s all-inclusive self is her criticism 
against the “mediator”, or “third”, which conducts the “inclusion” , in other words, the 
Dialectical Reversal. Butler criticism against the “third” is taken up in the next chapter.    
 
 
5.2.5. Hegelian “full self-identity” as a threat to politics 
 
 
In her texts Butler worries about something which she calls the “survival of the subject”, or 
the “linguistic survival” of the subject. In her political theory, the survival of the subject 
appears as a core goal. In fact, the survival of the subject is connected to the survival of 
politics,  or actually to the existence of the political,  conflictual realm.   This means that the 
prevention of what could be called the End of Subject appears as core political goal for her. 
Butler sees that a full self-knowledge denotes a threat to the existence of the subject and 
politics.   Especially  the  Hegelian  synthesis  between  the  self  and  the  Other  (taking  place  in  
free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition) is a threat to the subject  as something 
futural, political and changeable. The reason why Butler sees Hegel´s full self-knowledge as a 
risk can be understood on the basis of Butler´s Kojevian reading of Hegel. In the Kojèvian 
End of History (taking place as a Hegelian free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition) 
there are no subjects, politics, ek-static selves or future.  The self, the Other, the past, the 
present, the future etc. all possible epistemological aspects, constitutive of the self, are 
synthesized  into  an  un-limited  realm  of  the  Wise  Man.  In  the  Kojèvian  End  of  History  the  
political field disappears. (see e.g. SD 59, BM 113-116, 218-223, 224, 227 ) 
 
According to Butler´s basically Hegelian subject-theory, “subject” denotes the moment of the  
limited “subject-position”. Subject-position – an Althusserian concept -  is always a particular 
(i.e limited) one, as only limited entities can be positional. Unlimited  entities  (like  the  
Kojèvian  Wise  Men)  are  not  restricted  by  limits  or  positions  (time,  place,  cultural  context,  
discourse etc.). Further, particular objects (limited objects) are seen only when looked at from 
a limited subject-position.  In fact, subject-position is synonymous to a limited, particular 
“point of view”, through which anything at all can be seen. This means that a “point of view” 
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-  i.e. a subject  - is a particular system of differentiation and relation.  The subject is, in this 
sense, a particular language, or, a particular universe.   
 
In  Kojève´s End of History, there are no limited subjects or viewpoints. Instead, there are un-
limited Wise Men. Wise Men are all “one” because they have integrated all otherness into 
them - i.e. all Other points of views from which things could be looked at.  In fact, the 
existence of the Other (contradicting other limited points of views)  goes hand in hand with 
the  existence  of  the  limited  subject,  and  the  structure  of  the  ek-static  self.  The  existence  of  
Other points of views is the core idea in the structure of the ek-static self.  Hence, in the ek-
static self (which denotes the structure of the self and the Other),  there must be a separation 
between the self and the Other.  (see e.g. BM 218-222)  
 
However, as concerns the necessary separation between the self and the Other, there is, for 
Butler,  also  a  risk  that  this  separation  takes  place  as  a  full  identification  of  them.   In  other  
words, there is  the risk that the self and the Other become related in the same way as in the 
Hegelian,  internal,  conceptual  mediation.   The  reason  why Butler  sees  this  as  a  risk  for  the  
survival of the limited subject (who ought to stay limited) and the survival of ek-static politics 
(which dependes on there being limited subjects) can be understood on the basis of Butler's 
Kojèvian reading of Hegel. Kojève interprets  Hegel´s conceptual mediation between the self 
and the Other - the one which takes place in free self-consciousness and reciprocal 
recognition – as resulting from the  immanent, non-differentiated, non-limited  self-identity. 
This unlimited self-knowledge cannot be criticised (politicised) from the point of view of the 
Other, as all Other points of views are included in it already. (see e.g. BM 113-116) 
 
For  Kojève,  when  the  self  and  the  Other  recognize  each  other  as  fully free, they see each 
others as free nothingnesses. They cease to be particular subjects for themselves, or for each 
others. They also cease to be parochial (otherness-refuting) subjects. They cease to be subjects 
who can be criticised from Other points of views.  Nor do the Wise Men see any reason to 
criticise each others. In the realm of this kind of Wise Men, there is no reason for politics as 
nobody needs to change anything.  With Kojève, being a particular subject means the same 
thing as to be a parochial subject. A particular, parochial subject (i.e. a one whose knowledge 
of itself and others is based on the Master-Slave-relation) can be criticised, as it can move, 
become changed through its enslaved otherness.   
 
The Wise Men create together, by their mutual attitude toward each others, an unpolitical 
realm. They are in this sense, paradoxically, at the same time, fully separated from each other 
and fully identified with each other. There is no system of differentiation – i.e. no third -   on 
the basis of which the separating and relating between them could be thought. There is also no 
system of differentiation which could be criticised.  They are in this sense melted into one - 
without a mediation through a political “third”-  because there is no way to draw a 
differentiating border between them.  There is no particular (limited) point of view, i.e. 
particular subjectivity, from which a differentiation between the self and the other selves 
could be thought.  The selves cease to be particular subjects.  As Kojève says, they are free 
nothingnesses, or, Wise Men. This means also that they do not exist as identifiable entities for 
each other any more.   They cannot “read” (see) the other at all, or interpret in any way what 
the other one says. As was explicated in the previous sub-chapters, this is how Butler also 
reads Hegel´s realm of free self-consciousness, especially as a self-conscious Spirit and as a 
free State (see e.g. CHU 174, BM 116).    
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It is true that for Hegel (in PhS) the otherness becomes internalized into the self in the realm 
of free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition.  Yet, in contrast to Kojève, Hegel 
always emphasizes that this internalization takes place as a conceptual relation. It takes place 
through a particular “third”, as is explained in the chapter 2.1.5. There is no disappearance of 
particular points of views, i.e. particular thirdness. The self and the Other remain particular 
subjects, particular thirds, having their particular points of views onto the world.  The “larger 
third”, or the “free, unlimited third”, connecting the particular selves together, takes place as a 
shared rationality, or, the triplicity of Knowing, as is explained further in the next sub-chapter. 
The larger third conducts a preservation and negation (sublation, Aufhebung) of the particular 
points of views onto the world. The shared (sublated) rationality could be described as a 
“theory” of what subjects, things and the world are like. This theory is however always a 
particular theory, and a historical one, thus providing a particular (limited) point of view onto 
things.  However,  it  is  also  an  un-limited  one,  and  it  is  a  “free  theory”,  as  its  substance  is  
determined by reciprocally recognitive selves.  The theory is  free from internal 
epistemological Master-Slave-relations. No one self or group alone acts as the “universal 
truth”, which would one-sidedly fix the substance of the theory, as in relations of Desire 
(Master-Slave). Because the selves recognize each others as basically equally valid 
contributors to the theory, the particular substance of the theory can change or enrich itself 
limitlessly, through  contradiction.  As  such,  the  self  and  the  Other  do  not  melt  into  a  non-
differentiated sameness in Hegel’s theory of reciprocal recognition. In short, Hegel’s theory 
of recognition is fundamentally different from the Kojévian interpretation of it.   A Hegelian 
full self-identity (ultimately denoted by the sublated free theory, which is not based on 
Master-Slave-epistemology) is dialectical, historical and political. Its particular substance can 
be criticised and politicized by the particular selves.    
 
Whereas Kojève assimilates particularity with parochiality – i.e. particular (limited) self-
knowledge  and  identities  with  Master-Slave-relations  –  Hegel  does  not  do  so.  In  free  self-
consciousness  and  reciprocal  recognition  the  selves  can  still  criticise  each  others  -  and  the  
“shared rationality”-  for being  limited. One way to understand this could be perhaps through 
the idea that, in order for there to be criticism and politics, we do not necessarily need the 
kind of Master-Slave –systems, like in the Aristotelian world. Politics does not necessarily 
always take place between Masters and Slaves, i.e. between the “recognized universals” and 
the “not recognized, un-speakable universals, who do slave-labour for others”.  Also the so 
called “free and equal citizens” can criticise each others views and the ways of the 
community, i.e. “polis”.  Master-Slave-relation thus does not have to be taken as the 
necessary and normative paradigm of a political relation.  
 
Butler  says  that  there  is  a  “necessary  error”  to  all  self-identities.  (see  e.g.  BM 228-229,  SD 
59)   With Butler, as with Kojève, the duality between the realms of “full self-identity” and 
“not full self-identity” correspond with the duality between the realms of  “no politics” (which 
in Butler is constituted by the negative ideal of the End of History) and “politics” (the realm 
of the struggle for recognition). However, as Butler does not accept Kojéve´s normative ideas, 
it seems that for Butler there is a dilemma of how to strive for something, which nevertheless 
should not be reached. Overcoming the violence of exclusion (the Master-Slave-system, the 
realm  of  Desire)  appears  as  an  important  goal  for  Butler.   However,  a  situation  where  that  
goal was reached would be a situation of “non-limited singularity” and the disappearance of 
all differences (resembling the Kojèvian End of History and Wise Man). This dilemma (of 
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striving for something which should not however be reached) is taken up also e.g. with the 
political thought of Chantal Mouffe, see chapter 6.  Butler writes: 
 
The task is to refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon, one in which 
the violence of exclusion is perpetually in a process of being overcome. But of 
equal importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse 
meets its limits, where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of 
truth acts as a disruptive site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability, 
illuminating the violent and contingent boundaries of that normative regime 
precisely through the inability of that regime to represent that which might pose 
a  fundamental  threat  to  its  continuity.  In  this  sense,  radical  and  inclusive  
representability is not precisely the goal: to include, to speak as, to bring in 
every marginal and excluded position within a given discourse is to claim that a 
singular discourse meets its limits nowhere, that it can and will domesticate all 
signs of difference.  (BM 53, see also CHU 174) 
 
Butler speaks frequently of the “violence”, inherent to all self-identities, as a restricting yet 
also politically enabling violence. Violence is necessary for the existence of the political 
realm. According to Butler, we cannot fully dispose of the violence done against the Other, 
because this violence is formative of the subject, and also formative of there being the ek-
static relation between the self and the Other.  The end of this violence would mark the end of 
the subject, the Other,  ek-static relations,  and,  also the end of ek-static politics. However, 
there  is  a  dilemma of  how to  think  of   this  violence,  which  on  the  one  hand is  a  necessary  
presupposition of subjects and of political possibilities, yet, which on the other hand means 
that there is, indeed, violence.  Butler writes about this, in connection with the politics of the 
term “woman”: 
 
… the descriptions offered in the name of “women” not only attest to the 
specific violences that a partial concept enforces, but to the constitutive 
impossibility  of  an  impartial  or  comperehensive  concept  or  category.  The  
claim to have achieved such an impartial concept or description shores itself up 
by foreclosing the very political field that it claism to have exhausted. This 
violence is at once performed and erased by a description that claims finality 
and all-inclusiveness. To ameliorate and rework this violence, it is necessary to 
learn a double movement: to invoke the category and, hence, provisionally to 
institute an identity and at the same time to open the category as a site of 
permanent political contest. That the term is questionable does not mean that 
we ought not to use it, but neither does the necessity to use it mean that we 
ought not perpetually to interrogate the exclusions by which it proceeds,… 
(BM 221-222)  
 
One of the claims made in this study is that Kojève presents a specific interpretation of 
Hegel´s  realm of free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition. Butler approves of this 
interpretation. Consequently, she refutes Hegel´s free self-consciousness and reciprocal 
recognition. Butler does not seem to realize that her reading of Hegel is here influenced by 
Kojève.  Nor  does  she  seem  to  realize  that  also  her  political theory,  based  on  the  Hegelian  
subject-theory,  is influenced by Kojève. For Butler, the Master-Slave-system cannot be 
escaped, because without it,  there would  be a non-limited singularity and the disappearance 
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of  all  differences  (in  terms  of  full  self-identity).   Butler´s  Kojèvian  thinking   -   i.e.  that  
Master-Slave-relations and conceptually unmediated self-knowledge (in a Hegelian way) are 
necessary elements of politics -  sets the theoretical ground for her performative politics.  This 
means that the special type of politics between Master and Slave - the struggle for recognition 
– becomes a base for Butler´s performative politics. This supposedly necessary connection 
between a self-identity, a striving for recognition, and a violent struggle is typical for Kojève 
and for those who derive their inspiration from him (see, Weir 1996, ch. 1; Williams 1997, ch. 
15).  The necessary failure of recognition and the unavoidable hostility between the self and 
the Other is already present in the first important work inspired by Kojève, Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness (1943). There, Sartre rejects Hegel’s “epistemological optimism”: 
 
Hegel’s optimism ends in failure: between the Other as object and Me as subject 
there is no common measure. I know myself in the Other if the Other is first an 
object for me; neither can I apprehend the Other in his true being – that is, his 
subjectivity. No universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of 
consciousnesses. This is what we shall call their ontological separation  (Sartre 
2001, 219) 
 
Nevertheless, Kojève´s reading of Hegel is a parochial one.  In fact, Hegel discusses the kind 
of thinking, which resembles Kojevian thinking, and calls it a pure self-consciousness. Hegel 
criticises pure self-consciousness for similar reasons as Butler criticises “Hegel´s” free self-
consciousness.  
 
 
5.2.7. Althusser and Butler 
 
 
Althusser  is  a  key  theoretical  figure  for  Butler.  The  “Althusserian  reversal  of  Hegel”,  
discussed already before,   is perhaps the most fundamental theoretical structure in Butler. 
Butler herself says that she adheres to an  Althusserian subject-theory, where not all the 
relations, formative of subjects, are turned into internal ones,  rather than  a Hegelian theory, 
where these relations become totally internal, i.e. known by the subjects themselves.  
According to Butler, the subject is problematically complete in Hegel, in a way which 
ultimately  cannot  but  suffocate  politics.   In  other  words,  the  subject  is  seen  as  able,  in  
principle, to understand all its radical aspects. For Althusser, the subject is necessarily 
incomplete, as the interpellative relations, formative of it, are external to it. Butler writes in 
CHU about the incompletion of the subject:  
 
I understood the “incompletion” of the subject-position in the following ways: 
1)  as  the  failure  of  any  particular  articulation  to  describe  the  population  it  
represents; 2) that every subject is constituted differentially, and that what is 
produced as the “constitutive outside” of the subject can never become fully 
inside or immanent. I take this last point to establish the fundamental difference 
between the Althusserian-inflected work of Laclau and Mouffe and a more 
Hegelian  theory  of  the  subject  in  which  all  external  relations  are  –  at  least  
ideally – transformable into internal ones  (CHU 12). 
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Butler criticises Hegel in several books in reference to Althusser. Lacanian ideas, which 
Butler receives not only directly from Lacan, but also through thinkers like Althusser, appears 
important for Butler.  (see e.g. CHU 12, ES 5, PLP 4-6, 30, 34). Butler writes in ES:   
 
If a subject becomes a subject by entering the normativity of language, then in 
some important ways, these rules precede and orchestrate the very formation of 
the subject. Although the subject enters the normativity of language, the subject 
exists only as a grammatical fiction prior to that very entrance. Moreover, as 
Lacan and Lacanians have argued, that entrance into language comes at a price; 
the norms that govern the inception of the speaking subject differentiate the 
subject from the unspeakable, that is, produce an unspeakability as the condition 
of subject-formation. (ES 135) 
 
In an Althusserian- Lacanian manner, Butler sees throughout her writings that when the 
“speaking subject” - i.e. an intelligible and self-conscious subject - is formed, a realm of 
“unspeakability” becomes produced as well. Thus, something unspeakable, and in this sense 
“external” , is necessarily constitutive of a subject-position.  For Butler, via Althusser and 
Lacanian thought in general,  the realm of unspeakability is the condition of the possibility of 
the subject. Even if Butler does not fully agree with any of these theorists, she nevertheless 
claims that unspeakability is constitutive of intelligible  subjectivity. She claims that the 
realms of “speakability” (intelligible subjectivity) and “unspeakability” are differentiated or 
split off from each other in a way which is repressive and constitutes a “founding submission” 
as the base of subjectivity (see e.g. ES 27, PLP 1-3; BM 3,8).  Butler writes:  
 
“Subjection” signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as 
the process of becoming a subject. Whether by interpellation, in Althusser´s 
sense, or by discursive productivity, in Foucault´s, the subject is initiated 
through a primary submission to power. (PLP 2) 
 
 
Even that Butler disagrees with any specific theories, given of this primary (interpellative) 
relation (given e.g. by Hegel, Althusser, Lacan or Foucault), she nevertheless claims that there 
is this kind of primary relation, or alterity. Butler´s critical discussions with the theorists who 
have some specific theory of the primary split appear to constitute most of Butler´s own 
theory of it, i.e. Butler´s theory of the self and things as “ek-static”. Following the 
Althusserian usage, Butler often calls her theory a critical practice. In a manner, resembling 
Althusser´s distinction between the realms of subjective (ideological, failing) theories of 
things and  critical (scientific, non-subjective) theorizing of things, Butler takes specific 
theories of the ek-static self as objects of critical analysis. However, the way Butler takes 
specific theories as objects of critical analysis does not quite correspond with Althusser´s 
distinction between “subjective theorizing” and “scientific, critical theorizing”. Butler claims 
that she rejects all distinctions between “subjective” and “non-subejctive” realms. She 
adheres, throughout her writings, to the basic Hegelian claim, i.e.  that all thought things,  
including all thought distinctions, are subjective, that is, they exist for someone. As such, the 
theoretical  relation  between  Butler,  Hegel  and   Althusser  is  a  complex  one.  Nevertheless,  
Althusser is seen in this study as a theorist who has a major influence in Butler´s thought - 
also in ways not commented on by Butler herself.  
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As  has  been  already  explained  above,  Butler  discusses  the  primary  relation,  formative  of  a  
subject - as an ek-static subject - in reference to a few theorists. For Butler the primary 
relation - rendering the subject ek-static -  constitutes a relation between what is speakable  
and what is unspeakable of the self.  Butler partly agrees with each one of these theorists, like 
with  Hegel  and  Althusser,  and,  partly  disagrees  with  all  of  them.  As  was  explicated  in  the  
chapter 5.2.3., it appears that what Butler is primarily critical of is when a particular 
description is given (of the primary relation, constitutive of the ek-static self) as a final 
description.  For  Butler  a  description  is  presented  as  the  final  one  if  the  one  who presents  it  
does not say that the description is valid only inside its own context, i.e. in terms of its own 
subject-position, instead of being universally valid. In other words, Butler’s critique is 
directed against all views in which – according to her - some particular description of the 
primary relation (constitutive of the self as ek-static) is presented as a non-failing description.   
 
The rejection of such “final explanations” is the reason why Butler, in line with Althusser, 
criticises Freud´s theory of Oedipal phase. As is explained in the next chapter, this is why she 
is also critical of Althusser, Lacan and Foucault. (see the next chapter on Butler´s criticism of 
Althusser et.al) 
 
Basically, Butler follows Althusser in the sense that, as in Althusser, the subjects themselves 
cannot take the primary relation, or interpellation - which is their origin as intelligible subjects 
-  as an object of analysis. The subjects themselves cannot conceptualize their own ek-static 
formation.  Butler rejects Hegel´s idea of free self-consciousness, i.e. the idea that subjects are 
not (necessarily) externally known, by external Masters.  According to Butler, in reference to 
Althusser and in contrast to Hegel, there always remains something, constitutive of the 
subjects – something which she often refers to as a “surplus” or a “remainder” - that cannot be 
described conceptually by the subjects themselves. Butler argues that the self is never 
identical with itself. The self always fails to know its constitutive primary relation (its ek-
static structure, constituted in relation to Otherness) as a particular relation.  
 
It will not do to say that there is first a self and then it engages in splitting, since 
the self as I am outlining it here is beyond itself from the start, and defined by 
this ontological ek-stasis, this fundamental relation to the Other in which it finds 
itself ambiguously installed outside itself. This model is, I would suggest, one 
way of disputing any claim concerning the self-sufficiency of the subject or, 
indeed, the incorporative character of all identification.(…).. it is possible and 
necessary to say that the subject splits, but it does not follow from that 
formulation that the subject was a single whole or autonomous. (UG 150-151)  
 
For Butler, the primary relation or split,  the “ontological ek-stasis” between the self and the 
Other cannot be determined as a particular relation by the subject itself. Like Althusser, Butler 
sees that the psyche takes place as a relational psyche. What the primary relations specifically 
are, and who are the relational parties (i.e. the constitutive parts of the ek-static self ) is 
determined culturally and historically.    
 
For Butler, like with Althusser, subject is known if it is looked from a linguistic subject-
position. Butler´s description of “subject-position”, which she also calls in an Althusserian 
way a “category”, is very similar to Althusser’s description of the subjects.  For Butler subject 
is a category, a position, which is formed by a primary interpellation.  For Butler, this 
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interpellation constitutes the subject as a linguistic, self-reflective, social, responsible, 
gendered being. This constitution is, for Butler, as for Althusser and in general in Marxism, a 
forced one. In line with Althusser, Butler sees that ideology appears (for the subjects) as a 
natural fact. Butler herself has become famous especially of her theories of the forcible, 
ideological constitution of anatomical facts, such as the gender-differentiation and 
heterosexuality. She writes about the forced constitution of gender: 
 
To expose the contingent acts that create the appearance of a naturalistic 
necessity, a move which has been a part of cultural critique at least since Marx, 
is a task that now takes on the added burden of showing how the very notion of 
the subject, intelligible only through its appearance as gendered, admits of 
possibilities that have been forcibly foreclosed by the various reifications of 
gender that have constituted its contingent ontologies. (GT 33) 
 
As for Althusser, for Butler the forcibly gendered subject-position is the mode by which the 
ideological power makes itself existent and legitimate and by which reproduces itself. The 
subjects themselves fail to see that their subjectivities are forcibly produced, instead, they take 
their subjectivities (i.e. their gender-identities, racial identities etc.)  as natural facts.  
Gendered subjects produce - in reference to the hidden “symbolic Law” which they are 
“programmed” to obey - a gendered objectivity and gendered bodies.  The “gendering” takes 
place as an everyday compulsory, ritualistic and institutionalistic practice, supported by the 
heteronormative state. Subjects follow ideological, institutional rules of how to be a right kind 
of woman, a man and a heterosexual. In an Althusserian, Lacanian and Foucauldian manner,  
the intelligible, coherent genders produce also the realm of “prohibited”, un-normal, not 
intelligible genders.   
 
“Intelligible” genders are those which in some sense institute and maintain 
relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice, and 
desire. (…) The notion that there might be “truth” of sex, as Foucault ironically 
terms it, is produced precisely through the regulatory practices that generate 
coherent identities through the matrix of coherent gender norms. The 
heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete 
and asymmetrical oppositions between “feminine” and “masculine”, where these 
are understood as expressive attributes of “male” and “female”. The cultural 
matrix through which gender identity has become intelligible requires that 
certain kinds of “identities” cannot “exist” – that is, those in which gender does 
not follow from sex and those in which the practices of desire fo not “follow” 
from  either  sex  or  gender.  “Follow”  in  this  context  is  a  political  relation  of  
entailment  instituted  by  the  cultural  alws  that  establish  and  regulate  the  shape  
and meaning of sexuality. (GT 17) 
 
 
When the gender-practices, as well as other ideological practices, are repeated loyally, in 
identity with the ideology, they make ideology to appear as a natural fact.  Loyally repeated 
gender-practices make the genders seem stable gender- identities. When the gender is 
repeated identically in time,  it appears to “express” an independent ontological substance. 
Consequently, subjects mistake genders as time-less natural facts. Butler calls this 
productivity by the core notion of her theory, as performativity. For Butler, subjects (as 
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subject-positions) are performative (productive) of themselves.  Yet,  the subjects do this 
unconsciously.  Butler writes about this:   
 
gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, for we have 
seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and 
compelled  by  the  regulatory  practices  of  gender  coherence.  Hence,  within  the  
inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be 
performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to 
pre-exist the deed. (GT 24-25) 
 
 
Like with Althusser, for Butler subject is a normative position. For Butler, like for Althusser, 
the subject-position provides a normative principle, a rule, according to which the subject 
must conduct its life. Thus, like with Althusser, subject is not an ontological, factual or 
biological “thereness” but an ideological category. Butler writes of the constitution of  a 
gendered subject   ultimately a ritualistic process, sanctioned by ideological rules. As is seen 
in the next quotation, Butler shifts the emphasis, placed by Althusser on the compulsory 
production of the economic class-relations into the compulsory production of the gender-
relations:   
 
the “unity” of gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that seeks to render 
gender identity uniform through a compulsory heterosexuality. The force of this 
practice is, through an exclusionary apparatus of production, to restrict the 
relative meanings of “heterosexuality” and “bisexuality” as well as the 
subversive sites of their convergence and resignification. (GT 31) 
 
 
Because the ideology assumes a psychic, internalized structure, the subject becomes a 
responsible and a moral subject and can be held as the originatory cause behind its actions. It 
can be hold responsible for its deeds.  Yet, for Butler, like for Althusser, it is erroneous to see 
the subject as the actual origin of its deeds.    
 
the one who speaks is not the originator of such speech, for that subject is 
produced in language through a prior performative exercise of speech: 
interpellation. Moreover, the language the subject speaks is conventional and, to 
that degree, citational. The legal effort to curb injurious speech tends to isolate 
the “speaker” as the culpable agent, as if the speaker were at the origin of such 
speech. The responsibility of the speaker is thus misconstructed. (ES 39)  
 
According to Butler, the “speech” and the deeds of the subject are constructed within 
compulsory discursive contexts. Thus, when a subject speaks or does something, it refers to - 
i.e. it “cites” - such authorities (cultural principles, values etc.) which are provided by the 
ideological and compulsory context, where the subject is born into - without any prior “own” 
choice.  The subject  is ordered  to cite the  Law loyally, and it is guilty if it cites it wrong. As 
the Law which determines what the subjects are like and what they must be like,  refutes 
otherness, the subjects are interpellated into subjectivity in which they themselves must 
violate otherness. The recognition of others (other Laws) is prohibited.  Butler finds support 
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also from thinkers like Nietzsche and Foucault for the idea that the responsible origin – or 
“cause” -  for e.g. the violent speech of the subject lies not (at least fully) with the individual 
subject itself (see e.g. ES 28, 43-52)  (see the chapter on performative politics on a further 
discussion on this). 
 
Althusser is not the only theorist in reference to whom Butler “reverses” Hegel´s  complete 
and final subject (as Butler interprets it, through Kojèvian lenses). Butler finds very similar 
views  with theorists like Foucault, Lacan,  Nietzsche, Derrida -  and also with J.L. Austin. In 
ES she discusses the views of a few of  these theorists and conducts what she calls an 
“Althusserian reversal of Hegel” not only in reference to Althusser but also to these other 
theorists. The basic point in this reversal, for which she finds support also from these other 
thinkers, is that the primary relations, constitutive of the subject, are not all conceptually 
describable for the subject itself. Hence the subject is not complete and final. (see e.g. CHU 
12; BM 113-116; ES 5; UG 145-151; GA 26-40)    
 
In  the  beginning  of  ES  Butler  writes  that  she  considers  it  necessary  to  conduct  an  
“Althusserian reversal of Hegel”. The discussion of Body is important in this reversal.  In 
reference to “body” Butler theorizes what kinds of material, bodily existencies are possible.  
Basically, she adheres to the Hegelian and also Althusserian idea that such bodies which exist 
“out there”, as identifiable and readable -  i.e. as thought bodies - exist for subjects. They exist 
for subject-positions (in Hegelian terms, they exist for “Consciousness as Understanding”). 
According to Butler, we have no “access” to bodies (or any other things) except through 
language, i.e. through subjective, symbolic systems. We are unable to see “pure”, extra-
linguistic bodies. As such, bodies are always already “interpreted”, when they appear for us 
phenomenologically.  Bodies (for us) are always linguistic bodies. This very basic idea is not 
in contrast to Hegel´s subject-theory. Butler sees (see e.g. UG, 148; SD 217-230) that thinkers 
like Lacan, Foucault etc. have adopted this idea from Hegel. Nevertheless, Butler considers it 
important to “reverse” Hegel on this matter. She writes of this “Althusserian” reversal: 
 
Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal 
way; rather, it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a 
certain social existence of the body first becomes possible. To understand this, 
one must imagine an impossible scene, that of a body that has not yet been given 
social  definition,  a  body  that  is,  strictly  speaking,  not  accessible  to  us,  that  
nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion of an address, a call, an 
interpellation that does not “discover” this body, but constitutes it 
fundamentally. We may think that to be addressed one must first be recognized, 
but here the Althusserian reversal of Hegel seems appropriate: the address 
constitutes a being within the possible circuit of recognition and accordingly, 
outside of it, in abjection (…) Thus, to be addressed is not merely to be 
recognized for what one already is, but to have the very very term conferred by 
which the recognition of existence becomes possible. One comes to “exist” by 
virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the Other. One “exists” 
not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being 
recognizable. The terms that facilitate recognition are themselves conventional, 
the effects and instruments of a social ritual that decide, often through exclusion 
and violence, the linguistic conditions of survivable subjects. (ES 5)      
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In connection with the theme of “mediating thirdness”, the way Althusser interprets the 
primary relation, constitutive of the subject, is that this relation is not mediated conceptually 
for the subject itself.  Althusser agrees on this matter with a few other thinkers. They all, 
including Butler,  think that it is impossible for a subject to reflect on the entire history of its 
formation, and to reflect on all the possible influences by which it has become the subject it 
is.  Accordingly,  Butler argues that the “power” (in Foucauldian words), or “ideology” (in 
Althusserian words) or the “symbolic Law” (in Lacanian words), which form the subject as a 
recognizable subject (and as an identifiable “body”) for itself,  is not conceptual for the 
subject  itself.  With  all  these  thinkers,  the  “power”,  constitutive  of  the  subject,  remains  
something  un-conceptualized for the subject itself. In a sense, they return back to the Kantian 
position.  
 
The Althusserian, Lacanian and Foucauldian ideas of how the subject interprets itself (i.e. in 
reference to what kind of “universal” it particularizes its subjectivity for itself)  are indeed in 
contrast with Hegel. For Hegel,  the self, who already (as  in most subject-theories after Kant) 
thinks of itself as “interpellated” through a subjective, historical system (though Hegel did not 
use the term “interpellation”) mediates this primary relation conceptually for itself, in one 
way  or  the  other.  For  Hegel,  all  thought constitutions of the subject are subjective 
constitutions of the subject – they exist for us. Thus, for Hegel, all distinctions between things 
or relations which exist for us and which exist external to us, are themselves distinctions, 
thought by subjects.  For Hegel, one subjective and historical way to determine the primary 
“interpellative” relation (i.e. a relation constitutive of subjects) is to claim that it is unknown 
or partly unknown for the subject itself. This kind of thinking of the primary relation 
constitutes, for Hegel,  a “pure self-consciousness”, a version of which is “unhappy 
consciousness”. In Unhappy Consciousness subjectivity in general, including the subjectivity 
of the Other, is seen as not fully valid because the subjects knowledge of themselves is not 
considered as fully valid. Because the subjects knowledge of things is partly constituted 
externally, subjective knowledge is not fully valid, and as such it constituets a 
“misrecognition” of its object. In Lacanian terms: conceptual descriptions lose their referents.  
For Hegel, Unhappy consciousness precedes the realm of reciprocally recognitive relations.  
In the realm of reciprocally recognitive relations subjectivity in general, including the 
subjectivity of the Other, is acknowledged as “free” from being externally determined (i.e. 
being determined through an external interpellation, coming from an unknown “power”, 
“ideology”, or “symbolic Law”).  
 
Often Butler refers not only to Althusser,  but also to Austin,  when she theorizes how words 
“do” (i.e. enact into existence, perform) things, instead of just describing things. Yet, the way 
Butler theorizes performativity - which mostly takes place in reference to thinkers like Hegel, 
Althusser,  Lacan and Foucault  -   is  quite far from the strictly socio-linguistic theory of J.L. 
Austin.  In  Austin´s  theory  of  performative  speech-acts,  there  is  e.g.  no  analysis  of  the  
“unspeakable” side of the performatives, which is a core theme for Butler. Butler writes in 
BM of the performative formation of the subject: 
 
..the  matrix  of  gender  relations  is  prior  to  the  emergence  of  the  “human”.  
Consider the medical interpellation which (the recent emergence of the 
sonogram notwithstanding) shifts an infant from an “it” to a “she” or a “he”, and 
in that naming, the girl is “girled”, brought into the domain of language and 
kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that “girling” of the girl does 
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not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by 
various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reinforce or 
contest this naturalized effect. The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, 
and also the repeated inculcation of a norm (BM 7-8).  
 
Butler´s own critical analyses concentrate mainly on themes of gender and sexuality. 
Nevertheless,  like Althusser, she sees that the gender-positions are part of a larger cultural, 
normative matrix (hegemony) which determines what it means, in general, to be a human. In 
the next quotation Butler argues how the gender-differentiation works as a part of a larger 
discourse on normative humanity: 
 
Such  attributions  or  interpellations  contribute  to  that  field  of  discourse  and  
power that orchestrates, delimits, and sustains that which qualifies as “the 
human”. We see this most clearly in the examples of thise abjected beings who 
do not appear properly gendered; it is their very humanness that comes into 
question. Indeed, the construction of gender operates through exclusionary 
means, such that the human is not only produced over against the inhuman, but 
through a set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused 
the possibility of cultural articulation. Hence, it is not enough to claim that 
human subjects are constructed, for the construction of the human is a 
differential operation that produces the more or less “human”, the inhuman, the 
humanly unthinkable. These excluded sites come ot bound the “human” as its 
constitutive outside, and to haunt thoise boundaries as the persistent possibility 
of their disruption and rearticulation (BM 8).  
  
In reference not only to Althusser but, in general, to Lacanianism, or, broadly said, 
psychoanalytical poststructuralism, Butler develops her thought of normative, linguistic 
subjectivity and its relation to a prohibited, un-linguistic subjectivity. Butler sees, in SD, that 
the theories of the relation between speakable subjectivity and unspeakable subjectivity – by 
e.g, Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and Kristeva - are rooted in Hegel´s theory of “desire” and 
“recognition” in PhS (SD, vii-xv).  
 
Butler argues, in a Lacanian vein, that normative subjectivity is produced through the 
constitution of a realm of un-thinkable, irrational humanity. Un-thinkable humanity is a realm 
where the structure of the coherent language breaks. In the realm of irrational and incoherent 
humanity, the ordinary linguistic system, where meanings are constructed relationally, and 
differentially, becomes fragmented. E.g. Julia Kristeva describes this “abjected realm” as a 
realm of “modern poetics”, where the ordinary structure of language becomes fragmented. 
The thinkers, by which Butler develops the idea of the “excluded, abjected humanity” as the 
realm of “linguistic silence” are, besides Lacan, e.g. Kristeva, Irigaray and Zizek. Butler sees 
in SD that all  these thinkers build on the Hegelian legacy. Indeed, it  is  easy to see that how 
the relation between “speakability” and “unspeakablity” is described by these thinkers,  
resembles  how Hegel describes what the “silenced, irrational” otherness is from the view-
point of “desire”. A “desiring” self recognizes only its own linguistic structure and rationality 
as the valid one, thus rendering all other rationalities as unvalid ones. Consequently, a 
struggle for recognition ensues. In Hegel´s struggle for recognition, an internal 
unspeakability, as irrationality, “haunts” the rational humanity and demands to be included 
into the group of those who are recognized as rational beings.  
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Butler calls the subject-position also a “historical moment”. Like for Althusser, for Butler, 
ideological subject-positions vary historically, but this history is necessarily not fully known 
for the subjects themselves. Subject-positions do not stay the same, as Althusser argues e.g. in 
his  criticism against  Freud.  For  Butler,  like  for  Althusser,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume that  
subjects are at all times and all places interpellated in the same way, by a same ideology, e.g. 
by the Oedipalizing interpellation.  
 
For Butler, via e.g. Laclau (1990) the moments (of being a particular subject) are necessarily 
also  moments  of  “violence”  in  which  otherness  is  refuted.   Other  ways  of  knowing the  self  
and the Other are  refuted, rendered illegitimate and unspeakable. Yet, for Butler, in line not 
only with Althusser but also with Kojève, these moments of violence are also important, as 
they keep the historical process going on. Because there is the unspeakable, repressed 
otherness, there is also political demands, coming from the repressed Others. These demands 
(in Hegelian terms, the struggle for recognition) secure, for Butler as for all thinkers, 
influenced by Kojèvian thinking, the existence of politics, historical change and future.        
 
As such, for Butler, the moment of a particular subject, i.e. the moment of an intelligible 
subject-position, is (like with Kojève, Althusser, Lacan and several other poststructural and 
postmodern thinkers) a moment of just one universal truth.  With Althusser, as well as in 
Lacanianism in general and also with Foucault, subject-positions necessarily refute (i.e. 
“enslave”) otherness.  Subject-position (as always a position inside some specific, historical, 
particular  symbolic  order)  denotes  the  imperialism of  its  own “Law” on  the  expense  of  the  
contradicting others. Each symbolic order necessarily recognizes only its own subject-
position (which are speakable within its systemic whole) and refute others, rendering them 
un-linguistic, “abject”. Hegel´s idea of subjects, as capable of recognizing also other 
rationalities, is refuted.  
 
For Butler, the moment of conceptualization, which is the moment of rationalization, making 
coherent histories, predicting the future, describing other cultures (i.e. the moment of giving a 
particular substance to one´s subjectivity) is -  like with Kojève, Althusser and Lacan - a 
moment of repressing the Other. This idea is shared by Foucault. Butler notes (PLP 4-5), that 
Althusser´s subject-theory sets the stage for the (later) ideas of Foucault (who, indeed, was 
sometime a student of Althusser).  Even that Foucault adheres to the idea that the discursive 
power - the effects of which subjects are-  is a heterogenous power, he nevertheless builds on 
the   Kojèvian  idea,  (shared  also  by  Althusser,  who otherwise  was  a  stern  critic  of  Hegelian  
Marxism) that this power is a violent and repressive power.  In fact, many Foucauldian ideas, 
on which Butler builds her subject-theory and also her political theory, are already found in  
Althusser. (ES 26-31; UG 46, 146-151, 164-166)    
 
Althusser´s criticism against particular psychoanalytical theories, e.g. against Freud’s theory 
of the Oedipal phase, has clearly influenced Butler. For Butler, as for Althusser, any specific, 
particular interpretations, given of the formation of the psyche, are always historical, given in 
some specific interpretative field (in a specific theory or in a historical moment in therapy).  
Further, Butler sees, again like Althusser, that psychoanalysis can be used for various hidden 
normative purposes, i.e. for upholding a patriarchal order: 
 
Psychoanalysis  has  sometimes  been  used  to  shore  up  the  notion  of  a  primary  
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sexual difference that forms the core of an individual´s psychic life. (…) But 
this recruitement of psychoanalytic vocabularies for the purpose of preserving 
the paternal line, the transmission of national cultures, and heterosexual 
marriage is only one use of psychoanalysis, and not a particularly productive or 
necessary one. (UG 14)   
 
 
Like Althusser, Butler sees that psychoanalysis can be a critical practice, which takes the 
cultural and normative psychic “laws” as objects of critical scrutiny. As such, psychoanalysis 
does not take some specific psychic structure as the normative “point of view”, on the basis of 
which it criticises the cultural psychic laws. Instead, it works to expose the laws as cultural 
and historical ones, produced by the ideological culture itself, as its effects.  
   
In PLP, which is her major study of subject-formation, Butler discusses Althusser extensively. 
Nevertheless, she starts her analysis in PLP with Hegel (PLP, 1-13, 31-62).  This appears 
clearly in her account of the basic  formation of the subject. She says, via Hegel, that the 
subject is internally double, i.e. that there is an internal “alterity” to the subject,  a relation 
between the subject and the Other. She says that the relation between the subject and the 
Other is constitutive of the subject as a self-reflective, self-conscious, social being. In a sense, 
then, this relation is prior to the subject: it precedes the subject and makes it possible. By this 
primary self- (through the Other)- relation,  the subject is also invested with the idea of 
responsibility - to take the otherness (subjects in general, universally)  into account.   In this, 
however, she follows actually not only Hegel but also Althusser. With Althusser, the figure of 
the Capital “S” serves as the “universal other” which demands to be taken into account.   With 
Hegel, the moment of the Other connects the subject with the “universal point of view” from 
which it looks at itself. The Other serves as the view-point, as a “mirror”, from which the self 
looks itself, controls itself and holds itself responsible. In spite of their mutual disagreements, 
various post-Hegelian thinkers like Freud, Sartre, Lacan, and Foucault all accept this idea as 
central. It introduces the very basic structure of self-reflection,  the relation between the self 
and the (not only descriptive but also normative) point of view, from which it looks at itself.  
 
As is explained in chapter 2, with Hegel the Other can take many different forms. It can be a 
“spirit of nature” or “a multitude of gods”. With Hegel, whatever the Other may be for the 
self, it sets an internal “demand” for the self, from the part of “universal subjectivity”.  The 
Other demands to be included into the “universal theory”, through which the self interprets 
and forms (or, “performs”, to use a Butlerian term) the world.  Through the moment of the 
Other, a demand for recognition is  presented  for  the  self.    As  the  Other  can  take  various  
forms for the self,  the normative “universal subjectivity” may take, correspondingly, various 
forms for  the  self.  An internal demand may come from the source of “spirits of nature”, 
Christian God, or various other “theories”, describing what all subjects are like.  According to 
Althusser, the otherness (capital “S”, ideology) brings the idea of normative, universal 
subjectivity for the subjects.  In Althusser’s Lacanian theory, subjects cannot know the real 
other, as any knowing is linguistic knowing, and thus necessarily imaginary, not real (see ch. 
3.2.1.).  In reference to Althusser (and also Lacan, Foucault, Althusser etc.) Butler argues that 
the primary subject-constitutive relation remains unconceptual for the subjects. All 
conceptualizations of this relation are misrecognitions, i.e. they fail to describe this relation.  
(PLP 5-6, 30-34,  ES 5, CHU 12)  
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Butler argues in PLP that subjects are formed as subjects by a figure of “turning towards an 
Other” and identifying themselves through the idea of a subject, provided by the Other. The 
turn towards the Other is thus, at the same time, a turn towards the self. Through the Other, 
the self sees itself as a “subject”.  Via Althusser Butler  argues that the Other, towards whom 
the subject turns, and from the point of view of which the subject identifies itself as a subject, 
is necessarily a “traumatizing”, repressive power. Hence, unlike the subjects, who do not see 
themselves as traumatizing, otherness-refuting beings (when they mirror themselves from 
others),  yet, as e.g. “heterosexual women”, Butler sees differently. It appears that while the 
subjects see natural facts from the mirror, provided by the Other, Butler sees ideological, 
distorted, repressive subjects. Butler sees subjects who are necessarily repressive. Mirroring 
subjects through the Other, Butler sees subjects in general as necessarily repressive powers. 
Butler sees subjects, who recognize only their own “speakabilities” and render Others 
“unspeakable”. Subjects as intelligible beings recognize only their own universal rationality 
(like the egoistic “desiring “ subject in Hegel´s PhS). Also, for Butler, ek-static relations,  
relations between selves and Others, can never be conceptually transitioned by the selves 
themselves.   Thus,  the  Other  (or  actually  subjects  in  general)  are  for  Butler,  necessarily   
traumatizing, non-speakable beings. The Other cannot be mediated as a part of intelligible, 
conceptual speakability.  Butler writes about this:   
 
There is, as it were, no conceptual transition to be made between power as 
external to the subject, “acting on”, and power as constitutive of the subject, 
“acted by”. What one might expect by way of a transition is, in fact, a splitting 
and reversal constitutive of the subject itself. Power acts on the subject, an 
acting that is an enacting: an irresolvable ambiquity arises when one attempts to 
distinguish between the power enacted on the subject, that is, between the power 
that forms the subject and the subject´s “own” power. (PLP 15) 
 
In the chapter 5.2.1., it was argued that Butler reads Hegel´s idea of reciprocal recognition 
through Kojèvian lenses. Hence, it can be argued that Butler conducts an “Althusserian 
reversal” of  what appears as a Kojèvian interpretation of Hegel. Kojèvian interpretation of 
Hegel has apparently dominated much of the French thought not only of Hegel but, in 
general, of the “self as internally multiple”. I have tried to argue that this Kojèvian reading of 
Hegel is implausible. Like Butler and her sources, I agree that Hegel’s view is the most 
comprehensive and important of all  classical  theories of the subject.  However,  if  it  does not 
have the un-intuitive consequences drawn by Kojève, the structuralist/poststructuralist case 
against it collapses.   
 
 
5.2.8. Butler’s critique of Althusser and Foucault 
 
 
Butler argues throughout her texts that subjects are “interpellated” into subjects and that the 
subjects, while already in language, cannot take the interpellative ideological power as an 
object of critical analysis. However, her references to Althusser are not without criticism. She 
argues in ES: 
 
In “Ideolody and Ideological State Apparatuses”, Althusser attempts to describe 
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the subject-constituting power of ideology through a recourse to the figure of a 
divine voice that names, and in naming brings its subjects into being. The divine 
name makes what it names, but it also suboridinates what it makes. In claiming 
that social ideology operates in an analogous way to the divine voice, Althusser 
inadvertently assimilates social interpellation to the divine performative. The 
example of religion thus assumes the status of a paradigm for thinking ideology 
as such: the authority of the “voice” of ideology, the “voice” of interpellation, is 
figured as a voice almost impossible to refuse. (ES 31) 
 
  
Butler argues that there is no such “sovereign interpellation” which would succeed fully to 
constitute the subject it names. No interpellation is without limits.  Any ideological 
interpellation is necessary a failure, or partly a failure. There is no sovereign interpellation (i.e 
ideology, rule) which succeds to (fully) form the field of the human according to itself. Butler 
argues against both Althusser and Lacan in the following quotation, taken from PLP: 
 
Under what conditions does a law monopolize the terms of existence in so a 
through way? Or is this a theological fantasy of the law? Is there a possibility of 
being elsewhere or otherwise, without denying our complicity in the law that we 
oppose?  Such  possibility  would  require  a  different  kind  of  turn,  one  that,  
enabled by the law, turns away from the law, resisting its lure of identity, an 
agency that outruns and counters the conditions of its emergence. Such a turn 
demands a willingness not to be – a critical desubjectivitation – in order to 
expose the law as less powerful than it seems. What forms might linguistic 
survival take in this desubjectivized doman? (PLP 130) 
 
In the quotation above Butler actually moves somewhere between the Hegelian “turns” (of 
free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition) and the Althusserian (and Lacanian, 
Foucauldian) turn, which come from an unknown power. In contrast to Althusser’s subjects, 
Butler´s subject, or the not-yet-subject, is seen to be able to resist the interpellative, 
ideological law – i.e. the particular subject-position and identity - offered by the Other. Butler 
criticises the Althusserian psychonanalysis-inflected theory of Interpellation and also 
Foucault’s account of the subject, which Butler sees similar, in this sense. She finds that 
Foucault’s subject-theory is not only rooted in Hegel, but also in Althusser. With Foucault, 
there is also the idea that the subject becomes a subject through a necessary, primary 
repressive subjection:: 
 
What does it mean, then, that the subject, defended by some as a presupposition 
of agency, is also understood to be an effect of subjection? Such a formulation 
suggests that in the act of opposing subordination, the subject reiterates its 
subjection (a notion shared by both psychoanalysis and Foucauldian accounts). 
How,  then,  is  subjection  to  be  thought  and  how  can  it  become  a  site  of  
alteration? A power exerted on a subject, subjection is nevertheless a power 
assumed by the subject, an assumption that constitutes the instrument of that 
subjetct´s becoming. (PLP 11)     
 
In criticism against both Althusser and Foucault, Butler argues that power is “double” in a 
way which makes it possible for the subjects to resist to be formed fully by the other (i.e fully 
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determined by the linguistic, ideological interpellation). However, because the  subject cannot 
conceptually mediate between the  power   as  external  to  itself  (“acting  on”  the  subject)  and  
power  “acted  by”  the  subject  (internal  to  the  subject,  conceptualizable  by  the  subejct),   the  
subject is not a unified concept.  Butler is moving somewhere between the Hegelian accounts 
of  subject-formation  (according  to  which  the  subject  is  a  unified  concept  for  itself  as  it  can  
mediate between various parts of its constitution) and Althusser´s theory of Interpellation.  
 
For Butler, a subject is not formed unilaterally either by the power “owned” by the subject or 
by the power “not owned” by the subject  (i.e. by power as external, not conceptualizable by 
the subject). The selves own power cannot be differentiated from the power of the other, so 
that a particular conceptual unity (a definable form) would emerge as a result or as an effect 
of this relation. For Butler, subject is an “ambivalent” constitution, not fully (conceptually) 
owned  either  by  itself  or  by  the  other.  For  Butler,  the  political  aspect  of  this  not  fully  
conceptualizable relation - between the formative power as known by the subject and as 
unknown by the subject- is that the subject cannot distinguish certainly between its own 
intentions and the intentions of the other. Its “own” politics is thus not fully known to itself, 
as it cannot conceptually transition between the internal otherness, constitutive of its “own” 
politics.  Butler says that there always is a remainder, an exceeding surplus,  constitutive of 
the subject - also as a critical and political category. (PLP 13-15; ES 28, 32-35, 87-92)  Butler 
writes: 
 
Where conditions of subordination make possible the assumption of power, the 
power  assumed remains  tied  to  those  conditions,  but  in  an  ambivalent  way;  in  
fact, the power assumed may at once retain and resist that subordination. (PLP 
13)  
 
Butler´s theory of the “founding ambivalence” of the subject is theorized mainly by her 
critical readings of various theorists, of whom the most important ones are (besides Hegel), 
Althusser, Lacan  and other Lacanian´s (e.g. feminist Lacanian-inflected thinkers like 
Irigaray) and Foucault. The founding ambivalence concerns the way the “ek-static” subject is 
formed.  The  parts  of  the  ek-statism  –  the  self  and  the  Other  -  denote  the  modalities  of  
“internal power” and “external power”. The primary relation between the self and the Other 
structures also the political intentions of the subject, i.e. the subject as a critical and political 
agency.  As Butler argues in the quotation above, when the subject becomes interpellated into 
language, it becomes interpellated also into a political system of power, inherent in the 
language  as always a social phenomenon. For Butler, via Althusser, linguistic identities and 
positions connect with social hierarchies and positions of authority and power. However, for 
Butler,  via  Foucault,  these  systems  of  power  are  not  so  systematic  and  coherent  as  in  
Althusser.   For  Butler,  the  “self”  of  the  subject  -  the  internal  power,  assumed  through  
interpellation,  which  renders  the  subject  a  critical  and  political  agency  -  is  not  fully  
determined by an ideological, external power.    
 
Even that Butler sees Foucault and Althusser as similar thinkers in the sense that according to  
both of them subject is formed through a “founding submission” or “founding violence”, she 
also criticises Althusser in reference to Foucault.  In reference to the latter, Butler argues that 
subject is formed through a founding submission which cannot be “defined, conceptualized”  
to have come from some specific repressive source. The repressing force thus cannot be 
identified  or  conceptualized,  at  least  not  fully.   The  power  which  forms the  subject  is  not  a  
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unified agent or structure  – e.g. like the Althusserian ideology -  seen as a sort of “sovereign 
subject”. Nor is the “interpellated” subject -  the effect or result of interpellation – an identical 
copy (an identical reflection in the mirror) of a specific, identifiable  interpellating power.  
Rather, the power which forms subjects comes from various sources, various formative 
interpellations, which cannot be differentiated from each other from the point of view of  
some “scientific” higher system of relation and differentiation. The interpellative powers are, 
in a sense, Other to each others. 
 
Power does not arrive in the form of a name; its structures and its institutions are 
not such that the name seems perfectly suited to whatever power is. A name 
tends to fix, to freeze, to delimit, to render substantial, indeed, it appears to 
recall a metaphysics of substance of discrete and singular kinds of beings; a 
name is not the same as an undifferentiated temporal process or the complex 
convergence or relations that go under the rubric of a “situation”. But power is 
the name that one attributes to this complexity, a name that substitutes for that 
complexity, a name that renders manageable what might be otherwise too 
unwieldy or complex, and what, in its complexity, mught defy the limiting and 
substantializing ontology presupposed by the name (ES 35). 
 
For Butler, via Foucault, any conceptual system which analyzes the multiple powers, 
formative of subjects, is itself formed in the midst of multiple, ek-static powers. There is no 
neutral, “power-free” and “exclusion-free” point of view from which the power,  formative of 
subjects (including the analyzor itself ) could be seen as it “truly”  is.  For Foucault, subject is 
formed amidst multiple, contingent powers, which cannot be conceptually differentiated from 
each  other.  Butler  explains  what  kind  of  an  idea  of  the  formative power (the power which 
“labours” objects, like e,g, bodies) she finds in Foucault: 
 
Power is not a subject who acts on bodies as its distinct object. The grammar 
which compels us to speak that way enforces a metaphysics of external 
relations, whereby power acts on bodies but is not understood to form them. 
This is  a view of power as an external relation that Foucault  himself calls  into 
question., Power operates for Foucault in the constitution of the very materiality 
of the subject, in the principle which simultaneously forms and regulates the 
“subject” of subjectivation (…) “Materiality” designates a certain effect of 
power or, rather, is power  in  its  formative  or  constituting  effects.  Insofar  as  
power operates successfully by constituting an object domain, a field of 
intelligibility, as a taken-for-granted ontology, its material effects are taken as 
material data or primary givens. These material positivities appear outside 
discourse and power, as its incontestable referent, its transcendental signifieds. 
(BM 33-35)  
  
In  a  way  Butler  groups  Althusser  and  Foucault  together,  as  in  both  of  them,  the  subject  is  
formed by a founding submission, repressive by its nature. Both Althusser and Foucault see 
that the power, formative of the subject is not conceptualizable, as a particular object, for the 
subjects themselves. Yet, in contrast to Althusser, Foucault thinks that the originatory 
“ideology” (to use an Althusserian choice of words) through which the subject becomes 
interpellated into subjectivity, cannot be analyzed as some specific ideology, or, ideological 
apparatus. Foucault thus denies the possibility of an Althusserian, or Marxist,  “scientific” 
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analysis of the subject-formation.  Butler agrees here more with Foucault than with Althusser, 
even that Butler does not take Althusser´s distinction between ideology and science directly 
as a target of criticism.   
 
With Foucault, there is no distinction into “ideology” and “science” as in Althusser.  Butler 
does not discuss Althusser´s distinction into “ideology” and “science” actually at all. Yet, it 
appears that the reason why, for Althusser, it is possible to analyze where the interpellative, 
subject-formative addresses specifically come from, is because there is the “subject-less” 
realm of science. As science itself is not ideologically interpellated, and thus not “failing” in 
its knowledge of subjects, the historical origin behind the formation of subjects can be 
specified  by  the  scientific  practice.  As  such,  a  Capital  “S”,  as  the  originatory  cause  behind  
some historical, particular subject-position can be ascertained  for science. In Foucault, any 
discursive practice is formed in a founding subjection.  Thus, for Foucault, there is no external 
position (external from power) from the view-point of which the “founding submission of 
subjects” could be neutrally identified.  Ideological power is internal to every such “external”, 
scientific  “looker” itself, instead of being distinct from it.  As there is a lack of any “higher” 
(either  Hegelian  or  Althusserian)  system  of  rationality,  from  which  the  primary  relation  
constitutive of the subject and its politics could be conceptually mediated, the power appears 
“heterogeneous”.  
 
While the basic Kojèvian interpretation of the “violent” relation between the self and the 
Other as political and historical agents remains intact in Althusser´s Lacanianism and in 
Foucault – both of whose subject-theories are rooted in Hegel -  Butler modifies Althusser´s 
subject-theory through Foucault. Even that Butler does not discuss Althusser´s distinction 
between “ideology” and “science”, Butler criticises Althusser´s theory through Foucault. 
Foucault criticises strongly all theories – found according to him not only  with Hegel but also 
with  psychoanalysts – where the idea is that some “universal” point of view can be reached 
from which subjects and things can be interpreted.   While in Althusser, there is still a 
“higher” (scientific) system of reading the formation of the subject, in Foucault such “higher” 
(power-free) systems are lacking. Foucault appears as critical not only against Hegel´s 
universal rationality but also towards Althusser´s Marxist science and Lacan´s and Freud´s 
psychoanalysis  and  theories  of  sexuality.   For  Foucault,  all  such  rational  or  intellectual  
practices are themselves formed in power.  Through Foucault Butler adopts a theory of a 
subject-formative power which is referred to mainly as just  “power” because it cannot be 
identified (differentiated from or related to) in any other way.      
 
Butler seemingly agrees more with Foucault than with Althusser on the nature of the “power”, 
formative of the subjects. For Butler, like in Foucault, formative power (formative of things 
and subjects) is heterogeneous and contingent. As the effects of the workings of this kind of 
“ambivalently” formative power, the subjects are ambivalent as well. The interpellative power 
is  not  a  particular  subject  as  it  is  not  a  unified  power,  acting  with  a  clear  “ideological  
program” in its mind.  It cannot be understood as an Althusserian Capital “Subject”.  Neither  
can it be known  at some universal meta-level - as Althusser´s science appears to be – which 
is  distinct from the subjective realm.  
 
Nevertheless, Butler´s agreement with Foucault is not without reservations, either. Butler 
writes about this in PLP: 
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Whether by interpellation, in Althusser´s sense, or by discursive productivity, in 
Foucault´s, the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power. 
Although Foucault identifies the ambivalence in this formulation, he does not 
elaborate on the specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in 
submission. Not only does the entire domain of psyche remain largely 
unremarked in his theory, but power in this double valence of subordinating and 
producing remains unexplored (PLP 2)  
 
 
For Butler, in order for power to be resisted or criticised in any way it must be somehow 
taken as an identifiable “object”.  It appears that for Butler it is possible to elaborate on the 
specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in submission – at least in some ways.  She 
criticises Foucault for leaving the power, formative of subjects, totally ambivalent, not 
“elaborated”.  Butler  argues  that  if  we  do  not  elaborate  on  the  power  at  all,  we  cannot  alter,  
question  or  “re-appropriate”  it.  As  such,  we  place  the  power,  formative  of  us,   discursively 
above  politics.  Butler  seems  to  think  of  abstractions  –  at  least  as  concerns  her  criticism  of  
thinkers like Foucault –  like Hegel. For Hegel, all thought abstractions exist as larger 
conceptual constructions, all relational parts of which cannot be abstractions. All thought 
abstractions are thus ultimately internally other (or “ek-static”) as they cannot be thought at 
all without relation made to those specific particulars from which they are abstracted off. As 
constituted by particulars, they are limited, contextual  and historical entities. As such, 
abstractions can be rendered into criticisable “somethings” by thinking them as particular 
constructions. This resembles the way Butler frequently criticises not only Foucauldian but 
also many other abstractions (e.g. Lacanian “Lost object”,  Irigarayan “feminine joussaince” – 
even Derridean and Lèvi-Straussian “floating signifiers”). Butler´s way to argue for the 
necessity to “elaborate” on abstractions in order to render  them “alterable through otherness” 
echoes Hegel´s discussions on abstractions, especially as a part of his criticism of “pure self-
consciousness” in PhS.  
 
In the next quotation Butler criticises Foucault´s notion of “sexuality”. Butler finds a 
distinction between “sex” (produced, in an Althusserian vein, by repressive “Law”) and 
“sexuality” (sexuality as it is outside of Law) in Foucault. Importantly, Butler´s critique of 
Foucault´s distinction between sex/sexuality echoes Hegel´s critique of Kants distinction 
between “thing for us”/”thing in itself”: 
 
On the one hand, Foucault, wants to argue that there is no “sex” in itself which 
is not produced by complex interactions of discourse and power, and yet there 
does seem to be a “multiplicity of pleasures” in itself which is not the effectof 
any specific discourse/power exchange. In otger words, Foucault invokes a trope 
of prediscursive libidinal multiplicity that effectively presupposes a sexuality 
“before the law”, indeed a sexuality waiting for emancipation from the shacles 
of “sex”. On the other hand, Foucault officially insists that sexuality and power 
are coextensive and that we must not think that by saying yes to sex we say no 
to power.   In his antijuridical and anti-emancipatiry mode, the “official” 
Foucault argues that sexuality is always situated within matrices of power, that it 
is always produced or constructed within specific historical practices, both 
discursive and institutional, and that recourse to a sexuality before the law is an 
illusonary and complicitous conceit of emancipatory sexual politics. (GT 97)  
284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Butler´s Hegelian-inflected idea of “things, formed in multiple powers” is different from 
Foucault´s notion of “things, formed in multiple powers”. According to Butler, the 
Foucauldian “multiple power” – and sexuality, formed in multiple power - is placed above 
particular discourses and history. This is due to Foucault´s not “elaborating” on the internal 
otherness of power, or sexuality. Multiple, unnameable power appears as a universal, 
unlimited  agent, forming subjects and sexualities everywhere in all times and places. There 
appears no “other” for this power, which would limit it and constitute an outside to it. Placed 
beyond the critical capacities of subjects, it appears as an “unlimited explanation” of all 
matters. In Foucault, the unnameable and unlimited sexuality becomes a norm.       
 
For Butler, in contrast to both Althusser and Foucault,  the power, forming the subject and its 
sexuality can become “partly” accounted for - and politicized - by the subjects themselves. 
Power can be questioned and altered through its “ek-static” structure, i.e. through its internal 
otherness. As noted above, this is basically a Hegelian idea, setting the basis for Hegel´s idea 
of self-conscious relations between the subject and the Other, which is, importantly, the basic 
idea of dialectics. The ground idea of Butler´s performative politics (which she theorizes also 
in reference to Hegel´s dialectics) is that the subjects can repeat the  norms  of  compulsory  
subjecthood “radically”, in a manner not fully in compliance to external otherness.  
 
The compulsory norms, formative of subjects, can be reiterated in some ways against the 
norms.  Hence, the subjects themselves can take part in the “labouring” (interpellative 
formation) of things. This means that subjects are capable of resisting the “external norm” and 
capable of including also their own thoughts and norms into the formation of objects 
(including also their own selves as objects for themselves).  Thus, the interpellation, coming 
from an external power is rendered not sovereign, even if it cannot be totally resisted. There is 
an element of freedom which resembles the Hegelian idea of freedom. In Hegel´s community 
of free selves, objects are formed by mutually recognitive selves.   
 
Butler´s critique against Althusser takes up also the question of the “subject” as a practice.  
Butler says, via Althusser, that in order for the ideology to exist, it needs to be constantly 
reiterated, repeated “loyally” in the everyday lives of the subjects. One of Butler´s most 
famous (Althusserian-inflected) ideas is that a subject, and especially a gendered subject,  is a 
reiterative practice, an institutionalized, sanctioned,  continuous ritual. The subjects must 
constantly repeat the rules of right, legitimate subjectivity and gender to actually be subjects, 
women, men, heterosexuals.   However, Butler argues – in criticism against Althusser - that 
the rules can be repeated not loyally;  they can be repeated “wrongly”.  
 
After all, to be named by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, 
an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to 
exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is 
repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been 
called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into a 
linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but 
perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by 
which  we  are  hailed  are  rarely  the  ones  we  choose  (and  even  when  we  try  to  
impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms 
we  never  really  choose  are  the  occasion  for  something  we  might  still  call  
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agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one 
whose future is partially open. (ES 38)  
 
Even that the subjects cannot totally resist being subjects – being hailed, interpellated by the 
Other  and thus subordinated by an external power - they can nevertheless “trouble” the rules 
which subordinate them. This “troubling” can take the internal otherness of the power itself 
(its  constitutive  radical  outside)  as  the  point  of  reference.  The  power  can  be  turned  against  
itself, through the Other which is excluded by it, yet nevertheless internal to it as an ek-static 
construction.   This  idea  is  the  base  of  Butler´s  performative  politics  where  the  rules  of  
legitimate subjectivity are repeated, yet not loyally. The rules can be “appropriated” and 
repeated in a subversive (radical) manner. The idea of political “gender trouble” as a not 
loyally reiterative practice is based on this idea.  
 
Like for Hegel, for Butler the subject itself can in some ways take itself (including such 
aspects like “subject-position”, “other”, “subject as a lost object”/ subject as an empty power” 
– as an object of thinking. For Butler, the subjects themselves can politicize the various 
interpellations (identities) by which they themselves are formed  by making a recourse to the 
internal otherness of their own selves.   
 
 
5.2.9. The critique of pure politics 
 
 
Butler criticises Hegel in reference to thinkers like Althusser, Lacan and Foucault. By 
criticising Hegel´s total subject they criticise especially the realm of free self-consciousness 
and reciprocal recognition, which they equate with something like Kojève’s “End of History”. 
However,  after criticising Hegel through Althusser (and through Foucault, Lacan etc.) Butler 
turns  to  criticise  Althusser  and  Lacanians  in  general  and  also  Foucault.   Hence,   somewhat  
“reciprocally”, these thinkers are criticised in reference to Hegel, or in reference to ideas 
found primarily with Hegel.  
 
The  way Butler  criticises  Althusser,  Lacan,  Foucault  -  or  Derrida  -  echoes  closely   Hegel´s  
criticism of Kant. According to Kant, the epistemology of the subject is constituted by a 
primary relation (subject as a subject for itself/subject as a subject in itself) which (this 
relation itself) remains unknown for any particular, historical practice of thinking. Butler 
criticises Althusser, Lacan and the Lacanians (such as Zizek and Laclau, see especially CHU 
on this)  as well  as  Foucault,  for the same reason than Hegel criticized Kant.   Butler claims 
that  in the theories of these thinkers, subjects are known externally and unpolitically.   
 
According  to  Hegel´s  criticism  of  Kant,  as  well  as   according  to  Butler´s  criticism  of  
Althusser, Foucault etc. , any primary relation which is thought to be necessarily unknown, is 
rendered as such in historical thinking. As such, this primary relation is (including both of its 
parts, also the unknown part) subjective, historical and particular. For Hegel, as for Butler, 
any thought distinction (including both of its parts) is a particular, subjective distinction, 
because it is not thought by God, or by nature, but by historical subjects.  
 
These arguments are presented in CHU where Butler criticises Ernesto Laclau´s Lacanian 
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notion of the incompleteness of the subject. Butler makes in this criticism frequent references 
to Hegel´s criticism of Kant.  First Butler gives an account of Laclau´s idea of particular 
subject-positions. For Laclau (according to Butler), particular subject-positions try to 
universalize  their  own  particular  idea  (or,  truth)  of  subjectivity,  i.e.  to  render  their  limited  
truth into an unlimited, “global” truth, accepted by everyone in all places and times.  Laclau 
argues that the subject-positions are bound to fail as to their universalizing efforts.  A 
particular subject-position cannot globalize itself because it is not universal but contains a 
limited and historical truth of what subjects are like. What each subject-position shares with 
other subject-positions is the similar nature of being not universal, instead particular and 
limited.   Any attempt, on the part of a subject-position, to gain universal recognition for its 
own  truth  from  all  other  subject-postions  (of  all  times  and  places)   is  bound  to  fail.  Butler  
agrees with Laclau on that subject-positions are bound to fail if they attempt to universalize 
themselves (Laclau 1990; 2000a,b)  
 
..we are, I believe, in agreement that the field of differential relations from 
which any and all particular identities emerge must be limitless. Moreover, the 
“incompleteness” of each and every identity is a direct result of its differential 
emergence: no particular identity can emerge without presuming and enacting 
the exclusion of others, and this constitutive exclusion or antagonism is the 
shared and equal condition of all identity-constitution. (CHU 31) 
 
As is seen in the quotation above, Butler shares with Laclau the (Kojèvian) interpretation 
concerning particular subject-identities. For Butler, as for Laclau, every particular subject–
identity is based on an exclusion of others and this exclusion is “antagonistic” by its nature 
(see also Laclau 1990).  Butler describes, throughout her writings, that the primary relation 
which constitutes every particular subject-identity is necessarily a violent and repressive 
exclusion. In this Butler disagrees with Hegel,  according to whom the primary exclusion of 
others  (i.e. the relation between the self and the Other) does not have to be based on the 
attitude of “desire” (i.e. on one-sided recognition and thus the repressive exclusion - i.e. the 
“enslaving” - of others).  
 
Butler agrees with Laclau – and in general with the Lacanians – on a few things, yet, she also 
disagrees with them.  In general, her disagreement with the Lacanians is similar as her 
disagreement  with  all  those  thinkers  -   in  reference  to  whose  idea  of   the  subject  as  
“incomplete” - she criticises Hegel´s “complete” subject. An interesting question is what is 
wrong with Althusser´s, Foucault´s and Lacan´s notions of the subject as incomplete, as 
Butler nevertheless agrees with these theories on the “incompleteness” of the subject?   A 
similarly interesting question is what is wrong with Hegel´s idea of the subject as “complete” 
if Butler nevertheless appeals to Hegel’s theory of the subject as complete, when criticizing 
the theories of the incomplete subject?  
 
CHU, which comprises of Butler´s discussions with the Lacanian thinkers Laclau and Zizek is   
devoted to the question of the “incompleteness” of the subject. All these three thinkers agree, 
basically, that the subject is incomplete, yet, they disagree on the nature of this incompletion. 
In CHU, Butler takes Hegel as the main point of reference in her critical thinking of the 
incompletion of the subject. Butler explains first  Hegel´s criticism of the Kantian “formal 
abstractivism”. For Butler Kant´s distinction between “subject for us/subject in itself” 
provides one theory of the subject as incomplete. With Kant there is an idea that particular, 
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historical subjects can know themselves only in terms of “subject for us” which never fully 
reaches what the subject is “in itself”.  Butler equates, at least in some ways, the Lacanian´s 
theory of the incompletion of the subject (including the ideas of Laclau and Zizek) with the 
Kantian idea, which she criticises through Hegel. Through a Hegelian reading she, firstly, 
argues that the Kantian and the Lacanian idea of the incompletion of the subject actually 
constitutes an idea of the subject as complete. For Hegel, all theories of the subject are self-
relational conceptual constructions and thus complete and universal taken as such, alone. In 
this Butler agrees with Hegel.   
 
Importantly, Hegel does not criticize Kant for presenting a universalizing, complete theory of 
the subject. For Hegel, all theories of the subject are “complete and universalizing”, in one 
way or the other.  Hegel is not against universalizing  theories as such. Instead, he is critical 
of Other-refuting theories, i.e. theories which constitute an internal  “patronizing” structure (a 
Lord – Bondsman- relation). For Hegel, in patronizing (epistemologically asymmetrical, 
enslaving) theories only some subjects are treated as complete, while others are seen as 
incomplete. Nevertheless, for Hegel, complete and universalizing theories do not necessarily 
refute otherness.  In reciprocally recognitive relations all selves -  each self seen as a 
“theorist” of the subject - are seen as complete. Nevertheless, they do not patronize each 
others.  As for the criticism of Kant, Hegel is  critical of the distinction between  subject for 
us /subject in itself.  For Hegel, it constitutes a Lord-Bondsman-relation. This distinction 
renders Kant´s subject-theory an Other-refuting theory.  
 
Butler disagrees with Laclau, basically for the same reason why Hegel disagrees with Kant.   
According to Hegel, particular subject is externally known and thus epistemologically 
enslaved in Kant´s subject-theory. For Hegel, subjects are enslaved in Kant´s philosophy 
because they are thought to be constituted by a primary relation (thing for us/thing in itself, 
which corresponds with the distinction between “subject for us”/”subject in itself”), which is 
thought as necessarily beyond the conceptual capacities of the subjects themselves.  Hegel´s 
idea that subject is a self-conscious concept repeats the idea that the subject is internally 
known and  complete.   The  idea  here   is  that  all  relations  –   thought by someone (e.g.  by  
philosophers, scientists, priests or other mediators, like perhaps the contemporary 
psychoanalytic theorists) to be constitutive or formative of the subject – are “accessible” for 
the subjects themselves. Whatever can be known about the subject can also be learned by the 
subject itself. And there are no aspects of the subject (or of any thing, for that matter) which 
cannot be known by someone, for all things in this world are constituted by the synthesis of 
all humanly possible descriptions of them.   Hegel´s insight was that if the subjects 
themselves are seen as capable of conducting their own internal mediation, the internal 
dualism (Lord-Bondsman-relation and epistemological slavery) can be abolished.   
 
In reference to Hegel´s criticism of  Kant,  Butler criticises Laclau´s idea that the “universal 
truth  of  things”  is  an  “empty  place”,  void  of  particular  content.  First  Butler  explains  what  
universality of things is for Laclau: 
 
Where universality is to be found, according to Laclau, it is as an “empty but 
ineradicable place”. It is not a presumed or a priori condition that might be 
discovered and articulated, and it is not the ideal of achieving a complete list of 
any and all particularisms which would be unified by a shared content. 
Paradoxically, it is the absence of any such shared content that constitutes the 
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promise of universality. (CHU 31)  
 
As  a  part  of  the  same  critique  against   Lacanians,   Butler  argues  the  following,  echoing  
closely Hegel´s critique of the Kantian Reason as “empty formalism”. For Hegel, as for 
Butler, Kantian idea of the incompletion of the subject resulted into an abstract intellectualism 
and “formal Reason” which has a “enslaving” attitude towards  particular subjectivity.   
 
The notion that all identity is posited in a field of differential relations is clear 
enough, but if these relations are pre-social, or if they constitute a structural 
level of differentiation which conditions and structures the social but is distinct 
from it, we have located the universal in yet another domain: in the structural 
features of any and all languages. Is this significantly different from identifying 
the universal in the structural presuppositions of the speech act, in so far as both 
projects elaborate a universal account of some characteristic of language? Such 
an approach separates the formal analysis of language from its cultural and 
social syntax and semantics, and this further suggests that what is said about 
language is said about all language –users , and that its particular social and 
political formations will be but instances of a more generalized and non-
contenxtual truth about language itself. (CHU 34) 
 
For Butler, the Kantian as well as Lacanian idea of “universality” (i.e. the universal truth of 
things, i.e. the truth of the “object”) as “lost” or as an “empty place” results from political 
thought abstracted from such contradictory (radical) otherness which could question this 
thought itself. Butler criticises the Lacanian “psychoanalytical linguisticism” for being a 
politically paralyzing mode of thought. Criticism against Lacanian-inflected theories of 
feminist thinkers is a repeatedly recurring theme in Butler. E.g. in Irigaray Butler finds a 
Lacanian-inflected idea of “femininity” as a “lost object”.  Butler presents basically very 
similar criticism against Irigaray as she presents against Lacanians in general. (see e.g. BM 
57-91).  
 
According to Butler, Lacanian-inflected linguisticism renders language the ultimate abstract, 
structural  thruth  of  things  which  becomes  placed  external  to  politics.  Particular  political  
claims become seen as the “changeable” and “contingent” contents which variably fill the 
universally stable abstract structure of language itself. If the “truth” of things becomes 
equated with the plain structure of language, abstracted from specific semantic contents, there 
is no room for politics against this thought itself.  Butler writes:  
 
..if we conceive of universality as an “empty place”, one that is “filled” by 
specific contents, and further understand political meanings to be the contents 
with which the empty place is  filled,  then we posit  an exteriority of politics to 
language that seems to undo the very concept of political performativity that 
Laclau espouses. (CHU 34)     
 
 The Kantian-inflected notion of  “free reason” is also a target of Butler’s criticism.  Butler 
criticises the Habermasian and Rawlsian communicative and deliberative proceduralisms for 
their “Kantian” abstractivism. The next quotation is from a text which targets the Lacanian 
notion  of  the  incompletion  of  the  subject  as  well  as  also  the  Habermasian  and  Rawlsian  
formal proceduralisms:  
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...the fear, of course, is that what is named as universal is the parochial property 
of dominant culture, and that “universalizability” is indissociable from imperial 
expansion. The proceduralist view seeks to sidestep this problem by insisting 
that it makes no substantive claims about human nature, but its exclusive 
reliance on rationality to make its claim belies this very assertion. The vialbility 
of the proceduralist solution relies in part on the status of formal claims and, 
indeed, whether one can establish a purely formal method for adjudicating 
political claims. Here the Hegelian critique of Kantian formalism is worth 
reconsidering, mainly because Hegel called into question whether such 
formalism are ever really as formal as thy purport to be. (CHU 15)    
 
Butler criticises the idea that political aims could be established by methods thought as purely 
formal, as the very idea of “purity” here (i.e. the idea behind Kantian “transcendental 
Reason”) and also behind Althusserian subject-less philosophical practice)  is to be void of 
political content. Even that Butler does not discuss Althusser´s subject-less scientific Marxism 
here, also the idea behind it was to be free from limited (ideological, misrecognitive, failing) 
political aims.    
 
Butler´s insight here appears to be that political claims (as intentional and thus formative)  are 
always in some ways “limited” (otherwise they could not be claims  in favour of  something, 
instead of being in favour of something else). Intentional claims thus include some notion of 
the favoured “object”. The favoured object, giving a direction and also “identity” to the 
intentional action, must be somehow differentiated from disfavoured objects. As such 
intentional (political) claims are formative of objectivity. Thus, the  idea that political  claims 
are established by a “pure” mode of thought (thought as free from limits) indeed appears self-
contradictory and also undemocratic.  
 
Why should we conceive of universality as an empty “place” which awaits its 
content in an anterior and subsequent event? Is it empty only because it has 
already disavowed or suppressed the content from which it emerges, and where 
is the trace of the disavowed in the formal structure that emerges?  (CHU 34) 
 
It indeed seems that “pure politics” criticised by Butler does not allow for a critical outside to 
it. Such politics, seen to be purified from “limited” intentions, places itself above criticism.  
Whereas any criticism is seen to belong to the realm of subjective (limited) knowledge,  the 
pure politics itself is considered to emanate from a “pure method”,  free from subjective 
knowledge.  Butler´s criticism here echoes closely Hegel´s criticism of Kantian “pure self-
consciousness” and Enlightenment Reason. Also sceptical thinking, an intentional aspect of 
pure self-consciousness, appears as a target of this criticism. For Butler, via Hegel, political 
aims, which appear as results of “pure” methods,   do not allow for a critical outside, hence 
they refute otherness and produce un-democratic politics.   
 
Butler´s Hegelian criticism of Kantian- and Lacanian-derivative “pure politics” seems 
reasonable. This sort of  pure politics  seems indeed “placed” above critical otherness.  E.g. in 
Althusser  (whom  Butler  does  not  however  discuss)  there  seems  to  be  an  otherness-refuting  
dualism inside politics. There is the subject-less Marxist politics, thought as free from 
incomplete subjectivity and incomplete political aims, hence appearing as complete. And then 
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there is the “fallen” and misrecognitive (ideological) politics of the subjects. There appears to 
be some sort of “therapeutic” relation between these two realms, where the Marxist politics 
tries to cure the traumas, caused in the realm of the misrecognitive politics, in which subjects 
strive for wrong (ideological) objects.  Because of the dualist (not conceptually mediated) 
relation between these two realms, the subjects necessarily strive after something else than the 
subject-less scientists. Yet, importantly, intentionality (and thus politics) is conducted in both 
of these realms, and seemingly directed towards the same reality. Hence, “thingness” 
(“world”, as well as “subject”) is constituted by an internal Lord-Bondsman-structure (put in 
Hegelian terms).  
 
It appears that for Butler, whenever some thing becomes an “object” of thinking (an 
identifiable something) - i.e. a thought object, it becomes a complete, universal object for 
itself, and thus otherness-refuting. However, it appears that there is at least some thinking, 
which is not dominated by this logic.  Butler seriously seems to think that her performative 
politics is a way to “democratize” terms, to open them up for otherness. Thus, the one (like 
Butler herself) who thinks of things in terms of “performative politics” – i.e. in terms of an 
ek-static process in which all particular identities become in turn questioned through their 
Others – is actually able to think in a “democratizing” way. The way to think of objects in a 
democratizing way is to think of them as ek-static processes. Whereas “stable identities” are 
otherness-refuting identities, ek-staticly processual identities are democratic because during 
the process the refuted identities become also “freed from slavery”. Through the process all 
the  particular  identities  and  definitions  that  terms  (like  e.g.  “woman”,  “sexuality”,  “human”  
etc.) take on are opened up for their own otherness. As the definitions of the terms vary in 
time and place, also the Other varies correspondingly, as the Other is something relational and 
contextual.  Even that the internal moments (i.e. moments in which a particular identity is 
given to the term) are otherness-refutive, the process itself is “ek-static” and hence radically 
democratizing.  The process takes the Others into account. The process takes all the (mutually 
refutive and refuted) moments into account, and sees them as valid moments of the term. In 
this sense, the process goes beyond any of its singular (temporally and contextually limited) 
moments. Whereas the singular moments define the term only from their own limited point of 
view,  the  one  (like  Butler)  who sees  the  term as  a  process,   sees  (or,  “speculates”,  to  use  a  
Hegelian term) the term as consisting of various mutually contradicting parts. Indeed, in this 
way (in the sense of seeing terms as dynamic processes, consisting of mutually contradicting 
aspects) Butler, as a seer of terms, resembles what Hegel says of “speculation”.   
 
Butler’s performative politics claims not to have its own “particular” (and thus otherness-
refuting)  ideas concerning things. Its internal moments have particular political goals, yet, the 
process itself does not have. This is what makes it ek-static and contrasts it with non-ek-static 
processes, like coherent histories, which are known “in advance”. Performative politics is an 
ek-static  process,  recognitive  of  otherness,  even  that  its  internal  moments,  taken  alone,  are  
refutive of otherness. It includes moments of particularity, however, it goes also beyond them, 
through  the  recognition  of  the  Other.   This  kind  of  process  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  
Althusserian Marxist politics. It may “trouble” the  particular politics, yet, it refrains from 
setting its own, conceptually defined political goals, hence refraining from a Hegelian, 
conceptually synthesizing dialectics.   What is important, Butler herself is apparently capable 
of thinking of things as this kind of ek-static processes. Even that Butler would no doubt 
concede that her own thinking is as subjective, historical and particular as anybody elses, 
constituting in this sense a limited “moment” in an ek-static process, she nevertheless speaks 
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of this “limitedness” from a reflective point of view. Her way to look at the otherness-refutive 
moments from the point of view of the refuted others, shows not only that she worries for the 
sake  of  the  refuted  others,  but  also  that  she  acknowledges  that  there  is  an  Other  for  any  
moment of particular historical thinking, also to her own.  It appears that Butler, who thinks 
of things as critical processes is able to form an object, which is not otherness-refuting: object 
as an ek-static process. Butler’s thought of the object corresponds to the constitution of the 
object (object as a process or a futural doing, which goes beyond its limited otherness-refutive 
moments). However, Butler does not see a capacity to see things as ek-static processes as a 
capacity which belongs to  “particular subjective identities”.  This is connected to Butler’s 
“Althusserian reversal of Hegel”, i.e. her way to see particular subjects as not capable of 
reflecting their own ideological formation. For Butler, particular subjects are conditioned by 
what remains inaccessible, external for them.   
 
Butler does not explain the possibility of her own self-(through the Other)- consciousness. 
Her own capacity to introduce e.g. the “performative politics” – in which the Other is taken 
into account – appears as an impossible capacity, given her theory of the subject.  Her own 
model of “reciprocal recognition” (performative politics) appears an impossibility – at least 
for actual subjects – because she, quite like Althusser, does not consider subjects capable of 
reflecting the ek-static constitution of themselves. Butler does not discuss Althusser´s 
distinction into the realms of “ideology” and “science”. Nor does Butler compare Althusser´s 
distinction between ideology (as a realm of subjective, incomplete knowledge) and science 
(as a subject-less knowledge free from the incomplete subjectivity) with Kant´s distinction 
between the realm of subjective knowledge and transcendental Reason. For Kant, Reason 
constituted a “transcendental” mode of thinking, abstracted free from parochial, limited 
subjectivity. In this sense, as a sort of “subject-less” mode of thinking the Kantian Reason 
could be compared with Althusser´s “scientific, subject-less” philosophy. 
 
Althusser  can  be  seen  to  have  given  an  answer   –  by  the  view-point  of  “science”  -   to  the  
question of how, and for whom, his own subject-theory was possible. With Butler, this 
question, which relates to the “Ishmaelian paradox” remains unanswered.     
 
 
 5.2.10. The timeless Law  
 
 
According to Butler, even that the refutation of others cannot be fully overcome, there is no 
need why it should mean that some specific others are always refuted. There is no necessary 
reason why the refuted others must always be women, homosexuals etc.  For Butler, the 
refutation of women or homosexuals is also not a necessary structural part of all languages at 
all times (or the necessary feature of all linguistic psychical structures) as the Lacanians or 
some Lacanian feminisits (like Irigaray) claim. There is no need (outside of this very Law 
itself) why just these groups are always the silenced groups. This is why Butler opposes the 
Lacanian theory of the silenced and irrational other “sex” as forever the “feminine” sex., or 
the abject, perverted sexuality as forever the homosexuality. Butler agues that because the  
refuted otherness is produced as such,  as an everyday reiterated practice,  it can produced 
differently.      
 
292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Butler, even that subjects are incomplete, they are not fully incomplete (in the 
Althusserian or Foucauldian sense). They can politically alter, and question, the specific ways 
in which the otherness becomes refuted in some cultural and historical context (as a specific 
symbolic order). Even that there is always symbolic orders, and Laws which are based on the 
foreclosure of the otherness, these Laws do not have to stay the same forever.  The same 
Others (like homosexuals or women) do not have to remain refuted forever.  Butler´s theory 
of the incompletion of the subject has been importantly modified by Hegel´s critique of Kant.   
 
 By performative politics, the defining borders of particular subjects and things are to be made 
more “open” for “unspeakable otherness”. Butler calls this openness a “founding 
ambivalence”. This includes the idea  that there is no such timeless Law, as timeless language, 
which can fix the limits of all subjects forever to some speficic particular place. The border 
between what belongs to the rational, speakable, legitimate subjectivity and what belongs 
outside of it in abjection is temporally movable.   The idea is to expose particular things to 
their internal “unspeakability” and make the borfder between these realms move.  There is an 
intention is to “make room” inside the things (such as “human”, “woman”, “sexuality” etc.) 
for the internal, refuted otherness.   
 
Butler’s intention, in her performative politics,  is not to make the particular borders of things 
disappear. This is also seen  in her criticism of “Kantianism”.  For Hegel, as for Butler, the 
borders of things disappear (and particularity becomes “enslaved” ) if things are thought  to 
be constituted in primary relation to the Kantian “thing in itself” or to the Lacanian “lost 
referent”. Because these “things in themselves” are fully abstract, fully unlimited, they render 
the limited, particular part of the thing unlimited as well. Butler argues that the “constitutive, 
unspeakable outside” can be thought always in relation to the particular subjectivity, whose 
“other side” and whose “unspeakability” it is. In line with Hegel, Butler argues that there is no 
such “unspeakable otherness” which would not itself be historical and relational. Any 
otherness is itself internally altered, because it is also a construction, thinkable because of its 
relation to its “speakable” and “legitimate” outside. The subject-position is the outside of this 
“outside”. Because this outside is thus a relational, instead of an absolute outside, it is also 
political: it can be questioned, exposed as historical and subjective.  The constitutive outside – 
as  always  a  relational  and  thus  specific  outside  -  is  thus  a  construction,  or  a  part  of  a  
construction.  
 
This zone of uninhabitability will constitute the defining limit of the subejct´s 
domain; it will constitute that site of dreaded identification against which – and 
by virtue of which – the domain of the subject will circumbscribe its own claim 
ot autonomy and life. In this sense, then, the subject is constituted through the 
force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to 
the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, inside the subject as its own 
founding repudiation. (BM 3) 
 
 
For example “feminity”, “homosexuality” or “blacks” etc.  are discursively produced and 
constructed as abjected outsides. Correspondingly, as the “world out there” is discursively 
produced, abject and incomplete humanity may gain its objective materialization as women, 
homosexuals, blacks etc.  These abject outsides, in comparison to which “complete, normal 
and legitimate humanity” becomes understood, are always historical constructions. In the next 
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quotation Butler goes back to Plato to criticise the idea that some specific groups are 
necessarily always the incomplete, irrational (i.e. slaves) instead of universal beings (i.e. 
Lords, Masters): 
 
After all, Plato´s scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of 
women,  slaves,  children,  and  animals,  where  slaves  are  characterized  as  those  
who do not speak his language, and who, in not speaking his language, are 
considered diminished in their capacity for reason. This xenophobic exclusion 
operates through the production of racialized Others, and those whose “natures” 
are considered less rational by virtue of their appointed task in the process of 
laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life. This domain of the less than 
rational human bounds the figure of human reason, producing that “man” as one 
who is without childhood; is not a primate and so is relieved of the necessity of 
eatig, defecating, living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always a property 
holder; one whose language remains originary and untranslatable. (…) This is a 
materialization of reason which operates through the dematerialization of other 
bodies, for the feminine, strictly speaking, has no morphe, no morphology, no 
contour, for it is that which contiributes to the contouring of things, but is itself 
undifferentiated, without boundary. (BM 48-49) 
 
For Butler, even that it makes sense to say that the “refuted otherness” is something 
constitutive to  linguistic beingness, there  is no specific otherness which must necessarily and 
always inhabit the zone of the irrationality. Butler argues all through her writings that the 
“outside”, constitutive of all coherent subjectivity, is a relative outside.   It  is  a  part  of  the  
always historical construction of coherent subjectivity. As historical and changeable, the 
realms of coherent and incoherent subjectivity may be inhabited by different figures. Even 
that  this  resembles  Althusser´s  criticism of  e.g.  Freud’s  theory  of  the  Oedipal  phase,  Butler  
criticises  also  Althusser’s  interpellative  power  for  its  way  to  pose  as  a   non-relative (non-
political) outside. Even that Butler does not discuss, let alone criticise Althusser´s distinction 
into “ideology” and “science” she criticises Althusserian ideology as completely “above” 
subjective knowledge. Butler criticises the idea that the subjects themselves could not be able 
to mobilize, to politicize, i.e. to make other, the distinction, by which they are “known.  Butler 
argues that there is no power, which could not be turned against itself, reappropriated, in some 
ways.  All powers are ek-static: they can be “troubled” through their Other. In the next 
quotation, from a text (in BM) where she reads critically Lacan´s theory of the “Real”, Butler 
criticises the “Lacanians” Zizek and Laclau (as well as also Mouffe). Her criticism resembles 
Hegel’s critique of the aprioristic Kantian dualism 
 
To claim that there is an “outside” to the socially intelligible, and that this 
“outside” will always be that which negatively defines the social is, I think, a 
point on which we can concur. To delimit that outside through the invocation of 
a preideological “law”, a prediscursive law” that works invariantly throughout 
all history, and further, to make that law function to secure a sexual differential 
that ontologizes subordination, is an “ideological” move in a more ancient sense, 
one that might only be understood through a rethinking of ideology as 
“reification”. That there is always an “outside” and, indeed, a “constitutive 
antagonism” seems right, but to supply the character and content to a law that 
secures the borders between the “inside” and the “outside” of symbolic 
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intelligibility is to preempt the specific social and historical analysis that is 
required, to conflate into “one” law the effect of a convergence of many, and to 
preclude the very possibility of a future articulation of that boundary which is 
central to the democratic project that Zizek, Laclau and Mouffe promote.  (BM 
206-207) 
 
 
For Butler, any epistemology of the subject, and any description of what subjects are 
universally like,  is “ek-static” so that there is always an “unknown” side to the subject. 
However, this “unknown” side is as historical, subjective and “ideological” as  the “known” 
side. These sides are constitutive of each other and thus both relational. As such, this whole 
distinction into the known and into the unknown belongs fully to the realm of subjective 
historical thinking. Importantly, Butler repeats, above, the idea behind Hegelian reciprocal 
recognition, as the main point of reference in her criticism. In order to give possibility to the 
otherness (called here as the  “outside”) to articulate differently the way subject is formed (or 
interpellated) into intelligible subjectivity, we should not make our theory of this primary 
relation an “unreachable” one. A theory is rendered unreachable, and politically inaccessible 
if  it is  rendered a “lost object”. If it is “lost” from language – by claiming that it cannot be 
analysed as a linguistic  object - it is also lost from politics as politics takes place in language. 
Hence, for Butler, the “unknown” is necessarily some specific unknown, as femininity (and 
consequently also actual heterosexuality as well as actual homosexuality) is for the 
Lacanians.  
 
For Butler, a democratizing  ek-statism of the subject  takes place as a  “double-movement” in 
which any (present) form of universality is opened up for its relative otherness. Consequently,  
in the course of the movement there appears a plurality of formative (interpellative, radically 
performative)  powers, instead of one, as in Althusser´s ideological practice.  There is hence 
features resembling Hegel´s dialectical movement and absolute, “shared” knowing. In Hegel´s 
reciprocal recognition – as a dialectical relation - both the self (as one thesis of the world) and 
the Other (as another, contradictory thesis) are considered formative (“negating”, in Hegel´s 
words, or “performative” in Butler´s words) powers. In such dialectical movement the 
“result” (the actual thing being formed, another name of which is synthesis) is constituted by 
the formative labour of  both the self and the Other, instead of, like in Althusser, in reference 
to  the ideology of the other side, i.e. for the ideological capital “S”.  (In fact, with Althusser, 
there is a kind of reciprocality as well, as “science” appears also as an intentional agent. 
Butler however does not discuss the synthezising role of Althusser´s science at all. This theme 
will be discussed further in the next chapters)  
 
Butler´s “double movement” is actually another name for her “performative politics”. This 
theme will be discussed further in the next sub-chapters.    
 
 
5.2.11. The dialectical critique 
 
 
Butler theorizes her performative politics in reference to Hegel´s dialectics (described in ch. 2 
in this work). Butler e.g. criticises Althusser, Lacan and Foucault for their “Kantian” one-
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sided movements in reference to Hegel´s double-movement, dialectics.   
 
Basically, in Hegelian dialectics - whether it takes place before or after the entrance into the 
realm of free self-consciousness and reciprocal recognition -  the movement is synthesizing. 
The particular subject – or particular things in general- as the effects or as the results of the 
dialectical process (a sort of “double interpellation”) are not in identity with just one 
interpellative power. Butler recalls this idea when she argues that no “interpellative power” is 
a sovereign power which “performs” (i.e. constitutes) the objectivity self-identically, one-
sidedly, by itself alone (ES 71-102). Thus, Hegelian double-movement is referred to in 
Butler´s  criticism  of   the  Althusserian  “ideological  practice”,  the  course  of  which  is  
dominated just by the other side, which acts as the Capital “S”. With Althusser, subjects are 
“practices”, dominated by the Capital “S”. Subjects cannot reflect radically the interpellative 
power, the Capital “S”, which constitutes them as subjects.  Interpellative power is used on 
the subjects, not by the subjects (see ch. 3.2). 
 
With Hegel, subjects are dialectical processes, in which there is no singular power which 
would set the course of the process.  Contradictory selves take part in the process, by which  
“terms” (subjects as well as “things” in general, and objective existence) are determined. 
Thus, while with Althusser there is the small “s” (subject as particular, subject as formed by 
an interpellative power) and the capital “S” (subject as an authoritative, interpellative agent), 
with Hegel there are, so to speak,  two interpellative “S”:es. With Hegel, both sides in the 
dialectical process are universalizing and formative - i.e. negating -  powers. The “negation” 
of subjects and things are not done by a singular power. With Hegel, neither side of the 
interpellation is, alone, a capital “S”, as is the case with Althusser.  Hegel´s idea of the double 
movement is the base of Hegel´s subject-theory in general (the theory of the “ek-static self”). 
It  is  also  the  base  of  Butler´s  theory  of  the  ek-static  self  and  Butler´s  politics  as  a  double-
movement.    
 
In  ES  Butler  discusses  the  problem  of  “hate  speech”  on  the  basis  of  Althusser´s  theory  of  
Interpellation, critically modified by Butler in reference to Hegel´s theory of double or mutual 
(dialectical) subject-formation.  Butler argues that “hate-speech” such as the calling of 
somebody a “nigger” or “queer” does not necessarily produce a “victim-class” because the 
injurious address (interpellation) is not a sovereign, one-sided power.  Butler argues the 
following:  
 
“The political possibility of reworking the force of speech act against the force 
of injury consists in misappropriating the force of speech from those prior 
contexts. The language that counters the injuries of speech, however, must 
repeat those injuries without precisely re-enacting them. Such a strategy affirms 
that hate speech does not destroy the agency required for a critical response. 
Those who argue that hate speech produces a “victim class” deny critical 
agency..” (ES 41) 
 
With Hegel, there is of course no Althusserian distinction between “ideology” and “science”. 
With Hegel, “science” is an internal, conceptual part of the subjects. Even if intellectual 
abstract practices contribute to the collective development of the Spirit, they are conducted by 
particular subjects. From the point of view of Hegel´s subject-theory in PhS   Althusser´s 
“science” occupies the position of a synthesizing “third” in Althusser´s Lacanian subject-
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theory.  By the “third”,  the internal doubleness of the subject is “seen”.  Althusser´s science, 
placed as a neutral practice above subjects, sees that the subject is double. Science sees that 
the subject consists of the “particular subject” (little “s”, i.e. the addressee of interpellation) 
and the ideological Capital “S” (the interpellative power).  From the point of view of Hegel´s 
theory of the synthesizing “third”, the Althusserian external and “pure”, Marxist “third” acts 
like  a “pure self-consciousness”. Because the Althusserian “science” has not acknowledged 
its own particular subjectivity, it does not allow any contradictory “otherness” to itself.  
 
Butler criticises Althusser´s Interpellative subject-theory in reference to Hegel´s criticism of 
the Kantian pure self-consciousness (see e.g. CHU 1-40; ES 28-38).   Butler argues that in 
Althusser,  the subject is seen as a one-sided process, dominated fully by ideology as the 
Capital “S”.  Butler does not however engage into criticizing Althusser´s distinction between 
“ideology” and “science”. By the distinction between “ideology” and “science” Althusser, in 
a way, explains the possibility of the theory of Interpellation. Through science, it is possible 
to  talk of the “dyad” interpellative subject-formation. Without any such realm like “science”, 
the very talk of the interpellative subject-formation appears as impossible. Without “science” 
there would be no theory of any such human “practice” which could be seen as capable of 
theorizing the interpellative formation of subjects, as the subjects themselves are considered 
incapable of such discussions. There would be also no theory of how the interpellative, 
ideological subject-formation can ever be interfered with, or “troubled”, as the conscious 
politics of subjects take always already place in the realm of ideology. There would be no 
explanation  of  the  possibility  of  Marxist  politics.  The  speculation  of  “fallen”  (ideologically  
formed, misrecognitive of themselves, each others and the world) subjects would have to be 
transformed to take place in the realm of “gods” etc.  In Althusser´s atheist Marxism there is 
naturally  no  room  for  gods,  thus  the  talk  of  the  formation  of  the  “mistaken”  and  “limited”  
subjects cannot take place as a religious communication between gods or between priests and 
gods.  Nevertheless, for Althusser, the “real”, “universal” knowledge of the subjects cannot 
take place by the “fallen” subjects themselves because their knowledge of themselves and of 
the world is “failing”.      
 
Butler criticises Althusser´s idea of the subject as a “practice” for its one-sidedness. 
Althusser´s subjects repeat quite loyally the orders of the capital “S”, because the particular 
subjects themselves are not seen as “interpellative  powers”. Hegel´s idea of the dialectical 
movement (as a double-movement) is the basic point of reference in Butler´s criticism against 
Althusser´s one-sided practice. Basically, Hegel´s idea of the dialectical movement between 
the self and the Other – as it takes place in PhS before the realm of free self-consciousness 
and reciprocal relations – is the model for Butler´s politics and serves as the point of reference 
in Butler´s criticism of Althusser.   
 
For Butler, the interpellative formation of the subject - as a continuous practice - is seen as a 
critical process. The process is not dominated by any one sovereign power.  This process is 
caused or motivated by the refutation of contradicting otherness. Hence the process proceeds 
through contradicting otherness, like the Hegelian dialectics. Process through radical 
(contradictory) otherness is the basic idea also in Butler´s performative politics. The process 
consists  of   concurring  criticism  and  demands,  on  the  part  of  the  radical  otherness,  to  be  
included into the “valid” universal. The Other demands to be included into the group of those 
who  are  seen  as  valid,  universal  beings  (i.e.  as  complete  beings)  and  who  are  also  seen  to   
have valid “bodies” (i.e. valid objective existence).  As was explained already in the chapter 
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on Kojève, Butler takes Hegel´s “struggle for recognition” as the base for her politics.  
 
In CHU and also in other texts Butler criticises various subject-theories, especially the 
theories of Foucault, Lacan, Althusser etc. on the basis of her idea of the “double-movement” 
of things” (movement through radical otherness). For Butler, things or actually  terms (such as 
“woman”, “man”, “human”) are primarily processes which proceed through radical otherness.  
Butler´s notion of terms as processes is however based on both Althusser´s idea of subject as 
an ideological linguistic practice (theory of Interpellation) as well as on Hegel´s idea of the 
“struggle for recognition”.    
 
Butler calls e.g. “woman” “a term in process” (GT 33). However, for Butler, in criticism of 
the Althusserian “gendering” practices (and in reference to Hegel´s dialectics) the subject-
formative practices are not fully determined, alone,  by any particular ideology. They are not 
fully determined  by some sovereign Other.  Hence there is no sovereign Other (as an 
ideology or a “symbolic Law”) which can fix (or, interpellate) things as a sovereign power. 
When a thing is fixed in reference to some “power”, it is, in turn, soon contradicted  by its 
internal refuted otherness. This idea repeats the idea of Hegel´s dialectics, as it takes place 
before the realm of reciprocal recognition.  Basically the process takes place, as was 
explained also in the chapter on Kojeve, as the politics of the slaves.     
 
Butler´s idea of politics as a critical process becomes also a critique against Althusser, other 
Lacanians (such as Ernesto Laclau) and Foucault.  Butler argues that it is important for the 
“survival of politics and historical change” not to think of universality as an empty place. For 
Butler, universality can be only temporally an empty place. If universality was recognized 
“empty”  by  all,  in  all  places  and  times,  this  universal,  timeless   recognition  would  end  the  
critical process of things. Butler argues that if all would agree that the universal truth of things 
is necessarily “empty”, politics would lose its motif. There would be no disagreements as to 
what  the  ultimate  “truth”   is.  Everyone  would  agree  that  the  truth  is  empty  of  content,  and  
hence “an end of history” would be constituted. According to Butler “the failure of things” 
cannot, itself, be the goal of politics, for which universal recognition (as the agreement of all) 
is demanded.  (CHU 31-32) 
 
Partly in criticism of Laclau´s Lacanian idea of the “incompletion of the subject” (Laclau 
1990; 2000 a,b) and partly in agreement with it, Butler  writes (as a part of the same text from 
where the quotation (above) is from):   
 
Laclau identifies a condition common to all politicization, but it is precisely not 
a condition with a content: it is, rather, the condition by which any specific 
content fails fully to constitute an identity, a condition of necessary failure 
which not only pertains universally, but is the “empty and ineradicable place” of 
universality itself. A certain necessary tension emerges within any political 
formation  inasmuch as  it  seeks  to  fill   that  place  and  finds  that  it  cannot.  This  
failure to fill the place, however, is precisely the futural promise of universality, 
its status as a limitless abd unconditional feature of all political articulation. 
Inevitable as it is that a political organization will posit the possible filling of 
that place as an ideal, it is equally inevitable that it will fail to do so. Much as 
this failure cannot be directly pursued as the “aim” of politics, it does produce a 
value – indeed, the value of universality that no politics can do without. (CHU 
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32) 
 
 
According to both Hegel and Butler - and in criticism against Kant, Althusser et al. - if a part 
of some thing is thought as necessarily unknown (like the Kantian thing in itself)  the whole 
thing  is  rendered  unknown,  empty  of  content.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  unknown  part  
cannot be differentiated from the “known” part – as the unknown part is without limits - and 
hence the whole thing is rendered unknown, fully identical with the unlimited (unknown) part 
of  it.   Consequently,  for  Hegel,  as  for  Butler,  the  claim,  coming  from  the  Other,  not  yet  
included into the universality, is to be something particular:  
 
The assertion of universality by those who have conventionally been excluded 
by the term often produce a performative contradiction of a certain sort. But this 
contradiction, in Hegelian fashion, is not self-cancelling, but exposes the 
spectral doubling of the concept itself. And it prompts a set of antagonistic 
speculations on what the proper venue for the claim of universality ought to be. 
(CHU 38) 
 
 
According to Hegel, a thinker who opposes some particular, subjective “truth” of some thing 
in reference to a claim that “the truth of this thing cannot be known by particular subjects or 
in terms of particular descriptions” (as the Lacanians, according to Butler, claim) engages in a 
“self-cancelling contradiction”.  Such self-cancelling contradiction results into an abstract,  
self-same  (i.e.  not  doubled,  but  “one”)  term,  purified  empty  of  its  particular  content.  It  
becomes same with the “unlimited”, “empty” opposition. An opposition, coming from such 
non-particular other is self-cancelling (of the concept in question) for the thinker who 
considers such an “opposition” valid.    Butler  engages  in  a  very  similar  criticism against  a  
few “post-Hegelian” thinkers such as Althusser, Lacan and also Foucault, as Hegel engages 
against the Kantian “pure self-consciousness”.  
 
 
5.3. A critique of Butler’s Althusserianism 
5.3.1. A critique of Butler´s Althusserian subjectivity 
 
 
Butler modifies her basically Hegelian subject-theory in reference to Althusser. As said 
already, with Hegel (found already with Kant) the subject is structured by a primary relation, 
i.e. an internal relation, which Butler calls “internal ek-statism”.   
 
Butler has a theory of the internal ek-statism as a critical process, or as a “double movement”.  
This theory of a critical process presents, basically, a description of what terms are.  It  also 
serves as a model for Butler´s performative politics as a radical process.   Two moments are 
discerned as structural in this process.  There is the Hegelian moment and the Althusserian 
moment. These moments or reversals conduct the “turning” of the term in question (like e.g. 
“woman”, “sexuality” or “human”).  A Hegelian moment is criticised by an Althusserian 
moment, which again is criticised by a Hegelian moment. The ek-static, radical process (of 
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terms,  such  as  “woman”,  “human”,  “sexuality”,  “democracy”  etc.)  is  structured  by  these  
successive Hegelian and Althusserian moments. These moments present a mobilization, a 
reversal, of each other. Neither moment is thus permanent. The Althusserian moment points 
to the “other power” in the Hegelian synthesis, and, the Hegelian moment points to the 
particular, temporal nature of the “ideological power” which is left outside of the subjects in 
the Althusserian moment. Butler herself calls these theoretical moments a moment at which a 
conceptual unity (a particular identity) concerning a term is affirmed (the Hegelian moment),  
and, a moment at which the affirmed identity becomes exposed to its internal, disavowed 
otherness (the Althusserian moment).  
 
Butler, however, does not discuss the crucial distinction Althusser makes between “ideology” 
and “science”.  In Althusser, even that the subjects cannot take their formation as an object of 
critical study, science can.  In Althusser, the subject cannot take the ideological linguistic 
power, which forms it, as its object of analysis. This power exceeds the conceptualizing 
capacity of the subject and hence remains a “surplus” or a “remainder” for the subject.  There 
is  no  “surplus  power”  or  “remainder”   for the subject itself. The ideological subject has no 
outside (for itself).  The subject is not formed by an ideological power for itself.  In Althusser, 
all the talking of the ideological, linguistic power, exceeding the subject, is conducted by the 
scientist, not by the subject. This talking takes place outside the realm of the interpellative, 
ideological power.    The reason why the ideological formation of the subject can be talked of 
at all – and   why a “surplus” or “remainder” power can be analyzed – is that what remains 
outside of subjects, does not remain outside of the  science.   
 
In Althusser, the subject is totally identified with the ideology. There is no interfering “other” 
power for the subject itself which could alter what the subject is for itself. Any change in what 
the subjects are for themselves takes place externally, through historical struggles between 
such large constructions as economical classes.  The subjects themselves cannot turn the 
interpellative linguistic power against itself in any “radical” or “ek-static” manner (to use a 
Butlerian terminology). Consequently, according to Althusser, the ideological subject itself 
cannot be behind the theory of Interpellation. The theory of Interpellation can be written only 
by somebody who acknowledges that there is an outside for the subject. This “third” party 
(even that Althusser does not use this Hegelian term) which sees the relation between the 
subject and its outside power is science. A scientist sees more of the subject than the subject 
itself.  In  fact,  the  ek-static  structure  of  the  subject  exists  as  an  object  for  the  scientist.  The  
relation between the subject and the other is for the scientist. The scientist synthesizes the ek-
static  parts   by  seeing  that  a  subject  (or  any  other  term)  consists  of   ek-static  parts.   In  this  
sense, also in Althusser’s theory the ek-static structure of the subject – i.e.  the ek-static 
relation  as  the  foundation  of  the  subject  -  exists  for  the  “third”  party  which  is  the  scientist.   
Butler´s claim, that  she reverses the Hegelian synthesizing (“third”) moment through the 
Althusserian non-synthesizing moment appears  consequently problematic in so far as the 
Althusserian moment is also synthesizing. The Althusserian theory of the subject-formation 
includes its own synthesizing “third”, the scientist.  It must be emphasized that when Butler 
claims to reverse Hegel through an Althusserian moment, she refers to his theory of 
Interpellation. Althusser himself says that he has written the theory as a scientist,  not  as  a  
subject. (Ideol., 160)     
 
Butler does not discuss the Althusserian scientific view-point onto things.  Althusserian 
science appears indeed as a synthesizing “third” which is capable of reflecting the relation 
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between the subject and its constitutive (formative) outside, the Other. To a certain, however 
very limited extent, science is also capable of interfering into the logic of the ideological 
formation of subjects. The difference between the Hegelian synthesizing “third” and the 
Althusserian “third” is that, for Hegel,  all “third” points of views onto things are still 
“subjective” in the sense that subjects can adopt them. For Hegel, the moment of the “third” is 
a part of the reflective self-consciousness which is always subjective and historical.  All 
synthesizing and relating together of ek-static parts are conducted by subjects. For Althusser, 
only non-subjective science can see the relation between the subject and the ideological other.  
It exists only for non-ideological, non-subjective thinking, science.  Because this scientific 
point of view is non-subjective, Althusser´s theory of the primary relation (constitutive of 
subjects)  is presented as a non-subjective, non-particular theory.  The ek-static constitution of 
the subject is seen to be there, to exist , however, it is seen only as an abstraction, because the 
seeing of it is thought to take place outside of subjects.  
 
Butler claims to conduct a reversal of Hegel´s “all-inclusive” subject-theory by an 
Althusserian “non-all-inclusive” subject-theory.  However, Althusser´s Interpellative theory 
takes the  ideological power, which is external to the subject - but not external to science -  as 
its  object  of  study  (see  ch.  3.2.2.).  The  theory  of  the  Interpellative  formation  of  the  subject  
indeed includes into it those aspects of the subject which are outside of the subjects 
themselves. Even if it includes them in a non-particular, non-subjective, “scientific” form, it 
nevertheless includes them and discusses them.  In this sense, also the Althusserian subject is 
fully known for itself, i.e. for the Althusserian scientific writer, who is behind the 
Interpellative theory. The “other”, formative of the subject, is known for both Hegel and 
Althusser  in  their  theories.    Neither  theory  leaves  the  “other”  outside  of  its  scope.  Both  
Hegel’s and Althusser’s theories think of the relation between the subject and its constitutive 
Other from a “third” point of view, which for Althusser is Marxist science and for Hegel the 
subject (reflective self-consciousness) itself.  The difference between these two theories is that 
whereas Hegel argues that all ways to think of the relation between the subject and its “other” 
are conducted by beings who are themselves subjects - thus presenting subjective, particular 
and historical conceptualizations of the subject and its “other” - Althusser claims that the 
relation between the subject and its “other” is seen (in a non-ideological, non-misrecognitive 
way) only by a non-subjective science.  For Hegel, the “third” party (i.e. the one who sees the 
constitutive relation between the subject and its “other”) is itself a subject, a particular self, 
whereas for Althusser it is a non-subjective science.  Butler’s position between these two 
views appears as problematic. Her way to “reverse” Hegel through Althusser seems to link 
Butler problematically with a theory which is against her own thought concerning the 
subjectivity and particularity of all thinking (including philosophical and scientific thinking). 
One of Butler’s basic arguments is that there is no thinking outside of subjects or outside of 
time and place.    
 
By his scientific point of view Althusser tries to explain how his subject-theory is possible. If 
the ideological power is actually external to the subject, we could rightfully ask how such 
theories, in which this external power is theorized, can be formulated. Aren´t we all subjects?  
Althusser  answers this question by pointing to his role as a scientist. He writes of the power, 
which is external to the subject, as a scientist, not as a subject. Hegel answers the same 
question by the general claim that subjects, as constructions which include the contradicting 
other power, can be reflected by themselves and known to themselves. Theorists and 
scientists (like himself) are all subjects.  Both Althusser and Hegel apparently think that to 
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present a theory of the ek-static structure of a subject and, at the same time, to deny the 
possibility that this structure could be known at all, constitutes a self-contradictory statement. 
Althusser  tries  to  avoid  this  self-contradiction,  or  theoretical  self-denial,  by  referring  to  his  
possibilites as a scientist. Hegel refers to the possibilities of subjects in general. Butler does 
not answer this question at all. 
 
What Butler does is to present her theory of the subject as a critical, ek-static process. Butler 
agrees with Hegel in that there is no thinking (or theorizing, or science) which is done outside 
of subjects. In this sense, she disagrees with Althusser who adheres to the idea of non-
subjective science.  However, in this light, Butler´s theory of the subject as an ek-static being, 
who cannot fully conceptualize its ek-statism appears self-contradictory or self-denying.  
Butler seems to fall into the Kantian dilemma with her structure of ek-statims.  Like for Kant, 
for  Butler,  there  remains  always  something  -  which  she  typically  calls  as  a  “surplus”  or  a  
“remainder” - constitutive of subjects which cannot be conceptualized by the subjects 
themselves.   Butler is not unaware of the general problem concerning such “surpluses”, as 
they resemble the Kantian “thing in itself”. She criticises Kant in reference to Hegel. She 
criticises Althusser, Foucault and Lacan for this same reason.  However, she seems to fall into 
it herself.  Butlers way to theorize the subject from the point of view of that which cannot be 
conceptualized by the subject (a “surplus”) is not itself acknowledged  (in Butler’s text) as a 
particular, subjective way to theorize the subject. Butler’s way to see more of the subject than 
what  is  seen  (in  Butler’s  theory)  to  be  possible  for  the  subjects  themselves  renders  Butler’s  
position a privileged one. Butler reflects subjects and subjective, historical moments of terms. 
She finds subjects misrecognitive (of terms) because, as limited, they cannot conceptualize 
the constitutive “surplus” of a term. Nonetheless, what is beyond subjects (i.e. the constitutive 
outside, “surplus”) is not beyond Butler.  Like in Althusser, Butler refrains from presenting a 
particular (subjective) concept of a term in which the constitutive “surplus” is taken into 
account because, for Butler, subjects cannot see the constitutive “surplus” of themselves or 
other terms except in a “misrecognitive” way. Because Butler does not consider this way (i.e. 
her own way) to speak of  subjects and terms  - as ek-static constructions, including the 
“surplus” -  a particular one Butlers own thought (which nonetheless thinks of the constitution 
of  subjects  and  terms  so  that  it  includes  the  outside  “surplus”)  becomes  posited  into  a  non-
subjective  realm,  somewhat  similar  to  the  Althusserian  realm  of  science.  Butler’s  theory  
becomes divided into two realms, resembling the Althusserian distinction between the 
“subject” and the“science”.    
 
As is explained earlier, Butler criticises Hegel for his “all-inclusiveness” and Althusser for his 
“Kantianism” (i.e. for placing the ideological power outside of subjectivity and politics). 
Butler is neither fully Hegelian or Althusserian.  Instead, she presents a processual theory 
which includes both of these subject-theories as “moments” inside terms as critical, ek-static 
processes. Because these moments not only present necessary aspects of terms, but also 
criticise  each  others,  neither  one  becomes  placed,  alone,  as  the  full,  permanent  truth  of  the  
term.   By her “internally radical” theory, Butler includes the two, mutually radical aspects, 
into terms.  The mutual radicality of these moments is supposed to be preserved, because the 
process itself remains not known for any particularizing subject. No historical moment of the 
term (i.e. no particular “subjective context” at which the term is conceptualized) knows the 
ek-static process which the term is. The ek-static process itself does not hence become 
conceptualized or particularized. Terms as processes remain always, permanently beyond 
historical “momentary” subjects. The problem in Butler’s thought is that this is known and 
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that this knowledge becomes posited into a privileged position.  
 
The  ek-static  process  is,  according  to  Butler,  not  an  instance  of  the  Hegelian  synthesizing,  
teleological dialectics in which the subject and the Other can synthesize (by Aufhebung) what 
they think and know.  Butler´s process is structured by an Althusserian “Other”, not by a 
Hegelian, conceptually known and reciprocally recognized Other. Consequently, according to 
Butler, the process is not a Hegelian rational  process, which is supposed to be teleological 
and  its result “known in advance”.    
 
Butler apparently tries to avoid both the Hegelian problem and the Althusserian problem, by 
this model of a critical process. As these moments reverse, in turn,  each others, neither one 
dominates the term alone. However, both moments become preserved as inescapable 
moments of the term. In a way, this resembles the Hegelian, dialectical idea of “preservation 
and negation”.  Nevertheless, the Hegelian synthesizing rationalism and the idea of the 
conceptualizing “third” is supposed to be avoided by the Althusserian moment.  
 
However, there is a problem due to the fact that the constitutive moments of Butler’s futural 
critical process are known already now (for Butler, i.e. for Butler´s theory). The structure of 
the relation between the moments of the “subject-position” and the constitutive outside, 
“surplus” (of a term like e.g. woman) is known already now. It is known already now (for 
Butler) that the structure of the relation is not known for subjects, i.e. for these moments 
themselves except in a misrecognitive way.   It is not known for the present subjects or for the 
futural subjects.  However, this fact of the nature of the relation is known (already) for 
Butler´s theory.  This knowledge (of the internally critical Hegelian-Althusserian 
processuality of terms) does not seem to change because it is not (itself) a historical, particular  
moment of knowing, instead, like Althusser’s science, it presents knowledge of the historical 
moments of knowing and how these moments  relate to each others.  It presents knowledge of 
the mutually colonialistic and unconceptualizable relations between the individual moments. 
As this kind of knowing is impossible for particular subjects, Butler’s theory, like the 
Althusserian science, practices its knowing in an abstract realm, above politics.   
 
Butler´s problem here can be thought through her own, Hegelian-inflected criticism against 
Kant and “Kantian” thinkers like Althusser or Foucault.   The Kantian relation between the 
moments of “thing for us” and the “thing in itself” serves as a model here. According to 
Butler, because the “thing for us” does not know the “thing in itself” (in Kant´s theory), the 
“thing”  is  rendered  a  formal  abstraction.    It  is  known  in  Butler’s  theory  that  a  moment  at  
which a term is known subjectively and conceptually (resembling the “thing for us”) cannot 
know subjectively and conceptually the constitutive Other of the term (resembling the “thing 
in itself”).  But the both two aspects, or moments,  resembling the Kantian “thing for us” and 
“thing in itself” can be thought of  in Butler´s theory.  Butler’s theory sees a constitutive 
relation - constitutive of terms - between these two aspects or moments. Butler´s theory 
determines the relation between these two moments, which are thought, by Butler, to be 
constitutive of the term. Butler sees that the other moment cannot conceptualize the other 
moment, except in a “failing” or a colonialistic way.  Butler sees the mutual alienness of the 
moments. Butler acknowledges  that this kind of mutual unknowingness and alienness is what 
terms are, as ek-static constructions.  
 
This type of seeing of terms, conducted by Butler, resembles what Hegel says of the “absolute 
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dialectical unrest” (see ch. 2.2.6). Butler  is  a  consciousness  (a  seer)  of  the  internal  
contradictoriness and alienness between the structural moments inside  terms. Butler does not 
see  only  one  temporal  moment  (i.e.  one  historical  subjectivity)  to  be  constitutive  of  a  term,  
instead, she sees how the mutually contradicting  temporal moments relate to each others and 
constitute a term. She sees the internal unknowingness of terms, due to the mutual hostility 
between the constitutive moments.  Butler constructs a term (like “woman”, “human” or 
“democracy”) from mutually un-conceptualizable moments, i.e. from moments which 
(themselves) do not recognize each others to be constitutive or constructive of each others.    
 
Butler sees that there is a mutually failing recognition between the constitutive, subjective 
moments of terms.  The internal moments are seen by Butler to be “alien” (in Hegel´s words) 
or “colonialistic” (in Butler´s words) toward each others.  She sees, observes,  that these 
moments  do  not  synthesize  so  that  a  conceptually  coherent  “thing”  would  be  formed.   She  
knows that these moments are radically beyond each others conceptualizing capacity, as well 
as beyond each others ethical (recognitive) capacity. Butler’s way to think of the internal 
“beyondness” (contradictoriness and otherness) inside terms resembles Hegel´s pure self-
consciousness (especially Unhappy Consciousness).    
 
Butler cannot escape the dilemma of pure self-consciousness by claiming that the relation 
between a “moment of knowing” (corresponding to “thing for us”) and a “moment of not 
knowing” (corresponding to “thing in itself”) takes place as a futural process.  Insofar as the 
structure of this process - the way the historical moments relate non-conceptually and 
misrecognitively to each others - is foreseen already now the process corresponds to the 
Kantian relation between  “thing for us” and “thing in itself”.  Butler knows already  (i.e. in 
advance of the futural  moments which are Other to the present time)  that  every moment at  
which a term is known “for us” cannot relate conceptually to futurally Other moments, 
constitutive of the term, except in a misrecognitive, “failing” way. Thus, the “incapacity for 
reciprocal recognition” of all subjective moments, also in the future (or, in other Other times) 
is known already now (for Butler). (see on this theme Hutchings 2003, 160)   
 
In Butler, like in Kant, the inter-relationality, between the constitutive moments of terms, 
remains an abstraction. The moments exceed each others identificatory or recognitive 
capacity. Because they fail to identify each others in a valid way, it is difficult to see how they 
could criticise each others in a valid way. Butler claims that terms are critical processes.  
However,  as  it  is  known  (for  Butler)  that  the   moments,  constitutive  of  terms,  cannot  
conceptualize each others or recognize each others in a valid way, the moments do not make 
up (mutually critical) moments or parts of a same thing.  How could some specific thing (like 
e.g. “woman”) be identified as the object of the critical change? By whom can this 
identification be made in a valid way? As Butler herself refrains from making particular 
conceptualizations of terms or subjects, there is nobody  - no subject recognized as capable of 
this “labour”  - to unify the various mutually radically other moments to construct an 
identifiable term.  Butler herself recognizes the internal otherness of terms, yet, she situates 
this recognition beyond the conceptual and recognitive capacities of particular subjects. She 
does not give an explanation how a subject could adopt her own otherness-recognitive point 
of view i.e. she does not render her own way to think of things as a subjective way to think of 
things. Hence, her otherness-recognitive way to think of things remains beyond, external to 
subjects.   
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Butler writes that any subjective mode of thought (into which she apparently would include 
also her own thought) constitutes a universal truth for itself.  Further,  Butler  disagrees  with  
Kant who claims that because subjective universal  truths are parochial,  we should strive for 
non-subjective, truly universal truths and ethics.  In Kant, by abstracting from the subjective, 
parochial contents we can create a universally equal ethics for all.  Equality thus resides in our 
capacity for abstraction,  in our ability to distance ourselves from our subjectivity.  For Butler, 
via the Hegelian critique of Kant, even if we abstract from subjective contents, the resulting 
ethics constitutes always a particular subjective universe, dependent on its history, time and 
place.  Subjectivity cannot be escaped in any mode of thinking.    
 
Butler claims that subjects (and subjectively thought terms) constitute temporal, parochial 
moments  and that these  moments  cannot conceptualize the constitutive “other” moments of 
the term. The subject´s inability to conceptualize its “other” exists for Butler. What Butler 
sees of this constitutive relation becomes an external (natural, universal) fact insofar as she 
does not consider any Other description (of the relation between the ek-static moments) as a 
valid description. Thus her own description becomes placed above politics and criticism. She 
places what she sees (of subjects and their relations with others) into a realm beyond 
subjectivity, history and politics, as she does not consider an ability to reflect subjectivity like 
this an ability which belongs to (other) subjects (subjects in general).    
 
According to this analysis Butler’s theory of subjective thinking as a “necessary error” is 
based on a Kojévian interpretation of Hegel. Also Althusser´s theory of Interpellation  is seen 
to draw from Kojéve, through Lacan.  This Kojévian interpretation of the Hegelian processual 
ek-statism appears as the fundament of Butler´s thought. Butler sees this kind of process – a 
historical change though slavery – as a structure which cannot be escaped. This process 
resembles closely what Hegel says of the struggle for recognition. There is a moment of 
identity which is a colonialist moment. The colonialist moment is questioned by the “others” 
demand for recognition. However, this “other” moment can itself become another colonialist 
moment, if its own subjectivity (and inherent slavery) is not questioned.  In fact, both 
moments constitute a potential moment of slavery, as they are both subjective moments. 
Nevertheless, when turned processually against each others, they work in favour of freeing 
the slaves, internal to each,  from imprisonment. It can be summarized that Butler´s general 
theory of the ek-statism of terms –as well as her theory of the politics of the performative – is 
built on the model of the Hegelian struggle for recognition.   
  
For a thinker who thinks of terms as “struggles for recognition”, and who knows them to be 
this kind of struggles, this process  - i.e. a struggle - is however problematic.  It resembles 
what is said earlier of the Althusserian “pure politics” and also what is said of the Hegelian 
pure self-consciousness and of absolute dialectical  unrest.   For example,  as said before,   no 
identifiable thing can be seen to be in a process of change in it (for a thinker who thinks of 
terms as this kind of processes).  Because a moment of identity is thought to be related to such 
another moment, which it cannot conceptually relate to, the “thing”, seen to be structured by 
this kind of relations, ceases to be an identifiable thing.  A thinker who sees that a thing 
consists  of  moments  which  are  not  parts  of  a  same  conceptual  whole,  ceases  to  be  able  to  
identify a “thing”. However, this thinker (like Butler) does not actually even want to identify 
any particular thing, which would move in this process, as the identification of things is 
thought to be a violent act.  
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The term becomes consequently an abstraction (for a thinker like Butler).   Because it is 
known that  there  will  be  moments  which  cannot  be  conceptually  related  to  each  others,  the  
term does not continue or remain itself during the process (for a thinker like Butler).  The 
term  (as  this  sort  of  process)  cannot  be  discerned  from  any  other  processes  (i.e  from  other  
terms) as it does not make an identifiable conceptual process (for a  thinker who thinks of it 
like Butler). Its temporal moments cannot be identified to belong to a same process, because 
this would entail a conceptual relation between them. A thinker who sees the process 
necessarily as a process through slavery, cannot (itself) make conceptual relations between the 
mutually enslaved moments “in advance”. And because all moments are indeed moments “in 
advance” (for a thinker like Butler), no moment appears as a moment at which the term can be 
identified or conceptualized.  Making such conceptual relations would itself constitute another 
moment of slavery. By necessarily refraining from making conceptual relations between the 
moments,  and,  at  the  same  time  foreseeing  that  the  term  is  structured   by  this  kind  of  (not  
conceptually related) moments, this kind of thinker renders the term an abstraction (for itself, 
i.e. for a thinker who observes the term in this way). No identifiable process is seen, because 
the thinker refrains from “slavery”, i.e. from identifying the thing which is in process.  In 
order for there to be an identifiable process, in which a thing could be seen to change, other 
kind of  thinker´s – i.e. synthesizing thinkers -   are needed to make a conceptual continuation, 
mediation,  between the various moments of the  process. Ordinary synthesizing subjects, who 
do not think of terms like Butler (i.e. resembling Hegelian “Bondsmen”)  are needed  to 
labour particular things out from the fragmentary, non-related moments.       
 
As I have argued, for Hegel even asymmetric, one-sided relations to the Other are forms of 
recognition. Butler´s theory includes a peculiar form of the recognition of the Other. This 
assumes the form of refraining from the refutation of otherness, in other words, refraining 
from the identification of  particular subjects and objects.  Butler´s recognition of the Other 
assumes the form of seeing particular subjective entities as ek-static constructions. Butler sees 
that any particular descriptions, given of any terms (of e.g. the Other) include an internal 
violence.  Interestingly, if the others themselves present particular descriptions of themselves, 
Butler considers also these descriptions failures, in so far as others say anything particular of 
themselves, or of things in general.  Butler’s Hegelian-inflected way to recognize the Other 
(modified by Kojève and Althusser) takes the form of insisting that all recognizions of the 
Other, made by particular, historical subjects are misrecognizions.   
 
 
5.3.2. Abstract recognition 
 
 
Butler´s terms are abstractions which are also violent abstractions.  Terms  are  seen  to  be  
necessarily constituted through a colonialist refutation of the Other.  The reason why the 
moments of terms cannot relate conceptually to “other” moments of the same terms is that the 
moments of identity are colonialist moments. Consequently, there is no conceptual relation (a 
genuine “hearing” of what the Other says) because they do not recognize the validity of the 
Other as an equal “knower” of the thing. They cannot include what the Other says into their 
knowledge of the term. Via a Kojevian interpretation of Hegel, Butler does not consider it 
possible for subjects – now or in the future - to mediate conceptually with their contradicting 
others, and thus to recognize their others as valid and existent beings. A colonialist 
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(Lord/Bondsman-) attitude toward others is thought  to be constitutive of all subjectivity  in 
Butler´s Kojevian-inflected theory. Subjects are violent toward others without ever being able 
to change this fundamental feature in themselves.  
 
As Butler does not consider her own way to see or reflect the relation between the subject and 
the Other a subjective ability,  her  own  way  to  reflect  this  relation  becomes  placed  beyond  
(other) subjects. This means, consequently, that all social constructions (like sexual identities, 
political systems, institutions, the state) are built on the refutation of the other (for Butler).  
For Butler, we can trouble colonialism to some extent, e.g. by trying to change the object of 
the  colonialist  refutation,  so  that  e.g.  homosexuals  or  women  do  not  have  to  be  always  
constructed as inferior beings. However, the basic structure remains a colonialist one. It 
resembles closely Hegel´s description of the  Lordship and Bondage.  
 
Butler´s own attitude towards the contradicting others is evidently different than what she 
thinks of the subject´s attitude towards them. She claims that subjects exclude and disavow 
their contradicting others and render them illegitimate.   Butler herself, however, worries of 
the situation of  the excluded others and tries, by performative politics, to render them into 
legitimate beings. Butler is aware that any subjective thought has its excluded other and that 
any subjective thought should be democraticed and mobilized from the point of view of its 
other. Notwithstanding, Butler describes subjects as beings who do not entertain this kind of 
sympathies or worries for the sake of the excluded other;  they just (often violently) disavow 
them. Butler has hence an attitude toward excluded others which she sees as impossible for 
subjects.  Butler´s attitude can be described in some ways as recognitive, to use a Hegelian 
term. She acknowledges the worth of the excluded others as valid sources of knowledge, 
deserving to be granted a right to exist and be heard.   
 
Butler does not, very importantly, see that the capacity to recognize the Other is a subjective 
capacity. Consequently, Others can be recognized only by refraining from subjective 
(enslaving) thinking and from the identification of particular (otherness-refutive) objects. As 
this cannot be actually done (for we cannot stop thinking) we should render things into critical 
, internally ek-static processes, in which any affirmation of identity is questioned by its 
refuted other.  What follows from this is that the recognition of Others is placed into an 
abstract realm beyond the subjects themselves.  This thought bears a resemblance to the 
Althusserian thought, in which there is a distinction between the psychoanalytically oriented 
Marxist scientist and the ideologically “interpellated” subjects.  A peculiar aspect of this 
abstract recognition is that what the Others say of themselves is considered another moment 
of  the  enslavement  of  the  Other,  in  so  far  as  the  Other  identifies  itself  as  a  subject  with  a  
particular  identity,  i.e.  speaks  of  itself  as  an  object  (for  itself).   The  Other  is  granted  
recognition only as an abstract (unspeakable, un-identifiable) other, not as a particular subject. 
A norm of an abstract (unspeakable, unparticular) other becomes created in Butler´s theory, at 
the same time when the unspeakability of the Other is seen to be the result of the refutation of 
the  Other.    In  this  sense,  particular,  historical  subjects  are  the  enslaved  Others  of  Butler’s  
thought because she does not recognize them as valid knowers of themselves or the world. 
Butler´s way to see subjects as “misrecognitive” beings works as a similar “enslaving” 
attitude as the attitude of the Lords towards the Bondsmen in Hegel’s theory of self-
consciousness  in  PhS.  Hegel’s  own  way  to  see  women  as  “misrecognitive”  beings  (i.e.  not  
capable of reciprocally recognitive, free and rational relations) is also echoed here.   
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Butler´s way not to consider her own reflections of subjects, Others and of ek-static terms in 
general as subjective reflections, means that whatever she sees is placed  into the position of 
an unlimited  (non-particular, abstract) truth. This means, among other things,  that both, the 
subjects  and  the  others,  remain  unconceptualized  (for  Butler).   The  subjects  and  the  Others  
cannot be conceptualized (particularized, identified) as the ability to recognize them is not 
considered a subjective ability. Any conceptualization of them refutes them and even that we, 
according to Butler, cannot escape from making conceptualizations and identifications of 
terms, identity is an error. Identity is a necessary error, a misrecognition, because we cannot 
escape from making identifications. We are destined to make these errors, and we are destined 
to refute others, insofar as we think, act and speak as subjects. Identity never presents a valid 
statement, a valid knowledge,  of a term, because it does not recognize the “other” of the term.  
As the recognition of the Other is denied from subjects, recognition is rendered an abstraction.  
What follows from this “abstract, impossible recognition” is that subjects and others are, 
equally, not considered valid being.  Because subjectivity, in general, is seen as an “otherness-
refutive” category, albeit necessary, subjectivity as something valid is denied from everybody.   
Butler falls here, together with Althusser and others, into problems which Hegel describes 
under the heading of “pure self-consciousness” , especially Unhappy Consciousness. In 
Hegel´s theory of Unhappy Consciousness, particular historical subjectivity becomes 
“enslaved” by what Hegel calls as “pure I”. Particular subjects are enslaved, because they are 
considered incapable of relating to what constitutes their ek-static formation. Subjects are not 
considered valid epistemological beings, as they are seen to be formed externally. Subjects 
are enslaved, in short, by considering them enslaving beings. Butler´s thought constitutes a 
highly internalized Lord-Bondsman-relation. A thinking self is distanced, or alienated as in 
Unhappy Consciousness, from subjectivity in general, including its own.  
 
Indeed, the very idea of a “necessary error”, central for Butler as for many poststructuralists,  
seems to be problematic. When something is called as an “error”, some notion of “successful 
performance” is simultanuosly presupposed.  In other words, it must be possible at least to 
conceive what it would be to not commit to that error. Here, Hegel’s argument on the “limit” 
seems to apply: 
 
Only he who does not know is limited, for he does not know his limitation; 
whereas he who knows the limitation knows it, not as limitation of his knowing, 
but as something known, as something belonging to his knowledge; only the 
unknown would be a limitation of knowledge, whreas the known limitation , on 
the contrary, is not; therefore to know one’s limitation means to know one’s 
unlimitedness. (Enc.III, § 386, Zusatz) 
 
Hegel is, of course, not speaking of any physical or practical limits of knowledge; rather, he 
has in his mind such arguments which claim that we are necessarily limited – and therefore, 
bound to err – by our language, “conceptual framework”, historical and cultural backgrounds 
and  so  on.  Applying  Hegel’s  argument,  if  we  are  able  to   recognize  an  error  as  an  error,  it  
cannot be strictly “necessary”.    
 
As a summary, Butler’s subject-theory is based on the Hegelian ek-static subjectivity so that it 
includes an Althusserian critique of Hegel.  Butler´s criticism towards the Hegelian subject-
theory is based on Althusser.   Althusser´s subject-theory is, however, based on there being 
“science”. For Althusser, science is free from subjectivity. Science, at least, is able to see 
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through the “necessary errors” of subjectivity.  Without there being “science” it would be 
difficult to understand how Althusser’s subject-theory would be possible. Butler, in contrast, 
does not accept an idea of a subject-less science, which constitutes a universal, non-subjective 
view-point onto terms. Butler does not discuss Althusser´s dualistic distinction between the 
subjective, “failing”, view-point onto things and the universal, scientific view-point onto 
things. Nevertheless, Butler´s rejection of the Althusserian view-point becomes shown in 
Butler´s criticism of Althusser´s way to posit the interpellative, subject-formative Ideology 
into a realm beyond subjects, history and politics.   
 
Butler ends up into a contradictory situation. Even that she adheres to Althusser´s theory of 
how the subject is “interpellated” by an external ideology, she cannot accept the premises of 
this theory or Althusser´s conclusions of the sovereign role of ideology  in the formation of 
the subjects.  Butler’s model in which Hegel is criticised through Althusser and Althusser 
through Hegel, appears as self-contradictory and arbitrary. Butler appears to present a subject-
theory and a model for politics which cannot be adopted by subjects. As she appears to reject 
the idea that there could be subject-less “scientists” it appears that there is no-one left, in her 
subject-theory, who could pursue her ek-static politics. The ek-static process appears not to 
work (so that anyone could actually see some kind of an ek-static process) because there 
seems to be no-one (according to Butler’s subject- theory) who could perform the  “ek-static 
turns” between the Althusserian and Hegelian moments.  There  is  no-one  who  can  see  the  
internal ek-statism of the moments and turn these moments against themselves internally 
through this ek-statism. Shifting from one violent scene into another violent scene does not 
present a radical, ek-static political change. In Althusser, the Marxist psychoanalytical 
scientist, who was behind the theory of Interpellation, was able to see through the linguistic, 
ideological syntheses of the subjects. This scientist was able to perform Marxist, non-
ideological politics, too, even if on a somewhat external way (i.e. external for the ideological 
subjects). In Hegel, there is the self-consciousness who is capable of reflecting its enslaving 
attitude towards the Other and enter into reciprocally recognitive, free, relations with others.   
In Butler there is no-one who can adopt her recognitive attitude toward the Other. Whatever 
radically democratic or ek-static happens for the subjects is  beyond (external) for the subjects 
themselves, as it cannot be thought except as an abstraction.   
 
A central flaw is that Butler does not consider her own reflective and recognitive capacities 
(i.e. the capacity to see the ek-static structure of subjects and to worry for the sake of the 
refuted others) as capacities of the human subject.  Consequently, whether she admits it or 
not, what she sees of the subject is posited beyond the capacities of the subject. Hence, what 
she sees of the subjects and what she suggests as an “ek-static politics” is placed into a realm 
resembling the Althusserian science and Marxist politics, with the exception that all scientists, 
along with the subjects, are denied access to this realm, due to their subjectivity.  By not 
explicating her own role, nor seeing what she sees as subjective, she falls into the dilemma for 
which she criticises Althusser, Foucault and Lacan. Either Butler’s story is told by a human 
subject to other human subjects, or it is not. If not, who, then, is the storyteller?  If, however, 
the story is told by a human subject, Butler finds herself in Ishmael’s situation: how can it be 
that “I only am escaped alone to tell thee”?  
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6. Butler and the Radical Democracy of Chantal Mouffe 
 
6.1. Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe 
 
Chantal Mouffe is a Belgian political theorist who holds a professorship at the University of 
Westminster in England. She studied in Althusser’s seminars in the late 1960’s. In her recent 
works she draws on the socialist tradition, deconstruction philosophy, psychoanalysis and the 
“decisionist” political theory of Carl Schmitt to develop a radical democracy. She is also 
known as a “postmodernist” theorist.  She has published her perhaps most known book 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) together with Ernesto Laclau. Mouffe is also an 
author of The Return of The Political (1993), The Democratic Paradox (2000). Her most 
recent book is On the Political (2005). Here views have been discussed by several authors 
(for example: Brockelman 2003; Deveux 1999; Man Ling Lee 2001; Norris 2002; Tanesini 
2001). However, the critique presented in this chapter is essentially independent of those 
earlier studies. 
 
Chantal Mouffe has a theory of radical, or agonistic democracy  and agonistic pluralism 
which can be compared to Butler’s  theory of radical, performative politics.  In fact, it appears 
that Butler has gained much of her “Kojèvianism” and “Althusserianism” through thinkers 
like Mouffe and Laclau.  Mouffe´s theory of Radical democracy has been influenced directly 
by his former teacher Althusser, and by Lacan, although Derrida also appears important for 
her.   
 
For Mouffe, the ultimate truth of what subjects and things are like and what an ideal society, 
justice,or the common good are, is permanently “lost”. It is lost for subjects, because subjects 
cannot know themselves, nor things in general, in a total and final manner. Mouffe rejects all 
versions of  “foundationalist” or essentialist thought. When she explains her “anti-
foundationalism” and her Schmittian-derivative “decisionist” politics (explained further in 
this chapter more thoroughly),  she also  refers to Judith Butler: 
 
Judith Butler asks: “What new shape of politics emerges when identity as a common 
ground no longer constrains the discourse of feminist politics? My answer is that to 
visualize ferminist poltics in that way presents a much greater opportunity for a 
democratic  politics  that  aims  at  the  articulation  of  the  various  different  struggles  
against oppression.”(…) To be adequately formulated, such a project requires the 
discarding of the essentialist idea of an identity of women as women as  well  as  the  
attempt to ground a specific and strictly feminist politics. (RP 87) 
 
And further: 
 
As  Judith  Butler  reminds  us,  “To establish  a  set  of  norms that  are  beyond power  or  
force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises 
and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of normative universality” 
(RP 143) 
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In defining her own idea of a subject, and her idea of a society, Mouffe criticizes the Hegelian 
“totalities” in which all differences, pluralities and alienations (otherness) are ultimately 
always parts of a self-conscious unity. Mouffe criticizes the way all pluralities and otherness 
can be identified, in Hegel, inside a rational system.   Mouffe sees that, in Hegel, the subject 
and  the society are complete, final, all-inclusive, and, hence, closed and un-political. When 
criticising Hegel, Mouffe criticizes both Hegel´s idea of a subject (as a totally self-conscious 
being) and Hegel´s idea of society (as a “closed” community, based on the union between 
self-conscious subjects). All these criticisms   are  shared  by  the  tradition  which  reads  Hegel  
through the Kojèvian interpretation. In HSS, Mouffe acknowledges the importance of 
Althusser in dissolving the Hegelian “complex structured whole”. (HSS 94-97, DP 134-139)  
 
In HSS, Mouffe and Laclau, however, depart from the Althusserian scientific Marxism. They 
do not accept the way the Marxist science unifies the different planes of the subject and 
society into an “abstract universal object” of economy in Althusser. Althusser is important, 
according to Mouffe and Laclau, for trying to dissolve Hegel´s universal, rational object. 
However, the Althusserian view ends up creating its own a priori explanatory cause, 
economy.    Mouffe and Laclau do not accept the way the Marxist science, with its notion of 
economy, functions as a unifying “third” level in Althusser. It unifies the two other levels, i.e. 
the levels of the subject and ideology. Althusser’s own attempts to get rid of the primacy of 
the economy by concepts like “overdetermination” and “the last instance” are not convincing. 
Nevertheless, Mouffe and Laclau see the value of Althusser in the criticism of the Hegelian 
ideals of the self-conscious subjectivity and self-conscious society (HSS 98-99, 104).  
 
Mouffe  and  Laclau  argue   that  the  ground  principle  of  democracy  and  of  politics  are  what  
they calls as “the permanent loss of stable, conceptual signifiers”. Basically, in an 
Althusserian vein,  they see that subjects and subjective thinking are based on a primary  
relation between the “subject-position” and the “constitutive outside”. Because the 
“constitutive outside” remains un-conceptualized, not differentiated and identified for the 
subject itself, there is a permanent loss of stable signifiers. For Mouffe and Laclau, various 
wholes (like the subject or the society) cannot be separated and differentiated into constitutive 
moments in a logical, rational manner.  These parties should not be conceptually separated, as 
is ultimately also  the case in Althusser´s scientific approach, as well as in Hegel´s rational 
approach.  Mouffe and Laclau argue in reference to what they understand to be the “original” 
Althusserian formulation. Apparently they contrast this original formulation (which they 
seemingly adhere) to Althusser´s later, “scientific” formulation: 
 
In the original Althusserian formulation, however, a very different theoretical 
undertaking was foreshadowed: that of a break with orthodox essentialism not 
through the logical disaggregation of its categories – with a resultant fixing of 
the identity of the disaggregated elements – but through the critique of every 
type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete, open and politically 
negotiable character of every identity (…) far from their being  an essentialist 
totalization, or a no less essentialist separation among objects, the presence of 
some objects in the others prevents any of their identities from being fixed. 
Objects appear articulated not like pieces in a clockwork mechanism, but 
because the presence of some in the others hinders the suturing of the identity of 
any of them. (HSS 104) 
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Like in Butler, in Mouffe various objects are constituted by “ek-static” parts, which cannot be 
differentiated from each other on the basis of a shared rational system. However, Mouffe 
argues that it is politically important that various “closed” (mutually incompatible, 
incommensurable) ideals are strived for. This is due to what appears to be another ground 
principle for Mouffe. A foundational principle in Mouffe’s Radical democracy is 
conflictuality. Mouffe criticizes various contemporary political theorists for forgetting that 
politics is fundamentally about conflicts. If conflicts disappear, politics itself disappears. 
However, In order for there to be conflicts, political actors must strive for “closed” goals; 
ideals which are final and complete  for the political actors themselves.       
 
Mouffe recognizes the importance of Lacan in showing the impossibility of intersubjective 
communication which would be free of constraints and violence.  She argues that subjects are 
discursive beings,  and that they are never free from ideological discourses.  Ideological 
discourses  are  conflictual,  and  often  violent,  because  they  exclude  the  point  of  view  of  the  
radical Other. Because radical otherness is nevertheless seen as constitutive of the subject, the 
relation between the subject and the other remains both un-conceptual, and, conflictual.  The 
basic similarity between  Butler and Mouffe  concerns how the primary relation inside 
subjects and also politics is defined.  For Mouffe, like for Butler, subjects are structured by a 
radical and agonistic (or, antagonistic)  relation between the “subject-position” and “the 
constitutive” outside, or, the “other”.  The relation between the subject and the constitutive 
outside remains un-conceptualized, and also conflictual,  because the subject can 
conceptualize its outside only within the ideological discourse. Because ideological 
discourses are always parochial (excluding the Other) all conceptualizations of the subject  
constitute a further instance of the refutation of the other. Both  Butler’s and Mouffe’s 
political theories are based on the basic notions of the “un-conceptuality” (unknowingness)  
of  the  subject  as  a  unity  of  the  subject  and  its  outside,  and,   the  “antagonism” between the  
subject and the other. (DP 134-139; RP 1-21)  
 
Butler refers to Mouffe’s ideas  of hegemony and the incompletion of the subject,  when she 
explains  how  her  theory  of  the  internal  ek-statism  of  the  subject  differs  from  the  Hegelian  
“all-inclusive” theory of the subject. Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau  present the idea of the 
subject as incomplete in their jointly written book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985; 
see e.g. 181-193).  It appears that the incompletion of the subject and the contingent nature of  
hegemonies as social wholes connect to each others.   
 
…the material character of discourse cannot be unified in the experience or 
consciousness of a founding subject. (HSS 109)  
 
Whenever  we  use  the  category  of  “subject”  in  this  text,  we  will  do  so  in  the  
sense of “subject positions” within a discursive structure. Subjects cannot, 
therefore, be the origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense of 
being  endowed  with  powers  that  render  an  experience  possible  –  as  all  
“experience” depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility. (HSS 115) 
 
In Mouffe,  the subject is established as a discursive being who is necessarily unable to take 
its  discursive formation as an object for itself.  This also means that social  wholes appear as 
contingently formed, as contingent processes.  One important aspect, in the idea of 
contingency is that for Mouffe all modes of knowledge, also scientific ones, are discursive so 
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that they cannot take the formation of their basic thoughts or concepts as objects for 
themselves. Here it is important to note that Mouffe rejects both the Hegelian way, as well as 
the Althusserian way,  to take the  discursive formation of subjects as an object of knowledge.   
Mouffe rejects the Hegelian  free self-consciousness of subjects. For Hegel, subjects can take 
the “discursive formation” of themselves as  objects for themselves, through their capacity to 
recognize others. Consequently, for Hegel, subjects and social wholes are not contingent 
processes.  Mouffe rejects also the Althusserian idea of a “non-subjective” scientific 
knowledge (as will be discussed further). For Althusser, social wholes are not contingent 
processes   In Althusser, societies can be objects for science – even if not for  subjects 
themselves – and, hence,  they are not seen as contingently formed but governed by 
“structural necessities”. Mouffe and Laclau write: 
 
 
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices. It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, 
insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence. 
(HSS 107) 
   
…every relation of representation is founded on a fiction: that of the presence at 
a certain level of something which, strictly speaking, is absent from it. But 
because it is at the same time a fiction and a principle organizing actual social 
relations,  representation  is  the  terrain  of  a  game  whose  result  is  not  
predetermined from the beginning. (HSS 119) 
 
 
For Mouffe and Laclau, any particular, historical political systems, also democratic ones, 
constitute hegemonic systems. These systems form, discursively, their basic units, such as 
subject-positions  and economical classes.   Hegemonies  are total  systems. Or, in fact, they 
attempt to be total, stable and universal, but are bound to fail in this attempt (HSS 112-113).  
Hegemonies constitute their own “particular universes”, to use a Hegelian choice of words. In 
a basic Kantian or Hegelian manner, these systems produce themselves. Within these systems, 
things or objects  exist “for us”.  Hegemonies are hence “performative”, to use Butlerian 
terminology.   They  produce  the  objective  reality  in  relation  to  themselves  as  discursive, 
articulating  systems. Discourses are “object- performative” practices (HSS 105-116).  Thus, 
Althusser’s “interpellating ideologies”, Butler’s “performativity” and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
“hegemonies” are closely related. 
 
Hegemonies are also hierarchical systems.   However, they are contingent , historical 
formations, with no external, necessary  foundation. Hegemonic subject-positions and classes 
have no universal or natural base. There is also no rational logic to how the historical struggle 
between the  hierarchically formed classes proceeds. Mouffe´s and Laclau´s socialism claims 
to depart from the classical Marxism by its emphasis on the contingent nature of the class and 
the class-struggle. (HSS 1-5, 93-116).  
 
Butler says in CHU  that she understands the central idea of hegemony  in Mouffe´s theory to 
be as follows:  
 
democratic polities are constituted through exclusions that return to haunt the 
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polities predicated upon their absence. That haunting becomes politically 
effective  precisely  in  so  far  as  the  return  of  the  excluded  forces  an  expansion  
and rearticulation of the basic premises of democracy itself (CHU 11) 
 
 
Explaining  her  rejection  of  what  she  understands  to  be  Hegel’s  idea  of  the  subject  and  the  
state as “complete” Butler refers to Mouffe’s Althusserian-inflected theory of the subject as 
“incomplete”.  The incompletion of the subject and the incompletion of any social or political 
groups (e.g. the state) go together in both Mouffe´s and Butler´s theories. This appears to be 
meant as a critique against the Hegelian formulation, in which the completion or all-
inclusiveness (or, conceptuality, to use Hegel´s words) of both the subject and the state go 
hand in hand.  The incompletion of polities includes the idea that any particular subject-
position in the polity is necessarily incomplete.  Butler writes: 
 
I understood the “incompletion” of the subject-position in the following ways: 
1)  as  the  failure  of  any  particular  articulation  to  describe  the  population  it  
represents; 2) that every subject is constituted differentially, and that what is 
produced as the “constitutive outside” of the subject can never become fully 
inside or immanent. I take this last point to establish the fundamental difference 
between the Althusserian-inflected work of Laclau and Mouffe and a more 
Hegelian  theory  of  the  subject  in  which  all  external  relations  are  –  at  least  
ideally – transformable into internal ones. (CHU 12) 
 
 
In a few of her books Butler refers to Mouffe´s idea of the radical democracy as a model in 
which a term is opened for future articulation. (There is, then, a continuous relation of cross-
reference between Mouffe and Butler. ) Butler writes in ES: 
 
The term gestures toward a referent it cannot capture. Moreover, that lack of 
capture constitutes the linguistic possibility of a radical democratic contestation, 
one that opens the term to future rearticulations. (ES 108) 
 
In  BM  Butler  speaks  of  the  “critical  reformulation  of  Althusser”,  conducted  by  Laclau  and  
Mouffe.  Butler writes of the central idea in this reformulation of Althusser: 
 
 
Their notion that every ideological formation is constituted through and against 
a constitutive antagonism and is, therefore, to be understood as an effort to cover 
over or  “suture” a set of contingent relations. Because this ideological suturing 
is never complete, that is, because it can never establish itself as a necessary or 
comprehensive set of connections, it is marked by a failure of complete 
determination, a constitutive contingency, that emerges within the ideological 
field as its permanent (and promising) instability.  Against a causal theory of 
historical events or social relations, the theory of radical democracy insists that 
political signifiers are contingently related, and that hegemony consists in the 
perpetual rearticulation of these contingently related signifiers, the weaving 
together of a social fabric that has no necessary ground, but that consistently 
produces the “effect” of its own necessity through the process of re-
articulation”.; ..” What is here understood as constitutive antagonism, the 
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nonclosure of definition, is assured by a contingency that underwrites every 
discursive formation”  (BM 192-193) 
 
 
This passage follows closely the argument presented in HSS (see e.g. ibid.122-132). The 
central  ideas of  this Althusserian-inflected theory of radical democracy have had an 
important influence on Butler’s thought. The central notions are: antagonism (conflicts, 
agonism, violence), the constitutive outside, and an idea of politics as a critical process which 
has no final resolution.  An idea of the “failure” of all particular descriptions of the common 
good, or of the subject, or world,  to capture the referent, which they attempt to describe, is 
also central to this theory.  
 
 
6.2. The influence of Carl Schmitt 
 
 
The political theory of Carl Schmitt appears important for Mouffe. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) 
was a German political and constitutional theorist. Especially in his books Political Theology 
(1922) and The Concept of the Political (1932) Schmitt developed his decisionist political 
theory. It was influenced by Hobbes and by the Catholic counter-revolutionary thinkers, but 
also by Hegel. 
 
For Schmitt, “the political” is the realm of sovereign, unconstrained decision. Political 
appears as a sovereign realm, because it is not determined by anything external, such as 
nature, God or some rational or developmental logic. The fundamental political decision is 
that which distinguishes “the friend” from the “enemy”, and the basis of that decision is 
essentially unpredictable and indeterminable. Collective political identities presupposed the 
existence  of  potentially  hostile  others,  the  relation  between  self  and  the  other  was  always  
conflictual. (Schmitt 1976, 26-27) 
 
Schmitt´s views were partly influenced by the struggle of recognition described in PhS (see 
e.g. Kennedy 2004, 104-107). However, for Schmitt, the relation between “us” and “they” 
(resembling basically Hegel´s relation between the self and the other) is always an external 
one. This means that the friend-enemy-relation it is not mediated by any “third”, which the 
“us” and “they” could mutually recognize. Consequently, there is no room for a Hegelian 
reciprocal recognition which would be mediated conceptually and  rationally.  Schmitt rejects 
un-political (liberal) societies, built upon individualism and the idea of individual freedom. 
These societies are abstractions which cannot produce their own positive theory of state, 
government and politics. An important feature in this is that these societies lack the political 
friend-enemy-principle. What Schmitt says of these un-political societies resembles Kojève´s 
descriptions of the Hegelian “Wise Men” in the “universal, homogeneous state” which 
constitutes  the  End of History (Schmitt 1976, 69-74) Schmitt argues in a passage where he 
criticizes  Hegel and  the un-political societies. 
 
“The triple structure weakens the polemical punch of the double-structured 
antithesis” (ibid. 74). 
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Schmitt was not primarily interested in developing an interpretation of Hegel, although he 
refers to Hegel in most of his works. Nevertheless, there is a certain parallelism between his 
political writings and those of Kojève. Although they were politically in opposite camps 
(Schmitt was a counter-revolutionary who also worked for the Nazis, while Kojève was a 
Marxist) these two thinkers were in correspondence after the war, and obviously respected 
each others. Kojève also visited in Schmitt’s seminars. (On the discussions between the two 
thinkers, see Müller, 2003, pp. 93-8.) Kojève, who studied in Germany in 1920’s, was 
probably aware of Schmitt’s ideas when formulating his influential interpretation of the 
struggle of recognition in Hegel’s PhS. At least in his unpublished work, Outline of a 
Phenomenology of Right (written in 1943 but not published until 1981) Kojève explicitly 
accepts Schmitt’s conception of “the political” (OPR, 134 - 135). In OPR Kojève makes clear 
that  the  Schmittian  “political”  will  disappear  at  the  End of  History.  Whole  the  work  can  be  
read as a critical response to Schmitt’s ideas (see Frost and Howse 2000). Its fundamental 
idea is that universal recognition is realized only in a legally regulated world where the law 
takes the role of the “third” as a mediator between “us” and “them”. In such a world, politics, 
as conceived by Schmitt as well as by Kojève, becomes needless (Müller 2003, 98).   
 
Like the postmodernists, such as Mouffe and Laclau, Schmitt would reject the Kojèvian idea 
of a “universal homogenous state” as the ultimate nightmare (Müller 2003, 95-6). For 
Schmitt, the liberal tradition, in its cosmopolitanism, legalism, and economism, actually 
strives for such a state. To quote Müller (ibid., 97), “Schmitt… thought that struggle could 
and should be preserved”.  In his critique of parliamentary politics, Schmitt (1985) reads 
Hegel mainly as the predecessor of Marxism.  Like Kojève in IRH, he ignores Hegel’s 
constitutional theory formulated in PR, and argues that Hegel’s theory may justify an 
“educational dictatorship”, although it cannot be derived directly from the theory. Like 
Kojève, he invokes the image of Napoleon arriving to Jena just at the moment when Hegel 
was writing his PhS (Schmitt 1985, 56-9).   
 
In all her political works published after HSS, Mouffe relies on Schmitt and accepts his 
friend-enemy distinction and his notion of politics  (OP 11-16, 77-81, 87; DP 3, 9, 36-59; RP 
105-116, 118-133; see also her anthology on Schmitt). In Mouffe,  the Schmittian political 
relation between “we” and “they” is described, however,  in a similar manner as how Butler 
describes the relation between the subject and the Other.  It appears that Mouffe´s reading of 
Schmitt is highly modified by the subject-theories of Lacan and Althusser.   Mouffe sees, via 
Lacan, that the political relation between the mutually antagonistic “we” and “they” 
corresponds to the  primary, antagonistic relation, structural of the subject itself and of each 
political concept. A political relation  does not hence exist only between groups of people, 
instead, it exists inside each individual subject and inside the linguistic terms which form the 
subject.  
 
For Mouffe, each subject is, like for Lacan and for Althusser, formed through an ideological 
power. This is why the constitutive outside remains a “lost referent” for the subject itself. 
Each subject is constituted by  a relation, corresponding basically to the Lacanian and 
Althusserian relation between the subject-position and the constitutive outside. Through 
Lacan,  Mouffe´s theory of the political relation can be seen to trace back to the Kantian 
theory of the “thing for us” and the “thing in itself” and to the Hegelian theory of the subject 
and the Other.    Through Lacan,  Mouffe´s theory of radical democracy  gets a strong post-
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Kantian and post- Hegelian flavor. Radical democracy is seen as a permanent, antagonistic 
process, which is constantly moved by the primary relation between the subject-position and 
the  constitutive  outside.  Subject  tries  to  explain  the  truth  of  who  it  is.  However,  all  
explanations fail as all explanations are parochial and they are based on the exclusion of the 
“true” outside.   This primary relation, structural of each subject corresponds to the relation 
between “we” and “they” at a social or national level. Mouffe contrasts, in reference to 
Derrida,  her idea of the radical political process to Hegel’s synthesizing dialectics: 
 
It is the notion of the “constitutive outside” which helps me to emphasize the 
usefulness of a deconstructive approach in grasping the antagonism inherent in 
all objectivity and the centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of 
collective political identities. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me 
point out that the “constitutive outside” cannot be reduced to a dialectical 
negation. In order to be a true outside, the outside has to be incommensurable 
with the inside, and at the same time, the condition of emergence of the latter. 
This is only possible if what is “outside” is not simply the outside of a concrete 
content but something which puts into question “concreteness” as such. This is 
what is involved in the Derridean notion of the “constitutive outside”: not a 
content  which would just be its dialectical opposite – which would be the case 
if we were simply saying that there is no “us” without a “them” – but a content 
which, by showing the radical undecidability of the tension of its constitution, 
makes its very positivity a function of the symbol exceeding it. (DP 12) 
 
    
Mouffe argues that the relation between the “inside” (the subject-position) and the 
“constitutive outside” remains un-decidable.  It is constituted through a tension which exceeds 
it. Apparently, this relation is similar to Butler´s ek-static relation, which also exceeds itself. 
This relation exceeds the conceptual capacities of the subject which it constitutes. In short, 
subject, or, society which is constituted by this relation is unknown for itself.   For  Mouffe,  
this means that the constitution is necessarily political.  (DP 20-22)  
 
Mouffe´s radical democracy as a conflictual  process, which corresponds to Butler´s  ek-static 
process  (and  contrasts  to  Hegel’s  synthesizing  dialectics).  Both  theorists  see  that  a  primary  
relation  which  is  “radical”  (by  way  of  remaining  unconceptualizable,  at  least  fully)  and  
“conflictual” must be preserved in order for a  historical change and politics itself to be 
possible. For both theorists, it is important that the  conflictuality of political movement is not 
tried to by suffocated by a  consensus. Mouffe adheres to plurality, but, unlike the traditional 
pluralists, sees it as conflictual rather than consensual. Mouffe describes radical democracy 
also as a “paradox”. It appears as paradoxical because the particular political actors 
necessarily strive for something (a hegemony, a universal consensus over their own truth) 
which, however,  should and could  not be reached. For if there will be a universal consensus 
over the truth, the political, conflictual relation would cease to exist. Consequently, politics 
would disappear and, in Kojeve´s words, history would end. This kind of  mediation between 
the antithetical  “us” and “they”, through  a “third” (emphasized in Kojève’s unpublished 
OPR),  is  rejected  also  by  Schmitt  as  un-political.     Mouffe´s  theory  shares  with  Butler  the  
basic “Kojèvian” problem of historical and political movement as striving for the impossible.  
This basically “Kojèvian paradox” is carried into Mouffe´s theory through the post-Hegelian 
thinkers like Lacan, Althusser, and, also through Schmitt.  
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However, it should be noted that Schmitt, in contrast to the Kojèvian, post-Hegelian thinkers 
like Lacan, Althusser, and Foucault,  did not speak of the antagonistic relation as a relation of 
“violent unknowingness”, structural and internal to each political group, each subject, and 
each identity.  In this, Schmitt´s theory is fundamentally different to the more 
psychoanalytically oriented thinkers like Lacan, Althusser, Mouffe, and Butler.  Actually, 
Mouffe acknowledges this and names it as the “Schmittian problem”. For Schmitt, nations, or 
all politically relevant groups of people, are constituted the mutually antagonistic parties of 
“we” and “they”. For Schmitt, the mutually conflictual groups are, however, not internally 
conflictual, as themselves. The self and the Other are invariably conceived as political groups.  
In contrast to Mouffe,  the political groups are supposed to be homogeneous; indeed, the 
principle of internal homogeneity is essential for Schmitt. Mouffe´s theory of all identities as 
internally conflictual (i.e. as including a primary conflictual relationship) draws, hence, 
mainly from  post-Hegelian theorists like Althusser and Lacan, rather than from Schmitt. (DP 
49-57) (Ultimately, the “Schmittian problem” seems to be that Schmitt does not say what he, 
according to Mouffe, should have said!) In spite of her frequent references to Schmitt, 
Mouffe´s theory is actually quite unlike Schmitt’s. The same could be said about the views of 
other Lacanians (e.g. those of Zizek, 1999, 114-5) who have been interested in Schmitt’s 
works. 
 
In  the  following  chapters,   Mouffe´s   theory  of  radical  democracy  is  examined  critically.  
Special emphasis is paid to two of her books The Democratic Paradox (2000) and The Return 
of the Political (1993) and On the Political (2005).    Mouffe defines her notion of  Radical 
democrary to a large extent through criticizing other theories of democracy.  Mouffe’s 
criticism of the modern, or liberal  theories of democracy is explained in the following 
chapters. In the last chapter, a comparison between Butler and Mouffe is made. I intend to 
show that Mouffe’s more specific and politically more articulated theory of democracy can be 
criticized on the same basis as Butler’s general theory.  
 
 
6.3. The self-defeating argument 
 
 
What is Mouffe’s basic argument against the modern (liberal) theories of democracy?  In 
criticizing consensus-oriented authors like Rawls or Habermas, she uses the following 
argument:  The  criticized  authors  try  to  solve  the  “paradox  of  democracy”   by  presenting  a  
comprehensive theory of democracy, and claim that all consistent democrats should agree 
with them. However, an actual consensus  on  the  truth  of  any  particular  interpretation  of  
democracy would, in effect, destroy the agonistic tensions which are central for democracy. 
An agreement on the basic principles of democracy would stop the movement of democratic 
society, create a stasis. It is this very process, produced by the tensions and differences, that is 
really important and valuable in democracy. Thus, all attempts to provide a comprehensive 
theory of democracy are (indirectly) self-defeating. If the correct, true theory of democracy 
were to be found, and if it were generally accepted it would undo the whole democracy. If a 
theory of what the relations between the various mutual “others” (i.e. political subjects) are 
were recognized by the political subjects themselves, there would be no attitude of violent 
exclusion any more. The political subjects (which constitute each others´ “others”)  would not 
exclude each others any more from their vision of the ideal society,  and try to gain universal 
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recognition just for their own particular ideal any more.  This kind of “reciprocally 
recognitive” attitude would undo the democracy itself.  Mouffe joins Butler in the criticism of 
consensus-oriented communivative systems: 
 
 
To believe that a final resolution of conflicts is eventually possible – even if it is 
seen as an asymptotic approach to the reguilative idea of a rational consensus – 
far from providing the necessary horizon of a democratic project, is something 
that  puts  it  at  risk.  Indeed,  such  an  illusion  carries  implicitly  the  desire  for  a  
reconciled society where pluralism is superseded. When it is conceived in such a 
way, pluralist democracy becomes a “self-refuting ideal” because the very 
moment of its realization would coincide with its disintegration (DP,32) 
 
And, again: 
 
Indeed, one could not indicate how, in both Rawls and Habermas (…) the very 
condition for the creation of consensus is the elimination of pluralism from the 
public sphere (DP, 49)  
 
 
For  Mouffe, the fundamental fact is that there cannot be any solutions to the basic questions 
of democracy, and all attempts to find such solutions or even justify the possibility of having 
such solutions are positively harmful: 
 
…my aim was to reveal the danger of postulating that there could be a rational 
definite solution to the question of justice in a democratic society (DP 32)  
 
It is important to notice that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is not just a modus vivendi , a 
practical way to cope with the contingent but all-pervasive fact that in the modern world, 
people tend to disagree. For Mouffe, the pluralism and difference is a positive good in itself. 
It is something we should “valorize” and “be thankful for” (RP 139). All attempts to “close” 
the democratic process are dangerous because conflicts and confrontations are the very 
essence of democracy: 
 
A project of radical and plural democracy…requires the existence of 
multiplicity, of plurality and of conflict…(RP,18) 
 
In a democratic polity, conflicts and confrontations, far from being a sign of 
imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and inhabitated by pluralism (DP, 
34). 
 
One of the keys to the thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing 
democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence (DP 
103) 
 
Of course, not any confrontation or conflict would do. Pure power-struggles between self-
interested actors, or clashes of forces between fanatical groups are not radical in the required 
sense.  A  radical   agonist  does  not  praise  all  conflicts.  Democratic  conflicts  are,  in  a  sense,  
always conflicts about democracy, about its content. They arise between principled and 
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sincerely held views: 
 
Without a plurality of competing forces which attempt to define the common 
good, and aim at fixing the identity of the community, the political articulation 
of the demos could not take place. (DP 56) 
 
Mouffe´s thought here, that it is important that competing and conflicting forces try each to 
define the common good, resembles Butler´s idea of politics. For Butler, like for Mouffe, it is 
important that there is political views which are subjective and particular in the sense that 
they exclude each others and compete each others in trying to gain universal consensus to 
their own particular truth. For Butler, terms, such as democracy or justice (and, no doubt also 
“common good”) are internally ek-static “sites of conflict”. There is a constant internal 
conflict over the meaning of various  terms. 
 
In the following passage the argument is encapsulated: 
 
They (the mainstream democratic theorists)are unable to acknowledge that, 
while it is indeed the case that individual rights and democratic self-government 
are constitutive of liberal democracy…there exists between their respective 
“grammars” a tension that can never be eliminated…Such tension, though 
ineradicable, can be negotiated in different way. Indeed, a great part of 
democratic politics is precisely about the negotiation of that paradox and the 
articulation of precarious solutions. What is misguided is the search for a final 
rational resolution. Not only can it not succeed, but moreover it leads to putting 
undue constrainst on the political debate. Such a search should be recognized for 
what it really is, another attempt at insulating politics from the effects of the 
pluralism of value, this time by trying to fix once and for all the meaning and 
hierarchy of the central liberal-democratic values (DP 93; cf. RP 150).  
 
Mouffe´s rejection of “final solutions” which would fix “once and for all” the meaning of 
democratic values echoes Butler´s rejection of “full” and “final” conceptualizations of 
politically  central notions like  “human”. For Mouffe, as for Butler, politics is about a 
permanent process, ongoing movement. The process is structured by the conflictual relation 
between the mutually exclusive parties of  the “subject-position” and the “constitutive 
outside”.  
 
Mouffe criticises the efforts to solve the  basic questions concerning democracy, e.g. the role 
of individual rights versus popular sovereignty in democratic states.  Some contemporary 
theorists  of  democracy  –  e.  g.  John  Rawls  or  Ronald  Dworkin   -  claim that  rights  are  more  
fundamental, while some others like Jeremy Waldron claim that the principle of popular 
sovereignty is more fundamental. Finally, authors like Habermas say that there is no 
incompatibility. All these theorists try to provide theoretical arguments for their respective 
positions. But, according to Mouffe, they are all mistaken. There is no solution to the 
question; moreover, all attempts to solve the question are dangerous to democracy, for, if any 
of the solutions were to gain general acceptance, it would eliminate the plurality and the 
necessary tension. However, it is argued here that if we all would accept Mouffe’s view that 
there is no solution, the result would also be the elimination of the tension.  The “tension” is 
there only as long as people think that there can be a correct interpretation but disagree on the 
nature of the correct interpretation. It should be noted that Mouffe uses this “self-
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defeatingness”-argument when arguing against the other theorist of democracy. It is 
appropriate to ask whether Mouffe’s own theory passes the test she applies to the others.    
 
According to Mouffe´s agonistic theory, none of the conflicting interpretations of the rights-
sovereignty issue can possibly be the right one. Unlike most participants of the dispute, she 
knows that the problem is actually unsolvable. But because the tension between the various 
positions is essential in democracy (RP, 110), she should actually welcome all theoretical 
attempts – including those of Dworkin, Habermas,  and Rawls – to keep the issue alive by 
providing their conflicting solutions. A general acceptance of Mouffe’s own view would be as 
fatal for “the tension” and for democracy as a general acceptance of any of the competing 
single correct solution –views. Correct solution -theorists like Rawls, Dworkin or Habermas 
seem to play an important role in the conflict by providing theoretical support to various 
conflicting proposals. 
 
This malign form of the “democratic paradox” is visible in the question she poses  to Rawls: 
 
…why doesn’t [Rawls’s] conception of democracy leave any space for the 
agonistic confrontation among contested interpretations of the shared liberal-
democratic principles? (DP, 30) 
 
Again, when discussing communitarianism, Mouffe says: 
 
Its rejection of pluralism and defence of a substantive idea of the ‘common 
good’ represents, in my view, another way of evading the ineluctability of 
antagonism. There will always be competing interpretations of the political 
principles of liberal democracy, and the meanings of liberty and equality will 
never cease to be contested. Citizenship is vital for democratic politics, but a 
modern democratic theory must make room for competing conceptions of our 
identities as citizens.(RP, 7) 
 
 
In other words, we (Rawls, the communitarians etc.) should refrain from putting forth our 
own interpretations, in order to “make room” for the competing interpretations. What is the 
moral requirement presupposed in these critical comments? One possible reply to Mouffe is 
that Rawls’s or the communitarians’ interpretations of democracy do not “leave any space” 
for other interpretations for the simple reason that they are themselves among those 
confronting interpretations of liberal-democratic principles.  
 
Mouffe´s claim that the competing interpretations themselves should “leave room” for other 
interpretations, by not presenting their interpretation as  “complete and final”, resembles 
Butler´s criticism against any descriptions of society which think that they are complete and 
final. Like Butler, Mouffe endorses incompletion, in the sense of acknowledging the Other of 
any  conception  of  the common good. This “Other” cannot be conceptualized and whenever 
particular ideas of the common good are presented, the Other is violated.  Consequently, this 
“un-conceptualizable” Other should be acknowledged by endorsing the incomplete 
(indeterminate, un-conceptualizable) nature of any description of the common good.    
 
Consider the following passage taken from Mouffe: 
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political philosophy has an important role to play here, not in deciding the true 
meaning of notions like justice, equality or liberty, but proposing different 
interpretations of those notions. (RP 115; italics in the original). 
 
The question is, can we propose an interpretation of something without simultaneously 
proposing that it is (or at least might be) the true interpretation? Presumably, Mouffe herself 
tries to provide a true theory, although its central message is that notions like justice, equality 
or liberty do not have “the true meaning”. Suppose that an interpretation of something is 
proposed in a serious vein. We may reasonably require that it somehow takes other, 
competing  interpretations  into  account,  and  discusses  with  them.  But  can  we  require  that  a  
single interpretation has to “leave space” within itself for other, competing interpretations? 
Could it be a general demand for all conceptions of democracy that each of them leaves space 
within itself for other interpretations? And were they to do that, would there be any reasons 
left for agonistic confrontations between them? If they all leaved space for the others, the 
space would, presumably, not became occupied by anyone. Or, could Habermas, Rawls et alii 
get off the hook simply by adding a single sentence to the Prefaces of their respective books: 
“The interpretation suggested in this work is not intended to give the true meaning   of  the  
basic concepts (justice etc.)”, and then, by going on as usual? 
 
 
All  this constitutes a problem, for according to Mouffe,  the existence of different genuinely 
competing conceptions is essential:  
 
Ideally, such a confrontation should be staged around the diverse conceptions of 
citizenship which correspond to the different interpretations of the ethico-
political principles: liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-
democratic, and so on. Each of them proposes its own interpretation of the 
‘common good’… A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of 
democratic political positions. (DP 103-4) 
 
Obviously, all the proponents of these different conceptions are expected to defend their own 
conception as true (correct, valid) conceptions. Otherwise there would no clash between 
them. It is essential for democracy that these conceptions are mutually excluding. But what is 
Mouffe’s own position in this “vibrant clash”? The theorist of agonistic democracy appears 
here as a stage-master, as someone standing outside and above the confrontation. She knows 
that none of the protagonists playing their part in the democratic drama is actually defending 
the true view, for there cannot be any correct interpretation of the common good or any  right 
answer  to  the  questions  of  justice  (e.g.  RP,  64:  “substantive  common  good  has  became  
impossible”). But, because the confrontation between different conceptions of citizenship 
and/or  common  good  is  the  very  condition  of  the  existence  of  a  working  democracy,  it  is  
important that there are sufficiently many people around who sincerely hold these various 
convictions, however misguided they might be. Thus, all these mistaken and one-sided 
conceptions of democracy (“liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal” etc.) - 
criticized elsewhere in Mouffe’s writings - should be kept alive, if possible.  If people did not 
sincerely believe that the best definition of the common good exists, there would be no basis 
for the necessary confrontation and agonism. To conclude,  Mouffe’s theory can be criticized 
by  using  the  same  form  of  argument  she  herself  uses  against  other  theories.  The  theory  of   
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agonistic democracy is self-defeating in the same way as the Rawlsian or Habermassian 
theories are claimed to be. If all (or sufficiently many) citizens would actually accept the 
agonistic view that there are no justifiable solutions to the problems of justice and of common 
good, the essential agonism would disappear. In order to work, the agonistic democracy has 
to presuppose that most people do not share the agonist view. In the terms used in this study, 
it presupposes a Lord-Bondsman –relationship.  
 
For this reason, the agonistic theory cannot work as a basis for the self-understanding of those 
subjects who themselves participate in political struggles. Inadvertely, it is based on a similar  
“pure self-consciousness” as Butler´s ek-static politics.  In Mouffe, politics is divided 
dualistically into two realms. There is  concrete politics, where hegemonic claims are made. 
This realm is conflictual and its processes take place through a “struggle for recognition”.  
And, then there is the realm of the observing theorist, who does not itself take part in the 
struggle for recognition.  Instead, the external theorists just observes how the various “terms” 
such as “common good” become politically constructed  within the various struggles. This 
agonistic democracy is possible only when most people continue to believe in something 
which, according to this theory, is actually impossible, a “necessary error”. Consider someone 
who is fighting for women’s rights in a society where they are not firmly secured. Surely, she 
is  committed  to  the  position  that  there  exists  “one”  or  “the  best”  solution  in  this  particular  
issue,  namely  to  give  women  their  rights.  She  may  sometimes  welcome  opposition,  for  the  
confrontation may help her to make her own position more clear, for herself as well as for the 
others. She may well admit that the particular institutional solutions advocated by her need 
not be the final word; in the future, they might be superseded by some other arrangements. 
But surely, her basic aim is that women’s rights were to be secured firmly and irrevocably, 
that they are elevated above everyday political disputes, that the consensus supporting these 
rights becomes in her society, as wide as possible. She may, realistically, admit that she 
cannot expect a complete consensus: there are and will always be some people who are 
unwilling to accept even the basic rights for women. But, unlike the agonist, she can hardly 
“valorize” this disagreement, or see it a positive good as such.  
 
Mouffe’s discussion on the continuous relevance of the Left-Right –dimension in politics  
provides another illustration of the problem. In OP, she argues, through Freud and Lacan, that 
political discourse must be able to offer people, not only alternative policies, but also political 
identities which are strong enough to mobilize political passions (OP 30). Therefore, the Left-
Right division is still relevant: 
 
A well functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic political 
positions. This is what the confrontation between left and right needs to be 
about. (idem.) 
 
For this reason, Mouffe calls for a revitalization of the left/right distinction . However, 
 
what is at stake in the left/right opposition is not a particular content (…) but a 
recognition of social division and the legitimation of the conflict. (OP, 120) 
 
The very content of left and right will vary, but the dividing line should remain 
because its disappearance would indicate that social division is denied and that 
an ensemble of voices has been silenced. (OP 121)  
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The critical question is: Would the activists at the left and at the right be willing to participate 
in politics in those terms? Would they be interested in defending their respective positions just 
in order to keep democracy “well functioning”, to offer strong identities for people, and to 
“legitimate  the  conflict”?  Ironically,  Mouffe’s  argument  for  the  continuous  relevance  of  the  
Right-Left  -dimension  is itself formulated from a viewpoint which is supposed to be above 
that dimension.  
  
Mouffe´s politics can be compared to that of Butler’s. For example, in CHU she opposes the 
same-sex marriage laws because that would end the marriage as a “contested zone”. She asks, 
 
how does it become possible to keep an open and political efficacious conflict of 
interpretations alive? (CHU, 161) 
 
“Keeping conflicts alive” is important in democracy, for 
 
the open-endedness that is essential to democratization implies that the universal 
cannot be finally identified with any particular content, and that this 
incommensurability  (…)  is crucial to the futural possibilities of democratic 
contestation. (idem.) 
 
The core of Butler’s argument against the legalization of same-sex marriages is, then, that it 
would remove the problem from the democratic contest. To put it bluntly, only someone who 
has nothing personal at stake would be appealed by this kind of argument. But, as with 
Mouffe, with Butler, the point (presumably, the point of political theorists) is not to answer to 
question like “what is right?” or “what ought universality to be” but to “provoke a political 
discourse that sustains the questions” (CHU, 41). Nevertheless she asks; 
 
can a critical intellectual use the very terms she subjects to criticism, accepting 
the pre-theoretical force of their deployment in the contexts where they are 
urgently needed? (ibid, 159) 
 
Butler’s view is similar to that of Mouffe. “Keeping conflicts alive” and “valorizing 
unrealizability” (CHU 269) are important for the political theorist only; as generally shared, 
such arguments would be self-defeating.  If all agreed that the questions about the content of 
universality were to be left unanswered, the questions would lose their meaning. An 
affirmative answer to Butler’s last question allows that a critical intellectual is allowed to 
appeal to terms like “justice”, “rights” or “common good” – because there are others who 
have not understood that the terms are actually without any determinable content.  
 
In this analysis, Butler’s political thought is seen to correspond to Hegel’s description of pure 
self-consciousness, and especially Unhappy Consciousness. In spite of Butler’s criticism of 
Althusser, it also seems to presuppose something like the epistemically privileged position  of 
Althusser’s scientific Marxism, which is able to distinguish between the political conceptions 
of ideological subjects and the pure political theory formulated externally, by the Science 
which is free from subjective limitations. Butler’s politics is seen to include a duality into two 
political realms. There is the realm of particular political agents, who must necessarily think 
differently of things than Butler herself, in order for Butler´s politics to be possible.  The 
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particular political agents cannot  “leave room for contradicting otherness” inside their own 
views – at least so that they would do this consciously.  They cannot recognize their internal 
otherness,   hence,   they  cannot  think  of  themselves  the  same way as  Butler  thinks  of  them,  
and of all subjects. In other words,  they cannot acknowledge and valorize the radical ek-
statism of things.  If they did, conflictual politics, in which contradicting others are excluded 
(instead of being given room inside one´s own “truths”) would no more take place. Like in 
Butler, in Mouffe there must be particular political agents who think differently than herself. 
If they thought like Mouffe and Butler and acknowledged that their own “truth” is actually 
constituted by the Other which it excludes, their truth would not in fact exclude the Other any 
more. Instead, it would include the Other, by way of acknowledging it as constitutive of their 
own truth.  Consequently,  Mouffe´s conflictual,  otherness-refuting  politics depends on there 
being political agents for whom the other is not constitutive of themselves. Thus, Mouffe’s 
political theory presents the paradoxical conclusions of Butler’s theory in a more articulated 
form.    
 
 
6.4. Principles, decisions, and “the political” 
 
 
As I already argued, in her understanding of “the political”, Mouffe owes a lot to Carl 
Schmitt.  However,  as  concerns  the  most  fundamental  structure  of  the  “political”,  the  theory  
draws ultimately from the ideas of  Kojève, transmitted to Mouffe through Althusser, Lacan 
and Derrida.   
 
In her works, Mouffe  tries to combine ideas taken from different sources: from 
Wittgenstein’s and Oakeshott’s critiques of rationalism, from Derrida’s radical undecidability 
of meanings, and from Carl Schmitt’s existentialist-decisionistic critique of liberal legal 
theories. These ideas are not easily combined.  But it is quite true that they all converge at 
least at one point. They can all be seen as powerful critiques of a certain model of ethical and 
political decision- making. In order to introduce the issue,   a crude picture could be drawn – 
perhaps a caricature – of  the kind of model of  political or ethical decision making criticized 
(directly or indirectly) by all these authors. In this picture, ethical decision- making is based 
on principles. We have a rationally warranted general principle, roughly, of the form 
“Whenever the situation is S, do A”. This is the major premise. We, more or less passively, 
recognize that the situation at hands is S. This is the minor premise. Then, we have to draw 
the inescapable conclusion: “We have to do A”. In this model, practical decision- making is 
modelled as a logical inference. If we have to accept the premises, there is no way to avoid 
the conclusion. What is wrong with this picture? It could be said   that this crude picture has 
very little to do with the real life decision making. Nothing in this simplified model does 
indicate that it is intended to be a model of practical decision making. It does not distinguish 
between the first person perspective – our choosing – and the third person perspective – the 
description of a choice made by an outsider. It does not distinguish between a purely 
hypothetical argument and an actual decision.  Indeed, it could as well describe a trivial 
exercise performed in a logic class. The element of will is absent. (DP 75-7, 105, 129, 135) 
 
An existentialist-decisionistic critic like Schmitt focuses on the major premise of the model, 
the principle. “You justify your action by appealing to a principle. You say that it necessitates 
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your choice. But then, your real choice was made when you adopted the principle, and 
decided to stick to it in this particular case.” For Schmitt and Mouffe, the fundamental 
decision (by which e.g. a hegemonic principle is chosen) is political. The question how far the 
Other should be taken into account – tolerated, consulted, included into one’s own group – is 
solved by a political decision. This decision is not determined by anything external to the 
(political) decision itself. As such, the decision itself is, ultimately,  sovereign.  A decision 
maker who has accepted the inference model may try to counter this critique by providing 
further justifications – e.g. other, more general and more abstract reasons – for her principle. 
But the critic would simply repeat her critique: “And how do you justify these further 
reasons?” Any chain of justifications has to end somewhere. A rationalist (say, Kant) thinks 
that at the end we reach the reasons that should be acknowledged by every rational person. 
For Wittgenstein, the end of the chain is something like “the forms of life”, the basic practices 
which cannot be questioned without stepping out from our shared life, and which are not open 
for any further justifications. For a decisionist like Schmitt, the end of the chain could only be 
a “sovereign decision”, “substantially unbounded by any norms”, as Schmitt says in his 
Political Theology.  When  an   appeal  is  made  to  justificatory  reasons  like  principles,  the  
decision-makers have already chosen these reasons. For a reason or a principle cannot force 
itself  upon  us.  They  have  to  choose  it.   Thus,  the  first,  original,  most  fundamental  choice  
precedes all reasons and principles. (On this argument, see Rasch 2000, 4-9.) This does not 
mean that this fundamental moment of choice is ever reached in actual situations. It works as 
a  conceptual  idealization  which  helps  to  understand  the  ultimate  nature  of  all  choosing. 
(Laclau  1990; for a detailed critique see Norris 2002). 
 
This  unconstrained  choice  is,  for  Schmitt  as  well  as  for  Mouffe  and  for  Laclau,  the  proper  
realm of “the political”. Indeed, “the political” seems simply to mean a choice from which 
there is no further appeal to any rational reasons. Ultimately, it is behind everything:  
 
…the political cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution, or envisaged 
as constituting a specific sphere or level of society. It must be conceived as 
dimension that is inherent to every human society and that determines our very 
ontological condition. (RP, 3) 
 
“The political” must be conceived both as autonomous and as supreme. It is autonomous, 
because the ultimate choice cannot be regulated by any moral or rational principles. It is 
supreme, because it precedes the choice of all such principles. Hence, moral, scientific, 
aesthetic, religious etc. choices can be evaluated from the political point of view; political 
choices can be evaluated only politically. These “specific spheres” of human societies are 
constituted by rules, principles and standards; “the political”, as contrast, is constituted by the 
lack of such rules, principles or standards. To quote Mouffe again: “Politics cannot be 
reduced to rationality precisely because it indicates the limits of rationality” (RP, 115).  
 
Surely, this is a metaphysical view of the world. It may be a plausible one, but it is 
metaphysical all the same. Here we detect a difference between Mouffe and those 20th century 
thinkers who, like Mouffe, have also emphasized the specific role of “the political”. Authors 
like Max Weber or Hannah Arendt argued that “the political” was autonomous in the sense 
that it could not be reduced to economy, science, morality, or law. They thought that “the 
political” had its own logic and own point of view, and wanted to free it from the iron-cages 
of the bureaucracy (Weber) or of “the social” (Arendt). In these respects, their views were 
quite like those expressed by Mouffe.  But unlike Mouffe (and Schmitt, cf. e.g. Scheuerman 
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1994, 17-24), they never conceived the political as supreme, as something which “determines 
our very ontological condition”.  
 
Here,  it is important to make two critical points.  First, if the inference model of decision 
making sketched above does not capture the essential aspects of real life decisions, it is 
claimed here that the Schmittian model is equally alien to our experience. We do not really 
have experience of a choice made in a normative vacuum. We may well admit that in the real 
life,  there  may  well  be  different  moral,  rational  etc,  considerations  pulling  us  to  different  
directions, and there need not be any single, pre-determined way to solve these conflicts. 
Some of our basic choices may be underdetermined by reasons. Hence, they cannot be 
described as inferences based on undeniable premises. But a difficult or tragic choice is not a 
choice made outside and before all reasons.  In real life, there are always some reasons, 
however inconclusive, and they structure situations in which our choices are made. This is 
true both of personal ethical choices and of political choices.  Thus, it seems that Mouffe (and 
Schmitt) present  a false dilemma. Their dilemma is this: either our choices are fully 
determined  by  rational  principles,  and  there  is  no  real  choice,  or  then,  all  principles  are  
chosen, so the “first” choice must be totally undetermined. They also argue that all actual 
choices are political, in the sense that they are constituted by an antagonistic “us” and “they” 
relation. However, it is argued  here that the dilemma is an unnecessary  one, for both of the 
alternatives are inadequate. By a reference made to Hegelian reciprocally recognitive 
relationships, it is argued here that we do not have to make decisions from the view point of 
the Hegelian “Unhappy consciousness”.  The Unhappy Consciousness (a version of pure self-
consciousness) sees two types of “things” (or values, principles etc.). There are either “pure” 
terms which are abstracted from particular content. Or, there are particular terms, the content 
of  which is based on the conflictual relationship between the self and the other. In a Kojèvian 
fashion, things are either “free individuals”, empty from all particular content, and of all 
conflict. Or, then they are “sites of the struggle for recognition”.  However, it is argued here 
that we have more alternatives than those presented by the Kojèvian or  the Schmittian 
traditions.  Hegel’s model of the reciprocally recognitive  relationships presents a model 
which, importantly, acknowledges our inevitable need to take “the other” into account.  It 
acknowledges that the need to recognize others is a need felt by particular subjects, in their 
historical contexts, not only by “pure” (abstract) theorists or other external observers.    
 
Second, Mouffe says that responsibility presupposes unbounded decisions. Because principles 
do not force themselves upon us, we can never avoid criticism simply by appealing to the pre-
existing principles. Hence,  
 
 
we should never refuse bearing responsibility for our decisions by invoking the 
commands of general rules or principles… This emphasis on the moment of 
decision and on responsibility enables us to envisage democratic politics in a 
different way because it subverts the ever-present temptation in democratic 
societies to disguise existing forms of exclusion under the veil of rationality or 
of morality. (DP 74) 
 
 
It is true that responsibility is not compatible with the mechanistic model of decisions 
sketched above. But, contrary to what Mouffe seems to claim, the presence of principles and 
of  other  reasons  is  as  essential  for  responsibility  as  the  relative indeterminacy of our 
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decisions. To say that someone is responsible does not just mean that she can be identified as 
the first link in some chain of events. That we are responsible for our choices means that we 
could legitimately be criticized and praised, punished and rewarded for our choices. But these 
practices presuppose, not only relative freedom and causal efficiency, but also some shared 
reasons or principles. Someone can be held responsible for her choices only if there are some 
standards of conduct which can be used in judgments, and which the chooser herself is 
expected to accept as binding. This becomes clear in the cases of negligence. We may be held 
responsible,  not  only  for  what  we  have  done,  but  also  for  what  we  have  not  done.  But  the  
number of possible deeds we have not done is infinite. How we can ever be responsible for 
something we have not done? The answer is that we can legitimately be responsible for 
something we have not done only if there is some shared reason why we should have done 
the required action.  
 
Hegel´s theory of pure self-consciousness and Unhappy Consciousness describes forms of  
thinking which do not recognize any particular principles or standards as binding, because 
these standards are  always seen as parochial and constituted by the refutation of the Other. 
Hegel argued that this kind of thinking results into “absolute freedom”, a sort of abstract 
individualism. When abstract individualism becomes actual (i.e. when inter-subjective 
situations are judged in referencto to it)  it results into a culture in which it is impossible to 
think of such things as responsibility.  Abstract individualism refrains, to start with, from 
taking any particular idea of a subject as its point of departure. A refusal to take any particular 
form of subjectivity as a normative criteria  is also the ground idea in Mouffe’s and Butler’s 
subject-theories. However, when  particular subjects cannot be identified, no subjects can be 
identified. When  subjects are lacking, there cannot exist such inter-subjective relations in 
which responsibilities could be based.   Responsibility can be only  an abstraction.  It cannot 
be binding because there are no subjects who could be bound by it. Further, it does not relate 
to any shared, particular standards.  It means everything and nothing, as any other term, 
including the “subject”.  
 
Hegel’s theory of  a free society,  which is constituted for reciprocally recognitive particular 
subjects offers another model for thinking about principles and responsibility.  Particular 
standards are recognized as collectively binding in it. They are not only imposed by the 
coercive will of the state or the government.  Consequently, people can be held responsible on 
the basis of these standards. At the same time, however, the principles are seen as changeable 
through contradicting others. If an argument is made that the principles exclude some Others, 
the principles can be changed.    Principles are thus not alien, i.e. constituted on the necessary 
refutation (and the silencing, exclusion) of others. Responsibility, based on particular 
principles, does not constitute (at least not necessarily) a further instance of a struggle to force 
the other to take responsibility on the basis of alien, strange principles.      
 
6.5. Democracy and its limits 
 
 
For a theorist of democracy, the fundamental question is, whether democracy itself is 
ultimately just a result of a pure (rationally and normatively unlimited, hegemonic) political 
decision. If it is, there are no rational or moral arguments for choosing democracy rather than, 
say, dictatorship. The question how far – if at all – the conflicting opinions of the others are 
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taken into account or even tolerated, is arbitrary. This, indeed, was Schmitt’s view. He was 
ready to argue that dictatorship could be a legitimate expression of the collective will of a 
group. Hence, he could also embrace the most violent way to exclude the Other, the National 
Socialism with  its  racial  practices.  Mouffe’s  position  is  unclear.  If  she  rejects  this  arbitrary  
basis for democracy, does her position really differ from the universalisms defended by Rawls 
or Habermas? She asks: 
 
should liberal democracy be envisaged as the rational solution to the political 
question of how to organize human coexistence? Does it therefore embody the 
just society the one that should be universally accepted by all rational and 
reasonable individuals? Or does it merely represent one form of political order 
among  other  possible  ones?  A  political   form  of  human  coexistence  ,  which,  
under certain conditions, can be deemed ‘just’, but that must also be seen as the 
product of a particular history, with specific historical, cultural and geographical 
conditions of existence.  
 
This is indeed a crucial question because, if this second view is the correct one, 
we have to acknowledge that there might be other just political forms of society, 
products of other contexts. Liberal democracy should therefore renounce its 
claim to universality. It is worth stressing that those who argue along those lines 
insist that, contrary to what the universalists declare, such a position does not 
necessarily entail accepting a relativism that would justify any political system. 
What it requires is envisaging a plurality of legitimate answers to the question of 
what is the just political order. However, political judgment would not be made 
irrelevant, since it would still be possible to discriminate between just and unjust 
regimes (DP 62-3) 
 
To  this,   two comments  are  relevant.   First,  it  is  argued  here  that  Mouffe  misconstructs  the  
universalistic claim made by the liberal democrats. The liberal-democratic universalists are 
not defending – or at least, are not committed to defend -  the thesis that liberal democracy is 
the best form of government in all imaginable contexts. (Surely, they are not bound to deny 
that the liberal democratic political form has a history.) They claim that the liberal-democratic 
basic values – liberty and equality – are universal, and that in our present world or context, 
characterized by e.g. a pluralistic culture, a certain level of education, a certain level of 
technological and economic development, large and interdependent communities etc., the 
liberal-democratic institutions realize these values better than any other institutions. This 
judgment is supposed to be universally true, warranted by moral and rational and moral 
considerations.   In other words,  the liberal  democrats like Dworkin,  Rawls or Habermas are 
not defending the claim “It is true in all contexts that liberal democracy is the best system in 
all contexts” but the more modest claim “It is true in all contexts that liberal democracy is the 
best system in our context”.  This  allows  the  possibility  that,  in  radically  different  contexts,  
different institutional solutions may be compatible with the basic values of liberty and 
equality. Does Mouffe really disagree with them or not?  
 
Second, Mouffe says that her position does not entail relativism, but only a “plurality of 
answers” to the question of what is the just political order. She does not give any hint on how 
the non-liberal democratic, but equally just orders would look like.  But she clearly says that 
some possible alternatives are definitely ruled out. Hence, there must be some criteria, 
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however general or vague, for the justness of various regimes.  And hence, all her questions, 
initially addressed to the liberal democrats, may also be addressed to herself. Are all 
reasonable individuals bound to accept these more permissive criteria of a just order? Are 
these criteria universal? Are they products of particular histories? Are they ultimately based 
on a normatively unlimited choice? There is no middle way: by accepting the validity of a 
single universal judgment – however general or vague -  we make ourselves vulnerable to all 
anti-universalistic attacks. More generally: the plurality of acceptable answers does solve the 
problems arising from the fact that people seem to have different, partly competing criteria of 
what constitutes an acceptable answer. But it does not solve the problem of the justification. 
As long as some possible  answers  (for example,  National  Socialism)  are  rejected,  some  
ethical criteria are needed, and the problem of justification is there. (cf. Zizek 1999, 174) 
  
6.6. The problem of foundations 
 
 
Indeed, if one sees the democratic revolution as Lefort portrays it, as the 
distinctive feature of modernity, then it becomes clear that what one means 
when  one  refers  to  postmodernity  in  philosophy  is  a  recognition  of  the  
impossibility of any ultimate foundation or final legitimation that is constitutive 
of  the  very  advent  of  democratic  form of  society  and  thus  of  modernity  itself.  
(RP 11-2) 
 
On one side we find the ‘rationalist-universalists’ who – like Ronald Dworkin, 
the early Rawls and Habermas – assert that the aim of political theory is to 
establish universal truths, valid for all independently of the historico-cultural 
context. (DP, 63) 
 
In spite of the ambiguities noted above, the core of Mouffe’s critique of democratic theories 
(those put forth by Rawls, Habermas, Dworkin, and by the deliberative theorists) seems to be 
this: All the theories are based on some ahistorical metaphysical truths, about the human 
nature, universal rationality, the nature of morality etc. But there are no ahistorical 
metaphysical truths that could work as premises in an argument purported to justify some 
concrete political arrangements.  (cf. RP 11 on the impossibility of any ultimate foundation) 
Nor is there any historically developing but normatively fundamental process like Habermas’s 
critical discussion or Hegel’s reciprocal recognition.  
 
It is necessary to focus to two potential problems in Mouffe’s general view. The first problem 
is the nature of the denial of all ahistorically true metaphysical claims. Does this denial itself 
constitute an ahistorical metaphysical truth? It is certainly a kind of metaphysical claim, and 
someone like Mouffe who says that she knows its truth is certainly claiming to possess some 
metaphysical knowledge. (A negation of a metaphysical statement is a metaphysical 
statement.) Is it ahistoriclly true? If it is merely contingently true, it allows that there might, 
after all, be some non-contingent truths. It seems that a denial of all a-historical metaphysical 
truths contains a problem of self-reference.  
 
Again, Hegel´s theory of “pure self-consciousness” is  relevant also here. What is, in fact, 
denied when all metaphysical truths are denied? In Mouffe, typically, when metaphysical 
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truths are denied, it is denied that some particular truth (of the human nature etc.) could (even 
possibly) constitute a universal truth.  From the point of view of Mouffe´s political theory, 
this constitutes a dilemma. If the particular political agents, who try to gain universal 
recognition for their own particular  truth - which they themselves consider a universal truth -  
were to agree with Mouffe, politics would end. If all political agreed upon the universal 
validity of what Mouffe says, there would be no  “they” to constitute the political “outside”. 
What Mouffe says would be recognized as an absolute “truth” itself. Hence, Mouffe´s 
statement can be right if there are people who disagree with it and thus prevent it from 
becoming an un-political, universally accepted truth. There are constitutive outsides to 
various “truths”  as long as there is subjects who constitute (by their particular contradicting 
ideas) these outsides.  
 
Mouffe seems to think that her denial of all ahistorical metaphysical truths has important 
political consequences. She claims that if we accept that there are no ahistorical metaphysical 
truths (except, perhaps, the ahistorical metaphysical truth that there are no other ahistorical 
metaphysical truths), we have an argument, not only against metaphysically based 
interpretations of democracy, but also for her own agonistic interpretation. And the agonistic 
interpretation certainly is intended to have concrete political consequences. But then, 
paradoxically,  it  follows  that  there  is,  after  all,  a  sound  argument  in  political  theory  that  is  
ahistorical, starting from a metaphysical truth. The metaphysical truth that “there are no 
metaphysical foundations” seems to work like the metaphysical foundation in Mouffe’s own 
theory: 
 
 …instead of putting our liberal institutions at risk, the recognition that they do 
not have an ultimate foundation creates a more favourable terrain for their 
defence. (RP, 145) 
 
The dilemma is unavoidable. This becomes clearer when we consider Mouffe’s more specific 
arguments, for she operates with premises that have specific metaphysical contents. For 
example, the new democratic project should be informed by “the recent theoretical 
contributions” of philosophy and psychoanalysis (RP 10-11). The core of these recent ideas is 
the non-essentialist conception of the subject (RP 71; DP 11, 17). More precisely: 
 
to be capable of thinking politics today, and understanding the nature of these 
new struggles and the diversity of social relations that the democratic revolution 
has yet to encompass, it is indispensable to develop a theory of subject as a 
decentered, detotalized agent, a subject constructed as the point of intersection 
of  a  multiplicity  of  subject  positions  between which  there  exists  no  a  priori  or  
necessary relation…(RP, 12) 
 
Surely,  this  (basically  Lacanian)  theory  of  the  decentered  subject  is  as  metaphysical  as  the  
theory of the Kantian subject it tries to replace. And, according to Mouffe, it is as essential for 
the  new theory  of  democracy  as  the  old  theory  was  for  the  old,  rejected  liberal  theories.  In  
both cases, a certain conception of what kind of beings we really are appears as a premise in 
an argument which is put forth as a justification of concrete political practices.  
 
Still another example: the way Mouffe uses the Wittgensteinian argument on rule-following. 
She quotes Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: 
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Following rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we 
react to an order in a particular way. But what if  one person reacts in one way 
and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right? (DP 73) 
 
According to Mouffe’ interpretation, Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule-following shows that 
“there  cannot  be  one  single  best,  more  ‘rational’  way  to  obey…  rules  and  that  is  precisely  
such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralistic democracy”. Recognizing this problem 
would mean “fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the 
institutions that would make it possible to follow democratic rules in a plurality of ways” (DP, 
73). As in the discussion on the limits of legitimacy and of relativism, the recognition of the 
plurality of several alternatives is seen as a solution to the problem of ambiguity or 
indeterminacy. But does this requirement of plurality really follow from Wittgenstein’s 
analysis of rule-following? If the problem is a conceptual one, it does not matter whether 
there are one or several equally acceptable ways to follow democratic rules, as long as there 
are rules which are somehow supposed to exclude at least some possible reactions. It is 
always possible that someone tries to follow the rules - be they single or plural, permissive or 
rigid -  in a way that is not compatible with any of the acceptable ways. Then, the problem is 
still  there.   No amount of plurality and toleration can  remove the problem, if  something is, 
nevertheless,  excluded  –  in  other  words,  if  there  still  are  rules that can be obeyed or 
disobeyed, for the point of a rule is simply to rule out some possible forms of conduct. If there 
is a general, conceptual problem of the interpretation of rules, it concerns loose and 
permissive rules as much as rigid and fixed rules. But then we may ask: If the proposed 
“plurality of ways” cannot be conceived as a solution to Wittgenstein’s problem, how does 
the recognition of the problem nevertheless contribute to the justification of  this “plurality of  
ways”?  
 
But, again, there is a deeper problem in Mouffe’s account. For even if her conclusions do 
follow from Wittgenstein’s  analysis, this analysis  is still a perfectly general and conceptual 
one: it is supposed to apply to any rules (mathematical, linguistic, legal, religious etc.) in any 
society. Even if Wittgenstein has provided inspiration to the contextualist moral and political 
theorists, his account of rule-following is not itself “contextualised” in any relevant sense.  It 
is not tied to any particular context, and does not, as such, have anything to do with the 
specific problems of modern democracies. If it is used as a premise in an argument that 
purports to justify the democratic practices, isn’t this a clear example of an “ahistorical”, 
“universal” argument in political theory?  
 
This “antifoundationalist foundationalism” of Mouffe can be contrasted with the genuinely 
contextualist political views of such authors like Michael Oakeshott, Michael Walzer, or 
Richard Rorty. In Mouffe’s texts they are all treated as fellow antifoundationalists, together 
with poststructuralists like Derrida and decisionists like Schmitt. Mouffe says she subscribes 
the view of Rorty: democracy is not dependent on metaphysics (RP 10). Democratic 
principles “can only be defended as being constitutive to our form of life, and we should not 
try to ground our commitment to them on something supposedly safer” (DP 66).  
 
It is argued here, however, that the contextualist political theories have actually very little to 
do with Mouffe’s version of postmodernism. Authors like Rorty agree with Mouffe that all 
the traditional attempts to defend democracy by such metaphysical notions as universal 
rationality or human nature are misguided. But first, unlike Mouffe, they do not argue that this 
lack of rational foundations does itself constitute a new defence of democracy. Rather, they 
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claim that the alleged metaphysical foundations, and the lack of any such foundations, are 
both  equally  irrelevant  for  democracy.  The  defence  of  democracy  and  the  search  of  
metaphysical basic principles are simply two independent intellectual projects.  For example, 
even if the Kantian theory of subject is found as defective, or if whole notion of rule-
following is inherently problematic, democracy is neither endangered nor supported by these 
observations.   For the contextualists, democracy is a local and practical matter. It can be 
defended by appealing to our traditions and shared practices, or to pragmatic considerations, 
but not by any context-independent principles – or by the lack of such principles. (On Rorty’s 
reply to Laclau, see Rorty 1996.)  
 
This kind of contextualism is also incompatible with the Schmittian decisionistic view 
discussed above, and Mouffe’s attempt to combine both views is simply incoherent.  In 
contextualist thinking, we are always involved in traditions and in forms of life. Traditions 
and forms of life are supposed to have an authority that has to be recognized. They are not 
something we can just choose, nor can they be conceived as facts   which just limit our 
“horizons of options” even when we are not aware of them. We may decide to accept or reject 
some  particular  elements  of  a  tradition,  but  such  decision  can  be  made  only  in  a  context  
already constituted by other elements of a tradition or traditions. Hence, what determines our 
“very condition” as human beings is not “the political” as the realm of sovereign decisions but 
our participation in shared traditions and practices. According to a contextualist, “the 
political” cannot be supreme, for its role in different societies is also contingent, dependent on 
their particular traditions. In some societies the shared traditions do not reserve any dominant 
role for “the political”. Mouffe might reply that ultimately the political must be supreme 
because the traditions and the way they draw the distinctions between, say, the political 
sphere and the private sphere, or between the sacred and the secular, are themselves political 
by their nature. By saying “this is not a political matter” we are already making a political 
claim. But this kind of view of the role of the political is itself definitely anti-contextual and 
ahistorical. It says to the adherents of various traditions: although you do not see the authority 
of your traditions as based on political choices, they are based on such choices, and you 
should recognize this fact. Your way to draw the distinction between the political and the non-
political, although based on your own traditions, is a mistaken one. In this view, the 
perspective of “the political” transcends all particular contexts, determining “our ontological 
condition” in every society, as Mouffe says.   
 
In another context, F.R. Ankersmit, (2002) formulates a similar contrast when comparing the 
views of Schmitt to those of Machiavelli: 
 
When Machiavelli argues for the brokenness of the political domain and openly 
accepts all the implications of strife, conflict, and struggle that go with that, he is 
not saying, like Schmitt, that strife, conflict, and struggle are its ultimate source 
and foundation. He is saying, rather, that these constitute a permanently present 
aspect of politics. (…) The indisputable fact that we shall always have to fight in 
order to realize our political goals and ideals does not itself imply that fight and 
struggle are themselves the central issue in all politics. Or, to formulate it in the 
terms that have been used in this section: if the incommensurability of our 
political ideals invites a continuous fight between them, this fact does not 
elevate political fight to the status of being a new and extrapolitical ideal. (p. 
170) 
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It  seems that at  least  in this issue Mouffe is  quite  loyal to Schmitt.  For her,  as for Schmitt,  
conflict and antagonism, the lack of shared foundations are themselves the positive  
foundations of political theory. 
 
While making a distinction between the genuinely contextualist theories and Mouffe’s 
agonism, it is not claimed here that the theories of the former type do provide an 
unproblematic solution to the problems of the political.  One problem is that many of our 
shared traditions are themselves tied to universalist and metaphysical arguments which – 
according to the very traditions – transcend the limits of the traditions. This seems to be the 
case in e.g. the Christian, secular-humanistic, and Islamic political traditions: they all make 
universalistic claims. Thus, a contextualist seems to be forced to accept the position of a 
Rortyan ironist: someone who attaches him- or herself to a tradition while preserving a critical 
distance to its universalistic and metaphysical claims. Such an attitude may ultimately 
produce problem similar to that of Mouffe’s: the ironist’s detached form of solidarity is 
possible only if there are enough true believers whose attitude towards the tradition is non-
ironical. With its unavoidable dependence on the other (non-ironical, “serious”) forms of 
thinking, Rorty’s ironism appears as yet another version of Unhappy Consciousness.    
 
 
6.7. Conclusion: the ways of paradoxical and ek-static objects 
 
 
According to this analysis, Mouffe’s democratic agonism suffers from internal incoherence. 
However, she openly admits that her project is, in a sense, “paradoxical”. Does this admission 
leave her off the hook? Here a comparison between Butler and Mouffe can be made. Butler 
adheres to the idea of ek-statism, resembling Mouffe´s idea of what constitutes a “paradox”. 
Both the Butlerian ek-statism and Mouffe´s paradoxicality introduce a relationality which 
cannot be conceptualized inside any shared differentiating system. 
 
A philosophical view may be paradoxical in the sense that it contains internal incoherencies in 
the sense of being self-contradictory, self-eliminating.  It may also be called “paradoxical” if 
it produces a pragmatic contradiction of some type. For example, if a theory were true, it 
couldn’t be known to be true, or it couldn’t be generally believed to be true without actually 
making it untrue. These can be seen to be self-contradictory forms of paradoxicality. 
However, as Mouffe says, a paradox is not necessarily the same thing as an internal 
contradiction (in the form of self-contradiction). Contradictions are also a central part of 
Hegel’s thought. The existence of contradictions make dialectics and conceptual, historical 
change possible. But even for Hegel, a contradiction is never the last word.  
 
A philosophical view can be said to be “paradoxical”, and still consistent, at least in two 
ways. A philosopher may try to show that some of our received and normally held convictions 
(say about the nature of politics, language, mind etc.) are actually false. Such a view is 
“paradoxical” in the rather trivial  sense that it may be very difficult for most people to accept 
it,  even  when the  view is,  as  such,  fully  consistent.  In  another  sense,  an  ethical  or  political  
theory  may  be  said  to  be  “paradoxical”  when  it  implies  that  some  of  our  most  cherished  
principles or values are not simultaneously realisable. For example, it may be that the 
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demands  of  liberty  and  equality  cannot  be  combined  under  some circumstances.  We do  not  
want to drop either of the values. Thus we have to admit that there may be practical or ethical 
contradictions, and try to live with them. 
 
Mouffe argues that the best-known democratic theories are paradoxical in the first, self-
contradictory sense of the term. They try to eliminate conflicts between political adversaries,  
which are constitutive of democracy, and nevertheless remain as democrats.  Mouffe also tries 
to show, perhaps successfully, that the liberal-democratic values produce a paradox in the 
third sense of the term. She may well be right in claiming that there can be no general solution 
to the certain conceptual problems of democracy, for example, those of rights and 
sovereignty. Reasonably, she argues that this does not constitute a reason to reject liberal 
democracy;  rather  we  have  to  try  to  live  with  the  politically  dynamic  “paradox”  and  to  be  
content with contextual and temporary solutions. However, it is claimed here that the way she 
generalizes from this alleged “paradox” makes her own theory paradoxical in the sense of 
being self-contradictory.  If the subjects themselves were to accept Mouffe’s theory, it would 
equally lead into the disappearance of the contradictory relations between “us” and “they” 
and, hence, to the disappearance of politics. Thus, it is vulnerable to the same form of 
criticism she herself uses against Rawls, Habermas and the others. Her own affirmation that 
democracy itself is “paradoxical” does not, as such, make her theory immune for criticism. If 
it had that effect, any theorist could use it to shed off any possible criticism.  
 
Mouffe´s paradoxes end up into the same dilemma as Butler´s ek-statism. For the one who 
sees objects of thought and will as paradoxical (in the sense Mouffe sees them, or Butler sees 
ek-static objects)  these objects turn into abstractions. They cannot be identified to  exist,  as  
they are not actually objects, circumscribed unities, with borders around them, by which they 
can be  separated from other objects.  In Mouffe and Butler, objects exist for such thinkers 
who think of things like the conflictual subjects which Mouffe and Butler see as political 
agents.  Mouffe and Butler see identifiable objects through the eyes of the particular political 
subjects. As in the case of Hegel’s pure self-consciousness, ordinary subjects are needed to 
labour identifiable objects (in various ideological contexts) in order for the pure self-
consciousness to identify them. For theorists like Mouffe or Butler, these political bondsmen 
are necessarily striving for the impossible.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
Judith Butler has often been seen as a difficult, even as an incomprehensible thinker. Most of 
those who have not understood her works have probably passed by them in silence.  Some of 
her admirers have a tendency to present her ideas as completely new and revolutionary. 
Numerous impassionate rejections as well as uncritical apologies of Butler have been 
published. This study is an attempt to show that Butler’s work should be understood in the 
context of the Western intellectual tradition, and that such an understanding may also help us 
to see its merits and detect its problems in a more effective way. 
 
I have argued that in Butler’s case the definitive context of her ideas is Hegel’s philosophy. 
Butler  is  usually  related  to  the  post-modernist,  or  more  exactly,  to  the  post-structuralist  
tradition. This tradition is generally seen as hostile towards the rationalist projects of the 
Western philosophy, and Hegel’s project is certainly the most ambitious of all such projects. 
However, whole the post-structuralist tradition is itself related to Hegel’s thinking in a 
complex and ambiguous way. Descombes, Williams, and Weir, as well as Butler herself (in 
SD) have charted these relations. I argued that Butler’s thinking is even more closely related 
to  Hegel  than  that  of  the  other  post-structuralists.  I  have  tried  to  show that  in  an  important  
sense, she is, and has always been, a Hegelian thinker. Although other commentators have 
noticed this, no-one has tried to study this aspect of her thinking in detail. 
 
For Butler, as for her sources, “Hegel” means largely Hegel’s theory of the subject as 
formulated in his The Phenomenolgy of Spirit. In this study, I have tried to analyse and expose 
some of the central aspects of this theory, as a necessary precondition of a more complete 
understanding of Butler’s own theory of the subject. The central Hegelian themes shared by 
Butler are the formation of the subject and self-consciousness, the role of Desire and the 
Other, and the notion of recognition. These form the premises of her better-known views on 
the formation of gendered subjects and on performative politics. Butler’s way to discuss these 
issues cannot be understand without understanding Hegel. However, I am not just interested 
in Hegel because I see him as a key to Butler’s work. Rather, I think that Hegel also provides 
a critical perspective to Butler as well as to some other contemporary theorists (e. g. to 
Chantal   Mouffe). Finally, I want take Hegel’s own views seriously, an intention I share with 
Butler.   
 
My interpretation of Hegel is, however, based on another tradition than that of Butler; I rely 
mainly on the works of Taylor and Ikäheimo. Nevertheless, my analysis follows Butler at 
least in one sense: I concentrate on PhS and take the relationship between self and the Other 
as the interpretive key. But unlike some influential interpreters of Hegel, I interpret PhS – 
including the famous sections on Lordship and Bondage - in terms of the consciousness’ 
internal self-development rather than just in terms of external struggle. One consequence of 
this reading is that Hegel’s concept of Desire should no be interpreted merely as a primitive 
appetite. Rather, Desire characterizes all one-sided attempts to “appropriate” or “grasp” the 
world, theoretically or practically. 
 
The various one-sided forms of self-consciousness, presented in PhS were analysed in detail. 
According to my interpretation, Hegel’s key concepts – especially that of recognition – are 
meant to solve the epistemological problems which Hegel finds from Kant and from his 
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followers. Like Kant, Hegel sees that all objects of cognition, including ourselves, appear to 
us from some particular viewpoint.  Numerous conceptual problems arise from this. These 
problems emerge in both the traditional and the modern forms of scepticism and relativism. 
By acknowledging the necessity of multiple and contradicting perspectives, Hegel accepts the 
key premise of sceptical and relativistic thought: there is no metaphysically privileged 
viewpoint. Hegel, however, does not see scepticism as the last word. Rather, it is, for him, an 
inevitable starting-point. Scepticism itself is one possible viewpoint on the viewpoints of the 
Others, not a privileged meta-position. This observation opens the road to recognition.  
 
At the same time, concepts like recognition have an ethical and political meaning in Hegel’s 
work. While Hegel cannot be said to have a theory of political action (in the sense Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Arendt, or Schmitt have theories of political action) his “political theory” is not 
confined to his philosophy of Right. According to my view, his analyses of the one-sided 
forms of consciousness (Scepticism, Stoicism, Unhappy Consciousness etc.) do have political 
implications. They are all but versions of the asymmetrical Lord-Bondsman (Master-Slave) 
relationship introduced in PhS. They are connected with various other-refuting practical 
attitudes and political practices – for, example, in Hegel’s analysis of the Absolute Freedom 
which  ends  up  to  the  rejection  of  all  particular  forms  in  the  Terror.  While  PhS is  not  about  
“political theory”, it has its political relevance.  
 
Thus, recognition, the key term, has simultaneously an epistemological, ethical and political 
meaning, because various social, cultural and political forms which are incompatible with 
universal recognition are based on implicitly other-refuting (and therefore self-refuting) 
views. And, correspondingly, universal reciprocal recognition which takes all the possible 
viewpoints into account and allows them to interact and correct each other is simultaneously a 
solution to the epistemological problems of knowledge and self-knowledge, and the basis of a 
democratic  society  which  consciously  resists  all  forms  of  exclusion.  Hence,  I  read  Hegel’s  
views as potentially fruitful contributions to the contemporary discussions on democracy, 
exclusion, and marginalization. 
 
Contrary to the common conception, shared by many thinkers of different persuasions (e.g. 
such as Levinas and Lyotard as well as Popper) the vision of Hegel is not totalitarian in any 
sense. It does not try get rid of all differences or to melt them into one mystical whole. On the 
contrary, it sees that differences between various viewpoints are unavoidable for conceptual 
reasons (i.e. our knowledge is the knowledge of separate, different beings), and just our 
separate existence makes recognition necessary.   
 
While I try to defend Hegel against some of his critics – including Butler – my attitude 
towards him is by no means uncritical. His notorious exclusion of women is analysed at some 
length. It cannot be dismissed just as a minor defect in an otherwise excellent theory. I try to 
show  that  his  treatment  of  women  is  a  part  of  his  way  to  see  the  Family  as  a  moment  of  
particularity, and women as necessarily particular beings who are limited, for the Hegelian 
reason that they are inherently unable to see their limits. It appears that the nation-state and 
the patriotic spirit carried by the Youth are similar necessary moments of particularity for 
Hegel. Thus the two less appealing aspects of his political views – the position of women and 
the uncritical acceptance of the system of nation-states – arise from the same considerations. 
From  Hegel’s  own  point  of  view,  this  is  paradoxical.  For  the  women  –  as  well  as  the  
“patriotic youth” - appear as instruments (“Bondsmen”) for the nation-state. Women’s  ability 
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to become full members of the recognizing community is permanently denied.  Both, women 
and the Youth are instrumentalized as means of the collective development, not contingently 
but permanently. Women’s labour is needed to equip the Youth with the necessary 
“individualistic, immature spirit”, for the nation-state needs patriotic spirit to wage wars 
successfully.  This is a clear example of the exclusion of Others.  The fact that women, in our 
day,  have  been  able  to  see  and  challenge  their  limits  should  be,  from the  Hegelian  point  of  
view, a conclusive proof that they actually can overcome their limits.   
 
Throughout my discussion on Hegel, I have emphasized the peculiar structure of PhS and the 
implications of that structure. In the narrative, the self gradually learns to understand itself. 
And, because the book is about the human self, the book itself is a contribution to that 
understanding. Hence, the story, told in PhS, ends at the point when the self has reached the 
same level of self-consciousness as the narrator. According to my view, this reflects Hegel’s 
central  concerns.  As  I  said,  in  PhS every  object  of  cognition  is  an  object  for someone. It is 
seen  from  a  particular  point  of  view.  The  object  of  PhS  is  the  human  subject  and  its  
consciousness, including Hegel’s own. The fundamental (Kantian) question is, then, how is 
the viewpoint taken in PhS possible? Because, according to Hegel, all subjects are able to 
overcome their limits and take the viewpoint of another, the viewpoint taken in PhS must, in 
principle, be accessible to all. Unlike some philosophers criticized by Hegel (Kant and the 
sceptics in PhS, Spinoza in his other works), he explicitly tries to formulate a theory which is 
self-referential in the sense that it can explain its own possibility. This explains the structure 
of PhS. 
 
The last-mentioned idea is central for my interpretation of PhS. I argued that some other 
thinkers who have taken the self and the consciousness as their main objects have been unable 
to answer to the question: how am I able to tell this story? (I called this “Ishmael’s problem”.) 
Especially some Marxists and post-structuralists seem to be vulnerable at this point. The 
postmodernists/post-structuralists are often criticized for their supposedly “relativist” or 
“sceptical” views as well as for “political impotence”. (Martha Nussbaum’s criticism of 
Butler belongs basically to this genre.) The Hegel-inspired critique of Butler and Mouffe 
formulated in this work intends to be more nuanced and more constructive. The various ones-
sided forms of consciousness analysed in The Phenomenology of Spirit may  be  seen  as  so  
many different versions of scepticism. The core of Hegel’s critique is not, however, just their 
inability to “justify universal norms” or “knowledge”. Rather, Hegel argues that these forms 
of consciousness (for example, the Unhappy Consciousness) cannot consistently become the 
basis of general self-understanding. In order to be meaningful for their proponents, they have 
to presuppose epistemic asymmetries which cannot be justified within these forms of thinking.  
   
Although I am interested in the same aspects of Hegel’s views as Butler, our ways to read him 
are rather different. It appears that Butler’s reading of Hegel is – like that of most French 
thinkers – largely based on the influential interpretation given by Alexandre Kojève. This is 
striking, for Butler herself in SD discusses some one-sided aspects of  Kojève’s Hegel-
interpretation.  Most  of  Butler’s  commentators  (with  the  partial  exception  of  Allison  Weir)  
have not paid any attention to this. They have taken for granted that Butler’s way of reading 
Hegel is unproblematic. 
 
In Kojève’s reading, PhS is also seen as a political work, although in a very different sense. 
Roughly,  Hegel  is  seen  as  a  successor  of  Machiavelli  and  a  predecessor  of  Marx.  What  is  
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characteristic for Kojéve’s way to read Hegel is, that  (1) the interpretation is mainly limited 
to the first parts of PhS, to the Lord-Bondsman -sections; (2) the Hegelian notions of desire 
and negativity take an all-pervasive role; (3) all particularity and all particular self-identities 
are seen as constraining and other-refuting; (4) the relation between the Self and the Other 
becomes that of a perpetual and violent struggle; (5) recognition is not reciprocal but an 
aspect of Master-Slave relations, but (6) universal recognition is nevertheless the telos of 
history.  It  means  the  End  of  History  and  the  disappearance  of  all  differences  -  and  
consequently, of politics. The French thinkers typically accept all or most points (1)-(6) as 
correct interpretations of Hegel. They, however, reject point (6), as “totalizing” and 
“absolutist” closure. Both existentialists like Sartre and de Beauvoir and 
structuralists/poststructuralists like Lacan and Foucault agree on this. And because they see 
(6) as the inevitable outcome of Hegel’s theory, they turn against him. The real target of their 
anti-Hegelianism is Kojève, who, however, has also largely determined their positive agenda.   
 
It has been argued here that Butler, who largely relies on the French sources when developing 
his views, actually accepts a large part of the Kojèvian reading of Hegel. Like Kojève, she 
“halts” the story told in PhS, rejects reciprocal recognition and accuses Hegel for his 
totalizing tendencies. Here, it has been argued (through Taylor, Ikäheimo, Hutchings, and 
Williams) that Kojève’s interpretation is one-sided, and that none of the points (1)-(6) can be 
accepted without qualifications as a basis for an accurate interpretation of Hegel. Most 
importantly, Hegel did not see the process of recognition only in terms of struggle; Hegel did 
not believe that the unmediated (collective) self-knowledge and its practical realization, the 
“homogeneous universal state” were either possible or desirable. His theory did not have the 
totalizing aspect often ascribed to it.   Hence, the criticism of the Kojèvian reading of Hegel 
may partly be directed against Butler’s reading, too. 
 
Althusser is another important figure, whose influence has been decisive for Butler (as well as 
for many others interested in similar issues,). Like Kojève, Althusser is largely neglected; his 
Marxism is considered as outmoded. Butler tries to correct the supposed mistakes of Hegel 
with  the  help  of  Althusser  (and  those  of  Althusser  with  the  help  of  Hegel).  Most  notably,  
Hegel’s theory of reciprocal recognition is replaced by Althusser’s purely descriptive 
interpretation of recognition as ideological misrecognition (Interpellation) which produces 
particular subjects. This link between Butler and Althusser has not generally been analysed in 
the secondary literature on Butler.  
 
Although Althusser criticizes both Hegel and the French Kojèvian reception of Hegel, his 
own powerful anti-Hegelianism is an example how the Kojèvian ideas – in Althusser’s case, 
transmitted through Lacan – have pervaded the French discussion. In his own peculiar way, 
Althusser shares the Kojèvian view that “recognition is synonymous with the unequal 
recognition of master and slave” (Williams 1997, 11). Unlike the Hegelian recognition, the 
Althusserian interpellation is a socio-psychological mechanism without any rational or 
normative aspect. Indeed, it is fundamentally an irrational process.   Althusser’s theory is, 
however, troubled by difficult problems. It sees the consciousness of the ideologically 
produced subjects as a “necessary error”. In order to explain his own ability to see through 
the error, Althusser has to postulate a distinction between the subject’s erroneous 
consciousness and the subject-less Science which is able to see through the ideological 
delusions. Althusser, however, cannot explain in a satisfactory way how the subject-less 
Science is possible and how it can be distinguished from ideology in a non-circular way.  
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What is more important, Althusser’s distinction between perspectives of  the misled subjects 
and the epistemically privileged Science has serious political consequences. As Hegel 
recognized, epistemic asymmetries are related to political asymmetries. Althusser’s 
distinction  leads  to  a  Lord-Bondsman  relationship  which  can  also  be  used  to  justify  a  non-
democratic form of politics. Clearly, Butler subscribes to Althusser’s view of our particular 
identities as “necessary errors”. Hence, she is forced to face the fundamental Hegelian 
question: for whom do they appear as errors, if they are unavoidable? While Butler rejects the 
totalizing aspects of Althusser’s theory, she does not take any clear stand in the Science –
ideology issue.  It  is  not  clear  how  far  she  can  use  Althusser’s  theory  of  subject-formation  
against  Hegel  without  implicitly  committing  herself  to  the  more  problematic  aspects  of  the  
former. Both Althusser and Hegel have a solution to the fundamental problem which any 
theory of consciousness has to face: how is the theory itself possible? Althusser’s solution is 
to separate ideology from Science, and to claim that his theory is formulated from the subject-
less standpoint of Science. Hegel’s solution to the same problem is based on the possibility of 
universal reciprocal recognition. In this study, Hegel’s solution is preferred for both 
intellectual and ethical reasons. The fundamental point is that Butler is unable to accept either 
solution. Nevertheless, by rejecting the possibility of reciprocal recognition she implicitly 
commits herself to the Althusserian alternative: her own subject-theory has to be formulated 
from an epistemically privileged standpoint. The subjects themselves cannot share it. If 
Butler, unlike Althusser, still sees her own works as products of a human subject rather than 
of a subject-less Science, her own viewpoint remains mysterious and its possible political 
consequences unclear. 
 
A serious problem in Butler´s thought is caused by this impossibility of her own position. 
This is related to the aspect of mediating, self-conscious thirdness, by the name of which 
Hegel calls the self who has become aware of its own internal contradictoriness and who (like 
Butler) does not want to continue the refutation of the Other. As Butler rejects Hegel’s theory 
of the internally mediating third, a problem seems to arise. To put it simply: if Butler’s theory 
is correct, how can she (or anybody else) become to know it? Isn’t her own theory a living 
example that a subject can understand its own nature, to become a “third” for itself?   
 
It was further argued that Hegel actually anticipated the views expressed by the French 
existentialists, post-structuralists and Althusserians, as well as those of Butler. As M. J. 
Inwood says, “Hegel has an uncanny knack of anticipating apparent objections to his thought 
and incorporating them within it” (Inwood 1983, 521). Hegel’s descriptions of the one-sided 
forms of consciousness like Unhappy Consciousness, Pure Consciousness and Reason (all 
largely ignored by the Kojèvian tradition) are relevant here. They are all, according to Hegel, 
internally contradictory views about the nature of the knowing subject. They presuppose 
epistemic asymmetries – the other subjects, unlike the thinkers themselves, are necessarily 
unable to understand their own thinking correctly – and therefore lasting personal, ethical and 
political relationships cannot be grounded on them. According to Hegel, these forms of 
thinking are inherently unstable. They must be replaced by a larger, more inclusive 
perspective. Universal reciprocal recognition emerges in this process as conceptual necessity. 
In  this  study  this  is  seen  as  the  central  insight  of  Hegel.  Any thinker who focuses self-
consciousness, and sees the Others as potentially relevant, is ultimately forced to accept 
universal recognition as the logical outcome. 
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Butler, like her main sources, cannot accept Hegel’s conclusion. Therefore, she is stuck with 
the implicit epistemic asymmetry (for Hegel: a Lord-Bondsman –relation). All particular 
identities accepted by the subjects themselves are for her, as for Althusser; “necessary errors”. 
They are also necessarily other-refuting. But they are, nevertheless, necessary. Hence, the 
subject-theorist remains an outsider who, at least occasionally, is able to see through the 
collective illusions. The theory, which is able to provide the correct picture of people’s self-
understanding cannot itself become a part of that self-understanding. Unlike Hegelian 
subjects, the Butlerian (or Lacanian or Althusserian  subjects) are not potentially able to 
overcome their limits by becoming conscious of them.  
 
In this vision the struggle against the exclusion of the Other becomes the aim of politics. All 
particular identities and the corresponding viewpoints are results of violence – this one of the 
important ideas of Kojève. However, first, this struggle cannot be successful, for the 
exclusion of the Other is a aspect of all particular identities and the resulting necessarily 
limited viewpoints, and Butler (like Hegel and unlike Kojève) sees that particular identities 
and viewpoints are unavoidable. Second, it should not be successful, for the only (impossible) 
alternative of the eternal struggle is Kojève’s End of History, the disappearance of all 
differences and all political action. Ultimately, Butler cannot recognize the Others in the full 
sense, as real beings with own self-understandings, own identities, own needs and viewpoints. 
For all these are effects of power and of misrecognition. What remains is the unending 
struggle, fuelled by the subjects’ striving for the impossible. This idea is, in some form, 
already present in the early works of Sartre and de Beauvoir, even if their subject-theories are 
quite unlike to that of Butler. 
 
Here, it is claimed that this attitude roughly corresponds with Hegel’s description of Unhappy 
Consciousness. And, Hegel correctly characterizes this attitude as self-contradictory. It is not 
contradictory in the standard logical sense. Rather, it is self-contradictory or self-defeating 
because it cannot become the basis of the self-understanding of the subject who participates in 
the struggles against exclusion. The subjects themselves have to believe in something like 
Hegel’s genuine recognition: they cannot see their own identities and needs as “necessary 
errors”. Nor are they willing to participate into the struggles – and in the extreme cases, risk 
their lives – for the sake of the “movement itself”.  
 
Another instance of the same problem is revealed by Butler’s use of expressions like “not in 
advance” or “not yet”. Butler tries to escape the End of History by emphasizing that things 
should not be defined “in advance”. However, if this idea is generalized, it becomes empty. 
Expressions like “in advance” or “not yet” convey the impression that the “proper time” is 
somewhere in the future.  But, all defining is necessarily defining “in advance”. The result is 
not that the Others are allowed to define things in their own ways, but that no-one is allowed 
to define anything. The result is not really distinguishable from the End of History.  
 
Because all particular identities and viewpoints are inherently violent and necessarily exclude 
the Other, they cannot be recognized in the Hegelian sense. Nevertheless, I argued that Butler 
herself is, as an ethically concerned and responsible human being, implicitly committed to 
accept the Hegelian recognition. She is constantly and genuinely worried about the fate of the 
Others, of marginalized groups, of women, homosexuals, the prisoners of Guantanamo etc. 
This care is an expression of the recognizing attitude, and Butler would certainly not want to 
analyse it only as a symptom of something of which she is not conscious. Thus, she is like 
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Sartre who, according to Williams (1997, 372) “denies reciprocal recognition in principle 
while affirming it in practice”.  Because she cannot conceptualize this concern of the Others, 
her view on recognition remains abstract; for she does not see it as an expression of 
something which (potentially) belongs to other human subjects. For Hegel, this kind of 
attitude would still be implicitly patronizing.  
 
It was further agued that the form of asymmetry found in Butler is central in some other 
contemporary theories influenced by Althusser, Lacan and ultimately by the Kojèvian vision 
(minus the End of History). One such theory, formulated by of Chantal Mouffe, was analysed 
in detail. Mouffe’s view was seen as relevant for several reasons. First, it was developed in a 
close interaction with Butler’s views; second, it spells out Butler’s rather abstract ideas in an 
explicitly political context. It starts from basically the same premises as Butler’s view, but it 
is intended to have definite political consequences for democratic practices, for citizens’ 
movements etc. Mouffe’s view is also more accessible: especially in her later, directly 
political works she mostly avoids the complex philosophical discussions typical for Butler. 
She is also interested in more general political issues. Nevertheless, she relies largely on the 
same sources as Butler. Thus, reading Mouffe may help to understand Butler, and vice versa. 
Because this study is ultimately about politics, the analysis of Mouffe’s view appears as 
central.  
 
While Mouffe’s criticisms against some recent theories of democracy are well-taken, she 
ultimately falls into the same trap as Butler. She shares the central ideas of the latter: all 
politically central terms are sites of struggle and, as such, indeterminate. Any attempt to 
create a consensus would lead to something like Kojève’s End of History as depicted by his 
(or Hegel’s) critics. The political differences would disappear and, with them, all movement 
would cease. But democracy is basically the very movement itself. Hence differences and 
political disagreements are something we should “valorize” and “be thankful of”. However, as 
with Butler,  the political subjects cannot share this perspective. They are not willing to strive 
in order to make democracy alive: they are interested in those issues (justice etc.) which, 
according to Mouffe, are and should remain as undecided. Hence, if Mouffe’s (or Butler’s) 
own view of democracy were to be universally shared, it would be as disastrous to democracy 
as the universal consensus criticized by Mouffe. Thus, there is a political asymmetry between 
the  perspective  of  political  actors  striving  for  universal  ends,  and  the  political  theorist  who  
sees that this striving is misguided, and that its value lies in its unintended side-effects. From 
the  Hegelian  perspective,  all  this  constitutes  just  another  version  of  the  Unhappy  
Consciousness. There seems, indeed, to be close parallelism between Mouffe and Butler: both 
thinkers start from similar premises and end in a similar position, although there are important 
differences in their styles of reasoning. Butler’s argument that the institutionalization of  
same-sex marriages should be rejected because it would remove the conflict is just one telling 
example of the paradoxical consequences of this view. I have brought the two thinkers 
together  partly  because  I  think  that  the  analysis  may  be  applied  to  some  other  important  
thinkers, too, although I have not emphasized that aspect.  
 
Mouffe’s discussion on the nature of the “political” derives much from Carl Schmitt. Unlike 
the other theorists discussed here, Schmitt’s views do not, as such, belong to the general 
Hegelian-Kojèvian inheritance. His powerful vision of the “political” as autonomous and 
normatively unconstrained is parallel to Kojève’s view rather that a continuation or rejection 
of it. Nevertheless, there are striking similarities between these two (largely unacknowledged) 
342 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
political thinkers who have shaped the post-war European political thought. Both see 
particular identities as necessarily antagonistic and other-refuting, and still mutually 
dependent. Both see politics as a site of constant (often violent) struggle, and both see this 
struggle  as  necessary.  Both  see  the  end  of  struggle  as  the  end  of  politics  and  of  History  –  
although for Kojève this was the ultimate telos, while for Schmitt it was a nightmare. 
Kojève’s posthumous Outline reveals that he was influenced by Schmitt’s conception of the 
political, and wrote the work partly as a response to Schmitt. Both Kojève and Schmitt can be 
seen  as  critics  of  the  everyday  liberal  politics.  It  is  no  wonder  that  those  like  Mouffe  and  
Laclau who are implicitly attached to Kojève’s views see Schmitt’s views as appealing. 
 
I have tried to show that the connections between Schmitt’s views and those of Mouffe and of 
other radical democrats are nevertheless, rather thin. Schmitt’s dialectics of friend and enemy 
or of “us” and “they” presupposes closed individual identities. The individual subject as such 
is  not  problematic  for  Schmitt  –  as  it  is  both  for  Hegel  and  for  those  influenced  by  Lacan.  
Whole the Schmittian problematic is confined to collective groups. Moreover, his praise of 
the “political”- which, for him, means the realm of sovereign, normatively unbounded 
decisions – excludes all genuine concern of the Other who is not one of “us”.  Even 
democracy itself remains dependent on the ultimate unbounded decision. I have argued that, 
contrary to Mouffe and Laclau, our sense of responsibility does not presuppose Schmitt’s idea 
of an absolute decision, unbounded by any rational or moral norms. Rather, responsibility 
requires the very existence of some shared norms. While Schmitt’s theory is interesting, it is 
difficult to combine it with a genuinely democratic political theory. (My conclusion, it should 
be added, is independent of any assessment of Schmitt’s own controversial political career.)  
 
Finally, Mouffe’s claim that her “agonistic” or “radical” theory of democracy follows from 
the postmodern rejection of all metaphysical foundations is difficult to accept. Schmitt’s 
endorsement of antidemocratic views already shows that there is no inevitable connection 
between the primacy of politics over metaphysics. The real problem of Mouffe’s claim is that 
it is self-contradictory. I argued that the denial of metaphysical foundations is itself a 
(negative) metaphysical claim which, paradoxically, is presented as a foundation of 
democracy. An attempt to connect it with other anti-metaphysical views (like those of 
Wittgenstein or Rorty) fails, for Moffe’s reliance on “local narratives” is ultimately justified 
by a theory which has its own metaphysical ambitions. Butler has subscribed to the radical 
democratic  theory  put  forth  by  Mouffe  and  Laclau.  Therefore  these  problems  are  also  
problems in her political theory. 
 
My conclusions have been mainly critical. I want to emphasize that Judith Butler’s numerous 
works contain many interesting ideas and insights. She deals with important issues, and her 
concern of the excluded Others is certainly to be admired. I am convinced that her views are 
worth of a reasoned discussion, and that it is possible to discuss them in a rational way. In this 
study, I have tried to do justice to the complexity of her thought. Nevertheless, I do not think 
that her views are ultimately able to do justice to the role of the Other in our lives. They do 
not present a viewpoint which we could generally share, and which could work as a basis of 
our self-understanding if we try to work against exclusion and oppression. In Subjects of 
Desire (p.98) Butler tells how, according to Jean-Paul Sartre, “human beings are forced to 
desire the impossible”. I have argued that Butler’s own view is ultimately quite similar. 
Hegel’s answer to Sartre and Butler would be that even if we were able to believe the claim, it 
could not guide our lives.             
343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Primary sources: 
 
 
The writings of Judith Butler 
 
 
SD Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflection in the Twentieth-Century France. New 
York: Columbia University Press 1999.  [1987]. 
. 
GT Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge 
1990. 
 
BM Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. London: Routledge 1993. 
 
PLP The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997 
 
ES Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative.  London: Routledge 1997. 
 
CHU:  Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto and  Zizek, Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality. London: Verso, 2000. 
 
AC Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death. New York: Columbia 
University Press 2000. 
 
UG Undoing Gender.  New York: Routledge 2004. 
 
GA Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press. 2005. 
 
Butler, Judith 1989a. Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description. A Feminist 
Critique of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Pereception. In Jeffner Allen and Iris Marin 
Young (eds.) The Thinking Muse. Feminism and Modern French Philosophy. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 85-100. 
 
Butler, Judith 1989b. Commentary on Joseph Flay’s “Hegel, Derrida, and Bataille’s 
Laughter”. In William Desmond (ed.) Hegel and His Critics. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 174-8.  
 
Butler, Judith 1990a. Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse.  In 
Linda J. Nicholson (ed.) Feminism/Postmodernism. New York: Routledge, 324-340. 
 
Butler, Judith 1990b. A book review: Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History . Appropriations 
of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France. In History and Theory 29., 248-258. 
 
Butler, Judith 1993.  Postructuralism and Postmarxism. Diacritics 23., 3-11. 
 
344 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Butler, Judith 1995a. Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 
“Postmodernism”. In Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser. 
Feminist Contentions.A Philosophical Exchange. London: Routledge. 35-57. [1991]. 
 
Butler, Judith 1995b. For a Careful Reading. In Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla 
Cornell and Nancy Fraser. Feminist Contentions.A Philosophical Exchange. London: 
Routledge. 127-143. [1991]. 
 
Butler, Judith. 2000a. Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism. In 
CHU 11-43. 
 
Butler, Judith 2000b. Competing Universalisms. In CHU, 136-181. 
 
Butler, Judith. 2000c. Dynamic Conclusions. In  CHU, 263-280. 
 
 
 
The writings of G. W. F. Hegel 
 
PhS Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Tr. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1977. [1807] 
 
Enc I  Hegel’s Logic being  Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. Tr. William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975 [1830]. 
 
Enc III  Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, being Part Three of The Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences . Tr. William Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1971 [1830]. 
 
PhR Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Tr. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1992.  
 
SL   Hegel’s  Science of Logic. Tr. A. V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin 1969. 
[1812-16].  
 
Introduction  Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Introduction. Tr. H. B. Nisbet. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 19780. [1822-30]. 
 
Phil. Prop  Philosophical Propaedeutic. Tr. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Blackwell. 1986 [1809-
11]. 
 
 
 
The writings of Louis Althusser 
 
For Marx  For Marx. Tr. Ben Brewster. Middlesex: Penguin Books 1966  
 
Theor. Prac. Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and 
345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological Struggle. In Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of 
Scientists. Tr.  London: Verso 1990, 3-67. [1965] 
 
Ideol.  Ideological State Apparatuses. In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Tr. 
Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books 1971, 121-173.[1969] 
 
FL  Freud and Lacan. In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Tr. Ben Brewster. 
London: New Left Books 1971,181-202. [1964] 
 
MRH Marx’s Relation to Hegel. In Politics and History. Tr. Ben Brewster. London: 
New Left Books, 161-186. [1968] 
 
 
 
The writings of Alexandre Kojève 
 
 
IRH  Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
assembled by Raymond Queneau. Tr. J. H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press 1969. [written 1933-39; publ. 1947]. 
 
OPR Outline of a Phenomenology of Right. Tr. B.-P. Frost and R. Howse. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield 2000. [written 1943; publ.1981] 
 
 
 
 
The writings of  Chantal Mouffe 
 
 
RP The Return of the Political, London: Verso 1993. 
 
DP The Democratic Paradox. London:Verso 2000. 
 
OP On the Political. London: Routlege 2005. 
 
HSS Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics.  London:Verso. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal. 1996. Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy. In 
Mouffe, Chantal (ed.),  Deconstruction and Pragmatism. New York:Routledge, 1-12. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal (ed.). 1999. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London:Verso. 
 
 
 
Other works:  
 
346 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ankersmit, F. R. 2002. Political Representation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Assiter, Alison 1990. Althusser and Feminism. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Arendt, Hannah 1998. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press. [1958]. 
 
Austin, J. L. 1962.  How to do Things with Words Oxford: Clarendon Press.[1955]. 
 
Austin, J. L. 1971. Performative-Constative. In J. R. Searle (ed.) The Philosophy of Language. 
Oxford:Oxford University Press, 13-22. [1963] 
 
Barnett, Stuart 1998. Introduction: Hegel before Derrida. In S. Barnett (ed.) Hegel after 
Derrida London: Routledge, 1-37. 
 
de Beauvoir, Simone 1980. The Second Sex. Tr. H. Parshley. New York: Vintage. [1949]. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla 1995. Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance. In Behabib, 
Seyla,  Butler, Judith,  Cornell, Drucilla & Fraser, Nancy, Feminist Contentions: A 
Philosophical Exchange.  New York:Routledge, 17-34.  
 
Benton, Ted 1984. The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism. Althusser and his influence. 
London: MacMillan. 
 
Brockelman, Thomas 2003. The Failure of  the Radical Democratic Imaginary. Zizek versus 
Laclau and Mouffe on Vestigal Utopia. Philosophy and Social Criticism 29:2, 187-212. 
 
Callinicos, Alex 1976. Althusser’s Marxism.  London: Pluto Press 
 
Casey, Edward S. and Woody, Melvin J. 1983. Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan: The Dialectic of 
Desire. In Smith, Joseph. and Kerrigan, William (eds.) Interpreting Lacan. Psychiatry and 
Humanities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 75-112. 
 
Chambers; Samuel A. and Carver, Terrell 2008. Judith Butler and Political Theory. Troubling 
Politics. London: Routledge. 
 
Descombes, Vincent 1998. Modern French Philosophy. Tr. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1979]. 
 
Desmond,   William (ed.) 1989.  Hegel and His Critics. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
  
Deveux, Monique 1999. Agonism and Pluralism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25:1, 1-22. 
 
Elliott, Gregory 1987. Althusser. The Detour of Theory. London:Verso. 
 
Ferrarin, Alfredo 2001. Hegel and Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
347 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 1970. Science of Rights. Tr. A. E. Kroeger. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. [1797]. 
 
Frost, Bryan-Paul and Howse, Robert 2000.  Introductory Essay. The Plausibility of the 
Universal and Homogenous State. In  A. Kojève, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right. Tr. 
B.-P. Frost and R. Howse. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1-27. 
 
Gauthier, Jeffrey A. 1997. Hegel and the Feminist Social Criticism. Justice, Recognition, and 
the Feminine. New York: State University of New York Press.  
 
Grosz, Elizabeth 1989. Sexual Subversions. Three French Feminists. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
 
Grosz, Elisabeth 1994. Experimental Desire: Rethinking Queer Subjectivity. In J. Copjec (ed.) 
Supposing the Subject. Verso: London and New York.   
 
Hutcheon, Linda 1985. A Theory of Parody. The teachings of Twentieth Century Art Forms. 
The University Printing House: Cambridge. 
 
Hutcheon, Linda 1988. A Poetics of Postmodernism. History, Theory and Fiction.  Routledge:  
New York and London.  
 
Hutcheon, Linda 1994. Irony´s edge. The theory and Politics of irony. Routledge, New York 
and London 
 
Hutchings, Kimberley 2003. Hegel and the Feminist Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Ikäheimo, Heikki 2000. Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity. A study on Hegel’s 
Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1830). Jyväskylä: Publications in Philosophy 
67. University of Jyväskylä. 
 
Ikäheimo, Heikki  2003. Tunnustus, subjektiviteetti ja inhimillinen elämänmuoto. Tutkimuksia 
Hegelistä ja persoonien välisistä tunnustussuhteista. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä Studies in 
Education, Psychology and Social Research. University of Jyväskylä.  
 
Inwood, M. J. 1983. Hegel. London: Routledge. 
 
Inwood, M. J. 1995.  A Hegel Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Irigaray, Luce 1985. Speculum of the Other Woman. Tr. Gillian C.Gill. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
  
Irigaray, Luce 1985. This Sex which is not One. Tr. Catherine Porter. Cornell University 
Press. Ithaca, New York.  
 
Irigaray, Luce 1993. Sexes and Genealogies.  Tr. Gillian C. Gill. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
348 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kant, Immanuel 1959. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Tr. P. G. Lucas. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. [1783] 
 
Kant, Immanuel 1983. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Tr. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Co. 
 
Kant, Immanuel 1993.   Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. and ed. Vassilis Politis. London: Dent. 
[1781/1787}. 
 
Kennedy, Ellen  2004. The Constitutional Failure. Carl Schmitt in Weimar. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Kleinhans, Chuck 1994. Taking Out the Trash.  Camp and the politics of Parody.  In M.Meyer 
(ed.) The Politics and Poetics of Camp. Routledge: New York and London . 
 
Knowles, Dudley 2002. Hegel and the Philosophy of Right. London: Routledge. 
 
Kristeva, Julia 1982. Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection.  New York; Columbia Univ. 
Press. 
 
Kristeva, Julia  1984. Revolution in Poetic Language. Tr. Margaret Waller. New York: 
Columbia University Press. [1974]. 
 
Lacan, Jacques  2006. Écrits. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto 1990. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1996. Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony. In  Mouffe, Chantal (ed.),  
Deconstruction and Pragmatism. New York:Routledge, 47-67. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto. 2000a. Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution 
of Political Logics. In Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto and Zizek ,Slavoj, Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality.  London: Verso, 44-89. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto. 2000b. Structure, History and the Political. In Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto 
and Zizek, Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London:Verso, 182-212. 
 
Lloyd, Moya  2007. Judith Butler: From Norms to Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Loizidou, Elena. 2007. Judith Butler. Ethics, Law, Politics. Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish. 
 
Lukács, György 1972. History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics. 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. [1923]. 
 
Man Ling Lee, Theresa. 2001. Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Politics of Representation. 
Women & Politics 22:3, 35-57. 
 
Meyer, Moe 1994. Reclaiming the Discourse of Camp. In  M.Meyer (ed.) The Politics and 
349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poetics of Camp. Routledge: New York and London. 
 
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2003. A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Norris, Andrew. 2002. Against Antagonism: On Ernesto Laclau’s Political Thought. 
Constellations 9:4, 554-573. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha 1999. The Professor of Parody. The New Republic 02/22/1999, Vol.220 
Issue 8, 37-45. 
 
Pateman, Carole 1988. The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Pippin, Robert B. 1989. Hegel’s Idealism.The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rasch, William. 2000. Conflict as a Vocation. Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. 
Theory, Culture & Society 17:6, 1-32. 
 
Rorty, Richard. 1996. A Response to Laclau. In Mouffe, Chantal (ed.), Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism. New York:Routledge, 69-76. 
 
Rosen, Stanley. 1974, G.W.F. Hegel An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth. 2006. The Mirror Stage; an Obliterated Archive. In Rabaté, Jean 
Michel (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Lacan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
25-33  
 
Salih, Sara 2002. Judith Butler. New York: Routledge. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2001. Being and Nothingness. A phenomenological essay on ontology. Tr. 
Hazel Barnes. New York: Citadel Press. [1943]. 
 
Scheuerman, William E. 1994. Between the Norm and the Exception.The Frankfurt School 
and the rule of law. Cambridge (Mass.):MIT Press. 
 
Schmitt, Carl. 1976. The Concept of the Political. Tr. George Schwab. New Brunswick, 
[1932]. 
 
Schmitt, Carl 1985. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Tr. Ellen Kennedy. Cambridge 
(Ma): The MIT Press. [1926] 
 
Schmitt, Carl 1988.  Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.   
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. [1922] 
 
Spinoza, Benedict 1955 The Ethics. In On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, 
& Correspondence. Tr. R. H. M. Elwes. New York: Dover. [1675] 
350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tanesini, Alessandra. 2001. In Search of Community. Mouffe, Wittgenstein and Cavell. 
Radical Philosophy 110., 12-19. 
 
Taylor, Charles 1975. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, Charles 1979. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Weber, Max. 1994. The Profession and Vocation of Politics. In Lassman, Peter & Speirs, 
Ronald (toim.), Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 309—369 
[1919]. 
 
Weir, Allison  1996. Sacrificial Logics. Feminist theory and the critique of identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Ver Eecke, Wilfried 1983. Hegel as Lacan’s Source for Necessity in Psychoanalytic Theory. 
In Smith, Joseph. and Kerrigan, William (eds.) Interpreting Lacan. Psychiatry and 
Humanities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 113-138. 
 
Williams, Robert R. 1992. Recognition. Fichte and Hegel on the Other. New York: State 
University of New York Press.  
 
Williams, Robert R. 1997. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Wood; Allen W. 1990. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Zizek, Slavoj 1999. The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: 
Verso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
